Filipp Ivanovich Golikov

Филипп Иванович Голиков
Soviet Union state institutions Marxism–Leninism Soviet Union Russia 1900.7.15.–1980.7.29. ○ Natural causes

The GRU chief who held the intelligence yet missed the invasion, and fought his way back to marshal

On 20 March 1941, Golikov reported to Stalin: 'Rumours and documents speaking of the inevitability of war against the USSR this spring must be regarded as disinformation from British and perhaps even German intelligence.' Ninety-four days later, Barbarossa began.

A peasant-born political commissar in the Civil War, he spent 11 years in army political organs before switching to command after the Frunze Academy. Appointed GRU chief in July 1940, he assessed the spring 1941 intelligence on Germany's imminent invasion as Anglo-American disinformation, enabling the strategic surprise of Barbarossa. In the war he led the 10th Army at Moscow and the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts; his January 1943 offensives crushed 25 enemy divisions, but the loss of Kharkov that March ended his frontline career. After heading the Main Personnel Directorate, he became chief of GlavPUR in 1958, enforcing party control over the armed forces under Khrushchev, and was made Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1961.

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

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How did a village commissar become a commander in the years of the purge?

Filipp Golikov was born in July 1900 in the village of Borisova in Kamyshlov district, Perm Governorate (now Kurgan Oblast). His father Ivan had trained as a medical orderly at the Tobolsk garrison hospital and worked as a village feldsher. Golikov finished the seven-class gymnasium in Kamyshlov on a district scholarship. In April 1918 he and his father joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and a month later he volunteered for the Red Army.

In the Civil War he fought in the Urals with the volunteer "Red Eagles" regiment and soon became a correspondent for divisional and army newspapers and an agitator. Political commissars and agitators explained the aims of the revolution to the soldiers and built party organisations in the units. In 1919 he worked on village propaganda in the political department of the 51st Rifle Division as it pursued Kolchak's Whites into Siberia, and spent months ill with typhus.

After the Civil War he served another eleven years in the army's political organs, as a divisional information chief and head of agitation and propaganda in military district political directorates, and in 1929 he completed the higher command refresher course. In 1931, at his own request, he switched to command and became a regimental commander, finishing the Frunze Military Academy by correspondence in 1933. He then rose quickly to command a division, a mechanised brigade and, in 1937, the 45th Mechanised Corps in the Kiev Military District. He was a commander with a long political record and little operational experience.

His fast promotion was bound up with the purge of the Red Army. In 1937–1938 Marshal Tukhachevsky and a great many other commanders were arrested and shot, leaving vacancies. In January 1938 Golikov became a member of the Military Council of the Belorussian Military District, and English-language scholarship holds that he was sent there to oversee the purge of its commanders. The future marshal Georgy Zhukov was investigated by him at this time and is said never to have forgiven him. Yet Golikov himself was abruptly removed that year and dismissed from the army. According to Russian sources, he survived because Defence Commissar Voroshilov refused to sign the sanction for his arrest, and he was soon reinstated.

In November 1938 he took command of the Vinnitsa Army Group in the Kiev Special Military District, which became the 6th Army during the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939 and occupied Lvov. He also served in the Winter War of 1939–1940. In the same period he was a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a member of the bureau of the Belorussian party's Central Committee. A man who had overseen a purge, then in the same year nearly became its victim, then rose again to high command: his career shows how precarious the position of Red Army officers was in these years.

As chief of military intelligence, how did he handle the warnings of a German invasion?

In July 1940 Golikov was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff and head of the Red Army's Main Intelligence Directorate, the military intelligence service usually called the GRU, which ran espionage networks abroad. He had no experience of intelligence work. Five of his predecessors had been, or were about to be, shot, and most scholars believe that the man he replaced, Ivan Proskurov, was dismissed for speaking too frankly about the army's unpreparedness. Stalin himself reportedly said of Golikov in February 1941: "As an intelligence officer he is inexperienced, naive. An intelligence officer ought to be like the devil, believing no one, not even himself."

In the spring of 1941 warnings of a German invasion poured into Moscow, from sources inside Germany, from agents such as Richard Sorge in Tokyo, and from the British and American governments. Every seven to ten days Golikov sent special reports to nine to thirteen recipients, among them Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko and Zhukov. But the comprehensive assessment he signed and circulated on 20 March 1941 concluded that rumours and documents saying war against the USSR was inevitable that spring "must be regarded as disinformation coming from British and perhaps even German intelligence". He expected Germany to attack the Soviet Union only after defeating Britain and concluding peace with it. In May, even while reporting that German divisions on the border had increased from 70 to 107, he forecast that Germany's next operations would be against Britain, at Gibraltar, in North Africa and in the Near East.

His directorate did not, however, suppress the warnings. Counting only declassified documents, it sent the Soviet leadership 95 reports between July 1940 and June 1941 on the German build-up and invasion preparations. Those of April to June gave the number and location of divisions and the date of attack, 22 June, named by about fifteen reliable sources. Its information on new German weapons was also quite detailed. The problem was the frame in which he interpreted and presented the information, and how the leadership received it. Most Russian historians hold that he presented as reliable only information that matched Stalin's views and labelled reports of the invasion date unconfirmed or untrustworthy. Military intelligence also failed to identify the assembly areas and composition of any of the German strike groups.

Judgements of this failure differ. Some see Golikov as an opportunist who knew the truth but tailored it to Stalin's expectations. Others stress that under a Stalin who trusted the 1939 non-aggression pact and suspected Britain of trying to sow discord, an intelligence chief who had seen his predecessors' fate could hardly have drawn a different conclusion. English-language scholarship concludes that it is hard to tell whether he did not believe the intelligence or Stalin did not want to hear it. Either way, the result was the strategic surprise of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941 and the enormous losses of the war's opening phase. Golikov remained head of the directorate for some months after the war began.

What victories and failures did he have in the war against Germany?

When the war began, Golikov was made head of the Soviet military mission to Britain and the United States in July 1941, charged with securing weapons and supplies from the new allies and asking for a second front. He went to London in July and met President Roosevelt in Washington at the end of the month. On 31 August the first British Arctic convoy reached Arkhangelsk with aircraft and ammunition, an achievement Russian sources credit to him.

Returning in October, he took command of the 10th Army, then forming in Penza region. In the December counteroffensive before Moscow it drove back Guderian's Second Panzer Army south of Tula and retook ten towns. In spring 1942 he became commander of the Bryansk Front. But during the German summer offensive of June and July his front collapsed, and the Germans reached Voronezh and the middle Don, gaining a favourable springboard towards Stalingrad. Even Soviet historians judge his command in this period a failure.

Demoted, he commanded the 1st Guards Army near Stalingrad and then became deputy commander of the Stalingrad Front under Yeryomenko. Khrushchev, then a member of the front's military council, wrote in his memoirs that when the headquarters moved east of the Volga and Golikov was ordered to stay behind in the city, he was terror-stricken and kept repeating "Stalingrad is doomed". Khrushchev also recalled that Golikov wrote to Stalin disparaging Yeryomenko and him; it is the recollection of a man who disliked him and should be read as such. Stalin accepted Golikov's version and in October 1942 again gave him the Voronezh Front.

This second command was the peak of his military career. According to Vasilevsky's memoir The Cause of My Whole Life (1978), Vasilevsky and Georgy Zhukov, sent as representatives of the Stavka (the Soviet supreme command), worked out the Ostrogozhsk–Rossosh operation with Golikov at the front headquarters at Anna and Bobrov in early January 1943. The main blow was aimed at the weakest link of Axis Army Group B, the Hungarian Second Army in its centre, and the Stavka gave Golikov Pavel Rybalko's 3rd Tank Army. In their telegrams to Stalin Golikov appears under the cover name "Filippov", and Vasilevsky went round the corps with him checking the preparations.

In the operation of 13 to 27 January his front destroyed the main body of the Hungarian Second Army, the Italian Alpine Corps and the German XXIV Panzer Corps, taking some 86,000 prisoners by Soviet figures. Vasilevsky summed it up as a breakthrough on a 250 km front and an advance of 140 km in fifteen days. Golikov was promoted to colonel general on 19 January. In the Voronezh–Kastornoye operation that followed his front encircled part of the German Second Army and retook Voronezh on 25 January. In the Kharkov operation that began on 2 February, the 40th Army from the north, the 3rd Tank Army from the south and the 69th Army from the east closed round Kharkov and retook it on 16 February. The Hungarian Second Army was all but destroyed in this winter campaign, which Hungary remembers as the worst military disaster in its history.

But he tried to push his exhausted troops on towards the Dnieper, and in February and March Manstein's counterstroke retook Kharkov and Belgorod. Vasilevsky did not lay this failure on the front commanders alone. "Both the Stavka and the General Staff made the same mistake as the commanders of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts," he wrote: believing the enemy beaten, they did not foresee a counteroffensive, and the Stavka even widened the fronts' plans without reinforcing them. On 1 March Golikov decided to go over to temporary defence on the Kharkov axis, and the Stavka approved the next day. When the Germans opened the second stage of their counteroffensive against the Voronezh Front on 4 March, the Stavka rushed in the 21st Army, Mikhail Katukov's 1st Tank Army and the 64th Army, but Kharkov fell again in mid-March and Belgorod on the 18th. Vasilevsky insisted that the retreat showed "no traces of confusion or disorder".

In March 1943 Golikov was recalled to Moscow and never served at the front again. Vasilevsky's memoir says only that Nikolai Vatutin replaced him and that Golikov was placed at the Stavka's disposal, giving no reason; English-language biographies say that Zhukov insisted on his dismissal. A career that collapsed a few weeks after victory was also part of a wider pattern of early 1943, when Soviet overconfidence in the offensive was punished by a German counterblow.

After leaving the front, how did he come to control the army's personnel and politics?

After leaving the front, Golikov became Deputy People's Commissar of Defence for personnel in April 1943, in effect head of the Main Personnel Directorate, a post he held until 1950. It dealt with the appointment and promotion of officers and suited a man with his long political record.

In October 1944 he was also made the Council of People's Commissars' plenipotentiary for repatriation, responsible for bringing home millions of Soviet citizens, forced labourers (Ostarbeiter) deported to Germany, prisoners of war and others. His agency began with 200 staff in Moscow; at its peak in July to October 1945 some 140,000–150,000 people were involved, counting regional staff and other ministries. About 200 assembly, transit and screening camps were set up abroad alone, and returnees were vetted by the counterintelligence agency SMERSH and the NKVD. In the Cold War West it was claimed that most returnees were punished at once; research since the archives opened shows that 58 percent were sent home, 33.5 percent were drafted into the army or labour battalions and 6.5 percent went to NKVD camps. Officers and leading civilian collaborators were sentenced to the Gulag and rank-and-file collaborators exiled to special settlements, and many returnees bore a social stigma for life. The forced return, agreed with Allied governments, of people who did not want to go back remains a matter of controversy.

After the war he served Stalin's purposes in political attacks within the army. In June 1946, when Stalin resented the praise heaped on the victorious Zhukov, Golikov presented a detailed case against him at a special session of the Supreme Military Council, and Zhukov was relegated to the Odessa Military District. In 1949–1950, in connection with the Leningrad affair, the purge of the Leningrad party leadership, he is reported to have helped engineer the dismissal of Iosif Shikin, head of the army's Main Political Directorate.

In 1950 he took command of the Separate Mechanised Army, and in 1956 he became head of the Military Academy of Armoured Troops. When Khrushchev brought Zhukov down a second time in October 1957, Golikov was made head of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy in January 1958. Formally part of the Defence Ministry, the directorate functioned as a department of the party Central Committee, directing party organisations and political education in the forces. His task was to restore party control over the military, which was thought to have weakened under Zhukov. In 1961 he became a Marshal of the Soviet Union and a full member of the Central Committee.

In May 1962 he was dismissed, officially "for health reasons and retirement". Some English-language accounts speculate that he had opposed Khrushchev's decision to send nuclear missiles to Cuba, but no document supporting this has been produced. He then served as an inspector in the Defence Ministry's Group of Inspectors General, died in Moscow on 29 July 1980 and was buried in Novodevichy Cemetery. His career of intelligence failure, ups and downs at the front, and service as an instrument against rivals under both Stalin and Khrushchev shows how closely politics and soldiering were entwined in the Soviet military elite.