Unternehmen Barbarossa · 1941.06.22–12.05

Operation Barbarossa

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The code name for Nazi Germany's plan and operation to invade the Soviet Union, named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. Launched on 22 June 1941, it was the largest military offensive in human history, with some 3.8 million Axis troops attacking across a 2,900 km front. The name signified more than a military code: it embodied the Nazi ideological war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg) aimed at seizing Lebensraum and eradicating Judeo-Bolshevism. Though inflicting catastrophic losses on the Red Army in the opening months, the operation was halted at the outskirts of Moscow in December 1941, marking the decisive turning point at which Nazi Germany lost the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front.

In depth

Origins and Name

The operation was named after the 12th-century Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa ('red beard'). In German Romantic nationalist tradition, Barbarossa was the legendary emperor sleeping with his knights in a cave in the Kyffhäuser mountains, destined to awaken at Germany's hour of greatest need and restore the nation to its former glory. The invasion was originally code-named Operation Otto (after Emperor Otto the Great's eastern campaigns), but Hitler changed it to Barbarossa in December 1940. For Hitler, the name signified his belief that the conquest of the Soviet Union would usher in the Nazi 'Thousand-Year Reich.'

How It Was Planned

Hitler began to think of attacking the Soviet Union right after the victory over France in June 1940, and on 31 July at the Berghof he announced his decision to his senior generals. According to the diary of Franz Halder, Chief of the Army General Staff, he said that to crush "England's last hope" Russia had to be "finished off" from the spring of 1941, that the attack made sense only as a lightning campaign "in one go", and that it must aim at destroying Russia's vital strength. But the decision was not Hitler's alone. Rolf-Dieter Müller, analysing Halder's diary critically, showed that Halder had already been "anticipating" a plan for an attack on the Soviet Union since June 1940. On 29 July Halder gave Major General Erich Marcks the task of drafting it.

Marcks's "Operational Draft East" of 5 August put the weight north of the Pripyat Marshes and made the main thrust a drive on Moscow through the "Smolensk gate", the land bridge of Minsk, Orsha and Smolensk. He held that the loss of Moscow would tear the Soviet Union apart; the troops would then turn south to take the food and raw materials of Ukraine and the Donets basin. Subtracting forces tied down against Japan, Turkey and Finland, Marcks put the Red Army facing Germany at about 96 infantry divisions and reckoned that the final line could be reached in 9 to 17 weeks. In the Wehrmacht high command (OKW) Bernhard von Loßberg submitted a separate study on 15 September, and Friedrich Paulus, Halder's new deputy, reconciled the drafts and held war games in November and December.

On 5 December 1940 Hitler approved the army high command's (OKH) plan, and on 18 December, in Directive No. 21, he ordered preparations "to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign". The final objective was a line from the Volga to Arkhangelsk. Hitler changed Loßberg's draft so that Army Group Centre, after scattering the enemy in front of it, would first turn north to destroy the forces facing Army Group North before driving on Moscow. This difference with the army high command, which wanted to go straight for Moscow, erupted in the command quarrel of August 1941. On 3 February 1941 Halder presented the army deployment directive based on the order to Hitler, and the attack date, set for May, slipped to 22 June after the delays in the invasion of Greece.

What Forces Took Part

Germany committed 153 divisions to Barbarossa, among them 104 infantry and 19 panzer divisions. They had 6,867 armoured vehicles, of which 3,350–3,795 were tanks, 2,770–4,389 aircraft (65 percent of the Luftwaffe), about 600,000 motor vehicles and 625,000–700,000 horses. Finland slated 14 divisions and Romania 13 divisions and eight brigades, and 3.8 million Axis troops stood on a front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea.

Ideological Character

Operation Barbarossa was designed not as a conventional military campaign but as a racial war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg). As early as February 1939, Hitler told his commanders that the next war would be 'purely a war of Weltanschauungen... totally a war of peoples, a racial war.' Nazi ideology cast the Soviet Union as a land of Untermenschen ruled by Jewish Bolshevik conspirators, and this was operationalized in Generalplan Ost, which envisioned the deportation, enslavement, and extermination of Slavic populations. Wehrmacht commanders were complicit in this ideological character: General Erich Hoepner of the 4th Panzer Group declared the war 'an essential part of the German people's struggle for existence (Daseinskampf)' that 'must aim at the annihilation of today's Russia.'

On 30 March 1941 Hitler told 250 generals and senior officers that the coming war was a "struggle of world views" whose aim was to root out communism for all time through "the annihilation of the Bolshevik commissars and the communist intelligentsia". No one objected. The Wehrmacht high command turned this into orders. The decree of 13 May on the exercise of military jurisdiction in the "Barbarossa" area freed soldiers who committed crimes against civilians from mandatory prosecution; it was followed by the guidelines for the conduct of the troops in Russia of 19 May, the Commissar Order of 6 June, and Hitler's special task for Himmler, under which the SS and SD Einsatzgruppen were to murder the "Jewish-Bolshevik" population behind the front. A meeting of state secretaries on 2 May recorded, as the result of talks with the economic generals, that "without doubt tens of millions of people will starve to death if we take out of the country what we need": the so-called Hunger Plan.

Guderian wrote in his memoirs that he judged the jurisdiction decree would destroy discipline and sent it back to Berlin without passing it to his divisions, and that the Commissar Order never reached his panzer group at all. Yet General Joachim Lemelsen, a corps commander in his panzer group, is documented as saying that commissars among the prisoners had to be taken aside and shot at once and that the order came directly from Guderian, and Guderian himself reported to the OKW that his panzer group had "shunted off" 170 commissars by early August. Felix Römer, having examined the records of all front-line units, concluded that the killing of commissars was by no means carried out reluctantly but met with "profound approval" in considerable parts of the eastern army.

Military Outline

The invasion was launched by three army groups totaling some 3.8 million troops across a 2,900 km front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Army Group North (Leeb) drove through the Baltic states toward Leningrad; Army Group Centre (Bock) thrust toward Moscow; Army Group South (Rundstedt) attacked into Ukraine. In the opening months, the Red Army suffered millions of casualties and prisoners while retreating, and German forces captured Kiev, Smolensk, and Kharkov and laid siege to Leningrad.

The great battles of July to September are covered in Battle of Smolensk (1941) and Battle of Kiev (1941), and the attack on Moscow from October in Operation Typhoon (1941) and the Battle of Moscow.

Why It Failed

Every German plan badly underestimated the Red Army. Heinrich Uhlig pointed out that all the Barbarossa plans assumed only a small Soviet numerical superiority and took it for granted that the trained reserves, estimated at 8 to 12 million, could be ignored once the lightning campaign succeeded. In fact the Soviet Union had 14 million trained reservists, and by the end of 1941 it put 800 division-sized formations and 45 new armies into the field from them and from the remnants of shattered units. David Glantz counts this as a main reason for Barbarossa's failure. Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans themselves realised they had grossly underestimated Soviet strength.

Supply did not hold either. Of the 600,000 trucks available on 22 June, only 135,000 were still available on 15 November, and because ammunition and fuel had priority, food and winter clothing fell behind. Leo Stern saw the recklessness of German strategy in throwing 80 percent of the forces meant for offensive operations into battle in the first weeks and months without forming reserves. Whether the delay caused by the Balkan campaign was decisive is also debated: William Shirer argued that the weeks lost jeopardised Barbarossa, while Antony Beevor wrote in 2012 that most historians accept "it made little difference".

After the war German generals laid the blame on Hitler. Guderian wrote in his memoirs that the Balkan campaign delayed the move east, but that "even more fatal was the underestimation of the enemy's strength", adding that Hitler believed neither the reports of the military attaché in Moscow, Köstring, nor anyone else. According to Rolf-Dieter Müller, Halder, his fellow Barbarossa planner Reinhard Gehlen (later head of the Federal Intelligence Service) and Halder's chief of operations Adolf Heusinger (later Inspector General of the Bundeswehr) tried out of personal interest to "present Hitler as solely responsible for the war in the East and for the failure of a supposedly brilliant campaign plan". Müller points out, however, that fear of a Red Army attack played no part at any stage of German planning from 1938 to 1941; the planners instead counted on Soviet weakness and a victory within weeks.

Outcome and Legacy

On 5 December 1941, the German offensive stalled at the outskirts of Moscow, and the Soviet counteroffensive that began the next day pushed German forces back 100–250 km. The failure of Barbarossa was the first major defeat of the German army on land and shattered the myth of Blitzkrieg invincibility. German forces never again possessed the capacity for simultaneous offensive action across the entire Eastern Front, and subsequent operations, Case Blue (1942) and Operation Citadel (Kursk, 1943), never matched Barbarossa's scale.

Over the whole Eastern Front the Axis captured some five million Red Army soldiers, of whom roughly 3.3 million were deliberately starved to death or otherwise killed. The prisoners of 1941 were marched hundreds of kilometres without food and held on fenced open ground, and about two million of them died before January 1942. Einsatzgruppen death squads and collaborators murdered over a million Soviet Jews as part of the Holocaust. The code name 'Barbarossa' endures as shorthand for the largest war of aggression (and racial annihilation) of the twentieth century.

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Sources

  1. Wikipedia (EN) comprehensive account of the operation's naming, scale, ideological character, military course, and outcome
  2. Wikipedia (RU) Russian-language article providing the Soviet/Russian historiographical perspective on the operation
  3. britannica.com Britannica entry confirming the code name origin, force strength, and the operation's role as a turning point in World War II
  4. Wikipedia (EN)
  5. de.wikipedia.org
  6. de.wikipedia.org
  7. de.wikipedia.org
  8. de.wikipedia.org
  9. militera.lib.ru
  10. Wikipedia (EN)
  11. de.wikipedia.org
  12. Wikipedia (EN)