Blitzkrieg · Concept

Blitzkrieg

전격전

A combined-arms maneuver warfare doctrine employed by the German Wehrmacht in the early phase of World War II, concentrating tanks, motorized infantry, and close air support on a narrow front to achieve rapid breakthrough, deep penetration, and encirclement (Kesselschlacht) aimed at a swift, decisive victory. The term itself was a journalistic coinage of the Western press rather than an official Wehrmacht doctrinal term; within the German military it was referred to as Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare).

In depth

Origins and Terminology

The term 'Blitzkrieg' (lightning war) first appeared in the German military periodical Deutsche Wehr in 1935, but it was never an official Wehrmacht doctrinal term. After the September 1939 invasion of Poland, British and American journalists popularized the word to describe the German army's rapid operational successes. Hitler himself remarked in a November 1941 speech: 'I have never used the word Blitzkrieg, because it is a very silly word.' Within the German military, the preferred term was Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare).

Was "blitzkrieg" a German doctrine?

The origin of the word is obscure. According to German Wikipedia, a 1935 article in the military journal Deutsche Wehr used it in an economic and strategic sense: states short of food and raw materials should try to settle a war at a stroke by throwing in their whole strength from the start; tanks and aircraft did not come into it. A 1938 article in the Militär-Wochenblatt also used it for a swift strategic knockout, and in the same year Fritz Sternberg, a Jewish Marxist economist who had fled Nazi Germany, wrote in Die deutsche Kriegsstärke that Germany lacked the economic strength for a long war but might win a short one (a "Blitzkrieg"). The German popular press took the word up only after the fall of France in 1940, nine months after the British press. Guderian himself wrote in his memoirs that once the swift strikes at the start of the war had brought some successes, "our enemies began to speak of 'blitzkrieg'". After his remark of November 1941, Hitler in January 1942 dismissed the word as "Italian phraseology".

No manual or regulation of the German army or air force bore the title "blitzkrieg". German commanders spoke of Bewegungskrieg (war of movement), a Prussian tradition since the nineteenth century, resting on the Schwerpunkt principle of concentrating force at the decisive point and on Auftragstaktik, mission command that sets the goal and leaves the method to subordinates. In the late 1970s the British historian Matthew Cooper rejected the idea that the German army had a "blitzkrieg doctrine", and Richard Overy criticised the theory of a "blitzkrieg economy" in which Germany was said to have planned its economy for short wars only.

The most widely read study in this debate is The Blitzkrieg Legend (Blitzkrieg-Legende, 1995) by the German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser. In Frieser's account the OKW, created in 1938, prepared for a long war of exhaustion rather than a decisive battle, and the plan for the 1940 campaign in France did not grow out of any such concept but was improvised. In 1939–40 roughly half of German soldiers had only a few weeks' training, and the army had about 120,000 vehicles against the French army's 300,000. Only after the plan unexpectedly succeeded did the General Staff come to believe that a war of annihilation was still feasible, a belief carried into the Balkan campaign and Operation Barbarossa. Frieser treats "blitzkrieg" as a propaganda slogan rather than a military term, and sums up the 1940 victory as the use of the latest technology according to traditional principles, with "the right units in the right place at the right time".

It was postwar writing that hardened blitzkrieg into a finished doctrine. The literature of the early 1950s turned it into a historical doctrine bearing the signatures of Basil Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian. The British military commentator Liddell Hart asked Guderian by letter to credit his influence, and the English and German editions of Guderian's memoirs differ at that point. The memoirs cast Guderian as the founder of the panzer arm and of blitzkrieg, but the panzer force was built by many officers, Oswald Lutz among them, and the concept had its roots in an older German tradition of manoeuvre warfare. Some historians nonetheless still treat blitzkrieg as an operational doctrine of the German armed forces and a strategic concept of the Nazi leadership, and the word lives on in popular history.

Operational Principles

The core of Blitzkrieg was the concentration of panzer divisions and motorized infantry on a narrow front, supported by close air support (particularly dive bombers), to achieve a breakthrough. Armored columns would then drive deep into the enemy rear, bypassing strong points (to be reduced by follow-on infantry) and targeting command centers and logistics hubs. Cut off from communications and supply, encircled enemy forces were destroyed in a Kesselschlacht ('cauldron battle'). The strategic premise was a swift knockout blow before the adversary could fully mobilize.

Historical Application

Blitzkrieg achieved dramatic successes in the Polish campaign (36 days, September–October 1939) and the Battle of France (44 days, May–June 1940). However, its limits emerged during Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union beginning June 1941. The sheer geographical depth of the Eastern Front, the Soviet evacuation of industry (1941), and the USSR's capacity to mobilize human and material reserves slowed the German advance. The Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow (December 1941) marked the first major defeat of a German ground offensive and shattered the myth of Blitzkrieg invincibility. The strategic initiative passed irreversibly to the Red Army at Stalingrad and Kursk.

The Soviet Counter: Deep Operation

Blitzkrieg's doctrinal counterpart was Soviet Deep Operation (глубокая операция), developed in the 1930s by Triandafillov, Tukhachevsky, and others. Where Blitzkrieg relied on a single breakthrough axis, Deep Operation aimed at simultaneous strikes across the entire tactical and operational depth of the enemy defense, using multiple breakthrough sectors and second-echelon forces to collapse the front before operational reserves could respond. This approach proved particularly effective against Blitzkrieg and became the foundation of Red Army offensives from 1943 onward. The two are often confused, but deep operations were a theory the Red Army adopted as official doctrine in the 1930s, whereas "blitzkrieg" never entered a German manual.

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Sources

  1. Wikipedia (EN) term origin, operational principles, historiography; the term was journalistic, not official Wehrmacht doctrine; Bewegungskrieg as internal German term; Hitler's 1941 dismissal of the word
  2. Wikipedia (RU) Russian-language article confirming the concept's evolution from Moltke the Elder through Schlieffen Plan to WWII application; failure on Eastern Front due to Soviet territorial depth and industrial evacuation
  3. encyclopedia.ushmm.org US Holocaust Memorial Museum entry confirming combined-arms definition, list of campaigns 1939–1941, failure against USSR at Moscow and Stalingrad
  4. de.wikipedia.org
  5. Wikipedia (EN)
  6. militera.lib.ru
  7. Wikipedia (EN)
  8. de.wikipedia.org