Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky

Tukhachevsky's reputation can only be understood by holding together his mobile victories in the Civil War and his defeat in the Polish war of 1920. As commander of the Western Front, he led the July offensive that captured Minsk, Vilna, and Grodno, but the advance outran reconnaissance and supply. In the battle for Warsaw he assumed that the main Polish forces were withdrawing north of the capital, planned a northwestern envelopment, and left the southern flank thinly covered. On 16 August the Polish army counterattacked from the Wieprz River, broke through that flank, and drove the Western Front into a confused retreat amid encirclements.

The defeat cannot be reduced to one man's incompetence or to simple treachery. The Soviet high command underestimated Poland's will and military capacity, while political expectations of revolution spreading westward became entangled with operational objectives. Tukhachevsky's own bold maneuver was undertaken with inadequate information and too few reserves, and disputes over turning Southwestern Front forces northward compounded the crisis. Warsaw did not disprove the potential of the deep-operations ideas he later developed; it exposed the limit that operational art cannot work without integrated intelligence, logistics, and command.

The argument over responsibility continued until 1937, but it could not justify the fabricated espionage charges of the closed trial. The experience helps explain why Tukhachevsky and fellow theorists placed greater emphasis on sustaining a breakthrough, logistics, and coordination across fronts in a large-scale war. His legacy is therefore not that of an infallible military genius, but of a commander whose theory and practice revealed the tension between a revolutionary state's political expectations and the material conditions of modern war.

On 5 March 1921 Tukhachevsky was appointed commander of the 7th Army sent to suppress the revolt of the Kronstadt garrison; the revolt was put down by 18 March. In 1921 the RSFSR was engulfed by anti-Soviet uprisings, the largest in European Russia being the peasant rising in Tambov gubernia. According to the plan Tukhachevsky developed, it was mainly suppressed by the end of July 1921.

The documentation of this campaign rests on orders he signed himself. His Order No. 0116 of 12 June 1921 directed that the forests where \"bandits\" were hiding be cleared with poison gases, with the artillery inspector to supply the necessary cylinders of poison gas and specialists. The hostage machinery is recorded in orders of the VTsIK Plenipotentiary Commission that he co-signed with Antonov-Ovseyenko. Order No. 116 of 23 June 1921 prescribed cordoning a volost, seizing 60-100 prominent hostages under a state of siege, and shooting the hostages before the assembled population if the inhabitants did not hand over the \"bandits\" and weapons within two hours. Order No. 189 of 9 July 1921, signed by Antonov-Ovseyenko as chairman of the commission with Tukhachevsky as commander of forces, required taking at least five hostages from villages near important bridges, to be shot immediately if a bridge were damaged.

An archival qualification belongs with this record. Archival documents support the confident statement that the chemical warfare in this campaign was limited to a few gas-shell bombardments with a negligible number of shells filled with a tactical chloropicrin-based mixture; no gas-cylinder attacks were carried out for lack of trained personnel, and no gas-poisoned persons were found. In 1921 chemical warfare was not yet a war crime: the Geneva Protocol was signed on 17 June 1925, entered into force on 8 February 1928, and was ratified by the USSR in April 1928.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky, from an impoverished noble family, fought as a Guards officer in the First World War, was taken prisoner, and after five escape attempts made it back to Russia, joining the Bolsheviks in 1918. An army commander in the Civil War at twenty-five, he helped rout Kolchak's forces on the Eastern Front and earned the nickname the Red Napoleon. In the Polish war of 1920 he suffered the defeat before Warsaw, and in 1921 it was he who directed the suppression of the Kronstadt revolt and the Tambov peasant rising.

Tukhachevsky's historical legacy lies in interwar military theory. With Triandafillov and others he developed the theory of deep operations: combining tanks, aviation, airborne troops and motorized infantry to break through the enemy's defences and then strike and paralyse the entire operational depth simultaneously. As deputy defence commissar for armaments he drove the creation of the Soviet tank forces, the air force and the world's first airborne troops, and in 1935 he became one of the first five Marshals of the Soviet Union.

The Red Army field regulations of 1936, PU-36, enshrined his theory as official doctrine. He was also among the earliest and most persistent military voices warning of Nazi Germany's rearmament. After he vanished in 1937 deep operations theory was for a time taboo, but what the Red Army executed at Stalingrad, in Bagration and in Manchuria was in the end the way of war he and his colleagues had designed.

On 22 May 1937, just after being demoted to command the Volga Military District, Tukhachevsky was arrested. The interrogation was brutal: his confession protocols, verified in the archives, carry bloodstains. On 11 June he was placed before a closed military court with seven of the Red Army's highest commanders, including Yakir and Uborevich, charged with espionage for Germany and plotting a military coup. On the bench sat fellow marshals and generals, most of whom soon met the same fate. All eight were sentenced to death that night and shot before dawn the next day.

A story long circulated around the Tukhachevsky case: that documents forged by Heydrich's Nazi intelligence service reached Stalin through Czechoslovak president Benes and triggered the purge. The Nazi forgery operation itself was real, but post-archival research does not support the story. The forged documents appear nowhere in the actual investigation files; the case was built entirely on confessions extracted by the NKVD; and suspicion and investigation of the military leadership were already under way before the dossier is supposed to have arrived. The scholarship concludes that the purge was driven not by an external deception but by Stalin's distrust of the army's autonomy.

The military purge that followed took three of the five marshals and a large share of commanders from corps level upward, leaving the Red Army with a gulf of command experience on the eve of the war with Germany. In 1957 a review by the Soviet military procuracy confirmed that the entire case had been fabricated, and Tukhachevsky and his co-defendants were all rehabilitated.