Soviet colonel general who led the 5th Tank Army in Operation Uranus and the 48th Army from Kursk to Operation Bagration
Born on a peasant khutor in Poltava Governorate, he served in the First World War as an NCO of the 14th Orenburg Cossack Regiment and won four Crosses of St. George. In 1918 he raised a partisan detachment that joined the Red Army, commanded a cavalry regiment of the 1st Cavalry Army, and joined the Bolshevik party in January 1920. He went to Spain as an adviser and led the 10th Tank Corps in the Winter War. In 1942 his 3rd Tank Army failed in the Kozelsk offensive; from November his 5th Tank Army made the main blow of the Southwestern Front in Operation Uranus, but after sharp clashes with Nikolai Vatutin he was removed in December. From February 1943 to December 1944 he led the 48th Army on the northern face of the Kursk salient, at Gomel and at Bobruisk, until failing health ended his command. He died in 1949 after a long illness.
Also known as: Prokofii Romanenko
Activities and affiliations
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1918–1949
Soviet Union state institutionsMilitary and defenceMain
Military command -
1920–1949
Soviet Communist Party and Bolsheviks
Military command
Career Timeline
- 1914–1918.01Imperial Russian Army: NCO in an Orenburg Cossack regiment, then praporshchik
- 1920.05Commander, 33rd Cavalry Regiment, 6th Division, 1st Cavalry Army
- 1933Graduates from the Frunze Military Academy
- 1937.04Commander, 11th Mechanized Brigade; adviser in the Spanish Civil War
- 1938.02Commander, 7th Mechanized Corps (10th Tank Corps from May)
- 1941.01Commander, 17th Army, Transbaikal Military District
- 1942.05–09Commander, 3rd Tank Army
- 1942.11–12.28Commander, 5th Tank Army (Operation Uranus)
- 1943.01.15–02.12Commander, 2nd Tank Army
- 1943.02–1944.12.15Commander, 48th Army
- 1945.07.09Commander, East Siberian Military District
The 5th Tank Army and the 48th Army: Romanenko as Vasilevsky and Rokossovsky Saw Him, 1942–1944
On 19 November 1942, the first day of Operation Uranus, Aleksandr Vasilevsky, sent to the Southwestern Front as representative of the Stavka, reached Romanenko's 5th Tank Army around midday. In his memoir The Cause of My Whole Life he wrote that this army "was delivering the main blow of the Southwestern Front." Thick fog and snow ruled out the air force, and in the first two hours the rifle divisions advanced only 2–3 km. That afternoon the army's mobile group (two tank corps and a cavalry corps) went into the breach; its leading troops took Kalach-on-Don on the morning of 23 November and met the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front coming up from the south, closing the ring.
Romanenko then clashed badly with the front commander, Nikolai Vatutin. According to the memoir of Semyon Ivanov, then a staff officer of the Southwestern Front, as quoted in Russian Wikipedia, Romanenko complained that the front had in effect taken his tank corps out of his hands, and Vatutin accused him of never being at his command post, of "jumping" from formation to formation, and of losing control of the 1st Tank Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Corps. Vasilevsky does not mention the quarrel.
Vasilevsky does record what the 5th Tank Army failed to do. Under the plan for Operation Saturn it was to smash the enemy around Chernyshevskaya, Morozovsk and Tormosin on the lower Chir and firmly isolate Paulus's encircled army from the south-west. Yet into December it could not clear the German bridgeheads on the left bank of the Don near Nizhne-Chirskaya and on the east bank of the Chir, less than 40 km from the pocket. Stalin's directive of 13 December to Nikolai Voronov, Vatutin and Filipp Golikov said that "Romanenko and Lelyushenko are standing on the defensive and cannot move forward," and cut Saturn down to Little Saturn. Vasilevsky counted the 5th Tank Army's failure among the reasons the plan had to change. By Stavka order of 28 December Romanenko was removed and Markian Popov took over the army.
From February 1943 he commanded the 48th Army. Konstantin Rokossovsky writes in A Soldier's Duty that the Central Front received this army as it prepared the defence of the northern face of the Kursk salient, and that Romanenko was among the army commanders brought in to draw up the defence plan. Before Gomel in the autumn of 1943 the 48th crossed the Sozh together with the 65th Army but struggled to widen its bridgehead, and when Rokossovsky shifted the main blow further south he left only the 48th Army on that axis to pin the enemy down.
Preparing Operation Bagration, Rokossovsky crawled over the 48th Army's start line himself. "I saw that it was simply impossible to attack here," he wrote: the north bank of the Berezina was almost unbroken marsh, and even a light gun needed several layers of logs beneath it. Romanenko was therefore ordered to move his main forces to the Rogachev bridgehead and strike towards Bobruisk together with Aleksandr Gorbatov's 3rd Army. Bobruisk fell to the 65th and 48th Armies on 29 June 1944. In October, on the Narew bridgeheads, when the front staff warned of suspicious German movements, Rokossovsky notes that the staffs of Pavel Batov's and Romanenko's armies, "reassured by the quiet before their front line," were not alarmed. According to English Wikipedia, Romanenko gave up his command in December because of failing health.