1944.04.08–05.12

The Crimean Offensive (1944)

Why was the German 17th Army still holding the Crimea, cut off, in the spring of 1944, two years after the Soviet Union lost the peninsula? How did the Red Army retake it within a week from three directions, Perekop, the Sivash and Kerch, why did Sevastopol hold out for nearly a month until it broke at Sapun Hill, and how did the German and Romanian evacuation by sea from Cape Khersones end?

In the autumn of 1943 the Red Army swept across southern Ukraine and cut the Perekop isthmus, leaving the German 17th Army and its Romanian divisions, about 200,000 men, supplied only by sea. Hitler refused to evacuate, arguing that giving up the Crimea would shake Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. On 8 April 1944 Tolbukhin's 4th Ukrainian Front attacked from the Sivash bridgehead and at Perekop, and on 11 April Yeryomenko's Separate Coastal Army struck at Kerch; within a week only the fortress of Sevastopol was left. After two failed assaults, Sapun Hill fell on 7 May, Sevastopol was liberated on 9 May, and the last German and Romanian troops on Cape Khersones surrendered on 12 May. Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff, who coordinated the operation as Stavka representative, was injured by a mine on his way into Sevastopol.

Why did the Crimea matter so much to both sides?

The Crimea is a peninsula jutting far out into the northern Black Sea. It is joined to the Ukrainian mainland only by the narrow Perekop isthmus and, east of it, the shallow salt marsh of the Sivash, while the Kerch Peninsula at its eastern end faces the Taman Peninsula on the Caucasian side across the Kerch Strait. Sevastopol, at its south-western tip, was the main base of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Whoever held the Crimea could dominate much of the Black Sea and the air above it; whoever lost it had to pull the fleet back to small ports on the Caucasian coast. The Soviet assessment summarised in the Russian Wikipedia likewise puts the chief value of liberating the Crimea in returning the fleet to its main base and so greatly improving its conditions for fighting at sea. 1 2

For Germany the Crimea was a shield over the Balkans. The English Wikipedia notes that losing it was expected to sour Turkey's attitude and to bring the Romanian oilfields, on which the German war economy depended for oil, within range of Soviet bombers. Grand Admiral Dönitz, commander-in-chief of the German navy, saw the Crimea as protecting "the Balkans like a shield", and Hitler believed that abandoning the peninsula would push Romania and Bulgaria to leave the Axis camp. The German command therefore ordered the 17th Army to hold the peninsula to the last. 3 4 1

The Soviet view was similar. Aleksandr Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff, who coordinated this operation as Stavka representative, wrote in his memoir The Cause of a Lifetime (1978) that whoever held the Crimea could keep the whole Black Sea coast under threat and put pressure on the policies of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and that for Germany the peninsula was a springboard against the Soviet Caucasus and a prop for the southern wing of its front. In the spring of 1944 a further military reason was added: the German forces left in the Crimea were the last large bridgehead threatening the rear of the Soviet fronts advancing west through right-bank Ukraine. 2 1

How had the Soviet Union lost the Crimea in 1941–42?

After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 (Operation Barbarossa), the German 11th Army under Erich von Manstein and Romanian troops broke through the Perekop isthmus into the Crimea from 26 September. By November most of the peninsula had fallen; only Sevastopol and Kerch in the east remained. The siege of Sevastopol began on 30 October. The Coastal Army, evacuated by sea from Odessa, joined the defence, and the German attacks of November and the major assault of 17 December were beaten off at the last moment. 5 6 2

On 26 December 1941 the Soviet Union landed on the Kerch Peninsula to relieve Sevastopol; the landing had been planned by Fyodor Tolbukhin, then chief of staff of the Caucasian Front. In January 1942, however, Feodosia was lost again, and the Crimean Front dug in on the Kerch Peninsula failed to retake the Crimea in three offensives. Tolbukhin, by then the Crimean Front's chief of staff, was removed on 10 March after the Stavka representative Lev Mekhlis reported to Stalin against his leadership. Vasilevsky records in his memoir that in April 1942 the Crimean Front, with 21 rifle divisions, 3,577 guns and mortars, 347 tanks and 400 aircraft, clearly outnumbered the Germans facing it (ten and a half divisions, 2,472 guns, 180 tanks). 5 7 8

On 8 May the Germans broke through the sector of the 44th Army along the Black Sea coast in Operation Bustard Hunt. The Stavka ordered a withdrawal to the line of the Turkish Wall on 10 May, but according to Vasilevsky the front command delayed it by two days and failed to organise it. The Germans reached the outskirts of Kerch on 14 May, and the Crimean Front lost 176,566 men. A Stavka directive of 4 June found that the front commander Dmitry Kozlov, Mekhlis and others had failed to grasp the nature of modern war, and removed and demoted them. In a telegram reproduced in the memoir, Stalin answered Mekhlis's demand for a replacement for Kozlov: "we have no Hindenburgs in reserve." 8 9

Having cleared Kerch, the German 11th Army turned its whole strength on Sevastopol. In Operation Sturgeon Catch, begun on 2 June, the Luftwaffe flew more than 23,000 sorties in June alone, and the city fell on 4 July. The siege had lasted 250 days, and in the final assault alone 118,000 men of the Coastal Army and the Black Sea Fleet were killed, wounded or captured; only part of the command got out by submarine and aircraft in early July. Vasilevsky judged that the defence had badly weakened the German 11th Army, but also wrote that the loss of Sevastopol and the Crimea sharply worsened the strategic situation in the south and let the Germans threaten the Caucasus and the lower Volga. 6 2 8

How did the German 17th Army come to be trapped in the Crimea?

After Stalingrad and Kursk the German army was pushed back along the whole Eastern Front. The German 17th Army (commander Erwin Jaenecke), which had withdrawn from the Caucasus to hold the Kuban bridgehead, crossed the Kerch Strait into the Crimea in October 1943. At the same time the Soviet Southern Front (from 20 October the 4th Ukrainian Front) broke the German line on the Molochnaya in the Melitopol operation (26 September to 5 November) and drove down to the lower Dnieper and the Perekop isthmus. Once the land route between the Crimea and the mainland was cut in early November, the German and Romanian forces in the Crimea could be supplied only by sea and air. 3 1 10 2

The Red Army at once got a foothold on the peninsula. On 1 November units of the 51st Army waded across the shallow Sivash and seized a bridgehead on its southern shore, while the 19th Tank Corps (commander Vasilyev) broke through the Turkish Wall at Perekop as far as Armyansk; cut off from its infantry, it was briefly surrounded until the main body of the 51st Army came over Perekop and joined it. There was no strength left to push deep into the peninsula, and the fighting died down. As Vasilevsky put it, the German 17th Army and its Romanian formations in the Crimea were now completely cut off from the rest of the German land forces. 2 4

In the east came the Kerch–Eltigen landing operation. On 1 November the 318th Rifle Division landed at Eltigen south of Kerch, and on 3 November the 56th Army at Yenikale to the north. The Eltigen bridgehead, caught in a naval blockade by small German craft, held for five weeks until a Romanian attack broke it on 7 December; some of those who escaped seized Mount Mithridates and were then taken off by the Azov Flotilla (commander Sergei Gorshkov). The Yenikale bridgehead, by contrast, grew by 4 December to hold 75,000 men and 128 tanks and became the starting line for the spring offensive. On 15 November the Stavka turned the North Caucasian Front into the Separate Coastal Army under Ivan Petrov. 11 2 12

Even within the German army many thought holding the Crimea pointless. According to the German Wikipedia, Manstein, Kleist of Army Group A, the army chief of staff Kurt Zeitzler and the Romanian leader Ion Antonescu repeatedly urged an evacuation, which Hitler refused, with Dönitz backing him. The German command drew up a separate evacuation plan, Operation Adler, yet in late January 1944 it shipped in the 73rd Infantry Division and in early March the 111th to reinforce the Crimea. After Kleist was dismissed on 30 March, Ferdinand Schörner, now at the head of Army Group South Ukraine, reported on 7 April that the defence of the Crimea was assured for a long time to come. The Soviet offensive began the next day. 4 1 3

In April 1944 the 17th Army had five German and seven Romanian divisions and two assault-gun brigades, some 195,000 to 200,000 men, 3,600 guns and mortars, 215 tanks and assault guns and 148 aircraft based in the Crimea. In the north stood the XLIX Mountain Corps and the Romanian Cavalry Corps; on the Kerch Peninsula the V Army Corps and two Romanian divisions; on the southern coast the Romanian Mountain Corps. The defences were dense: three belts up to 35 kilometres deep across the Perekop isthmus (including the Ishun position and the line of the Chatyrlyk river), two or three in front of the Sivash bridgehead, and four on the Kerch Peninsula. 1 2 4

How did the Soviet side prepare the offensive, and why was it postponed so often?

In early 1944 Vasilevsky, while remaining Chief of the General Staff, coordinated the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts together as Stavka representative. According to his memoir, in early January he and the two front commanders expected the Germans to pull out of the Dnieper bend and the Nikopol bridgehead and to start evacuating the Crimea, and proposed opening the Crimean offensive in January or early February. The forecast proved wrong: the Germans stiffened their resistance at Nikopol and Krivoi Rog. The Stavka then gave the 4th Ukrainian Front sole responsibility for the Crimean operation, relieving it of other tasks and leaving it two armies and the 19th Tank Corps. 2

The start date kept slipping. According to the Russian Wikipedia, Vasilevsky and the front's military council proposed on 6 February to begin on the 18th or 19th; the Stavka first told them to clear the Dnieper bank as far as Kherson, then demanded a start no later than 1 March, and on 16 March ordered them to wait until the 3rd Ukrainian Front had taken Nikolaev and advanced on Odessa. The weather intervened again and again. Vasilevsky's report to Stalin on the night of 4 March said that rain had wrecked the roads, that all the motor transport was stuck in the mud and only tractors could move, and that he had given up on cars and flown to the Sivash in a U-2 light aircraft. "With the roads in this state the operation cannot be started," he wrote, proposing to begin between 15 and 20 March. 1 2

The choice of the main axis was made in February. Vasilevsky and the front command decided to deliver the main blow from the bridgehead south of the Sivash with Yakov Kreizer's 51st Army and a supporting attack across the Perekop isthmus with Georgy Zakharov's 2nd Guards Army. Vasilevsky explains the reasoning in his memoir: the Sivash route was the hardest and most awkward for the attackers, but for that very reason the enemy would least expect it, and success there would put Soviet troops behind all the Perekop fortifications and let them burst into the open interior of the peninsula far sooner. Once a gap opened, the 19th Tank Corps would be sent through towards Dzhankoy and Simferopol; the Stavka approved. On 22 February the front's military council issued its combat orders to the armies. 2

Building a way across the Sivash was a major project in itself. Before the offensive the engineers built a trestle bridge 1,865 metres long and a second crossing of two earth causeways of 600 to 700 metres joined by a 1,350-metre pontoon bridge, raising their load limit to 30 tonnes so that T-34 tanks and heavy artillery could cross. A dummy bridge was put up a kilometre away. Storms, air raids and shelling broke the bridges again and again. The German air force officer Paul Deichmann later recalled that the Soviets had built an underwater causeway across the Sivash, which the Germans thought impassable, and that the German side, though aware of it, had not taken its destruction seriously. 2 4

The Soviet forces committed numbered about 470,000 men, 5,982 guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,250 aircraft (2,245 counting the long-range aviation and air-defence fighters involved). The 4th Ukrainian Front (commander Fyodor Tolbukhin, chief of staff Sergei Biryuzov) had the 51st and 2nd Guards Armies, the 19th Tank Corps and the 8th Air Army (commander Timofei Khryukin); the Separate Coastal Army was supported by Konstantin Vershinin's 4th Air Army. Filipp Oktyabrsky's Black Sea Fleet and Gorshkov's Azov Flotilla were to support the coastal flanks and cut the enemy's sea lanes, and in the mountains were 3,679 Crimean partisans organised in three formations. 1 2

How did the two Stavka representatives clash over the plan?

Marshal Kliment Voroshilov had been sent to the Separate Coastal Army on the Kerch side as Stavka representative, together with Sergei Shtemenko, head of the General Staff's Operations Directorate. Through the winter the Coastal Army bled heavily for the town of Kerch and the heights around it with little to show for it. A Stavka directive of 27 January 1944, reproduced in Vasilevsky's memoir, said that an army superior in men and firepower was throwing away its advantages in street fighting, called these tactics "fundamentally wrong", and ordered the main effort shifted to the open field. On 4 February Petrov was removed and Andrei Yeryomenko took over the Coastal Army. 2 12

On 28 March Stalin told Vasilevsky to meet Voroshilov and settle the cooperation of the two forces. In chapter 22 of his memoir Vasilevsky describes being warmly received on 29 March in Voroshilov's railway carriage at Krivoi Rog, where Voroshilov told him in detail about the Tehran Conference. But chapter 27, on the General Staff and the system of Stavka representatives, tells the same meeting differently: on hearing the 4th Ukrainian Front's strength and tasks, Voroshilov doubted that it could carry out the plan the Stavka had approved with the forces it had. 2 13

At the conference in Melitopol the next day, after Tolbukhin presented the plan, Voroshilov pointed out that the Coastal Army had failed repeatedly at Kerch despite a large superiority and, Vasilevsky writes, told them: "I am sure that you too will not manage it with your forces, and you will let the Stavka down." Under the words of so senior a marshal Tolbukhin and his chief of staff Biryuzov wavered and said more strength would be welcome. Vasilevsky reminded them that the calculations behind the plan had come above all from the front command itself, and said he would neither report doubts to the Stavka nor ask it for reinforcements; if Tolbukhin withdrew from the decision, he would report from there and then, ask the Stavka to keep the plan and its dates, and take direct command of the front himself. Voroshilov then said he would not interfere in the front's affairs and would add his reservations as a note to their report, and later dropped even that. 13

This scene survives only in Vasilevsky's own account, published in the Soviet Union in 1978, and may reflect both the censorship of the day and the author's own case. What did go on record was the report the two men signed jointly and sent to Stalin on 31 March. It proposed making a real blockade of the Crimea, stopping traffic in both directions, the Black Sea Fleet's most important task, raising the fleet's air group at Skadovsk from under 100 to 250–300 of its more than 500 aircraft, and moving ten submarines to Nikolaev. Weather permitting, the 4th Ukrainian Front would attack no later than 5 April, and the Kerch axis two or three days later, as Voroshilov had insisted. 13 2

How were the three breakthroughs at Perekop, the Sivash and Kerch achieved?

After snow and fog cost three more days, a reconnaissance in force on the evening of 7 April confirmed the German dispositions. On the morning of the 8th an order of the front's military council was read out to every unit. As quoted by Vasilevsky, it declared, "We are fighting on land watered with the blood of our fathers and brothers in 1920," calling up the glory of Frunze's army, which had crossed the Sivash in the Civil War to drive out Wrangel. After two and a half hours of artillery and air preparation the 51st Army opened the main attack from the Sivash bridgehead, while the 2nd Guards Army's supporting attack at Perekop retook Armyansk that day. Progress on the first day was slow, but on the 9th the 51st Army got through the first defence line, and the 63rd Rifle Corps drove seven kilometres into the positions of the German 111th Infantry Division. 1 2 4

The breakthrough came on 10 April. A battalion was landed behind the German line and the 51st Army pushed onto the flank of the Perekop positions; fearing encirclement, the Germans abandoned the fortifications on the Perekop isthmus and began to fall back from the northern Crimea. Vasilyev, commander of the 19th Tank Corps, was badly wounded in an air raid on a command post, and his deputy, Colonel Ivan Potseluev, took over. On the morning of the 11th the mobile group led by the tank corps went through the gap and took Dzhankoy at a stroke, and that evening Moscow fired a salute. Vasilevsky, who had returned to the front headquarters on the 11th after the liberation of Odessa, and Tolbukhin formed a mobile group of the tank corps, the lorried 279th Rifle Division and an anti-tank brigade under Razuvaev, deputy commander of the 51st Army, and ordered it to take Simferopol by the 13th. 1 4 2

At Kerch the Separate Coastal Army attacked at 10 p.m. on 10 April, liberated Kerch by the morning of the 11th, and on the 12th broke the Ak-Monai position, the last defence line on the Kerch Peninsula. The same day the 4th Ukrainian Front broke the Ishun position and the Biyuk-Onlar position in the centre of the peninsula, retaking 314 villages in a single day. The offensive now fanned out: the 2nd Guards Army along the west coast towards Yevpatoria, the 51st Army across the steppe straight at Simferopol, and the Coastal Army through Feodosia along the southern coast. Simferopol, Yevpatoria and Feodosia were liberated on the 13th, Bakhchisaray and Sudak on the 14th, Alushta on the 15th and Yalta on the 16th. 2 12 1 4

The Germans streamed back into Sevastopol, and many Romanian units preferred to surrender; by Vasilevsky's account the 4th Ukrainian Front alone had taken 20,000 prisoners by 14 April. The retreating Germans blew up and burned whatever they could, and many palaces on the southern coast were wrecked. The partisans in the mountains ambushed roads, cut railways, hampered the evacuation through the port of Yalta and tried to stop the Germans destroying towns and plants. The Russian Wikipedia records that when a partisan detachment took Stary Krym on 11 April, a regiment of the German 98th Infantry Division retreating from Kerch seized one quarter of the town after a night battle, held it for twelve hours, and went from house to house shooting all 584 of its inhabitants, regardless of sex or age. 2 1

Why did the assault on Sevastopol take nearly a month?

On 15–16 April the Red Army reached Sevastopol's outer defences, but its attempt to take the city on the march failed. The command was also reorganised: Vasilevsky proposed putting the Coastal Army under Tolbukhin, Stalin and Voroshilov agreed, and the order came on the night of 16 April. The Coastal Army dropped the word "Separate" and joined the 4th Ukrainian Front from the 18th; Yeryomenko moved to command the 2nd Baltic Front and Konstantin Melnik took over the Coastal Army. On the 16th Voroshilov was recalled from the Crimea, while Vasilevsky was ordered to stay until the peninsula was fully cleared. 2 12 1

Hitler declared Sevastopol a "fortress city" to be held to the last man. Yet the fortifications the Red Army had defended in 1941–42 had never been restored, and the city was not the stronghold it had been. Instead the Germans built six lines of trenches on the southern bank of the Belbek and tiers of positions on Sapun Hill and the heights south of it. Combining prisoners' statements, air reconnaissance and partisan reports, Vasilevsky and Tolbukhin concluded that the Germans meant to hold on to win time to evacuate men and equipment by sea. The attacks of the 51st and Coastal Armies on 19 April, and the attack from Balaklava towards Cape Khersones on the 23rd, gained only a few kilometres a day, and minefields kept the tank corps out of the battle. 3 2 1

The failures came from shortages of ammunition and preparation; Vasilevsky reckoned at least one and a half loads of ammunition were needed. Moreover, by now the Stavka had already decided to strike Army Group Centre in Belorussia in the summer (Operation Bagration), so two divisions and Vershinin's 4th Air Army headquarters left the Coastal Army for the newly forming 2nd Belorussian Front. According to Vasilevsky, during a long telephone conversation on the night of 29 April Stalin raised no objection to the new plan but lost his temper when another postponement came up, and the exchange grew sharp; Vasilevsky recalls that he held his ground and was allowed to open a supporting attack in the north on 5 May and the general assault on 7 May. 2

On the German side, too, the commander was shaken. On 29 April Jaenecke urged Hitler at Berchtesgaden to give up Sevastopol and extract his cut-off army. On his way back to the front he was detained at Galați in Romania and put before a court martial to answer for the loss of the Crimea; only Heinz Guderian's delaying of the proceedings saved him from conviction. On 1 May Karl Allmendinger, commander of the V Army Corps, took over the 17th Army. His proclamation, quoted in Vasilevsky's memoir, invoked the Führer's order to hold every trench and every shell crater and told the infantry to stay in place even if tanks broke through. Meanwhile the Soviet side built training grounds in the rear to drill assault groups of infantry, sappers, flame-thrower tanks and accompanying guns. 10 14 4 2

On 5 May the 2nd Guards Army attacked from the north, towards the Mekenzievy Hills, after two hours of artillery and air strikes. The fighting turned hand-to-hand in many places; on the first day the Guards advanced a kilometre and took three or four lines of trenches. According to Vasilevsky, prisoners' statements showed that from that afternoon the Germans began, just as the Soviet side had hoped, to shift troops from Sevastopol's inner perimeter to the northern sector. The attacks continued on the 6th. 2 1

How did Sapun Hill fall, and how was Sevastopol liberated?

Sapun Hill is a ridge-like height of 240 metres south-east of Sevastopol. The name was given by Sevastopol hunters shortly before the Crimean War and is said to come from a Russian verb for puffing, after the breathless climb up its slopes. Vasilevsky wrote that comparing the operational maps of 1855, 1920, 1942 and 1944 shows Sevastopol's defence laid out in nearly the same way all four times, because the hills, the sea and the ground dictate the line. In 1944 its slopes carried tiers of continuous trenches with 36 concrete pillboxes and 27 timber-and-earth bunkers, and it was the key to the defence of Sevastopol. 15 2

At 10.30 a.m. on 7 May, after an hour and a half of artillery fire and with the support of all the front's aircraft, the general assault began. The main force, the left wing of the 51st Army and the centre of the Coastal Army, broke through on a nine-kilometre sector and after a full day of heavy fighting took Sapun Hill. Vasilevsky and Tolbukhin hardly left the Coastal Army's command post north of Balaklava. In the north the 2nd Guards Army reached the Severnaya Bay and brought its waters under direct fire, while the 51st Army fought for the English Cemetery and the Coastal Army around Marble Hill. From the tops of Sapun Hill and Kaya-Bash the whole city and the plain as far as Cape Khersones lay in view. 2 1 4

Having lost their main line on the first day, the Germans fell back to the inner perimeter. Soviet bombers kept up the attack through the night, and at 8 a.m. on the 9th the front resumed the general assault. The 2nd Guards Army cleared the north side and struck the Korabelnaya district with its left-flank corps, and the Coastal Army took a nameless height overnight to open the way for the 19th Tank Corps. Soviet troops broke into the city from the north, east and south-east and liberated Sevastopol that day. By evening they faced a prepared German line from Streletskaya Bay to the sea, beyond which lay the last strip of land running to Cape Khersones. On the morning of the 10th Stalin issued an order addressed to Vasilevsky and Tolbukhin announcing the capture of Sevastopol, and Moscow fired a salute. 2 1 4

Vasilevsky badly wanted to see Sevastopol on the first day of its liberation. According to his memoir, his car hit a mine while crossing a German trench near the Mekenzievy Hills, on a road hundreds of vehicles had used over the previous two days. The blast threw the engine and front wheels several metres away; the driver, Lieutenant Smirnov, injured his left leg, and Vasilevsky, beside him, took a heavy blow to the head and was cut in the face by glass. His aides in the back were unhurt. The Russian Wikipedia dates the incident to 9 May, the day Sevastopol was liberated, and adds that he suffered concussion and lost his hearing for several days. At the doctors' insistence he was flown to Moscow. 2 16

What happened at the end on Cape Khersones?

On Cape Khersones, west of Sevastopol, the remnants of three German divisions and scattered German and Romanian soldiers, some 30,000 men, crowded together, holding on in the hope that ships would come. The German general Kurt von Tippelskirch later described the last days: on the 10th came word that the promised embarkation was postponed by 24 hours; the next day, too, no ships appeared on the horizon, and the soldiers, penned on a narrow strip of land under ceaseless air raids and attacks, could bear it no longer, and negotiations for surrender began. 1 4

The sea evacuation was called Operation 60,000 on the Romanian side, after the number of Romanian soldiers in the Crimea. From 15 April to 14 May German and Romanian warships escorted convoys between Constanța and Sevastopol, and all four Romanian destroyers, the largest Axis warships in the Black Sea, took part. By German figures 120,853 men left by sea between 14 April and 13 May: 36,557 Romanians, 58,486 Germans, 723 Slovaks, 15,391 Soviet volunteers serving with the Germans, 2,581 prisoners of war and 7,115 civilians. Most got out in the first phase (15–25 April); after Hitler halted the evacuation in order to hold Sevastopol, over 30,000 were carried off in the final phase (10–14 May) under constant air attack. 3 4

From the outset the Soviet side made the blockade at sea one pillar of the offensive. A Stavka directive of 11 April gave the Black Sea Fleet the cutting of the enemy's sea lanes to the Crimea as its main task, to be carried out by submarines, bomber and torpedo aircraft and torpedo boats. On 10 May Soviet aircraft sank the transports Totila and Teja, killing up to 10,000 men in one night according to the English Wikipedia. The military historian Rolf-Dieter Müller, cited in the German Wikipedia, put the cost of extracting the last troops from Sevastopol at 60 ships lost and 31,700 Germans and 25,800 Romanians killed. The Romanian Black Sea flotilla lost two-thirds of its ships. 2 3 4 1

On 12 May the last German and Romanian units on Cape Khersones laid down their arms. According to Vasilevsky, the three days of assault on Sevastopol and the two days of fighting on Khersones yielded 21,000 German and Romanian prisoners and a vast amount of equipment. The last Axis warship to leave the peninsula was the Romanian minelayer Amiral Murgescu, carrying 1,000 men including the German general Walter Hartmann. Soviet accounts stressed that the Germans and Romanians had needed 250 days to take Sevastopol in 1941–42, whereas in 1944 the Red Army broke the Crimean fortifications in 35. 2 1 3

What were the losses on each side, and why do the figures differ?

Soviet losses are fairly clear. By the official count summarised in the Russian Wikipedia, the Soviet army and fleet lost 17,754 killed and 67,065 wounded, along with 171 tanks and self-propelled guns, 521 guns and mortars and 179 aircraft. The German Wikipedia gives the same official figure of 85,000 casualties, 18,000 of them killed. 1 4

German and Romanian losses vary widely between sources. The Russian Wikipedia cites an estimate that irrecoverable losses in the land fighting alone exceeded 100,000 (61,580 of them prisoners), rising to some 140,000 with the losses during the sea evacuation, alongside a figure published in 2020 of 111,587 killed and captured. The English Wikipedia gives German and Romanian losses as 57,000, and the German Wikipedia, besides Müller's 57,500 dead at sea, cites another German figure of 42,000 drowned in the Black Sea between 3 and 13 May alone. Vasilevsky's memoir speaks of the destruction of "the 200,000-strong German 17th Army", yet by German figures more than 120,000 men left by sea. The counts differ in how they treat Romanian troops, Soviet volunteers on the German side and wounded evacuees. 1 3 4 2

Occupation and battle left the peninsula deeply scarred. According to the Russian Wikipedia more than 300 industrial plants were put out of action, livestock was almost wiped out, and Sevastopol, Kerch, Feodosia and Yevpatoria were especially badly destroyed. Sevastopol, which had 109,000 inhabitants before the war, had only 3,000 left at its liberation, and only 6 per cent of its housing was intact. 1

What followed the liberation of the Crimea?

The Black Sea Fleet regained its main base at Sevastopol, and the last large German bridgehead threatening the rear of the Soviet fronts in right-bank Ukraine was gone. As Soviet assessments put it, this created favourable conditions for the advance into the Balkans, leading to the Soviet offensive into Romania in August 1944 and Romania's break with the Axis on 23 August. The 4th Ukrainian Front's headquarters was withdrawn into reserve at the end of May; Tolbukhin left it on 15 May to take over the 3rd Ukrainian Front, and its chief of staff Biryuzov moved on at the same time. 1 17 7

Soviet accounts of the war counted the Crimean operation as the third of "Stalin's ten blows" of 1944, and in 1948 a film about it, The Third Blow, was released. In 2023 Russia made 12 May, the day the operation ended, a day of military glory. On the German side Jaenecke, blamed for the loss of the Crimea, was retired from the army at the end of January 1945. After the war a Soviet military court tried him, on the basis of his own confession, for what he had done in the Crimea in the name of fighting partisans; sentenced to 25 years of forced labour, he was released only in 1955. 3 1 10

Immediately after the liberation the Soviet authorities expelled the entire Crimean Tatar people from the peninsula. A report by Beria of 22 April 1944 claimed that a large part of the Tatar population had collaborated with the occupiers, and under State Defence Committee decree No. 5859 of 11 May, the NKVD loaded at least 191,044 people onto freight trains over three days, 18–20 May, sending most of them to the Uzbek SSR. Crimean Tatars serving in the Red Army and Communist Party members were not spared, and tens of thousands died in transit and under the harsh conditions of exile. The deportation and its aftermath are covered in the entry on the Deportation of Nationalities. 18 19

Nine months later the Crimea drew the world's attention again. On 4–11 February 1945 the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain met at the Livadia Palace near Yalta to discuss the post-war order. The three delegations stayed in three palaces of the imperial era: Stalin's Soviet delegation in the Yusupov Palace, Roosevelt's American delegation in the Livadia Palace, where the talks were held, and Churchill's British delegation in the Vorontsov Palace. The last wartime meeting of the three leaders took place on the peninsula the Red Army had just regained. 20

Consequences

The Soviet Union regained Sevastopol, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, and the whole of the Crimea; the last large German bridgehead threatening the rear of the fronts fighting in right-bank Ukraine was gone, opening the way to the Romanian and Balkan offensive of August 1944. The German 17th Army was all but destroyed. By Soviet count the Red Army lost some 17,700 killed and 67,000 wounded, while estimates of German and Romanian losses range from about 60,000 to 140,000. From 18 May, days after the liberation, the Soviet authorities deported the entire Crimean Tatar people to Central Asia.

Timeline & Map

Sevastopol Armyansk Southern shore of the Sivash Dzhankoy Kerch Eltigen Yevpatoria Feodosia Simferopol Mekenzievy Hills Cape Khersones Sapun Hill Balaklava Yalta Constanța 13 Berchtesgaden 7 Melitopol 8 Armyansk 4 Southern shore of the Sivash 6 Southern shore of the Sivash 9 Dzhankoy 2 Kerch 5 Eltigen 10 Simferopol 19 Simferopol 14 Mekenzievy Hills 1 Sevastopol 3 Sevastopol 11 Sevastopol 12 Sevastopol 16 Sevastopol 17 Cape Khersones 18 Cape Khersones 15 Sapun Hill
  1. 11941.10.30Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    Siege of Sevastopol begins

    Manstein's German 11th Army and Romanian troops, having broken through at Perekop and overrun most of the Crimea, made their first attack on Sevastopol and laid siege to it.

  2. 21942.05.08GermanySoviet Union
    Operation Bustard Hunt

    The German 11th Army attacked the Crimean Front on the Kerch Peninsula and broke through the 44th Army's sector; the front collapsed within some ten days.

  3. 31942.07.04GermanySoviet UnionRomania
    Fall of Sevastopol

    After a 250-day siege the Germans took Sevastopol; the remaining troops of the Coastal Army surrendered or were captured.

  4. 41943.11.01Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    Sivash crossing and Eltigen landing

    Units of the 51st Army crossed the Sivash and seized a bridgehead on its southern shore, and the 318th Rifle Division landed at Eltigen south of Kerch.

  5. 51943.12.07RomaniaSoviet UnionGermany
    Eltigen bridgehead collapses

    Blockaded for five weeks, the Eltigen bridgehead fell to a Romanian attack; the Yenikale bridgehead to the north held.

  6. 61944.03.04Soviet Union
    Vasilevsky reports a postponement

    After inspecting the Sivash, Vasilevsky reported to Stalin that rain had ruined the roads and asked to postpone the start to 15–20 March.

  7. 71944.03.30Soviet Union
    Melitopol conference

    Vasilevsky and Voroshilov discussed the offensive plan and cooperation with the Coastal Army together with the command of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

  8. 81944.04.08Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    The offensive opens

    After two and a half hours of bombardment the 4th Ukrainian Front attacked from the Sivash bridgehead and at Perekop, and the 2nd Guards Army retook Armyansk.

  9. 91944.04.11Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    Dzhankoy and Kerch liberated

    The 19th Tank Corps went through the breach and took Dzhankoy, and the Separate Coastal Army, which had attacked the night before, liberated Kerch.

  10. 101944.04.13Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    Simferopol liberated

    Soviet troops liberated Simferopol, Yevpatoria and Feodosia.

  11. 111944.04.16Soviet Union
    Coastal Army placed under the front; Voroshilov recalled

    On the night Soviet troops reached Sevastopol's outskirts, an order placed the Separate Coastal Army under the 4th Ukrainian Front and replaced Yeryomenko with Melnik; Voroshilov was recalled.

  12. 121944.04.23Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    Assault on Sevastopol fails

    An attack from Balaklava towards Cape Khersones gained only a few kilometres.

  13. 131944.04.29Germany
    Jaenecke urges evacuation

    Jaenecke, commander of the German 17th Army, urged Hitler at Berchtesgaden to evacuate Sevastopol and was detained and removed on his way back.

  14. 141944.05.05Soviet UnionGermany
    Supporting attack in the north

    The 2nd Guards Army attacked towards the Mekenzievy Hills and advanced a kilometre on the first day; the Germans shifted troops north.

  15. 151944.05.07Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    Storming of Sapun Hill

    The general assault began at 10.30 a.m.; Soviet troops broke through on a nine-kilometre front and took Sapun Hill that day.

  16. 161944.05.09Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    Sevastopol liberated

    Soviet troops entered the city from the north, east and south-east and liberated Sevastopol. Vasilevsky was injured when his car hit a mine on the way in.

  17. 171944.05.10GermanyRomaniaSoviet Union
    Totila and Teja sunk

    Soviet aircraft sank the transports Totila and Teja as they carried troops away from Cape Khersones, killing thousands.

  18. 181944.05.12GermanyRomaniaSoviet Union
    Surrender on Cape Khersones

    The German and Romanian troops left on Cape Khersones surrendered, ending the Crimean offensive.

  19. 191944.05.18Soviet Union
    Deportation of the Crimean Tatars begins

    The NKVD began loading Crimean Tatars onto freight trains bound for Central Asia; the deportation went on until 20 May.

Related people 16

Soviet Union (Red Army and Black Sea Fleet)12

Participants9

Stavka representative with the Separate Coastal ArmyKliment Voroshilov1881–1969

Oversaw the Kerch axis; according to Vasilevsky, at the Melitopol conference on 30 March he doubted that the 4th Ukrainian Front could carry out the plan with its forces. Recalled on 16 April.

Chief of staff of the 4th Ukrainian FrontSergei Biryuzov1904/1905–1964

Chief of staff who planned the operation; Vasilevsky recalls him wavering with Tolbukhin at Melitopol and saying the forces were thin.

Commander of the Separate Coastal Army (Feb–Apr 1944)Andrei Yeryomenko1892–1970

Liberated Kerch on 11 April and advanced along the southern coast; moved to the 2nd Baltic Front when the Coastal Army joined the 4th Ukrainian Front.

Commander of the 2nd Guards ArmyGeorgy Zakharov1897–1957

Made the supporting attack at Perekop, advanced along the west coast to Yevpatoria and led the supporting attack north of Sevastopol on 5 May.

Commander of the Separate Coastal Army (Nov 1943–Feb 1944)Ivan Petrov1896–1958

Tried to widen the Kerch bridgehead but was rebuked by the Stavka for costly street fighting and removed in February; had commanded the Coastal Army in the defence of Sevastopol in 1941–42.

Commander of the Black Sea FleetFilipp Oktyabrsky1899–1969

Blockaded the Crimean sea lanes with the fleet's aircraft, submarines and torpedo boats; the admiral who had led the 1941–42 defence of Sevastopol regained the main base.

Commander of the Azov FlotillaSergei Gorshkov1910–1988

Supported the 1943 Kerch landings, rescued troops who broke out of Eltigen and supported the Coastal Army's offensive in 1944.

Commander of the 4th Air ArmyKonstantin Vershinin1900–1973

Provided air support to the Separate Coastal Army; in late April his headquarters moved to the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Head of the General Staff Operations DirectorateSergei Shtemenko1907–1976

Sent to the Separate Coastal Army with Voroshilov on behalf of the General Staff.

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20