The only officer Stalin addressed by name and patronymic, author of The Brain of the Army
Past midnight at the General Staff, Shaposhnikov worked over his maps in a white shirt with suspenders and received the young colonel summoned to him quite domestically. When the work went wrong he never scolded, only asked reproachfully: "What is this, my dear fellow (голубчик)?"
A tsarist staff officer and military theorist who volunteered for the Red Army on 22 May 1918. His three-volume The Brain of the Army (1927–1929) analysed the function and structure of the General Staff in modern warfare and remains on the Russian General Staff Academy curriculum. In June 1937 he sat on the Special Judicial Presence that condemned Tukhachevsky and others to death, while the NKVD was gathering compromising testimony against him. He took part in planning the winter 1941 counteroffensive and served as Stalin's military adviser until his death from pulmonary tuberculosis in March 1945.
Activities and affiliations
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1918
Soviet Union state institutionsMilitary and defenceMain
Military command -
1930–1945
Soviet Communist Party and Bolsheviks
Military command
Career Timeline
- 1903–1917Imperial Army service, WWI, rose to colonel
- 1918.05–1921Joined Red Army; planned major operations as head of Operations
- 1921–1925First assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Red Army
- 1925–1927Commander, Leningrad then Moscow Military Districts
- 1928–1931Chief of Staff of the Red Army (1st term); The Brain of the Army
- 1931.07–1932Commander, Volga Military District
- 1932–1935Commandant and professor, Frunze Military Academy
- 1935–1937Commander, Leningrad Military District
- 1937.05–1940.08Chief of the General Staff (2nd term); Marshal (1940); Winter War
- 1940.08–1943.05Deputy People's Commissar of Defence (fortified regions)
- 1941.07–1942.05Chief of the General Staff (3rd term); Moscow counteroffensive
- 1943.06–1945.03Voroshilov Academy commandant; Stalin's military adviser
Related historical events
- 1914–1918First World WarImperial officer and participantHe served as an officer in the Imperial Army during the First World War.
- 1918–1922The Civil War and Foreign InterventionChief of the Red Army's Operations Directorate, planning key operations
- 1937–1938The Great PurgeJudge on the Special Judicial Presence, Tukhachevsky caseIn June 1937 he sat on the Special Judicial Presence that sentenced to death Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other senior commanders. At the same time, the NKVD was compiling a file on Shaposhnikov himself for an alleged 'military-fascist conspiracy.'
- 1939.11–1940.03The Winter WarChief of Staff · planned the Winter War
- 1941–1945The Great Patriotic WarChief of the General Staff, directed initial war planning
- 1941.07.07–09.26Battle of Kiev (1941)Chief of the General StaffHeld back the Southwestern Front's requests to withdraw in line with Stalin's wishes, then sent the permission to leave Kiev on the night of 17 September.
- 1941.09.30–1942.04.20Battle of MoscowChief of the General StaffHeaded the evacuated General Staff and returned in late November to prepare the counteroffensive; according to Rokossovsky he approved the 16th Army's proposed withdrawal to the Istra line.
- 1941.10.16–12.30Defence and Recapture of Tikhvin (1941)Chief of the General StaffAt the Stavka meeting of 12 December said the Volkhov Front would play the decisive role in lifting the blockade.
- 1941.12.26–1942.05.20The Battle of the Kerch Peninsula (1941–1942)Chief of the General StaffChief of the General Staff during the offensives; ill, he gave way, and from the evening of 11 May Stavka directives were signed by Vasilevsky.
- 1942.01.07–07.12Lyuban Offensive and the Destruction of the 2nd Shock Army (1942)Chief of the General StaffPresented the offensive plan to the Stavka on 12 December 1941.
The Brain of the Army: A Classic of General Staff Theory
Shaposhnikov's three-volume The Brain of the Army (Мозг армии, 1927–1929) is not merely a military textbook but an original theoretical work that dissects the nature and function of the General Staff in modern warfare through historical analysis. Taking Clausewitz's dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other means" as his point of departure, Shaposhnikov argued that strategy must be subordinated to politics, and that the General Staff is the institution that manages this junction. The book used the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf during the First World War as its main case study, analysing not one man's leadership but how the collective intelligence of a staff organisation functions and fails. In a chapter titled "Mobilisation Is the Opium of War," Shaposhnikov warned that in an age of total war, mobilisation was tantamount to a declaration of war, making peacetime "pre-mobilisation" of the economy and society essential. He also embraced Svechin's theory of "integral" leadership: the conduct of war cannot be entrusted to a single genius commander but must be the integrated effort of the entire state. The title was borrowed from the late-nineteenth-century English journalist Spencer Wilkinson, but Shaposhnikov fused the concept with a Marxist view of history to create a distinctly Soviet theory of the General Staff. Widely read among Red Army commanders upon publication, the book drew broad response in Soviet and foreign military periodicals. It has remained on the curriculum of the Soviet (and now Russian) General Staff Academy for over ninety years, with a German edition published in East Germany (1987) and a Chinese edition in 2014. In 2023, Alexei Krivopalov of the Russian Academy of Sciences reassessed The Brain of the Army as a work that excavates "the destructive contradictions between strategy and politics," a compass for diagnosing the deficit of strategic thinking that persists today.
How did Vasilevsky remember Shaposhnikov, his teacher at the General Staff?
Aleksandr Vasilevsky, later Chief of the Soviet General Staff, wrote in his memoir The Cause of My Whole Life (Delo vsei zhizni, 1978) that few people had influenced him as strongly or given him as much as Shaposhnikov. When Shaposhnikov took over the Moscow Military District in 1926, Vasilevsky was one of his regimental commanders; in the late 1930s, as head of the operational training section of the General Staff, he worked on Shaposhnikov's assignments, above all drafting the People's Commissar of Defence's annual orders on operational and strategic training. "Beside B. M. Shaposhnikov and under his guidance," he recalled, his operational outlook, experience and knowledge grew.
Vasilevsky's Shaposhnikov is a superior whose restraint, courtesy, modesty, tact, discipline and exactness bred self-respect, responsibility and precision in those who worked under him. As Chief of the General Staff he lectured regularly on refresher courses and at the reviews of manoeuvres and exercises, teaching senior commanders the theory of staff work. Vasilevsky writes that he always felt proud when Stalin, turning to him in a discussion, said: "Well, let us hear what the Shaposhnikov school has to tell us!"
According to the memoir, the counterstroke plan Shaposhnikov put forward in the autumn of 1939 for a conflict with Finland insisted that operations be finished quickly, before Finland could obtain outside help; the Main Military Council rejected it and had the Leningrad Military District commander Kirill Meretskov draw up a new plan instead. When the Winter War begun on that plan stalled before the Mannerheim Line, preparing the Politburo session of January 1940 again fell to Shaposhnikov. Made a Marshal in May 1940, he left the post of Chief of the General Staff in August to oversee the building of fortified regions as Deputy People's Commissar of Defence. The move is usually put down to his health; Vasilevsky, repeating what Shaposhnikov told him, writes that Stalin explained the move by saying "as regards Finland you turned out to be right," but that the world had to see the Chief of the General Staff replaced along with the People's Commissar if it was to believe the lessons had been learned.
Shaposhnikov became Chief of the General Staff again on 29 July 1941, and from 1 August Vasilevsky served under him as head of the Operations Directorate and deputy chief. When Moscow was in danger in October, Shaposhnikov took the main body of the General Staff into evacuation, returning in late November to prepare the Moscow counteroffensive. In the planning for spring and summer 1942, in March, he argued against wide counteroffensive operations before the summer. Vasilevsky writes that Stalin accepted the conclusion in favour of active strategic defence but decided at the same time on partial offensives in the Crimea, around Kharkov and elsewhere, and he later judged "the decision to defend and attack at the same time" to have been the plan's weakest point.
On 24 April 1942 Stalin telephoned Vasilevsky to say that the strain of work had undermined Shaposhnikov's health, that he was being relieved to recover, and that Vasilevsky would act as Chief of the General Staff. Until 1945 Vasilevsky kept asking Shaposhnikov's advice by telephone. When the ailing marshal congratulated him on a high award in April 1944, he answered that his success was "in large measure the result of many years of work under your direct guidance." Shaposhnikov died on 26 March 1945, forty-four days before the victory.