Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov

Кирилл Афанасьевич Мерецков
Soviet Union state institutions Marxism–Leninism Soviet Union Russia 1897.6.7.–1968.12.30. ○ Natural causes

The marshal who survived NKVD torture to break the Leningrad blockade

Arrested on 23 June 1941 and released on 6 September, he later wrote in his memoirs that for roughly two months he was kept from all work "by circumstances beyond my control."

Born the eldest child of a Russian peasant family, he was a Moscow metalworker by twelve and in 1917 organised a Bolshevik cell at Sudogda, becoming its secretary. In the Winter War he commanded the 7th Army, broke the Mannerheim Line and became a Hero of the Soviet Union. After five months as Chief of the General Staff from August 1940, he was arrested on 23 June 1941 for an alleged anti-Soviet military conspiracy, tortured in Lefortovo, and freed on 6 September after writing to Stalin; his case file was destroyed in 1955. Commanding the Volkhov and Karelian Fronts he broke the Leningrad blockade in Operation Iskra in 1943, and in 1945 led the 1st Far Eastern Front against the Kwantung Army. Made Marshal in 1944, he died in 1968; his ashes were placed in the Kremlin Wall.

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

Related historical events

The Finnish War Plan, the General Staff and the Far East in 1945

Appointed commander of the Leningrad Military District in January 1939, Meretskov parted ways with the General Staff over the plan for war with Finland. According to the memoir The Cause of My Whole Life (1978) by Aleksandr Vasilevsky, then working in the General Staff's Operations Directorate, the General Staff plan, whose main lines were set by the Chief of the General Staff Boris Shaposhnikov, held that a war would have to be finished quickly, before Finland received outside help, and called for strong forces. The Main Military Council of the People's Commissariat of Defence rejected it and told Meretskov to draw up a new plan. The Leningrad District's plan, delivered within the deadline Stalin set, was approved: the district's main forces would form a two-corps 7th Army to break the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus, while weak, understrength 8th, 9th and 14th Armies covered some 1,500 km of front further north. Russian Wikipedia judges that the plan underrated the enemy and that its errors prolonged the war and raised its cost.

When the war began on 30 November 1939, Soviet troops spent December reaching the Mannerheim Line at heavy cost without breaking it. Vasilevsky wrote that the approved plan had failed to foresee much, so that many problems had to be solved by improvisation. The offensive was halted at the end of December; in January 1940 a new Northwestern Front was formed under Semyon Timoshenko, and Meretskov's 7th Army, now under it, broke the Mannerheim Line in February. As Shaposhnikov later told Vasilevsky, when Stalin removed him as Chief of the General Staff in August 1940 he said, "As regards Finland, you turned out to be right," but explained that to show the world the lessons of the war had been learned, it would not do to replace only the People's Commissar of Defence. Meretskov took his place.

As Chief of the General Staff, Meretskov presented to Stalin in September 1940, together with Timoshenko and Vatutin, the plan for strategic deployment against a German attack. As Meretskov told his staff, Stalin argued that Germany would aim its main blow not at the centre but to the southwest, to seize the richest industrial, raw-material and farming regions first, and had the plan reworked to concentrate the main forces on the southwestern axis. Vasilevsky portrayed him as "a talented practitioner" who relied above all on experience: livelier, more expansive and simpler than Shaposhnikov, "with a folk shrewdness and a sense of humour". Meretskov was dismissed in January 1941, succeeded by Georgy Zhukov, and became Deputy People's Commissar of Defence for combat training. His own memoirs give no reason for the dismissal.

In 1945 Meretskov commanded the 1st Far Eastern Front under Vasilevsky, now Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in the Far East. Striking from the Maritime Province towards Jilin through mountains and taiga, the front broke through border fortifications that Vasilevsky likened to "the Mannerheim Line, only on a larger scale", and took Mudanjiang on 16 August. Vasilevsky also recorded an episode after the fighting. While the high command was slow with its summary report, Meretskov sent his own front's report straight to the Stavka, and Stalin asked Vasilevsky, "Who commands our troops in the Far East?" Vasilevsky wrote that Meretskov was plainly upset at his own haste, adding that he "fought well and always observed subordination". In the afterword to his memoir he recalled that Stalin jokingly called Meretskov "the wise man of Yaroslavl", and described his command style as thorough and far-sighted, with a habit of clearing his decisions with the General Staff beforehand.

The 1941 Arrest and NKVD Torture

On June 23, 1941, the day after Operation Barbarossa began, Meretskov was summoned to Moscow and arrested by the NKVD. The arrest was based on testimony from already-purged commanders who named him as a participant in an alleged "anti-Soviet military conspiracy." Held in Lefortovo Prison, he was interrogated by notorious investigators Vlodzimirsky, Schwartzman, Rodos, and Ivanov. He was beaten with rubber rods, and under torture by Boris Rodos, who broke one of his ribs, he signed a false confession.

Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs that before his arrest Meretskov had been "a strapping young general, very strong and impressive-looking," but after his release "he was a shadow of his former self. He had lost so much weight he could hardly speak." During his imprisonment, he confided to a comrade that NKVD officers had urinated on his head.

After two months, Meretskov wrote to Stalin from his cell asking to be sent to the front. On September 6, 1941, he was abruptly released on Stalin's oral order. Presented to Stalin in full army dress, he was immediately appointed commander of the 7th Army. His case file was destroyed in 1955 on the orders of KGB chairman Serov, leaving the full story of his ordeal unknown. In his 1968 memoirs Meretskov passed over the episode in two short sentences: "On my return from Leningrad, owing to circumstances beyond my control, I was removed from all work for about two months. And in September 1941 I received a new appointment."

The 1942 Volkhov Front: Lyuban and the 2nd Shock Army

After his release, Meretskov commanded the 7th Separate Army from 24 September 1941, the 4th Separate Army from 9 November, and was appointed commander of the Volkhov Front on 17 December 1941. In January 1942 he began a new offensive towards Lyuban, aimed at lifting the siege of Leningrad and encircling a large number of German forces. After the Tikhvin counteroffensive the Stavka had ordered him to organise a new Volkhov Front, which he commanded until February 1944, except for May and June 1942.

The Luban advance was very slow. The German forces were dug in, reinforced and no longer overextended. By March the two Soviet armies trying to close the encirclement were less than 25 km apart but could advance no further. On 15 March the Germans counter-attacked and cut off the 2nd Shock Army; Soviet forces restored communications only by 30 March, after heavy fighting. When Meretskov reported the restored corridor to the Stavka, he omitted that it was no more than 2 km wide, under constant German air strikes and artillery bombardment, and therefore of very poor transport capacity. As a result the Stavka did not withdraw the 2nd Shock Army while that was still possible. At this point the Leningrad Front commander, Mikhail Khozin, proposed merging the two fronts defending Leningrad under his command, promising to lift the blockade. According to Vasilevsky's memoir The Cause of My Whole Life (1978), the Chief of the General Staff, Shaposhnikov, objected at once, but Stalin sided with Khozin. On 23 April the Volkhov Front was abolished and became an operational group of the Leningrad Front, and Meretskov went to the Western Front as deputy commander and then, at his own request, commander of its 33rd Army. Vasilevsky wrote that one man could not direct nine armies and several corps separated by enemy-held ground, and that the Stavka's decision to abolish the Volkhov Front "proved mistaken".

By May 1942 the 2nd Shock Army suffered supply shortages and low morale. On 30 May the Germans began a second offensive and cut it off again; after part of the encircled force broke out on 5 June, the rest was systematically destroyed. The Stavka had ordered Khozin to pull the 2nd Shock Army out quickly, but the withdrawal was not carried out in time. On 8 June the Volkhov Front was re-established, on 9 June Meretskov was again appointed its commander, and Khozin was dismissed. About 33,000 men were taken prisoner, roughly the same number were killed, and about 10,000 broke out.

Responsibility for the defeat is assessed differently. Immediately after the battle Meretskov placed the blame on the captured 2nd Shock Army commander Andrey Vlasov, whom he himself had recommended for the post in April 1942; the claim was echoed in his post-war memoirs, and Vasilevsky's memoir of 1978 took the same line, describing Vlasov as a commander of no great ability, "cowardly" by nature, who did nothing at all; because Vlasov later collaborated with Germany, few revisited it in the Soviet era. David Glantz counters that, whatever Vlasov's later collaboration, his level of command in May and June 1942 was no different from that of most other army commanders, and that Meretskov bears some responsibility for the defeat as the front commander who planned and carried out the operation. Khozin, commander of the Leningrad Front, was removed on 8 June, reduced in rank and never given a front again. One assessment explains his deflection of blame by noting that Meretskov, arrested less than a year earlier, knew his life might be at risk if he accepted responsibility for the disaster.

In the 1942 Sinyavino phase both sides planned offensives without knowledge of the other's. The Soviet Sinyavino Offensive failed, and the 2nd Shock Army was decimated for the second time in a year, but the German forces suffered heavy casualties and cancelled Operation Northern Light. Meretskov sought further local attacks, but the Stavka categorically refused, and he received a formal critique on 15 October 1942 for his conduct of the operation. After Lyuban he remained in command of the Volkhov Front and, together with the new Leningrad Front commander Govorov, planned the offensive to break the blockade. The plan was approved by the Stavka in December 1942 as Operation Iskra. It began on 13 January 1943; Soviet forces linked up on 18 January, the front stabilised by 22 January, and a land corridor 8 to 10 km wide was opened, eliminating the possibility of the city's capture and of a German-Finnish link-up. On 28 January 1943 Meretskov and Govorov were both awarded the Order of Suvorov 1st Class.