The marshal who survived NKVD torture to break the Leningrad blockade
Arrested on 23 June 1941 and released on 6 September, he later wrote in his memoirs that for roughly two months he was kept from all work "by circumstances beyond my control."
Born the eldest child of a Russian peasant family, he was a Moscow metalworker by twelve and in 1917 organised a Bolshevik cell at Sudogda, becoming its secretary. In the Winter War he commanded the 7th Army, broke the Mannerheim Line and became a Hero of the Soviet Union. After five months as Chief of the General Staff from August 1940, he was arrested on 23 June 1941 for an alleged anti-Soviet military conspiracy, tortured in Lefortovo, and freed on 6 September after writing to Stalin; his case file was destroyed in 1955. Commanding the Volkhov and Karelian Fronts he broke the Leningrad blockade in Operation Iskra in 1943, and in 1945 led the 1st Far Eastern Front against the Kwantung Army. Made Marshal in 1944, he died in 1968; his ashes were placed in the Kremlin Wall.
Activities and affiliations
-
1917–
Soviet Union state institutionsMilitary and defenceMain
Military command -
1917–
Soviet Communist Party and Bolsheviks
Military command
Career Timeline
- 1917Organised a Bolshevik cell at Sudogda; secretary and Red Guard chief of staff
- 1918.08–1921In the Red Army from August 1918, wounded at Kazan; graduated from the Military Academy in 1921
- 1922.01–1924.06Chief of staff, 1st Tomsk Cavalry Division and 9th Don Rifle Division
- 1924.06–1932.04Moscow Military District: head of mobilisation, deputy chief of staff, 14th Rifle Division commander (1930), district chief of staff (1931)
- 1932.04–1937.05Chief of staff of the Belorussian and Far Eastern military districts; military adviser in Spain 1936–1937 under the pseudonym Petrovich
- 1937.06–1938.09Deputy Chief of the General Staff
- 1938.09–1939.01Commander, Volga Military District
- 1939.01–1940.06Commander, Leningrad Military District: plan for war with Finland; commands the 7th Army from 9 December 1939; Hero of the Soviet Union for breaking the Mannerheim Line
- 1940.06–08Deputy People's Commissar of Defence; general of the army from 4 June
- 1940.08–1941.01Chief of the General Staff: strategic deployment plan against Germany
- 1941.01–06Deputy People's Commissar of Defence for combat training
- 1941.06.23–09.06Arrested and tortured by the NKVD; released on 6 September
- 1941.09.24–12Commander, 7th Separate Army, from November 4th Separate Army: defence of the Svir, Tikhvin counteroffensive
- 1941.12.17–1944.02Commander, Volkhov Front (April to June 1942 deputy commander of the Western Front and commander of the 33rd Army): Lyuban operation; breaks the blockade in Operation Iskra, 1943
- 1944.02.22–1945.04Commander, Karelian Front: Svir-Petrozavodsk and Petsamo-Kirkenes operations; Marshal of the Soviet Union, October 1944
- 1945.04–09Commander, Maritime Group of Forces, from August 1st Far Eastern Front: Manchurian operation; Order of Victory
- 1945.09–1955Commander of the Maritime, Moscow, White Sea and Northern Military Districts; head of the Vystrel courses, 1954
- 1955.08–1968Assistant to the Minister of Defence for military academies; from 1964 inspector general of the Ministry of Defence
Related historical events
- 1918–1922The Civil War and Foreign InterventionParticipated in the Civil War
- 1936–1939The Spanish Civil WarSoviet military adviserTook part in the operation that stopped the Italian expeditionary corps at Guadalajara
- 1939.11–1940.03The Winter WarCommander of the 7th Army, breaker of the Mannerheim LineLeading the Leningrad Military District and the 7th Army on the isthmus, he was stalled at first, but after the reorganization broke through the Mannerheim Line and was made a Hero of the Soviet Union.
- 1941–1944Siege of LeningradCommander of the Volkhov FrontKirill Meretskov commanded the Volkhov Front's westward advance, linking it with the Leningrad Front on 18 January 1943 and opening the land corridor.
- 1941–1945The Great Patriotic WarCommander, Volkhov & Karelian Fronts; 1st Far Eastern FrontArrested and tortured two days into the war, he was freed in September 1941 and returned to the front. As commander of the Volkhov Front he broke the Leningrad blockade in Operation Iskra (January 1943); as commander of the Karelian Front he led the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation and ended the war in Norway. Promoted to Marshal in October 1944. In August 1945 he commanded the 1st Far Eastern Front, delivering the main blow against the Kwantung Army and receiving the Order of Victory.
- 1941.10.16–12.30Defence and Recapture of Tikhvin (1941)Commander of the 7th Separate and 4th Armies, then of the Volkhov FrontTook over the 4th Army in November while keeping the 7th Separate Army, retook Tikhvin, and on 17 December became commander of the Volkhov Front.
- 1942.01.07–07.12Lyuban Offensive and the Destruction of the 2nd Shock Army (1942)Commander of the Volkhov FrontDirected the January-April offensive and, after the front was abolished in April, was reappointed on 9 June to rescue the 2nd Shock Army. His memoirs lay the blame on Khozin and Vlasov.
- 1944.02.12–11.15The Finnish front in 1944Commander of the Karelian FrontCommanded the Svir–Petrozavodsk offensive and the Petsamo–Kirkenes offensive; in September his plan to cut off the Germans with deep outflanking moves was overruled by the Stavka.
- 1945.08The Soviet Entry into the War against JapanCommander of the 1st Far Eastern FrontLed the eastern attack as commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front. At the June 26-27 conference he proposed occupying Hokkaido, opposed by Zhukov and Molotov.
The Finnish War Plan, the General Staff and the Far East in 1945
Appointed commander of the Leningrad Military District in January 1939, Meretskov parted ways with the General Staff over the plan for war with Finland. According to the memoir The Cause of My Whole Life (1978) by Aleksandr Vasilevsky, then working in the General Staff's Operations Directorate, the General Staff plan, whose main lines were set by the Chief of the General Staff Boris Shaposhnikov, held that a war would have to be finished quickly, before Finland received outside help, and called for strong forces. The Main Military Council of the People's Commissariat of Defence rejected it and told Meretskov to draw up a new plan. The Leningrad District's plan, delivered within the deadline Stalin set, was approved: the district's main forces would form a two-corps 7th Army to break the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus, while weak, understrength 8th, 9th and 14th Armies covered some 1,500 km of front further north. Russian Wikipedia judges that the plan underrated the enemy and that its errors prolonged the war and raised its cost.
When the war began on 30 November 1939, Soviet troops spent December reaching the Mannerheim Line at heavy cost without breaking it. Vasilevsky wrote that the approved plan had failed to foresee much, so that many problems had to be solved by improvisation. The offensive was halted at the end of December; in January 1940 a new Northwestern Front was formed under Semyon Timoshenko, and Meretskov's 7th Army, now under it, broke the Mannerheim Line in February. As Shaposhnikov later told Vasilevsky, when Stalin removed him as Chief of the General Staff in August 1940 he said, "As regards Finland, you turned out to be right," but explained that to show the world the lessons of the war had been learned, it would not do to replace only the People's Commissar of Defence. Meretskov took his place.
As Chief of the General Staff, Meretskov presented to Stalin in September 1940, together with Timoshenko and Vatutin, the plan for strategic deployment against a German attack. As Meretskov told his staff, Stalin argued that Germany would aim its main blow not at the centre but to the southwest, to seize the richest industrial, raw-material and farming regions first, and had the plan reworked to concentrate the main forces on the southwestern axis. Vasilevsky portrayed him as "a talented practitioner" who relied above all on experience: livelier, more expansive and simpler than Shaposhnikov, "with a folk shrewdness and a sense of humour". Meretskov was dismissed in January 1941, succeeded by Georgy Zhukov, and became Deputy People's Commissar of Defence for combat training. His own memoirs give no reason for the dismissal.
In 1945 Meretskov commanded the 1st Far Eastern Front under Vasilevsky, now Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in the Far East. Striking from the Maritime Province towards Jilin through mountains and taiga, the front broke through border fortifications that Vasilevsky likened to "the Mannerheim Line, only on a larger scale", and took Mudanjiang on 16 August. Vasilevsky also recorded an episode after the fighting. While the high command was slow with its summary report, Meretskov sent his own front's report straight to the Stavka, and Stalin asked Vasilevsky, "Who commands our troops in the Far East?" Vasilevsky wrote that Meretskov was plainly upset at his own haste, adding that he "fought well and always observed subordination". In the afterword to his memoir he recalled that Stalin jokingly called Meretskov "the wise man of Yaroslavl", and described his command style as thorough and far-sighted, with a habit of clearing his decisions with the General Staff beforehand.
The 1941 Arrest and NKVD Torture
On June 23, 1941, the day after Operation Barbarossa began, Meretskov was summoned to Moscow and arrested by the NKVD. The arrest was based on testimony from already-purged commanders who named him as a participant in an alleged "anti-Soviet military conspiracy." Held in Lefortovo Prison, he was interrogated by notorious investigators Vlodzimirsky, Schwartzman, Rodos, and Ivanov. He was beaten with rubber rods, and under torture by Boris Rodos, who broke one of his ribs, he signed a false confession.
Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs that before his arrest Meretskov had been "a strapping young general, very strong and impressive-looking," but after his release "he was a shadow of his former self. He had lost so much weight he could hardly speak." During his imprisonment, he confided to a comrade that NKVD officers had urinated on his head.
After two months, Meretskov wrote to Stalin from his cell asking to be sent to the front. On September 6, 1941, he was abruptly released on Stalin's oral order. Presented to Stalin in full army dress, he was immediately appointed commander of the 7th Army. His case file was destroyed in 1955 on the orders of KGB chairman Serov, leaving the full story of his ordeal unknown. In his 1968 memoirs Meretskov passed over the episode in two short sentences: "On my return from Leningrad, owing to circumstances beyond my control, I was removed from all work for about two months. And in September 1941 I received a new appointment."
The 1942 Volkhov Front: Lyuban and the 2nd Shock Army
After his release, Meretskov commanded the 7th Separate Army from 24 September 1941, the 4th Separate Army from 9 November, and was appointed commander of the Volkhov Front on 17 December 1941. In January 1942 he began a new offensive towards Lyuban, aimed at lifting the siege of Leningrad and encircling a large number of German forces. After the Tikhvin counteroffensive the Stavka had ordered him to organise a new Volkhov Front, which he commanded until February 1944, except for May and June 1942.
The Luban advance was very slow. The German forces were dug in, reinforced and no longer overextended. By March the two Soviet armies trying to close the encirclement were less than 25 km apart but could advance no further. On 15 March the Germans counter-attacked and cut off the 2nd Shock Army; Soviet forces restored communications only by 30 March, after heavy fighting. When Meretskov reported the restored corridor to the Stavka, he omitted that it was no more than 2 km wide, under constant German air strikes and artillery bombardment, and therefore of very poor transport capacity. As a result the Stavka did not withdraw the 2nd Shock Army while that was still possible. At this point the Leningrad Front commander, Mikhail Khozin, proposed merging the two fronts defending Leningrad under his command, promising to lift the blockade. According to Vasilevsky's memoir The Cause of My Whole Life (1978), the Chief of the General Staff, Shaposhnikov, objected at once, but Stalin sided with Khozin. On 23 April the Volkhov Front was abolished and became an operational group of the Leningrad Front, and Meretskov went to the Western Front as deputy commander and then, at his own request, commander of its 33rd Army. Vasilevsky wrote that one man could not direct nine armies and several corps separated by enemy-held ground, and that the Stavka's decision to abolish the Volkhov Front "proved mistaken".
By May 1942 the 2nd Shock Army suffered supply shortages and low morale. On 30 May the Germans began a second offensive and cut it off again; after part of the encircled force broke out on 5 June, the rest was systematically destroyed. The Stavka had ordered Khozin to pull the 2nd Shock Army out quickly, but the withdrawal was not carried out in time. On 8 June the Volkhov Front was re-established, on 9 June Meretskov was again appointed its commander, and Khozin was dismissed. About 33,000 men were taken prisoner, roughly the same number were killed, and about 10,000 broke out.
Responsibility for the defeat is assessed differently. Immediately after the battle Meretskov placed the blame on the captured 2nd Shock Army commander Andrey Vlasov, whom he himself had recommended for the post in April 1942; the claim was echoed in his post-war memoirs, and Vasilevsky's memoir of 1978 took the same line, describing Vlasov as a commander of no great ability, "cowardly" by nature, who did nothing at all; because Vlasov later collaborated with Germany, few revisited it in the Soviet era. David Glantz counters that, whatever Vlasov's later collaboration, his level of command in May and June 1942 was no different from that of most other army commanders, and that Meretskov bears some responsibility for the defeat as the front commander who planned and carried out the operation. Khozin, commander of the Leningrad Front, was removed on 8 June, reduced in rank and never given a front again. One assessment explains his deflection of blame by noting that Meretskov, arrested less than a year earlier, knew his life might be at risk if he accepted responsibility for the disaster.
In the 1942 Sinyavino phase both sides planned offensives without knowledge of the other's. The Soviet Sinyavino Offensive failed, and the 2nd Shock Army was decimated for the second time in a year, but the German forces suffered heavy casualties and cancelled Operation Northern Light. Meretskov sought further local attacks, but the Stavka categorically refused, and he received a formal critique on 15 October 1942 for his conduct of the operation. After Lyuban he remained in command of the Volkhov Front and, together with the new Leningrad Front commander Govorov, planned the offensive to break the blockade. The plan was approved by the Stavka in December 1942 as Operation Iskra. It began on 13 January 1943; Soviet forces linked up on 18 January, the front stabilised by 22 January, and a land corridor 8 to 10 km wide was opened, eliminating the possibility of the city's capture and of a German-Finnish link-up. On 28 January 1943 Meretskov and Govorov were both awarded the Order of Suvorov 1st Class.