1956

The Hungarian Revolution

Why did the hope of de-Stalinization run into Soviet tanks in Budapest?

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was an uprising against the Stalinist system, born of the hopes for de-Stalinization opened by Khrushchev’s Secret Speech. When student and worker protests in Budapest grew into a nationwide revolt in October, the reformer Imre Nagy returned as premier and declared a multiparty system, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and neutrality. The Soviet leadership saw this as the collapse of the bloc and crushed the uprising with a massive military intervention in November.

The Country Stalin’s Best Pupil Built

Mátyás Rákosi called himself “Stalin’s best Hungarian disciple.” It was no idle boast. Returning to Hungary with the Soviet Army in 1945, Rákosi had, by 1949, constructed a miniature replica of Stalin’s one-party dictatorship. Using what came to be called his “salami tactics” (slicing away coalition partners piece by piece) his Communist Party destroyed every rival, above all the Independent Smallholders’ Party, which had won 57% of the vote in the 1945 election. In August 1949 the Hungarian People’s Republic was proclaimed. 6 3

Two pillars held up the Rákosi regime: terror and forced industrialization. The State Protection Authority (ÁVH) employed 28,000 regular officers and 40,000 informants, maintaining surveillance files on over a million citizens (more than 10% of the population). Some 650,000 people were persecuted, and roughly 400,000 were imprisoned or sent to labour camps. ÁVH officers drew salaries three to twelve times the average worker’s wage. In 1949, former Interior Minister László Rajk (the very man who had founded the ÁVH) was arrested on fabricated charges of Titoist espionage, tortured, and executed in the first full-scale Stalinist show trial in Eastern Europe. 9 10 3

The economy replicated the Soviet model in miniature. All resources were poured into heavy industry; agriculture was forcibly collectivized; consumer goods production was suppressed. The results were catastrophic. By 1952, workers’ real wages had fallen to 66% of the 1938 level and were 20% lower than in 1950. War reparations consumed 19 to 22 percent of annual national income, and COMECON membership blocked direct trade with the West. Food rationing was introduced, and six compulsory “peace loans” between 1949 and 1954 siphoned off a total of 5.6 billion forints from personal incomes. 3

Stalin’s death in March 1953 cracked the edifice. Under Moscow’s direction, Rákosi was compelled to surrender the premiership to the reform communist Imre Nagy. Nagy’s “New Course” disbanded internment camps, lightened the compulsory delivery burdens on peasants, cut heavy-industry investment, and boosted consumer goods production. For a brief period, Hungarians breathed more freely. But Rákosi remained First Secretary of the Party and undermined every reform from within. In April 1955 (as Malenkov fell from power in Moscow) Nagy was stripped of his party posts and dismissed as prime minister; at the end of the year he was expelled from the Party. The promise of reform was rescinded, and the hard line returned. 7 4

Then, in February 1956, Khrushchev’s Secret Speech to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (denouncing Stalin’s crimes) detonated across Hungary. The substance of the speech leaked quickly and set the entire country debating. At the Petőfi Circle, a youth-run discussion forum, all-night meetings drew thousands demanding democratization and intellectual freedom. Rajk’s widow addressed one session to protest that her husband’s rehabilitation, announced by Rákosi in a passing reference during a provincial speech, was a hollow formality. On 6 October 1956, between one and two hundred thousand citizens of Budapest lined the streets for Rajk’s reburial with full honours: a dress rehearsal for the explosion that would come three weeks later. 10 4 3

Yet the solution Moscow imposed was a half-measure. On 18 July 1956, Rákosi was finally forced to resign. But his replacement was his right-hand man, Ernő Gerő, another unreconstructed Stalinist. Imre Nagy was not even readmitted to the Party. What Hungarians received was not the change they demanded but continuity with a new face. 6 15 4

How One Secret Speech Brought Down the Rákosi Regime

Shortly after midnight on February 25, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev spent four hours before a closed session of the 20th CPSU Congress detailing Stalin's crimes. Titled "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences," the speech charged Stalin with purging hundreds of thousands of loyal Party members through false confessions and torture during the Great Terror of the 1930s, failing to prepare for the Nazi invasion, deporting entire nationalities, and fostering a "cult of personality" around his own rule. Khrushchev classified the speech as "top secret," yet within days it was being read aloud at thousands of local Party meetings across the USSR, and by March the full text had leaked to the West. On June 5, The New York Times published it in its entirety: the speech was no longer secret. 3 5

For Mátyás Rákosi, First Secretary of the Hungarian Working People's Party, the speech was a political earthquake. Rákosi called himself "Stalin's best Hungarian pupil" and had, since 1949, transplanted the Stalinist system wholesale into Hungary: purges and show trials, forced collectivization, and a reign of terror enforced by the ÁVH secret police. Every charge leveled against Stalin applied equally to Rákosi. At a March Central Committee meeting, he grudgingly pushed through a resolution denouncing the "cult of personality," but his real strategy was to buy time with minimal concessions. 6 3

The speech's contents spread uncontrollably. The Petőfi Circle, founded under the auspices of the Communist youth organization (DISZ), began hosting debates on literature, economics, history, and ideology in the spring and soon became the center of anti-Rákosi opposition. By June, a debate on press freedom drew more than 7,000 people: the crowd spilled into the streets outside the hall. Speakers openly demanded Rákosi's resignation and the rehabilitation of László Rajk, executed in a 1949 show trial. At the universities, the banned independent student union (MEFESZ) began to revive. 4 3

Moscow grew anxious. Mikhail Suslov was dispatched in June, and on July 13 Anastas Mikoyan arrived in Budapest. In his July 14 report to the CPSU Central Committee, Mikoyan diagnosed the Hungarian party leadership as being in "a state of prostration," losing its grip on power day by day. Every Politburo member agreed that Rákosi was the core problem, but none dared say it first. When Mikoyan finally suggested that "comrade Rákosi step aside in the interests of the party," Ernő Gerő and András Hegedüs "breathed easier": they had been waiting for Moscow to say it aloud. 3 5

On July 18, Rákosi resigned "for health reasons" and departed for the Soviet Union. But his replacement was not Imre Nagy, whom the reformers had been demanding. It was Gerő, Rákosi's closest lieutenant, notorious since his Spanish Civil War days as a Stalinist enforcer. Moscow had removed Rákosi but left the system intact. This half-measure failed to defuse popular anger. On October 6, between 100,000 and 200,000 people gathered for the reburial of László Rajk, and the message was unmistakable: Hungarian society was already carrying a force the regime could not contain. Khrushchev's "secret" had brought down Rákosi, but in his place stood a void. 6 15 10 4

October 23: How a Demonstration Became an Uprising in One Day

October 23, 1956 was a Tuesday. The morning was unremarkable, but fissures had been accumulating. On October 16, the banned independent student union MEFESZ had been revived at the University of Szeged. On October 22, a student assembly at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics adopted the Sixteen Points: withdrawal of Soviet troops, secret-ballot elections, the return and trial of Mátyás Rákosi, a multi-party system, freedom of the press, removal of the Stalin statue, and the reinstatement of March 15 as a national holiday. This was not a program for revolution: it did not call for banning the Communist Party or abolishing socialism. The students were demanding the reform of socialism, not its overthrow. 4 3 8

At 2 p.m. on October 23, students and citizens gathered at Petőfi Square. The actor Imre Sinkovits recited Sándor Petőfi's "National Song" (Nemzeti dal), the very poem the Rákosi regime had banned from public performance, and a student representative read out the Sixteen Points. The crowd then marched to the statue of General Józef Bem, the Polish hero of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution. The wreath-laying was deliberate: it expressed solidarity with Poland's "Polish October," where Władysław Gomułka had just negotiated concessions from Moscow, including the withdrawal of some Soviet troops. By evening, the crowd had swelled to around 200,000 and filled Parliament Square. 3

The square chanted one name: "Nagy! Nagy!" Imre Nagy, who had pushed reforms as prime minister from 1953 to 1955 before Rákosi ousted him, was the symbol of the reformist wing. Nagy appeared on the Parliament balcony late in the evening. He tried to calm the crowd, but his words landed awkwardly. When he addressed them as "Comrades," the crowd jeered. He told them to wait for "natural developments." The crowd was cold. The U.S. Legation's cable recorded that "the crowd hardly listened." 3 7

At the same hour, 8 p.m., First Secretary Ernő Gerő delivered a radio speech. It was uncompromising. He branded the demonstrators as "nationalist and chauvinist" elements and dismissed the students' demands. The speech poured fuel on the fire. Enraged, part of the crowd moved to the Magyar Rádió building on Bródy Sándor Street, demanding the Sixteen Points be broadcast. A delegation of ten students entered the building, among them a 14-year-old girl, but the ÁVH security police detained them. Outside, the crowd demanded their release. 3 15

By 9:30 p.m., another segment of the crowd had reached the Stalin statue at the edge of the City Park (Városliget), near Heroes' Square, where they used trucks and winches to pull down the eight-meter-tall Stalin statue. The statue was decapitated; the crowd tore off red stars and chanted "Russians, go home!" Only Stalin's boots remained on the pedestal. 3 11

At the Radio building, the atmosphere turned violent. Faced with an angry crowd, inflamed by Gerő's speech and the news of the detained delegation, the ÁVH threw tear gas grenades and then opened fire. Who fired the first shot remains disputed, but the casualty record is clear. Budapest's No. 2 Surgical Clinic logged six dead and thirty-six wounded that night. U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Spencer Barnes cabled the State Department: "Hungarian troops refused to fire on the unarmed public; Russian-speaking men in ÁVH uniforms opened fire." While other parts of Budapest remained quiet, the area around the Radio building had descended into a shooting war. 3 5

By 11 p.m., Hungarian Army units arriving on the scene began tearing the red stars off their caps and siding with the demonstrators. Protesters hijacked an ambulance delivering weapons to the ÁVH, set police cars on fire, and seized arms from captured military vehicles. Gerő had already telephoned Soviet Ambassador Yuri Andropov, asking Khrushchev for Soviet troops to suppress what he called "a demonstration reaching an unprecedented scale." Moscow set in motion its prepared plan "Wave" (Volna) for the five Soviet divisions in Hungary, and at 2 a.m. on 24 October Defence Minister Zhukov ordered them into Budapest. So ended October 23: under a Hungarian tricolor with the communist red star cut out of its center, the flag that would become the revolution's emblem, Budapest entered combat. 3 5

Pulling Out the Pillars in One Week: The Political Unfolding of Nagy's Reforms

When Imre Nagy returned as premier on 24 October, the reforms he proposed were, at first, an extension of the "New Course" he had attempted and been defeated over in 1953. The Soviet leadership read them that way too. Mikoyan and Suslov, arriving in Budapest, gave Nagy and Kádár one condition in exchange for their backing: the two pillars of one-party rule and Warsaw Pact membership were not to be touched. 3 4

On the morning of the next day, 25 October, the crowd gathered in Kossuth Square in front of Parliament tried to fraternise with the Soviet tank crews, handing out bilingual leaflets, and some climbed onto the tanks. A few minutes after 11 o'clock the shooting began. Warning shots ordered by the KGB chairman, General Ivan Serov, threw the square into panic, and Soviet tanks fired first at the buildings opposite and then at demonstrators crowded around the Rákóczi statue. A border-guard platoon from Orosháza also took part in the firing; there is no clear evidence for the often-cited ÁVH marksmen on the roof of the Ministry of Agriculture. Estimates of the dead range from a few to the thousands; research by András Kő and Lambert J. Nagy counted at least 75 killed and 284 wounded. The same day the party Central Committee, which met from shortly after 10 a.m. with Soviet delegates present, removed Ernő Gerő from the party leadership under their pressure and elected János Kádár in his place. 19

But for the crowds enraged by Gerő's "counter-revolution" speech on the night of 23 October, and for the armed fighters who had spent four days battling Soviet tanks in the streets of Budapest, the 1953 reform package was already obsolete. Across the country, spontaneously formed workers' councils and revolutionary committees were dismantling the old party apparatus without waiting for instructions from the centre. By 27 October, even the official trade union federation SZOT had joined the university students and the Writers' Union in issuing a joint revolutionary platform. The party no longer held a monopoly on information or force. 4 3

On 28 October, Nagy made his move. He threatened to resign unless his new political line was adopted, and Kádár backed him. Mikoyan and Suslov had little choice but to yield. The Soviet forces were exhausted after four days of fighting, and with Hungarian People's Army units showing signs of going over to the insurgents, military suppression could not be guaranteed. In a radio broadcast that day, Nagy declared the uprising not a "counter-revolution" but a "great national democratic movement," announced an immediate ceasefire, dissolved the ÁVH secret police, promised to incorporate armed rebels into a new National Guard, and pledged to begin negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. By the end of October, Soviet units had started pulling out of Budapest. 4 3 18

Two days later, on 30 October, Nagy went further. He abolished the one-party system and declared a return to the 1945-style coalition government. Besides Nagy, Kádár and Géza Losonczy, the new inner cabinet included Zoltán Tildy and Béla Kovács of the Smallholders' Party and Ferenc Erdei of the National Peasant Party, with a seat held open for the Social Democrats. In Moscow's eyes this was the Party abandoning its leading role. 4

That same day, a dramatic reversal took place in Moscow. On 30 October, the CPSU Presidium adopted its Declaration on the Principles of Friendship and Cooperation with Socialist States, approving Zhukov's position that Soviet troops should withdraw from Budapest and "if necessary, withdraw from Hungary as a whole." But on 31 October, Khrushchev reversed course: "If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, and French, the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive." Coming just as Britain and France were launching the Suez War against Egypt, the argument that weakness must not be shown to imperialism flipped the Presidium from non-intervention to invasion. 3

Primary text

Hungary 1956: Seven Documents of the CPSU PresidiumПостановление Президиума ЦК КПСС «О положении в Венгрии»

31 октября 1956 г.

Строго секретно

VI. О положении в Венгрии.

(тт. Хрущев, Жуков, Булганин, Молотов, Каганович, Ворошилов, Сабуров)

1. В соответствии с обменом мнениями на заседании Президиума ЦК КПСС уполномочить тт. Хрущева, Молотова и Маленкова на ведение переговоров с представителями ЦК ПОРП.

2. Утвердить текст телеграммы совпослу в Белграде для т. Тито. (Прилагается.)

При положительном ответе уполномочить тт. Хрущева и Маленкова на ведение переговоров с т. Тито.

3. Поручить т. Жукову с учетом обмена мнениями на заседании Президиума ЦК КПСС разработать соответствующий план мероприятий, связанных с событиями в Венгрии, и доложить ЦК КПСС.

4. Поручить тт. Шепилову, Брежневу, Фурцевой и Поспелову на основе состоявшегося обмена мнениями на заседании Президиума ЦК подготовить необходимые документы и внести их на рассмотрение ЦК КПСС.

К пункту VI прот. № 49

Сов. секретно

Вне очереди. Особая

Белград

Совпосол

Немедленно посетите т. Тито и передайте следующее:

«В связи с создавшимся положением в Венгрии мы хотели бы иметь встречу с Вами инкогнито вечером первого ноября или утром второго ноября. Мы согласны прибыть для этой цели в Белград или другой пункт югославской или советской территории по Вашему выбору. Наша делегация прибудет в составе тт. Хрущева и Маленкова. Ждем ответа через т. Фирюбина. Н.Хрущев».

Если т. Тито нет в Белграде, настоящий текст для срочной передачи ему сообщите тт. Карделю или Ранковичу.

Исполнение доложите.

On 1 November, with reports arriving that Soviet forces were again crossing Hungary's eastern border, the Nagy cabinet convened in the afternoon. Ambassador Andropov was summoned and asked to explain, but his answers satisfied no one. The cabinet then voted unanimously, Kádár included, for two decisions: renunciation of the Warsaw Treaty and a declaration of neutrality on the Austrian model. Simultaneously, the government appealed to the United Nations, asking the four great powers to guarantee Hungary's neutral status. This was the first time a communist-led Eastern European government had turned to the Western powers for political help. In his radio address declaring "the neutrality of the Hungarian People's Republic," Nagy said: "The century-old dream of the Hungarian people is thus fulfilled." 3 4

Two days later, on 3 November, the Nagy government's delegation arrived at the Tököl base to negotiate the Soviet withdrawal. On the orders of KGB chairman Ivan Serov the entire negotiating team was arrested. The delegation's head, Defence Minister Pál Maléter, would be hanged alongside Nagy in 1958. The pillars Nagy had pulled out in a single week, one-party rule, the Warsaw Pact, and the stationing of Soviet troops, had, in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, moved beyond the realm where a political solution was still possible. 3 18

November 4: Soviet Tanks Roll Over Budapest Again

On 30 October 1956, the CPSU Presidium decided to withdraw its troops from Hungary. Defence Minister Zhukov himself said: "We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole." The next day, Pravda published a declaration stating that "the Soviet government is prepared to withdraw Soviet military units from Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary by the Hungarian government." 3

Twenty-four hours later, the decision was completely reversed. At the 31 October Presidium meeting, Khrushchev declared: "We should re-examine our assessment and should not withdraw our troops from Hungary and Budapest. We should take the initiative in restoring order." What changed? First, Nagy's formal declaration of a multiparty system on 30 October, with the fear that Hungary might slip out of the bloc, exhausted the Soviet leadership's patience. The withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of neutrality came on 1 November, the day after the decision. Mikoyan and Suslov reported from Budapest that "the political situation, rather than improving, is getting worse." Second, with Britain and France attacking Suez on 29 October, Khrushchev worried that a Soviet withdrawal from Hungary would be "perceived as weakness" by the imperialists. Third, China and other East European leaders pressed for military intervention. 3

On 1 November, Operation Whirlwind was approved. Zhukov oversaw the plan and Marshal Konev took command. Seventeen divisions and some 60,000 troops were deployed, with T-34-85 medium tanks, the new T-54s, IS-3 heavy tanks, assault guns and armoured carriers: more than three times the five divisions (31,500 troops) of the late-October plan "Wave". 3 5

Just before the attack, the Soviets executed a deft deception. On 3 November, the Soviet command invited a Hungarian military delegation, including Defence Minister Pál Maléter, to negotiate the withdrawal at Tököl, near Budapest. Around midnight, KGB chief Ivan Serov ordered the entire delegation arrested. The Hungarian military was decapitated hours before the invasion. Simultaneously, Soviet-controlled radio broadcast a fake "Maléter statement" ordering Hungarian troops not to fire. 3 18

At 03:00 on 4 November, Soviet tanks entered Budapest in two thrusts: one up Soroksári Road from the south, the other down Váci Road from the north. All Danube bridges were seized. At 04:25, the first shots hit the barracks on Budaörsi Road. At 05:20, Nagy broadcast his final message, a 35-second broadcast: "Soviet forces have attacked our capital. The Government remains at its post." 3 4

At about 05:00 the same morning, a transmitter claiming to be in Szolnok, 100 kilometres from Budapest (Hungarian research places it in fact at Uzhhorod in the Soviet Union), broadcast János Kádár's proclamation of the "Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government", which "requested" Soviet assistance: a regime that arrived essentially behind Soviet tanks. 5 4 12

The fighting proved far fiercer than expected. Soviet forces encountered the strongest resistance in the working-class districts of Csepel and the 8th and 9th districts of Budapest. The area around the Corvin Cinema, a symbolic stronghold of the uprising, came under concentrated attack. Hungarian Army units fought sporadically rather than in an organized fashion; the UN report noted not a single recorded case of Hungarian units fighting on the Soviet side. Zhukov reported that by 9 November, twelve Hungarian divisions, two armoured regiments, and the entire air force had been disarmed. 3 4 5

The last resistance was crushed around 11 November in Csepel and Sztálinváros (today Dunaújváros). Official Soviet losses were 669 killed, 51 missing, and 1,251 wounded. On the Hungarian side, about 2,500 were killed and some 20,000 wounded, and roughly 200,000 left the country, most of them into Austria. Half the dead were under 30; 53 percent were workers. 3 5

Nagy sought refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. State Minister István Bibó remained alone in the Parliament building, writing his proclamation "For Freedom and Truth." When Soviet troops occupied the building, he was still at his post. 14 3

The Killing of Imre Nagy: 19 Months of Kidnapping, Secret Trial, and the Noose

When Soviet forces invaded Budapest at dawn on 4 November 1956, Imre Nagy took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy with associates such as Géza Losonczy, György Lukács and Rajk's widow Júlia, and their families. The Kádár government gave a written guarantee of safe conduct home, but when the group left the embassy on 22 November Soviet troops stopped their bus, seized them and took them to Snagov, Romania. 7 3 17

In January 1957, a five-party summit of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary convened in Budapest, where Kádár placed the fate of the Nagy group on the agenda. The Romanian minutes record the first explicit reference to "the responsibility and legal consequences" for Nagy. That March, in Moscow, Kádár and Khrushchev agreed to put Nagy on trial. On 21 December 1957, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party resolved to prosecute Nagy on political charges, and on 5 February 1958, the secret trial opened before a military court in Budapest. 3 7

The trial was presided over by Ferenc Vida, chairman of the Council of the People's Court of the Supreme Court. The eight defendants included Nagy, Defence Minister Pál Maléter, journalist Miklós Gimes, Ferenc Donáth, and former President Zoltán Tildy. One key Nagy adviser, Géza Losonczy, had died on 21 December 1957 while in pre-trial detention, the result of a hunger strike during which guards forced a feeding tube into his windpipe. Another, József Szilágyi, had refused to answer interrogators' questions; his case was separated, and he was hanged on 24 April 1958. Interior Ministry sound technicians tape-recorded the entire 52 hours of proceedings, and state security operatives filmed the courtroom for a propaganda film that was never released. 3 17

Nagy rejected all charges and refused even to mount a substantive defence. The prosecution charged him with "initiating and leading a conspiracy" and with treason. Defence counsel were not permitted to call witnesses, and Judge Vida repeatedly prevented the defendants from presenting their evidence. On 15 June 1958, the court sentenced Nagy, Maléter, and Gimes to death with total confiscation of property. Donáth received 12 years, Tildy 6, and Sándor Kopácsi life imprisonment. 7 3

The sentences were carried out at dawn the following day, 16 June, in the courtyard of the National Prison in Budapest. The three men were hanged, and their bodies were wrapped in tar paper, bound with wire, and buried on the prison grounds. The Kádár government announced the executions only after they had been completed. In 1961, the remains were transferred to Plot 301 of the New Public Cemetery and reburied face-down, in unmarked graves. The families were not told the location until the spring of 1989. 7 4

On 16 June 1989, the 31st anniversary of the execution, Nagy and his fellow martyrs were exhumed and given a state funeral in Heroes' Square. A crowd of 250,000 attended the ceremony, which became the decisive turning point in the collapse of the Hungarian socialist regime. 7 3

What did the crushing of the revolution settle, in Hungary and in the Cold War?

Even after Soviet tanks took Budapest, the workers kept fighting. On 14 November, delegates from the district workers' councils formed the Central Workers' Council of Greater Budapest. "We stand strictly on the principles of socialism," they declared, while demanding Imre Nagy's return as head of government, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, an end to one-party rule and free elections. Across the country, roughly 2,100 workers' councils had formed, with over 28,000 members: an experiment not just in resistance but in a different kind of socialism, namely workers' self-management based on direct democracy and standing against the party-state. The Kádár regime initially pretended to negotiate, but on 11 December it arrested the Central Workers' Council leadership en masse. A 48-hour general strike followed, and by mid-1957 the council movement was crushed. 4 3

Internationally, what the crushing of the revolution settled was the Cold War stalemate, and Budapest proved both of its axioms at once. First, the West would not move militarily inside the Soviet sphere. On 27 October 1956, US Secretary of State Dulles declared: "We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies." Ever since Churchill had effectively conceded a Soviet security zone in Eastern Europe in 1953, the West had no intention of disrupting the status quo, and throughout the revolution the Eisenhower administration never considered any intervention beyond "containment." Internal studies concluded that an uprising in Hungary was unwinnable and risked escalating to nuclear war, and the simultaneous Suez invasion by America's allies Britain and France blurred even the West's moral standing to condemn the Soviet invasion. Second, the USSR would not permit withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Both propositions were reconfirmed in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and operated as the unwritten rule of European security until 1989. 3

When the second axiom hardened is still debated. The dispute centres on the so-called "Malin notes," Vladimir Malin's fragmentary minutes of CPSU Presidium meetings disclosed in the 1990s. On 30 October the Presidium voted unanimously to withdraw troops from Hungary and adopted a declaration promising negotiations on removing them. Some scholars read this as evidence that the Soviets were genuinely willing to compromise and another path was possible. But most historians, Csaba Békés among them, argue that withdrawal was only ever contemplated on the condition that the Communist system remain intact and Hungary stay in the Soviet camp, that this premise collapsed when Nagy declared a return to a multiparty system on 30 October, and that the option vanished when the Presidium turned to intervention the next day. The withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of neutrality on 1 November came after the decision had been taken. Even Mikoyan said that day: "We simply cannot allow Hungary to be removed from our camp." 3

The principle thus fixed, that any reform stepping outside the framework of one-party dictatorship would be blocked by military force, would be named the "Brezhnev Doctrine" when it was used to end the Prague Spring in 1968, but its real precedent was Budapest in 1956. Békés, drawing on newly opened archives from both sides, argues that 1956 did not intensify the Cold War but actually stabilised it. The superpowers reached a shared understanding that all-out war had to be avoided, and the line that divided Europe hardened into a de facto permanent arrangement tacitly accepted by both. After 1956 American policy toward Eastern Europe was rebuilt on the recognition that the restoration of independence to the satellite states was impossible in the foreseeable future, and the Cold War entered a phase of "compelled coexistence." 3

Inside Hungary, the new regime of János Kádár opened a path possible only within this frame. By 1963 most political prisoners had been released; in 1968 the New Economic Mechanism brought limited market elements into the planned economy, launching what came to be called "goulash communism"; and by the 1970s Hungary had the highest living standard in the Eastern Bloc. Kádár's formula, "whoever is not against us is with us," declared a social contract that would buy stability not through revolution but through consumption and depoliticization. But all of it rested on Soviet military sanction, and Kádár could never escape the origin of his rule: the Soviet tanks that installed him. On 6 July 1989, the day he died, the Hungarian Supreme Court declared the 1958 verdict against Imre Nagy null and void. 13 12 3

The cost of the revolution also spread beyond Hungary's borders. Roughly 200,000 Hungarians fled to the West, and mass defections shook communist parties across Europe. The British Communist Party lost thousands of members, and the Italian party split as the CGIL union leader Giuseppe Di Vittorio and others openly opposed the leadership's support for Moscow. Among Western European communist intellectuals, the moral authority of the Soviet model never recovered. 3

Whose revolution was 1956?

The argument over what the revolution meant began with the crackdown. For 33 years the Kádár regime defined 1956 as a "counter-revolution" organised by fascist and Horthyite remnants and controlled the official narrative within that frame. Mainstream Western accounts cast it as a national liberation struggle. Émigré intellectuals and the domestic democratic opposition countered that the mainstream of 1956 was democratic socialist, a rising against Stalinist dictatorship whose essence lay in the spontaneous democracy of the workers' councils, the autonomous student organizations and the reconstituted non-communist parties. C. L. R. James, Hannah Arendt and European council communists focused in particular on the spontaneous emergence of the workers' councils and read 1956 as a "revolution of workers' democracy against the bureaucratic party-state." These three readings have never fully converged. 4 3

The official reading first cracked from within. On 28 January 1989 the reform minister Imre Pozsgay became the first figure in the ruling party to call 1956 not a "counter-revolution" but a "popular uprising." At Imre Nagy's reburial on 16 June 1989, reform communists claimed him as their forerunner, and when the Third Hungarian Republic was proclaimed on 23 October 1989 the revolution's legitimacy was restored. 4 3

But the fall of the communist regime did not end the debate; it made it more complicated. As the historian András Mink has shown, after 1989 the new Hungarian right redefined 1956 as an anti-communist national struggle, advancing a revisionist interpretation that linked it to the anti-communist struggle of the pre-war Horthy regime and seeking to rehabilitate even the traditions of the interwar Horthy era. Some far-right readings even positioned 1956 as a continuation of the Arrow Cross's anti-Bolshevik fight of 1944. In the autumn of 2006, the 50th anniversary, far-right groups mingled with the anti-government protest outside Parliament, and on 23 October protesters drove a museum T-34 tank at the police: the memory of 1956, once the symbol of resistance, had been yoked to the symbolic apparatus of the interwar far right. From the 2000s onward Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz government captured the memory of the revolution in an anti-communist nationalist narrative of "national sacrifice for freedom," and since the 2010s the radical democratic legacy of the workers' councils has been erased rather than remembered. 4 16 3

The Russian verdict has not closed either. The apology in the preamble of the December 1991 treaties with the Soviet Union and Russia, and Yeltsin's 1992 address to the Hungarian Parliament, seemed to close the book on 1956. But in August 2023 a history textbook by Vladimir Medinsky, Russia's former minister of culture, described the revolution as "a fascist uprising organised by the West," and Hungary's foreign minister Péter Szijjártó publicly rebuked it: "Labelling these people as fascists is simply unacceptable." 3

Even among historians, consensus remains elusive. One camp reads 1956 as a Cold War watershed, the moment when the limits of reform within the Soviet bloc were violently fixed. Another sees in the emergence of the workers' councils a lost possibility for democratizing state socialism from within. And the paradox that without the defeat of 1956 there might have been no Prague 1968 and no Gdańsk 1980 has ensured that the revolution, though it "lost," occupies an indelible page in the chronology of Eastern European liberation. Its one certain legacy is the question it posed: how far could reform go inside the socialist camp? The answer was given again, the same way, in Prague in 1968. Sixty-seven years later, 1956 still cannot escape the question: whose revolution was it? 3

Consequences

The Soviet crackdown killed thousands and drove more than 200,000 to flee to the West. Nagy was arrested and secretly executed in 1958, and a Soviet-installed government under Kádár took power. The revolution was defeated, but it left all of Europe with the question of how far reform would be allowed within the socialist bloc.

Timeline & Map

Budapest 9 Soviet forces · into Budapest 13 Heroes’ Square 5 Parliament 7 Parliament 8 Parliament 1 Budapest 2 Budapest 3 4 Budapest 6 Budapest 10 Budapest 11 Budapest 12 Budapest Soviet forces9
  1. 1953.07.04
    Imre Nagy’s New Course

    On Moscow's instructions Rákosi gave up the premiership and Imre Nagy became prime minister.

  2. 1955.04.18
    Nagy dismissed

    Rákosi had Nagy accused of right-wing deviation and removed as prime minister.

  3. 1956.02.25
    Khrushchev’s Secret Speech

    In a closed session of the CPSU's 20th Congress, Khrushchev denounced Stalin's purges and personality cult.

  4. 11956.07.18
    Rákosi steps down

    Under pressure from Mikoyan, Rákosi resigned as First Secretary and was succeeded by his close associate Ernő Gerő.

  5. 21956.10.06
    Reburial of László Rajk

    László Rajk, executed after a 1949 show trial, was reburied as 100,000 to 200,000 people filed past in silence.

  6. 31956.10.23
    Protests in Budapest

    A student march swelled to some 200,000, and when the ÁVH security police fired at the Radio building an armed uprising began.

  7. 41956.10.24
    First Soviet entry and Nagy’s return

    Soviet troops entered Budapest, and the party Central Committee reappointed Nagy prime minister.

  8. 51956.10.25
    Kossuth Square shooting and Gerő’s removal

    Shots were fired into an unarmed crowd in Kossuth Square, and the same day János Kádár replaced Gerő as First Secretary.

  9. 61956.10.28
    Ceasefire and the “national democratic movement”

    In a radio address Nagy called the uprising a national and democratic movement and declared an immediate ceasefire.

  10. 71956.10.30
    End of one-party rule

    Nagy announced the end of one-party rule and formed a coalition cabinet.

  11. 1956.10.31
    Moscow decides to intervene

    The CPSU Presidium decided to restore order in Hungary by force.

  12. 81956.11.01
    Withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and neutrality

    Nagy's cabinet declared Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and its neutrality.

  13. 91956.11.04
    The second Soviet intervention

    Soviet forces attacked Budapest in Operation Whirlwind, and Kádár announced a new government.

  14. 101956.11.14
    Central Workers’ Council of Greater Budapest

    Delegates of Budapest's district workers' councils formed the Central Workers' Council of Greater Budapest.

  15. 111956.11.22
    Nagy’s group abducted

    Soviet troops arrested Nagy's group as it left the Yugoslav embassy and took it to Romania.

  16. 121958.06.16
    Nagy executed

    Imre Nagy, Pál Maléter and Miklós Gimes, sentenced to death at a secret trial, were hanged.

  17. 131989.06.16
    Reburial of Imre Nagy

    On the 31st anniversary of the executions, Nagy and his fellow defendants were reburied in a state ceremony in Heroes' Square.

Related people 40

Participants9

embassy staff (on-site participant)Vladimir Kryuchkov1924–2007

Minister of Culture in Nagy governmentGyörgy Lukács1885–1971

Served as Minister of Culture in Imre Nagy's revolutionary government in October 1956 and participated in attempts to reform the party on democratic lines. Interned in Romania after the revolution was crushed.

State minister who voted for neutralityZoltán Tildy1889–1961

He became minister of state in Nagy's coalition government on October 30, 1956, and was present at the November 1 cabinet meeting that voted unanimously to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and declare neutrality.

last state minister of the Nagy governmentIstván Bibó1911–1979

When Soviet troops arrived, he stayed alone in the Parliament building and wrote the proclamation 'For Freedom and Truth'.

former member of the Central Workers' CouncilBalázs Nagy1920–2003

He wrote the definitive firsthand account of the council's formation and resistance, published from exile.

Police chief who joined the revolutionSándor Kopácsi1922–2001

Refused to fire on demonstrators on October 23 and joined the revolution.

Minister of State in the Nagy governmentGéza Losonczy1917–1957

As minister of state in the November 1 coalition cabinet, he attended the cabinet meeting that voted for neutrality. Arrested after the Soviet intervention, he died on hunger strike in prison in December 1957.

commander of the armored unit at the Radio buildingPál Maléter1917–1958

On October 23 he commanded the armored unit sent to the Radio building, later became Minister of Defense in Nagy's government, and was executed alongside Nagy in 1958.

Agriculture minister in Nagy's revolutionary governmentBéla Kovács1908–1959

In 1956, he served as agriculture minister and state minister in Imre Nagy's revolutionary government.

Opposition & resistance16

Defense ministerGeorgy Zhukov1896–1974

As defense minister, he backed the military intervention.

Ambassador to HungaryYuri Andropov1914–1984

As Soviet ambassador in Budapest, he played a key role on the ground in the crackdown.

Soviet-installed governmentJános Kádár1912–1989

He left Nagy’s government and, with Soviet backing, formed the rival government that ruled Hungary.

Sent to BudapestAnastas Mikoyan1895–1978

Sent to Budapest with Suslov, he helped manage the crisis on the spot.

Sent to BudapestMikhail Suslov1902–1982

With Mikoyan, he coordinated the hard-line response on the ground.

Stalinist hardlinerMátyás Rákosi1892–1971

The architect of the Stalinist rule that provoked the uprising, ousted just before it.

Led the ideological response as Agitprop chiefFyodor Konstantinov1901–1991

As head of the CC Agitprop Department (1955–1958), he publicly warned of the 'revisionist' danger among intellectuals after the Hungarian uprising and published Against Contemporary Revisionism in 1958.

Vetoed UNSC resolutionArkady Sobolev1903–1964

As Soviet Permanent Representative, he vetoed the US resolution condemning the Soviet intervention in Hungary at the Security Council on 4 November 1956, calling it a lawful Warsaw Pact action.

Rákosi's successor whose speech triggered the uprisingErnő Gerő1898–1980

Became first secretary after Rákosi, but his 23 Oct radio speech denouncing protesters amplified the fury. Dismissed on 25 Oct under Soviet pressure.

Last Rákosi-loyalist Prime MinisterAndrás Hegedüs1922–1999

Served as Prime Minister until October 1956 and was recorded in the Mikoyan report as present at meetings where Rákosi's fate was decided.

Communist opponent of the Soviet suppressionEugenio Reale1905–1986

In 1956, he broke with the PCI over its support for suppressing the Hungarian Revolution.

Member of the force that crushed the revolutionGyula Horn1932–2013

He served in the armed militia that crushed the 1956 revolution.

Planner of the Soviet interventionMikhail Malinin1899–1960

He helped plan the Soviet military intervention against the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.

Soviet commander involved in suppressing the revolutionPavel Batov1897–1985

While commanding the Carpathian Military District, he took part in suppressing the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

PCF leader supporting Soviet interventionMaurice Thorez1900–1964

He supported Soviet intervention in the Hungarian uprising in 1956.

Minister of the armed forces and public security under KádárFerenc Münnich1886–1967

Interior minister under Nagy, he backed Soviet armed intervention in Moscow with Kádár in November and from 4 November helped organise the security regiments and the Workers’ Militia in Kádár’s government.

Related terms

Sources: Csaba Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in DocumentsEncyclopaedia Britannica: Hungarian Revolution of 1956reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19