Cold War historian who traced the Sino-Soviet split to inequality within the alliance and clashing national interests
ideological disagreements only served as a cover for the power struggle… in which ideology was merely a means to an end.
Sergey Radchenko is a Soviet-born British historian of the Cold War, known for his work on Sino-Soviet relations. His first book, Two Suns in the Heavens (2009), argued that the split was driven less by ideology than by the structural inequality of the alliance and Chinese resentment, becoming the major counter-argument to Lorenz Lüthi's ideology-centered interpretation.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 2001BSc International Relations, LSE
- 2005PhD International History, LSE
- 2005–2007Assistant Professor of History, Pittsburg State University
- 2007–2009Fellow in International History, LSE
- 2009–2013Lecturer, University of Nottingham Ningbo China
- 2013–2016Reader, Aberystwyth University
- 2016–2021Professor of International Relations, Cardiff University
- 2021–Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Related historical events
- 1956–1969The Sino-Soviet SplitCold War historian emphasizing national interest and inequalityIn Two Suns in the Heavens (2009), he offered the major counter-argument to the ideology-centered view, emphasizing national interest and inequality within the alliance as the primary causes of the Sino-Soviet split.
- 1975The Helsinki AccordsCold War historian interpreting the Helsinki AccordsHe argued that Brezhnev prioritized the Accords to secure Western recognition of the USSR's standing in Europe.
To Run the World and the 'Recognition' Thesis of Soviet Foreign Policy
To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power (2024) reconstructs Soviet foreign policy around a single axis. Drawing on vast Soviet, Chinese, and American archives, Radchenko argues that Kremlin decisions from Stalin to Gorbachev cannot be explained by ideology alone; the consistent driver was a thirst for Western, especially American, recognition of the Soviet state's legitimacy as a superpower. His emblematic case is Brezhnev's prioritization of the Helsinki Accords (1975), which he pursued even at the cost of its human-rights 'poison pill' because it secured Western recognition of the USSR's standing in the European order. Radchenko goes further: Marxism-Leninism does not adequately explain Soviet conduct, for Soviet ambition was a state attribute that both preceded and outlived the Soviet Union, and ideology served as propaganda packaging for revolutionary movements rather than as a factor in decision memos. The book won the 2025 Lionel Gelber Prize, was shortlisted for the Pushkin House Prize, and took a bronze Arthur Ross Book Award, and it is widely regarded as a new benchmark in the scholarship on Soviet Cold War diplomacy. Its stepping stone, Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the Cold War (2014), traced the rejection of Gorbachev's Asian vision by China, India, Japan, and the DPRK, previewing the recognition thesis in an Asian setting.