Soviet submarine officer who refused to launch a nuclear torpedo and prevented nuclear war
Thomas Blanton, director of the U.S. National Security Archive, called Arkhipov "the man who saved the world."
Soviet Navy vice admiral. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, as chief of staff of the 69th Submarine Brigade aboard submarine B-59, he alone refused to authorize a nuclear torpedo launch when the captain and political officer had both consented, preventing a likely nuclear exchange. He had previously served aboard the nuclear submarine K-19 during its 1961 reactor coolant accident, suffering radiation exposure while helping to avert a meltdown. He later commanded the 69th Brigade and the 37th Submarine Division, and served as head of the Caspian Higher Naval School from 1975 to 1985.
Career Timeline
- 1945Served in Soviet–Japanese War on Pacific Fleet minesweeper (cadet)
- 1947Graduated from Caspian Higher Naval School
- 1961Executive officer of nuclear submarine K-19 during reactor coolant accident
- 1961–1964Chief of Staff, 69th Submarine Brigade, Northern Fleet
- 1964–1968Commander, 69th Submarine Brigade
- c. 1968–1975Commander, 37th Submarine Division
- 1975Promoted to rear admiral
- 1975–1985Head of the Caspian Higher Naval School
- 1981Promoted to vice admiral
- 1988Retired from active service
Related historical events
- 1941–1945The Great Patriotic Warparticipated in the Soviet-Japanese War
- 1962The Cuban Missile CrisisB-59 Brigade Chief of Staff · refused nuclear launchAboard submarine B-59, when the captain and political officer agreed to fire a nuclear torpedo, Arkhipov alone refused. His veto as brigade chief of staff prevented nuclear war.
The B-59 Nuclear Torpedo Standoff (1962)
On October 27, 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Arkhipov was aboard the submarine B-59 as both chief of staff of the submarine flotilla and executive officer of the boat. B-59 was the flagship of four Foxtrot-class diesel-electric submarines dispatched by the USSR to Cuba. Each carried 22 torpedoes, including one T-5 nuclear torpedo with roughly the yield of the Hiroshima bomb.
A U.S. Navy task force, the aircraft carrier USS Randolph and 11 destroyers, detected B-59 and began dropping signaling depth charges (practice grenades) to force it to surface for identification. The submarine had been out of radio contact with Moscow for days and was running too deep to receive civilian broadcasts. The air conditioning had failed, temperatures exceeded 37°C (99°F), and carbon dioxide levels rose sharply, causing crewmen to collapse from heat exhaustion. Captain Valentin Savitsky, believing war had already begun, ordered the nuclear torpedo readied, reportedly declaring: "We're going to blast them now. We will die, but we will sink them all. We will not disgrace our navy."
On most Soviet nuclear-armed submarines, only the captain and the political officer were required to authorize a nuclear launch. But aboard B-59, uniquely, Arkhipov's position as brigade chief of staff made him the third required signatory. Captain Savitsky and Political Officer Ivan Maslennikov both agreed to launch; Arkhipov alone refused. He argued that the American depth charges were signals to surface, not an attack, and that using a nuclear weapon without orders from Moscow was indefensible. After a prolonged argument, he persuaded Savitsky to surface. B-59 emerged among the U.S. warships, made contact with the destroyer USS Cony, and was ordered to return to the Soviet Union.
Arkhipov's judgment averted what could have become a full nuclear exchange. In 2002, former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara acknowledged: "We came very, very close, closer than we knew at the time." Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. called it "not only the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. It was the most dangerous moment in human history." Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, called Arkhipov "the man who saved the world."
The fact that B-59 carried a nuclear torpedo remained classified until the 2002 Havana Conference on the 40th anniversary of the crisis. Upon returning to the USSR, the crew was reprimanded (one admiral told them, "It would have been better if you'd gone down with your ship"), and Arkhipov rarely spoke publicly about the incident.