December Theses (1928)
12월 테제
Common name of the resolution on the Korean question adopted by the Political Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on 10 December 1928. It defined the Korean revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution whose content was the overthrow of imperialism and the solution of the land question, and directed that the Communist Party of Korea, a faction-ridden body of intellectuals and students, be rebuilt as a party rooted among factory workers and poor peasants. It characterised the national bourgeoisie as national-reformist. It became the basis of the party-rebuilding movement and of the case for dissolving the Singanhoe.
In depth
The resolution applied to Korea the theses on the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (July to September 1928), which Kuusinen had drafted. It saw the workers, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie as the motive forces of the revolution, held that the bulk of the bourgeoisie was at best a national-reformist opposition to Japanese imperialism and that the big landowners stood with Japan, and declared that the national liberation struggle could not win without an agrarian revolution.
When the resolution appeared the Communist Party of Korea was in ruins. Founded in 1925, it had been rebuilt after each round of arrests, down to the fourth party; the arrests that ran from July to October 1928 took even its responsible secretary, Cha Geum-bong. The quarrels of the Tuesday, Seoul and ML factions had been carried up to the Comintern. The Political Secretariat of the Comintern executive adopted the resolution on 10 December 1928, and it was printed the following February in the Comintern's bulletin Inprecor under the title "Resolution on the Korean Question". In Korea it is also called the "Resolution on the Tasks of the Peasants and Workers of Korea".
It defined the character of the revolution as follows:
Thus the overthrow of imperialism and the revolutionary solution of the agrarian problem is the main objective historical meaning of the revolution in Korea in the first phases of its development.
In this sense the Korean revolution was a bourgeois-democratic one, with the two-stage prospect that under the hegemony of the proletariat it would pass through a democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants into a socialist revolution. The passage that calls the bourgeoisie national-reformist carries the words "especially since the experiences of the Chinese Revolution": the Kuomintang's turn on the communists in China in 1927 was carried straight over into the view taken of the Korean national bourgeoisie and of the Singanhoe.
On the party it said:
The ranks of the Communist Party of Korea have in the past consisted almost exclusively of intellectuals and students. A Communist Party built on such foundations cannot be a consistently Bolshevik and organisationally sound Party.
Of the party members arrested in the Communist Party incidents, 42.4 per cent were in fact petty bourgeois (intellectuals, students, merchants), 11.6 per cent workers and 13 per cent peasants. The resolution called for a sharp break with the methods of the intellectual circle and for mass Bolshevik work in the factories and trade unions, told the party to find a way to the workers in the Japanese government enterprises, and warned that amid factional struggle Japanese spies could easily enter its ranks.
It did not tell the communists to leave the national movement's organisations. It called for more intensive work inside national-revolutionary mass organisations such as the Singanhoe, the Hyeongpyeongsa and Cheondogyo, and added:
Fighting for the toilers in those organisations the Communists must expose the half-heartedness and indecision of the national–reformist and other opportunist leaders.
The demand to dissolve the Singanhoe came not from this resolution but later, from the September Theses of 1930 and from the debate inside Korea.
Whether the resolution withdrew the party's recognition as a section of the Comintern is read differently. Kim In-dok holds that a decision on the organisational question of November 1928 had already withdrawn it; Yi Kyun-yong holds that the December Theses neither withdrew recognition nor ordered dissolution but were guidelines for rebuilding the party. The New History of Korea (Sinpyeon Hanguksa) notes that the theses did not explicitly order dissolution but that many Korean socialists took them as in effect such an order, and it also records the judgement that the demand was excessive in Korean conditions, where workers were few and factions unavoidable.
After the theses Korean communists tried to rebuild the party in factories and villages under the slogan "to the masses". In September 1930 the September Theses of the Profintern characterised the Singanhoe as a national-reformist organisation, and this current led to its dissolution.
The resolution also reached Koreans outside Korea. With the party centre gone, the Comintern's one-country-one-party principle was applied: the Manchurian General Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea was dissolved in 1930 and the Japan General Bureau in October 1931, and Korean party members in Manchuria joined the Chinese Communist Party while those in Japan joined the Japanese Communist Party. As word spread that the Comintern had entrusted the rebuilding of the party inside Korea to the Chinese Communist Party, a committee for work inside Korea was prepared under that party's Manchurian Provincial Committee, while in Shanghai Kim Dan-ya and others ran a rebuilding movement under the Comintern's direct guidance. The party was not re-established until liberation in 1945.