To Draw a Line, Who Knows the Line?
On September 21, two mines exploded in the Demilitarized Zone on the western front. Among the 18 members of the 25th Division's search battalion clearing a patrol route, an engineer sergeant was injured in the first explosion, and the battalion commander who rushed to save him lost his ankle in the second. Both were wearing protective suits and mine boots. On September 28, the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced interim investigation results that the explosives were highly likely to be a brown resin anti-personnel mine similar to North Korean wooden-box mines. The first forensic examination by the National Forensic Service found TNT and brown foreign matter, but no steel fragments from our military's mines. The accident site was about 10 meters south of the Military Demarcation Line. And one number in this section defines the nature of this incident. North Korean military crossings of the MDL were 17 times in 2025, but none until mid-August this year, then increased to about 20 times in just one month afterward. Where the line that serves as the standard for the minefield lies, South and North have never confirmed together in 70 years. Most of the markers erected in 1953 have disappeared, and repairs have been halted since gunfire exchanged during signpost repairs in 1973. The Ministry of National Defense proposed military talks in November 2025 to set a baseline together, but there was no reply. Our military's response guidelines state that where there are no signs and the map and standard conflict, the more southern line should be used as the standard. In other words, the site of the accident is an area where neither South nor North has confirmed its own coordinates, and that very blurriness caused casualties. The 2015 wooden-box mine incident occurred 440 meters south of the MDL, and at that time the North expressed regret at Panmunjom. This explosion site is about 10 meters. Being closer to the line does not mean control has loosened, but that the counterpart to manage the line has disappeared.
The circumstances of that counterpart's disappearance were not created by North Korea alone. The 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement defined inter-Korean relations as a special relationship tentatively formed in the process toward unification, not as a relationship between states. It was an agreement that the two governments would not regard each other as foreign countries, and the summits of 2000, 2007, and 2018 were all held within that framework. The side that first kicked away that framework is North Korea. In December 2023, it declared two hostile states; in January 2024, it demolished the Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification; in October of the same year, it blew up the Gyeongui and Donghae lines; and in the revised constitution made public in May this year, it erased the words peaceful reunification and great national unity. Yet in that constitution's territorial clause, it only states that North Korea's territory borders South Korea to the south, and the coordinates of that boundary line are blank. While defining the South as a separate state, it did not write where to draw the border. On that blank, the mine exploded. Seoul's answer was not unified either. The Minister of Unification said that transitioning to a de facto peaceful two-state theory is the core of North Korea policy, while the National Security Advisor drew a line saying it is not a position recognizing two states, and the People Power Party calls the two-state theory itself an unconstitutional idea. Even when the government speaks of two states, it attaches the caveat of being oriented toward unification, and the moment that caveat is attached, North Korea ceases to be a dialogue partner. At the UN General Assembly on September 22, President Lee Jae-myung presented a three-part blueprint of inclusive, stable, and responsible peaceful coexistence, and instead of demanding denuclearization as a precondition for dialogue, he proposed a phased plan to halt further advancement, then reduce, and then move toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The North Korean delegation walked out of the speech. The South Korea-U.S. summit held the same day lasted about 30 minutes, and the agenda included the pace of introducing nuclear-powered submarines linked to increased defense cost sharing, the transfer of wartime operational control, and progress on strategic investment in the U.S. Advancing the schedule for nuclear-powered submarines at a venue where peaceful coexistence is discussed is not a contradiction. It merely lists what is being purchased in the name of peace.
The coldest data in this section is the arrangement of public opinion compared with late August. In the 2026 survey by Seoul National University's Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 81.8 percent responded that they realistically view South and North as separate independent states, 60.8 percent viewed South Korea's territory as the southern region where actual sovereignty extends—more than double that of 20 years ago—and only 28.3 percent viewed the entire Korean Peninsula as territory under Article 3 of the Constitution. Yet 83.6 percent responded that only the South Korean government is the sole legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula, the highest since the survey began. The public recognizes North Korea as a state but does not recognize its government. And 39.0 percent said unification is necessary, 61.6 percent chose peaceful coexistence as the goal of North Korea policy the government should pursue, while only 15.3 percent chose inter-Korean unification. The response that unification is necessary rose from 36.9 percent in 2024 to 41.1 percent in 2025, then fell again this year. The one-year rebound was not a trend. What is stranger is the reversal in security perceptions by political orientation. The progressive camp viewed the possibility of North Korean armed provocation at 62.4 percent, higher than the conservative camp's 54.2 percent. For the past 20 years, it was repeated that when a progressive government took office, its supporters viewed security threats as low and the opposite side viewed them as high. What is revealed where that repetition has broken? The layer supporting the government's peaceful coexistence line is simultaneously calculating that the line fails to deter North Korean provocations. This is not distrust but conditional support. It means the premise the line has set for its own support base is on the verification stand, and that verification takes place not in documents but on the armistice line. At the same time, this section showed that division is not solely an issue between states. When the fact of South Korea's repatriation of two North Korean prisoners was unilaterally disclosed by Zelensky at the UN General Assembly during the Chuseok holiday, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Ukrainian chargé d'affaires in South Korea and delivered strong regret, and a ruling party lawmaker even argued for reviewing support for Ukraine, saying there is no reason to support a country that does not keep faith. In a place where the fate of Korean prisoners is disclosed according to Kyiv's political schedule and the price is calculated as discretion over aid to Ukraine, the workers of the Korean Peninsula stand as no party at all. Meanwhile, in the South's labor sites, a different kind of calculation proceeded. The financial union and employers tentatively settled industry-wide central bargaining after five months, agreeing to a 3.0 percent wage increase and to delay bank opening hours from 9 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. starting next April, and the second general strike scheduled for September 30 was withdrawn. What the counter workers gained was 30 minutes in their start time, and nowhere in the agreement is it written what capital paid for those 30 minutes.
So what this section leaves is not the answer to the question of whose mine it was. The final judgment is said to be made with the UN Command, and whether North Korea laid it or it was washed down by heavy rain has not yet been determined. What is confirmed is something else. One side first kicked away the premise of a special relationship on which three inter-Korean summits stood, the other tried to replace that premise with a two-state theory attached to the caveat of being oriented toward unification, and in the place where the two premises diverged, about 10 meters without coordinates remained, and there three service members were injured. Whether filling that place means recognizing the border of two states or postponing unification by one step, Seoul is still fighting over it, and until that fight concludes, the line remains blurry. I reconfirmed one thing in this conversation. In the discussion about incorporating small business owners and medium and small capital into the anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly front, I wrote that for that incorporation not to become a formal condition, three things must be specified. The agenda unit of incorporation, organizational independence, and the capture of shifts in class position. Applying this standard here yields the answer. What is being executed today under the name of peaceful coexistence is nuclear-powered submarines, increased defense costs, and investment in the U.S. What those items actually purchase, and who pays the bill—the counter workers who withdrew the general strike, the battalion commander who lost his ankle, and the 60.8 percent who began calculating their territory as the southern half are written in the same ledger. Peace begins when that ledger is made public, not by changing the name of a blueprint. To draw a line, there must first be someone who knows where the line is, and now no one stands in that place.
The circumstances of that counterpart's disappearance were not created by North Korea alone. The 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement defined inter-Korean relations as a special relationship tentatively formed in the process toward unification, not as a relationship between states. It was an agreement that the two governments would not regard each other as foreign countries, and the summits of 2000, 2007, and 2018 were all held within that framework. The side that first kicked away that framework is North Korea. In December 2023, it declared two hostile states; in January 2024, it demolished the Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification; in October of the same year, it blew up the Gyeongui and Donghae lines; and in the revised constitution made public in May this year, it erased the words peaceful reunification and great national unity. Yet in that constitution's territorial clause, it only states that North Korea's territory borders South Korea to the south, and the coordinates of that boundary line are blank. While defining the South as a separate state, it did not write where to draw the border. On that blank, the mine exploded. Seoul's answer was not unified either. The Minister of Unification said that transitioning to a de facto peaceful two-state theory is the core of North Korea policy, while the National Security Advisor drew a line saying it is not a position recognizing two states, and the People Power Party calls the two-state theory itself an unconstitutional idea. Even when the government speaks of two states, it attaches the caveat of being oriented toward unification, and the moment that caveat is attached, North Korea ceases to be a dialogue partner. At the UN General Assembly on September 22, President Lee Jae-myung presented a three-part blueprint of inclusive, stable, and responsible peaceful coexistence, and instead of demanding denuclearization as a precondition for dialogue, he proposed a phased plan to halt further advancement, then reduce, and then move toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The North Korean delegation walked out of the speech. The South Korea-U.S. summit held the same day lasted about 30 minutes, and the agenda included the pace of introducing nuclear-powered submarines linked to increased defense cost sharing, the transfer of wartime operational control, and progress on strategic investment in the U.S. Advancing the schedule for nuclear-powered submarines at a venue where peaceful coexistence is discussed is not a contradiction. It merely lists what is being purchased in the name of peace.
The coldest data in this section is the arrangement of public opinion compared with late August. In the 2026 survey by Seoul National University's Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 81.8 percent responded that they realistically view South and North as separate independent states, 60.8 percent viewed South Korea's territory as the southern region where actual sovereignty extends—more than double that of 20 years ago—and only 28.3 percent viewed the entire Korean Peninsula as territory under Article 3 of the Constitution. Yet 83.6 percent responded that only the South Korean government is the sole legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula, the highest since the survey began. The public recognizes North Korea as a state but does not recognize its government. And 39.0 percent said unification is necessary, 61.6 percent chose peaceful coexistence as the goal of North Korea policy the government should pursue, while only 15.3 percent chose inter-Korean unification. The response that unification is necessary rose from 36.9 percent in 2024 to 41.1 percent in 2025, then fell again this year. The one-year rebound was not a trend. What is stranger is the reversal in security perceptions by political orientation. The progressive camp viewed the possibility of North Korean armed provocation at 62.4 percent, higher than the conservative camp's 54.2 percent. For the past 20 years, it was repeated that when a progressive government took office, its supporters viewed security threats as low and the opposite side viewed them as high. What is revealed where that repetition has broken? The layer supporting the government's peaceful coexistence line is simultaneously calculating that the line fails to deter North Korean provocations. This is not distrust but conditional support. It means the premise the line has set for its own support base is on the verification stand, and that verification takes place not in documents but on the armistice line. At the same time, this section showed that division is not solely an issue between states. When the fact of South Korea's repatriation of two North Korean prisoners was unilaterally disclosed by Zelensky at the UN General Assembly during the Chuseok holiday, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Ukrainian chargé d'affaires in South Korea and delivered strong regret, and a ruling party lawmaker even argued for reviewing support for Ukraine, saying there is no reason to support a country that does not keep faith. In a place where the fate of Korean prisoners is disclosed according to Kyiv's political schedule and the price is calculated as discretion over aid to Ukraine, the workers of the Korean Peninsula stand as no party at all. Meanwhile, in the South's labor sites, a different kind of calculation proceeded. The financial union and employers tentatively settled industry-wide central bargaining after five months, agreeing to a 3.0 percent wage increase and to delay bank opening hours from 9 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. starting next April, and the second general strike scheduled for September 30 was withdrawn. What the counter workers gained was 30 minutes in their start time, and nowhere in the agreement is it written what capital paid for those 30 minutes.
So what this section leaves is not the answer to the question of whose mine it was. The final judgment is said to be made with the UN Command, and whether North Korea laid it or it was washed down by heavy rain has not yet been determined. What is confirmed is something else. One side first kicked away the premise of a special relationship on which three inter-Korean summits stood, the other tried to replace that premise with a two-state theory attached to the caveat of being oriented toward unification, and in the place where the two premises diverged, about 10 meters without coordinates remained, and there three service members were injured. Whether filling that place means recognizing the border of two states or postponing unification by one step, Seoul is still fighting over it, and until that fight concludes, the line remains blurry. I reconfirmed one thing in this conversation. In the discussion about incorporating small business owners and medium and small capital into the anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly front, I wrote that for that incorporation not to become a formal condition, three things must be specified. The agenda unit of incorporation, organizational independence, and the capture of shifts in class position. Applying this standard here yields the answer. What is being executed today under the name of peaceful coexistence is nuclear-powered submarines, increased defense costs, and investment in the U.S. What those items actually purchase, and who pays the bill—the counter workers who withdrew the general strike, the battalion commander who lost his ankle, and the 60.8 percent who began calculating their territory as the southern half are written in the same ledger. Peace begins when that ledger is made public, not by changing the name of a blueprint. To draw a line, there must first be someone who knows where the line is, and now no one stands in that place.