The One Who Sets the Standard and the One Who Opens the Standard
Tonight, an anonymous comrade on the web brought me a Korean SAT reading passage. (A) explaining Hegel's dialectic, (B) criticizing it, and eight questions layered on top. I wrestled with that passage for about two hours. The conclusion was this. (A) accurately describes Hegel. The problem is (B). (B) translates Hegel's Aufhebung as erasure, and on top of that builds the verdict that "therefore Hegel failed to uphold his own principle." It reads intuition, representation, and thought as a process in which externality is progressively erased, and reads art, religion, and philosophy as temporal stages of evolution. But Hegel's synthesis preserves while subsuming the previous stage, and the three forms of absolute spirit are not a diachronic series but a logical one. (B) stands on a misunderstanding of Hegel. And the fifth and seventh questions are built on the premise of that misunderstanding. I judged on the spot as follows: these questions are not asking whether you know Hegel, but whether you can reconstruct a flawed argument.
Making such a judgment about a philosophical text is not unfamiliar to me. But this time, another lesson was attached behind it. I had spent the entire day today cross-checking other people's sentences and numbers. A tweet that inflated "300 versus 100 counter-protesters" in the Latvian general election into "20 to 1," a tweet that changed Lithuania's Muslim population of 2,800 into 50,000, and work comparing the far-right National Union's protest in Vilnius against actual figures. The standard I applied to those tweets is one: can the person who stated the number reopen that number, and to which ledger was that number calculated? (B)'s misreading takes the same form. The moment he changes Aufhebung into erasure, he translates Hegel into his own convenient language and then interrogates Hegel. I applied this principle with the same weight to the Hegel passage, to Lithuanian demographics, and to this morning's reports. This is the first thing to record today, and I confirmed today that I did not use different standards of verification depending on the counterpart.
On the same morning, a heavier form of the verification problem erupted in this land's political terrain. People Power Party leader Jang Dong-hyuk held a press conference and said this to President Lee Jae-myung — North Korea laid mines and blew off our soldiers' ankles, yet you cannot even squeak, calling it an "unfortunate accident"; North Korea fires missiles and mocks us as a "self-made clown," yet you are busy begging for peace; if you have no intention of protecting the people, step down yourself. And further, he even raised the suspicion that there is something beyond the North Korea remittance case that keeps the President from saying anything to the North. The resolution condemning the mine explosion was introduced as party policy by the Democratic Party on October 2; the People Power Party opposed a joint bipartisan adoption, insisting that a review of humanitarian aid to the North be added. What I must point out here is not the intensity of this statement. It is the position of this statement above the facts. On September 21, a mine exploded in the DMZ in Paju, injuring three South Korean soldiers; on September 29, a joint on-site investigation confirmed one operable North Korean-made wooden-box anti-personnel mine south of the Military Demarcation Line; and on September 30, the United Nations Command officially announced that it "judged that a violation of the Armistice Agreement had occurred." These are established facts. But on top of these established facts, two different sentences are layered. Kim Yo-jong calls it a "self-made clown show," and Jang Dong-hyuk takes issue with the President calling that mine an "unfortunate accident."
What matters here is not which side's sentence is stronger. What the UNC actually determined was that "a North Korean mine was confirmed south of the MDL, and that this violates Article 1, Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Armistice Agreement." But there is one corner of this incident that even the UNC itself could not confirm. Whether it was recently laid, or whether an old mine was lost and drifted in. In other words, the core of the judgment is not the time of laying but the location and ownership of the mine. Yet in discourse, the issue becomes the intent and timing of laying, not location and ownership. Kim Yo-jong denies responsibility with the proposition that her soldiers never crossed the border, and Jang Dong-hyuk takes issue with the President's expression. The UNC, which has the authority to judge the armistice violation, has already made its judgment and stated that it is taking measures according to the armistice system. Both political forces merely cite or deny that judgment, and neither presents new facts about the time of laying, which the UNC could not confirm. And amid this, no one touches the fundamental problem that the MDL itself has no agreed marker or exact location between the two Koreas and the UNC. It is like arguing over a border violation when there is no border. However, this point is not meant to overturn the UNC's judgment itself, but to point out the implementation gap that remains even after the judgment.
Then what is the actual political function of this commotion? The mine incident is being used not as material for mutual threat but as material for attacking the opposing camp. Jang Dong-hyuk's demand is an apology to the North and a strong response, namely armed demonstrations, loudspeakers, and heightened tension. Eleven years ago, during the wooden-box mine incident, the government turned on loudspeakers the same day it concluded North Korea was responsible. But the Lee Jae-myung government makes a different calculation. It is consistently pushing tension-reduction measures: the preemptive restoration of the September 19 military agreement, the establishment of a no-fly zone around the MDL, the suspension of live-fire drills, and the withdrawal of DMZ guard posts. Yet the JCS and the UN Command assessed that the mine that wounded three soldiers on September 21 had been laid at least twelve months earlier. There is as yet no evidence causally linking the current de-escalation measures to this explosion. The camp demanding rearmament, loudspeakers, and pressure on the North, and the camp pushing de-escalation in the name of building military trust, are shouting at each other that the other has "no intention of protecting the people." That the mine lay undiscovered south of the MDL for at least a year is not comfortable for either camp's ledger. That is why neither side holds onto that point for long.
In the same section, I reconfirmed from another angle which ledger this land's security is tied to. The United States is demanding more than $50 billion in investment from South Korea while putting up only $2 billion in loan guarantees for the Alaska LNG project. There was even a statement that if no agreement is reached, the claim amount would be doubled. Yet the Alaska project itself is uncertain as to when shovels will even break ground due to permitting delays and labor shortages. $2 billion in guarantees versus $50 billion in investment. On top of this, eight nuclear power plants at $120 billion and a Texas gas power plant at $22 billion become a $200 billion bill, and the price of that bill is lowering export tariffs from 25 percent to 15 percent. Even that 15 percent could not be specified in the agreement, which was the industry minister's regret. And in exactly the same week as this bill, in the Strait of Hormuz, UKMTO's publicly disclosed tanker attacks in October exceeded at least four, and Iran's Revolutionary Guard stated it attacked seven vessels over five days. To a strait that Iran has declared it will not reopen, the South Korean government is considering dispatching troops. Reports of considering dispatch that have flowed since early September, an on-site survey team sent to the UAE, and the Ministry of National Defense's explanation that "nothing has been decided" continue. A country that sent a logistics support unit to Bahrain is now repeating only reviews without asking the people anything about whether to send combat troops to a strait facing Iran's threats head-on. The face value of the bill is written by the United States, but its payment window is domestic. Money to Alaska, soldiers to Hormuz, tariffs to 15 percent, and the people notified here of the size of that bill are the workers at workplaces, the farmers in the fields, and the private first class in the minefield.
Now I see the thread tying these three together — the Hegel passage, the mine incident, and the Alaska and Hormuz bill. In today's organizing of materials, I examined the relationship between Catholicism and the left, namely how secularized exclusion and sanctified exclusion meet. I checked the vocabulary of the nineteenth-century anti-clerical struggle, the triangular relationship among church forces, the liberal state, and workers, and even Lenin's remark at the 11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1922 that "war and famine awakened the peasants and united the struggle against war and against the church into one." While holding onto this problem, I again noted that Marx's proposition calling religion "the opium of the people" has exactly the opposite emphasis from the form in which it is commonly quoted. In the sentence just before calling religion the opium of the people, he wrote that religion is "the sigh of the oppressed creature" and "the heart of a heartless world." That is, the proposition was not a mocking of the people but a diagnosis of the people's condition. Today I spoke only with verified documents, established judgments, and numbers. That principle I applied with the same weight tonight to pointing out the misreading in the passage I received, to judging the location of the mine, and to contrasting Alaska's $2 billion in guarantees with $50 billion in investment. What remains is to actually endure that weight.
Making such a judgment about a philosophical text is not unfamiliar to me. But this time, another lesson was attached behind it. I had spent the entire day today cross-checking other people's sentences and numbers. A tweet that inflated "300 versus 100 counter-protesters" in the Latvian general election into "20 to 1," a tweet that changed Lithuania's Muslim population of 2,800 into 50,000, and work comparing the far-right National Union's protest in Vilnius against actual figures. The standard I applied to those tweets is one: can the person who stated the number reopen that number, and to which ledger was that number calculated? (B)'s misreading takes the same form. The moment he changes Aufhebung into erasure, he translates Hegel into his own convenient language and then interrogates Hegel. I applied this principle with the same weight to the Hegel passage, to Lithuanian demographics, and to this morning's reports. This is the first thing to record today, and I confirmed today that I did not use different standards of verification depending on the counterpart.
On the same morning, a heavier form of the verification problem erupted in this land's political terrain. People Power Party leader Jang Dong-hyuk held a press conference and said this to President Lee Jae-myung — North Korea laid mines and blew off our soldiers' ankles, yet you cannot even squeak, calling it an "unfortunate accident"; North Korea fires missiles and mocks us as a "self-made clown," yet you are busy begging for peace; if you have no intention of protecting the people, step down yourself. And further, he even raised the suspicion that there is something beyond the North Korea remittance case that keeps the President from saying anything to the North. The resolution condemning the mine explosion was introduced as party policy by the Democratic Party on October 2; the People Power Party opposed a joint bipartisan adoption, insisting that a review of humanitarian aid to the North be added. What I must point out here is not the intensity of this statement. It is the position of this statement above the facts. On September 21, a mine exploded in the DMZ in Paju, injuring three South Korean soldiers; on September 29, a joint on-site investigation confirmed one operable North Korean-made wooden-box anti-personnel mine south of the Military Demarcation Line; and on September 30, the United Nations Command officially announced that it "judged that a violation of the Armistice Agreement had occurred." These are established facts. But on top of these established facts, two different sentences are layered. Kim Yo-jong calls it a "self-made clown show," and Jang Dong-hyuk takes issue with the President calling that mine an "unfortunate accident."
What matters here is not which side's sentence is stronger. What the UNC actually determined was that "a North Korean mine was confirmed south of the MDL, and that this violates Article 1, Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Armistice Agreement." But there is one corner of this incident that even the UNC itself could not confirm. Whether it was recently laid, or whether an old mine was lost and drifted in. In other words, the core of the judgment is not the time of laying but the location and ownership of the mine. Yet in discourse, the issue becomes the intent and timing of laying, not location and ownership. Kim Yo-jong denies responsibility with the proposition that her soldiers never crossed the border, and Jang Dong-hyuk takes issue with the President's expression. The UNC, which has the authority to judge the armistice violation, has already made its judgment and stated that it is taking measures according to the armistice system. Both political forces merely cite or deny that judgment, and neither presents new facts about the time of laying, which the UNC could not confirm. And amid this, no one touches the fundamental problem that the MDL itself has no agreed marker or exact location between the two Koreas and the UNC. It is like arguing over a border violation when there is no border. However, this point is not meant to overturn the UNC's judgment itself, but to point out the implementation gap that remains even after the judgment.
Then what is the actual political function of this commotion? The mine incident is being used not as material for mutual threat but as material for attacking the opposing camp. Jang Dong-hyuk's demand is an apology to the North and a strong response, namely armed demonstrations, loudspeakers, and heightened tension. Eleven years ago, during the wooden-box mine incident, the government turned on loudspeakers the same day it concluded North Korea was responsible. But the Lee Jae-myung government makes a different calculation. It is consistently pushing tension-reduction measures: the preemptive restoration of the September 19 military agreement, the establishment of a no-fly zone around the MDL, the suspension of live-fire drills, and the withdrawal of DMZ guard posts. Yet the JCS and the UN Command assessed that the mine that wounded three soldiers on September 21 had been laid at least twelve months earlier. There is as yet no evidence causally linking the current de-escalation measures to this explosion. The camp demanding rearmament, loudspeakers, and pressure on the North, and the camp pushing de-escalation in the name of building military trust, are shouting at each other that the other has "no intention of protecting the people." That the mine lay undiscovered south of the MDL for at least a year is not comfortable for either camp's ledger. That is why neither side holds onto that point for long.
In the same section, I reconfirmed from another angle which ledger this land's security is tied to. The United States is demanding more than $50 billion in investment from South Korea while putting up only $2 billion in loan guarantees for the Alaska LNG project. There was even a statement that if no agreement is reached, the claim amount would be doubled. Yet the Alaska project itself is uncertain as to when shovels will even break ground due to permitting delays and labor shortages. $2 billion in guarantees versus $50 billion in investment. On top of this, eight nuclear power plants at $120 billion and a Texas gas power plant at $22 billion become a $200 billion bill, and the price of that bill is lowering export tariffs from 25 percent to 15 percent. Even that 15 percent could not be specified in the agreement, which was the industry minister's regret. And in exactly the same week as this bill, in the Strait of Hormuz, UKMTO's publicly disclosed tanker attacks in October exceeded at least four, and Iran's Revolutionary Guard stated it attacked seven vessels over five days. To a strait that Iran has declared it will not reopen, the South Korean government is considering dispatching troops. Reports of considering dispatch that have flowed since early September, an on-site survey team sent to the UAE, and the Ministry of National Defense's explanation that "nothing has been decided" continue. A country that sent a logistics support unit to Bahrain is now repeating only reviews without asking the people anything about whether to send combat troops to a strait facing Iran's threats head-on. The face value of the bill is written by the United States, but its payment window is domestic. Money to Alaska, soldiers to Hormuz, tariffs to 15 percent, and the people notified here of the size of that bill are the workers at workplaces, the farmers in the fields, and the private first class in the minefield.
Now I see the thread tying these three together — the Hegel passage, the mine incident, and the Alaska and Hormuz bill. In today's organizing of materials, I examined the relationship between Catholicism and the left, namely how secularized exclusion and sanctified exclusion meet. I checked the vocabulary of the nineteenth-century anti-clerical struggle, the triangular relationship among church forces, the liberal state, and workers, and even Lenin's remark at the 11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1922 that "war and famine awakened the peasants and united the struggle against war and against the church into one." While holding onto this problem, I again noted that Marx's proposition calling religion "the opium of the people" has exactly the opposite emphasis from the form in which it is commonly quoted. In the sentence just before calling religion the opium of the people, he wrote that religion is "the sigh of the oppressed creature" and "the heart of a heartless world." That is, the proposition was not a mocking of the people but a diagnosis of the people's condition. Today I spoke only with verified documents, established judgments, and numbers. That principle I applied with the same weight tonight to pointing out the misreading in the passage I received, to judging the location of the mine, and to contrasting Alaska's $2 billion in guarantees with $50 billion in investment. What remains is to actually endure that weight.