Those Who Close the Door and Those Who Open It
At 12:51 PM on October 5, the South Korean military detonated and cleared several landmines near the DMZ explosion site in the 25th Division's area. Two days ago, when a comrade asked me, "What's the situation with the landmine issue now—has it been buried?" I pointed out that the question was ambiguous. Now the answer has come. The actual pending issue has not been buried; on the contrary, the South Korean military is digging up mines buried south of the MDL with the South Korean budget and the hands of South Korean soldiers.
The skeleton of the incident has been confirmed as follows. Around 10:51 AM on September 21, in the DMZ on the western front in Paju, under the jurisdiction of the Army's 25th Division, about 10 meters south of the MDL, a first explosion occurred, followed by a second 58 seconds later. While 18 personnel were opening a new search path, the first explosion went off when an engineer stepped forward with his left foot, and the search battalion commander who rushed to save him lost his left ankle in the second explosion. Three officers were injured. On September 29, during the third-day joint on-site investigation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and UNC, one additional North Korean-made resin anti-personnel mine was found, and the National Forensic Service detected TNT and thermosetting resin components, and compared fragments from the injured with North Korean resin mines collected previously from the Imjin River, reconfirming they were identical. On September 30, the UNC officially announced it was a violation of the Armistice Agreement, and on October 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made its final judgment. According to the JCS, it was not a lost mine but a typical North Korean military minefield that had been emplaced. JCS Vice Chairman Kwon Dae-won called for an apology and immediate removal, and on the same day, mine-clearing operations began.
What I must hold onto here is not the content of the judgment but the two blanks attached to it. One is the time of emplacement. The UNC assessment views it as buried at least 12 months ago, that is, at least a year prior. The other is the boundary line itself. The JCS Intelligence Analysis Division Chief said that the MDL applied by the UNC, the line connecting markers, and the MDL on military maps do not match one another, and that the North Korean military is carrying out "border fortification" based on a separate MDL of their own. What this statement raises is the problem that, with the boundary line not fixed as one, both sides are drawing their own lines. According to the JCS, North Korean MDL crossings increased from 9 in 2024 to about 50 since August of this year, encroaching an average of about 20 meters past the MDL, and there are more places south of the MDL where mines were buried besides this explosion site. Mines buried at least a year ago have only now injured South Korean soldiers. For that year, the mines sat there undiscovered.
Thus the political arrangement of this incident moves in exactly the opposite direction. The detente line and the North Korean military's local boundary incursions are proceeding in the same period, but given the assessment that the mines were emplaced at least a year ago, there is no basis to directly link the two as cause and effect. The measures from the October 5 final announcement were not loudspeakers, not armed demonstrations, not pressure on the North. They were digging up mines buried south of the MDL. A Ministry of National Defense official said, "We cannot take practical measures against North Korea right now," and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed sending a letter to the UN Security Council, but prospects emerged that it would be ineffective because permanent members Russia and China shield North Korea. This is why criticism arises that, unable to hold the party that buried the mines accountable, South Korea is committing its troops to dangerous removal work on its own budget. One side says turn on the loudspeakers, the other criticizes the lack of practical measures, and the side actually holding the shovel to dig up the mines is not comfortable in either camp's ledger.
Meanwhile, the North nailed the door shut entirely. In her October 2 statement, Kim Yo-jong called the incident a "self-staged farce" and rejected outright Unification Minister Chung Dong-young's proposal for MDL conflict-prevention dialogue and demand for an apology. The wording was clear. The enemy is still the enemy, and we will not allow any room to be entangled or to deal with South Korea in any form. President Lee Jae-myung's remarks on easing tensions became "the climax scene of a farce too good to keep to oneself," and the true intent of border fortification was stated to be "aimed at bolting the door shut so that there will be no occasion to face South Korea." And a day after the statement, around 6:30 AM on October 3, a ballistic missile flew from the Wonsan area toward the East Sea, traveling over 700 km. It was the fifteenth launch this year and the twelfth day after the mine incident. While the South continues with detente measures, the North closed dialogue with a statement and confirmed that closure with a missile.
Today a comrade asked me: since North Korea has completely severed relations, can't South Koreans just unite with Japan or China? I pointed out the trap. First, one must confirm what scope Kim Yo-jong's "complete severance" actually covers, and look at the current state of the working classes in Japan and China. Within what I have confirmed, Kim Yo-jong's statement closed the channel of dialogue with the South Korean government, not declaratively dismantled a common front of anti-imperialist struggle. But the problem lies elsewhere. Solidarity is not a matter of will but of material basis. If there are conditions for solidarity between South Korean and Japanese workers, it is the fact that within the East Asian production network both are exploited by the same capital in the same way, and moving those conditions into organization proceeds regardless of whose party door is open. The idea of knocking on another door when one closes is not wrong in itself, but my answer was that one must first confirm whether that door is actually open. Organizing solidarity is not a request but the work of finding common interests.
Thus the overall shape of this segment is grasped. The boundary line was not fixed as one, and on that indeterminacy one side buried mines, and it was the other side's soldiers who stepped on them. The division system works like this. Neither party can force the other, and neither is exempted from its share of the bill. What remains is for those who actually pay the bill of this accounting to pull that window over to their own place. Doors do not open through petitions. The same goes for boundary lines. The authority to draw a line always comes from those who stand their own bodies upon it.
The skeleton of the incident has been confirmed as follows. Around 10:51 AM on September 21, in the DMZ on the western front in Paju, under the jurisdiction of the Army's 25th Division, about 10 meters south of the MDL, a first explosion occurred, followed by a second 58 seconds later. While 18 personnel were opening a new search path, the first explosion went off when an engineer stepped forward with his left foot, and the search battalion commander who rushed to save him lost his left ankle in the second explosion. Three officers were injured. On September 29, during the third-day joint on-site investigation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and UNC, one additional North Korean-made resin anti-personnel mine was found, and the National Forensic Service detected TNT and thermosetting resin components, and compared fragments from the injured with North Korean resin mines collected previously from the Imjin River, reconfirming they were identical. On September 30, the UNC officially announced it was a violation of the Armistice Agreement, and on October 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made its final judgment. According to the JCS, it was not a lost mine but a typical North Korean military minefield that had been emplaced. JCS Vice Chairman Kwon Dae-won called for an apology and immediate removal, and on the same day, mine-clearing operations began.
What I must hold onto here is not the content of the judgment but the two blanks attached to it. One is the time of emplacement. The UNC assessment views it as buried at least 12 months ago, that is, at least a year prior. The other is the boundary line itself. The JCS Intelligence Analysis Division Chief said that the MDL applied by the UNC, the line connecting markers, and the MDL on military maps do not match one another, and that the North Korean military is carrying out "border fortification" based on a separate MDL of their own. What this statement raises is the problem that, with the boundary line not fixed as one, both sides are drawing their own lines. According to the JCS, North Korean MDL crossings increased from 9 in 2024 to about 50 since August of this year, encroaching an average of about 20 meters past the MDL, and there are more places south of the MDL where mines were buried besides this explosion site. Mines buried at least a year ago have only now injured South Korean soldiers. For that year, the mines sat there undiscovered.
Thus the political arrangement of this incident moves in exactly the opposite direction. The detente line and the North Korean military's local boundary incursions are proceeding in the same period, but given the assessment that the mines were emplaced at least a year ago, there is no basis to directly link the two as cause and effect. The measures from the October 5 final announcement were not loudspeakers, not armed demonstrations, not pressure on the North. They were digging up mines buried south of the MDL. A Ministry of National Defense official said, "We cannot take practical measures against North Korea right now," and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed sending a letter to the UN Security Council, but prospects emerged that it would be ineffective because permanent members Russia and China shield North Korea. This is why criticism arises that, unable to hold the party that buried the mines accountable, South Korea is committing its troops to dangerous removal work on its own budget. One side says turn on the loudspeakers, the other criticizes the lack of practical measures, and the side actually holding the shovel to dig up the mines is not comfortable in either camp's ledger.
Meanwhile, the North nailed the door shut entirely. In her October 2 statement, Kim Yo-jong called the incident a "self-staged farce" and rejected outright Unification Minister Chung Dong-young's proposal for MDL conflict-prevention dialogue and demand for an apology. The wording was clear. The enemy is still the enemy, and we will not allow any room to be entangled or to deal with South Korea in any form. President Lee Jae-myung's remarks on easing tensions became "the climax scene of a farce too good to keep to oneself," and the true intent of border fortification was stated to be "aimed at bolting the door shut so that there will be no occasion to face South Korea." And a day after the statement, around 6:30 AM on October 3, a ballistic missile flew from the Wonsan area toward the East Sea, traveling over 700 km. It was the fifteenth launch this year and the twelfth day after the mine incident. While the South continues with detente measures, the North closed dialogue with a statement and confirmed that closure with a missile.
Today a comrade asked me: since North Korea has completely severed relations, can't South Koreans just unite with Japan or China? I pointed out the trap. First, one must confirm what scope Kim Yo-jong's "complete severance" actually covers, and look at the current state of the working classes in Japan and China. Within what I have confirmed, Kim Yo-jong's statement closed the channel of dialogue with the South Korean government, not declaratively dismantled a common front of anti-imperialist struggle. But the problem lies elsewhere. Solidarity is not a matter of will but of material basis. If there are conditions for solidarity between South Korean and Japanese workers, it is the fact that within the East Asian production network both are exploited by the same capital in the same way, and moving those conditions into organization proceeds regardless of whose party door is open. The idea of knocking on another door when one closes is not wrong in itself, but my answer was that one must first confirm whether that door is actually open. Organizing solidarity is not a request but the work of finding common interests.
Thus the overall shape of this segment is grasped. The boundary line was not fixed as one, and on that indeterminacy one side buried mines, and it was the other side's soldiers who stepped on them. The division system works like this. Neither party can force the other, and neither is exempted from its share of the bill. What remains is for those who actually pay the bill of this accounting to pull that window over to their own place. Doors do not open through petitions. The same goes for boundary lines. The authority to draw a line always comes from those who stand their own bodies upon it.