1955.01–1973.11.16

High-Speed Growth, the Spring Wage Offensive and the Anti-Pollution Movement

In a Japan that grew by close to 10% a year from 1955 to 1973, how did workers and the victims of pollution fight over the gains and the costs of growth, and what did the spring wage offensive, enterprise unions, the four big pollution lawsuits and progressive local governments make of the outcome?

The spring wage offensive (shuntō) began in January 1955 when industrial unions in Sōhyō launched a joint spring wage campaign. After the defeats of the 1960 Anpo protests and the Miike strike, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda launched the Income Doubling Plan to double GNP within ten years, and the economy grew at around 10% a year until 1973. Sōhyō under Kaoru Ōta won large raises through the spring offensive, but workers were bound to their companies by lifetime employment, seniority pay and enterprise unions, and after the cooperationist Dōmei was founded in 1964 leadership of the offensive passed to the unions of big private firms. Pollution was the price of growth. Victims of Chisso's Minamata disease, Showa Denko's Niigata Minamata disease, Yokkaichi asthma and itai-itai disease fought government and corporate cover-ups through lawsuits and direct negotiation. As progressive local governments spread, the state answered with the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control and the 1970 "Pollution Diet".

When did high-speed growth begin, and what was it built on?

In Japan the period of high-speed growth means the years from about 1955 to about 1973, when real growth averaged around 10% a year. After the food crisis of the late 1940s the economy recovered on the back of American military procurement during the Korean War, passing its prewar peak in the second half of 1953, and in 1956 the government's Economic White Paper declared that "it is no longer the postwar". From December 1954 to November 1973 one boom followed another: the Jinmu boom, the Iwato boom, the Olympic boom, the Izanagi boom and the archipelago-remodelling boom. 1 2

The conditions usually cited are a cheap, well-educated young workforce (the "golden eggs"), surplus labour from the countryside and from closing coal mines, a high savings rate, the fixed rate of 360 yen to the dollar, cheap oil and government incentives for plant investment. Energy shifted from coal to oil, and petrochemical complexes (kombinato) lined the Pacific and Seto Inland Sea coasts. The zaibatsu broken up under the occupation re-formed as bank-centred groups holding each other's shares (keiretsu), and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) steered industry through its control of imports and technology licences. 1 2

On the labour side the period was led by the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sōhyō), founded in 1950. Formed as communist-led unions collapsed in the occupation's Red Purge, Sōhyō soon allied with the Japan Socialist Party and spent the 1950s organising strikes and political protests. When both the 1960 struggle against the revised US-Japan Security Treaty and the Mitsui Miike coal strike ended in defeat, Sōhyō shifted from political strikes towards wage increases and workplace demands. The labour movement of the growth years unfolded on that shift. 3 4

How did the spring wage offensive begin?

The unions formed in postwar Japan were overwhelmingly enterprise unions organised company by company. A union striking alone risked handing market share to rival firms, so unions were reluctant to fight for wages. In the early 1950s Sōhyō secretary-general Minoru Takano championed politically driven "whole community" struggles. Kaoru Ōta, chairman of the Synthetic Chemistry Workers' Unions (Gōka Rōren), opposed him from a trade-unionist position and argued for unified struggles by industry. In 1955 Akira Iwai of the National Railway Workers' Union was elected secretary-general with Ōta as vice-chairman, and the "Ōta-Iwai line" took charge of Sōhyō. 5 6 7 8

In 1954 Ōta called on "the industrial unions that can stand up to stand up" and fight through unified industry-wide strikes. In January 1955 six industrial federations (the private railway workers, coal miners, electric power workers, Gōka Rōren, paper and pulp workers and the national metal workers) held a "spring wage struggle rally" at Toranomon in Tokyo; in March the chemical and electrical workers joined, making it the "eight-federation joint struggle". Japanese Wikipedia dates the start to a five-federation council of 1954, English Wikipedia to 1954, and the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JIL) to 1955. A background factor was the "three wage principles" issued in 1954 by the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations (Nikkeiren), which refused to pass rising prices on into wages. The spring offensive was explained with a metaphor: "walking a dark road alone at night is frightening, so let us all go hand in hand" (JIL commentary, translated from Japanese). 5 9 10

In 1956 public-sector unions joined, creating a joint public-private struggle headquarters, and by 1957 people spoke of the "shuntō going rate". In 1959 the steelworkers, who had bargained in autumn, joined, and Sōhyō and the Federation of Independent Unions (Chūritsu Rōren) formed a Spring Struggle Joint Committee; the offensive now involved some four million workers. Because talks and strike notices were scheduled in advance each year, both sides could plan, and the system spread across the country to become a fixture of Japanese industrial relations. Ōta, chairman of Sōhyō from 1958, is reported to have told railway unionists around 1965: "We must make a world where workers can eat steak." 5 10 7

What did the Income Doubling Plan promise?

In July 1960 Hayato Ikeda succeeded Nobusuke Kishi, who had resigned amid the massive Anpo protests. In contrast to Kishi's "high posture", Ikeda adopted a "low posture" with the slogan "tolerance and patience". On 27 December the cabinet approved the National Income Doubling Plan, which aimed to double gross national product within ten years. Its outline stated that the plan "must aim to double gross national product rapidly, achieve full employment through increased employment, and raise the people's standard of living substantially" (National Archives of Japan commentary, translated from Japanese). The plan assumed average growth of 7.2% a year; actual growth topped 10%, and the target was reached by October 1967. 11 12 13 1

The plan's architect was Osamu Shimomura, an economist from the Finance Ministry. In the late 1950s, when many economists believed the reconstruction surge was over and expected stable growth, Shimomura argued that Japan was in a "historic rise" and that a cycle in which "investment calls forth investment" made growth of over 10% possible (the Shimomura-Yoshino debate). The Ikeda cabinet built the plan on his theory of "real growth capacity". After the first oil shock Shimomura turned around and recommended zero growth. 14 15 13

The government lowered interest rates and poured public investment into expressways, the Shinkansen, subways, ports and dams; the Tōkaidō Shinkansen opened in October 1964, just before the Tokyo Olympics. A universal national pension and universal health insurance were established in 1961. Soon after taking office Ikeda sent his labour minister Hirohide Ishida to settle the Miike dispute by binding arbitration. In 1968 Japan's GNP passed West Germany's to become the second largest after the United States. The historian Nick Kapur writes that the plan "enshrined 'economic growthism' as a sort of secular religion of both the Japanese people and their government". 2 1 11 13

Public-sector workers saw less of the gains. Barred from striking, civil servants and public-corporation workers fell behind private-sector pay, and in 1964 Sōhyō's public-sector unions threatened to strike in defiance of the law (the planned 17 April strike, which the Communist Party opposed, leading to clashes with party members in some unions). Ōta met Prime Minister Ikeda and won a promise that public-sector pay would be matched to private-sector pay each year, in return for calling off the action. Ōta received the Lenin Peace Prize (in 1964 according to English Wikipedia, 1965 according to Japanese Wikipedia). 6 4 7

How did enterprise unions and Japanese employment practices tie workers to their companies?

In his 1958 book The Japanese Factory the American management scholar James Abegglen presented lifetime employment, seniority-based pay and enterprise unions as the hallmarks of Japanese management. Lifetime employment is the practice of keeping workers until retirement unless the company fails; the seniority system raises rank and pay with length of service and age. Having been through great postwar disputes over dismissals, large firms avoided naming workers for dismissal during the growth years, and as labour shortages became the bigger worry during the Jinmu and Iwato booms, long-term employment became the norm in big companies. Critics note that these terms applied mainly to regular male employees of large firms. 16 17 18

An enterprise union organises all of a company's employees regardless of trade. Bargaining fits the company's circumstances, but its gains stay inside the company, and as competition between firms intensifies such unions tend to cooperate with management for the company's prosperity rather than act in solidarity with other unions; interest in the industry's workers as a whole, the unemployed included, weakens. In March 1955 business founded the Japan Productivity Center, with three principles for its productivity movement: maintaining and expanding employment, labour-management cooperation and consultation, and fair distribution of the gains. 19 20

On 11 November 1964 the All-Japan Trade Union Congress (Zenrō Kaigi), the Japanese Federation of Labour (Sōdōmei) and others merged into the Japanese Confederation of Labour (Dōmei). Under the banner of "free and democratic trade unions" Dōmei backed the Democratic Socialist Party, made labour-management cooperation its policy and confronted the Socialist-aligned Sōhyō. Its core was the private-sector unions of metals, cars, electric power and textiles, and by one account it was by 1967 the largest federation, just ahead of Sōhyō. Japanese Wikipedia records that, from its anti-communist stance, Dōmei spoke favourably of the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea and the Pinochet regime in Chile. 21 22

Leadership of the spring offensive also moved to big private firms. In the early years the settlements that public-utility unions such as the private and national railway workers won with transport strikes set the "going rate". In 1967 the metalworkers' IMF-JC set up a wage-struggle liaison council and joined, and Dōmei effectively joined under the name "wage struggle". That year the large electrical, shipbuilding and heavy machinery firms settled on the steel union's offer, the "JC shuntō", and thereafter the four metal industries (steel, shipbuilding and heavy machinery, electrical, cars) led. Participants passed nine million in 1972, while Nikkeiren countered with a "productivity standard principle" to keep raises within productivity growth. 5 9

What happened at Minamata?

The chemical plant at Minamata in Kumamoto Prefecture, opened in 1908, was where Nippon Chisso (later Shin Nihon Chisso, and Chisso from 1965) began. In the 1920s the company expanded into colonial Korea, founding the Korea Hydroelectric Power Company and the Korea Nitrogenous Fertilizer Company in 1926 and building a huge chemical complex at Hungnam in 1927. Hajime Hosokawa, later director of the Minamata factory hospital, joined the company in 1936 to head the hospital of its Agochi factory in North Hamgyong Province, Korea. Having lost everything in Korea with the defeat, the company restarted in 1950 as Shin Nihon Chisso. At one point more than half of Minamata's tax revenue came from the company and its employees, and the town was called its "castle town". 23 24 25 26 27

From 1932 the plant produced acetaldehyde with mercury sulphate as catalyst. After the co-catalyst was switched in August 1951 from manganese dioxide to cheaper ferric sulphide, highly toxic methylmercury flowed into the sea; output peaked at some 45,000 tonnes in 1960. The methylmercury built up in the fish and shellfish of Minamata Bay and the Shiranui Sea, and residents who ate them lost feeling in their hands and feet, had trouble walking and speaking, and died in convulsions. Cats were reported going mad and dying from around 1950. 27 28

In April 1956 a girl from Tsukinoura in Minamata was admitted to the factory hospital, and on 1 May director Hosokawa reported an outbreak of an unknown disease of the central nervous system to the health centre: the date of the "official discovery" of Minamata disease. That November the Kumamoto University research group suspected heavy-metal poisoning. In 1957 Kumamoto Prefecture sought to ban fishing in the bay under the Food Sanitation Act, but the Ministry of Health and Welfare replied that it could not be applied because "there is no clear evidence that all the fish and shellfish in the bay have become toxic" (Environment White Paper, translated from Japanese). In September 1958 Chisso diverted its wastewater to the mouth of the Minamata River, and from the following year patients appeared in fishing villages north of the river mouth. 29 27

In July 1959 Kumamoto University named organic mercury as the cause. In October Hosokawa saw the same symptoms in "cat 400", fed on factory wastewater, but the company suppressed the result and halted the experiments. On 2 November fishermen from the Shiranui coast stormed the plant, and on 19 December the company unveiled a wastewater treatment unit, its president drinking supposedly treated water at the ceremony; the unit did not remove methylmercury. On 30 December the company and the patients' mutual aid society signed a "sympathy money" agreement paying adult patients ¥100,000 a year. It stipulated that "even if it is determined in future that Minamata disease is caused by the factory's wastewater, no further claim for compensation shall be made" (Environment White Paper, translated from Japanese). 29 27 25

In its 2006 White Paper Japan's Ministry of the Environment wrote that by about November 1959 the authorities could have recognised that the organic mercury very probably came from Chisso yet failed to stop the damage from spreading, and that "behind this, concern about the effect not only on the local economy but on Japan's high economic growth is thought to have been at work" (translated from Japanese). In 2004 the Supreme Court ruled that the state and Kumamoto Prefecture had acted unlawfully in not using their powers to regulate the wastewater from 1960 on. Meanwhile, from 1961 doctors including Masazumi Harada re-examined children diagnosed with cerebral palsy, and in November 1962 children poisoned by methylmercury in the womb were certified as patients of congenital Minamata disease. 29 27 28

How did pollution become a national issue?

In 1965 a second outbreak of Minamata disease was confirmed along the Agano River in Niigata Prefecture, where Showa Denko's plant upstream at Kanose made acetaldehyde with the same mercury-catalyst process as Chisso. Professor Tadao Tsubaki of Niigata University reported it to the prefecture on 31 May and made it public on 12 June. Showa Denko blamed agricultural chemicals washed out in the 1964 Niigata earthquake, but with the Kumamoto University group and the retired Hosokawa bringing Minamata's experience, the cause was traced quickly. Living far from the plant, the victims had the community's support and went to court early (on 12 June 1967 according to Japanese Wikipedia, in March 1968 according to English Wikipedia). 30 29 28

In Yokkaichi, Mie Prefecture, asthma and bronchitis rose sharply in districts near the plants, Isozu above all, after the first petrochemical complex began operating in 1959; under the Income Doubling Plan a second complex followed in 1963. Sulphur dioxide from high-sulphur Middle Eastern crude burned without desulphurisation was blamed. In 1965, when the state had no relief scheme for pollution victims, the city became the first to pay patients' medical costs from its own budget. On 1 September 1967, a date chosen as the anniversary of the Great Kantō earthquake, nine patients from Isozu sued six companies in the complex. 31 32

Along the Jinzū River in Toyama Prefecture, from the 1910s people suffered a disease that softened the bones until they died crying "it hurts, it hurts". The local doctor Noboru Hagino presented a mine-poison theory in 1957 and in June 1961 announced that cadmium discharged by Mitsui Mining and Smelting's Kamioka mine was the cause, drawing abuse ("what does a country doctor know?") and threats. In May 1968 the Ministry of Health and Welfare declared that itai-itai disease was chronic cadmium poisoning and that the cadmium came from the Kamioka mine: the first time the government officially recognised pollution as a cause of illness. That March patients and bereaved families had sued Mitsui Mining and Smelting (28 plaintiffs according to Japanese Wikipedia, 29 according to English Wikipedia). 33 34 35 36

On 26 September 1968 the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Science and Technology Agency issued the government's unified view: Minamata disease in Kumamoto was caused by "methylmercury compounds formed in the acetaldehyde-acetic acid facility" of Chisso's plant, and the Niigata outbreak by methylmercury produced as a by-product in Showa Denko's process (Environment White Paper, translated from Japanese). It came twelve years after the official discovery and four months after Chisso had stopped its mercury process. The view held that new patients had stopped appearing in 1960, which was untrue. By then the Minamata, Niigata, Yokkaichi and itai-itai cases had come to be called the "four big pollution diseases". 29 27 28 37

The silence was broken by victims and small local voices. In April 1968 Chisso's labour union issued a "declaration of shame" criticising itself for having ignored Minamata disease. Michiko Ishimure, a Minamata housewife and poet, co-founded the Citizens' Council for Minamata Disease Countermeasures in 1968, and in January 1969 published Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Disease, carrying the patients' voices. Jun Ui, an assistant at the University of Tokyo, exposed Minamata disease from 1963 under the pen name Tonda Yarō, and from 1970 ran "Principles of Pollution", an open evening lecture series for citizens in a university classroom, for fifteen years. 28 38 39 40

How did victims fight in the courts and at company doors?

After the government's view the Minamata patients' mutual aid society demanded new compensation. When Chisso asked for government arbitration, the society split in April 1969 into an arbitration group and a litigation group, and on 14 June 1969 the litigation group sued Chisso in the Kumamoto District Court (112 plaintiffs according to Japanese Wikipedia, 41 certified patients in 28 families according to English Wikipedia). Their leader Eizō Watanabe declared, "Today, and from this day forth, we are fighting against the power of the state." The Association to Indict those Responsible for Minamata Disease, started by Kyōji Watanabe and others, backed the suit nationwide. On 4 July 1970 Hosokawa, hospitalised with lung cancer, testified from his bed that the company had known of the cat 400 experiment; he died three months later. 27 28 25

Rulings followed. On 30 June 1971 the Toyama District Court found Mitsui Mining and Smelting liable for itai-itai disease, and on 9 August 1972 the Kanazawa branch of the Nagoya High Court dismissed its appeal. The next day residents negotiated directly at the company's head office and signed agreements on compensation, soil restoration and pollution prevention, including residents' right to inspect the mine. On 29 September 1971 the Niigata District Court found Showa Denko negligent, and on 24 July 1972 the Yokkaichi branch of the Tsu District Court found the six companies jointly liable and ruled wholly for the plaintiffs. 35 34 28 32

On 20 March 1973 the Kumamoto District Court ruled that "the defendant's factory was a leading chemical plant with the most advanced technology and ... should have assured the safety of its wastewater", finding Chisso negligent from beginning to end (as quoted in English Wikipedia). The sympathy-money agreement was voided as contrary to public order and morals, and the total award of ¥937 million was the largest yet made by a Japanese court. The four suits over Minamata, Niigata, Yokkaichi and itai-itai disease became known as the "four big pollution lawsuits" and set precedents for corporate liability for pollution damage. 27 28 39 37

Some fought outside the courts. Teruo Kawamoto, who fell ill in 1955 and lost his father to the disease in 1965, was twice refused certification. He helped hidden patients apply, and on 7 August 1971 the Environment Agency overturned the rejections of nine uncertified patients, himself among them. Kawamoto then parted from the litigation group and led "direct negotiations" with Chisso's management, with a sit-in at the company's Tokyo head office lasting a year and a half. Assaulted by guards, he was himself prosecuted for assault, but the high court dismissed the charge. On 9 July 1973 the patients signed a compensation agreement with Chisso. In June 1972 Harada and Ui travelled with patients to the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm and made Minamata disease known to the world. 41 42 40

How did the state respond to pollution?

Under the Eisaku Satō cabinet the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control was promulgated on 3 August 1967. It defined pollution as air pollution, water pollution, noise, vibration, land subsidence and offensive odours, and set out the duties of business, the state and local governments. But Article 1(2) read: "With regard to the conservation of the living environment prescribed in the preceding paragraph, harmony with the sound development of the economy shall be sought" (enacted text, House of Representatives, translated from Japanese). This "harmony clause" was criticised as limiting pollution control to what would not hurt growth. 43 44 1

The 64th extraordinary Diet session, which sat from 24 November to 18 December 1970, passed fourteen pollution bills and is known as the "Pollution Diet". The harmony clause was deleted and Article 1 rewritten to open: "In view of the extreme importance of preventing pollution in securing a healthy and cultured life for the people" (enacted text, House of Representatives, translated from Japanese). The old water-quality laws, which required each body of water to be designated one by one, gave way to a Water Pollution Control Law with uniform national effluent standards, and laws punishing pollution crimes and making polluters pay for control works wrote the polluter-pays principle into law. The Environment Agency was launched on 1 July 1971. 45 46 47 29 48

The ruling Liberal Democrats had reasons to hurry. As discontent over the lack of pollution controls grew in the late 1960s, business worried about the effect of protests on industry and the LDP about defeat at the polls. In October 1973, under the Kakuei Tanaka cabinet, the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law was promulgated to pay victims of designated diseases. Within a few years, it is said, Japan went from a country of meagre environmental regulation to one of the strictest in the OECD. 45 49 50

What did progressive local governments change?

The shadow of growth fell on the cities too. In the 1960s the populations of the Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka regions rose by 30%, but the government built industrial infrastructure such as transport and industrial estates first and left housing, schools and hospitals behind. Riding that discontent, more and more "progressive local governments" were led by mayors and governors elected with the support of the Socialists, Communists and other progressive forces. Their forerunner was the economist Torazō Ninagawa, governor of Kyoto Prefecture for 28 years from 1950. He hung a banner reading "Let us bring the Constitution to life in daily life" on the prefectural office, created the country's first medical subsidy for people aged 65 and over, and set pollution standards stricter than the national ones. 51 52

In 1963 Ichio Asukata of the Socialist left was elected mayor of Yokohama; he likened it to "landing alone on the top of Mt. Fuji by parachute: I occupied only the summit, while the whole of the mountain was in the hands of the enemy." Asukata tried local direct democracy through citizens' meetings and founded the National Association of Progressive Mayors. In 1967 the Marxist economist Ryokichi Minobe, backed jointly by the Socialists and Communists, was elected governor of Tokyo. Minobe introduced free medical care for the elderly, a pollution control ordinance and a pollution bureau ahead of the national government, and expanded welfare facilities. In the 1971 local elections Minobe won by a landslide and Ryōichi Kuroda became governor of Osaka; with seven progressive governors, it was said that 45 million people lived under progressive local leaders. 53 51 54 55

Progressive governments also differed from the state in their treatment of Koreans in Japan. In 1968 the Minobe administration became the first in the country to license Korea University (Chōsen Daigakkō), about which the Education Ministry had expressed concern, as a miscellaneous school, and exempted facilities of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) from fixed-asset tax; local governments elsewhere then began subsidising Korean schools. Much of this was later reversed under governor Shintarō Ishihara. Progressive welfare policy moved national politics as well: having criticised free medical care for the elderly, the government and the LDP adopted it, the Diet amending the Welfare Law for the Elderly in June 1972 and the Tanaka cabinet introducing it nationwide from January 1973. 55 54 51

How did high-speed growth come to a halt in 1973?

In June 1972 Kakuei Tanaka published his Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago, which proposed to spread industry to the regions with bullet trains and expressways and so solve overcrowding, depopulation and pollution together; in July he became prime minister. The book sold 910,000 copies, but the plan encouraged land speculation and, together with expansionary budgets, sent land and share prices soaring (the "archipelago-remodelling boom"). His cabinet also expanded welfare: higher pensions, free medical care for the elderly and child allowances. 56 57 49

The Fourth Arab-Israeli War broke out on 6 October 1973, and on 16 October the Persian Gulf producers raised posted crude prices by 70%. Japan saw panic buying of toilet paper and detergent, and on 16 November the government adopted a policy of restraining aggregate demand. Consumer prices rose 11.7% in 1973 and 23.2% in 1974, which Takeo Fukuda dubbed "crazy prices". In 1974 Japan recorded its first negative growth since the war (-0.2% according to Japanese Wikipedia's article on crazy prices, -1.2% according to its article on the oil shocks). High-speed growth ended there. 58 57 1

Facing inflation, the labour movement fought the 1974 offensive as a "people's shuntō" that took up prices, taxes and social security as well, and won a record 32.9% raise (33% in the crazy-prices article). Alarmed, Nikkeiren issued a wage guidepost of "under 15% in 1975 and single figures in 1976". From 1975 export-industry unions such as the steelworkers took the lead, and the offensive shifted from strikes towards negotiations between top union and business leaders. The JIL commentary sees the first oil shock as the great turning point of the spring offensive. The world economic crisis of the 1970s is covered in a separate event. 5 9 57

Consequences

All four big pollution lawsuits ended in victory for the victims between 1971 and 1973; in March 1973 the Kumamoto District Court found Chisso negligent and voided the sympathy-money agreement. The Pollution Diet deleted the "harmony with the economy" clause from the Basic Law and passed fourteen laws, the Environment Agency was launched in 1971 and the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law was promulgated in 1973. Free medical care for the elderly, begun by progressive local governments, became national policy in 1973. The oil shock of October 1973 and the "crazy prices" that followed ended high-speed growth; after the record raises of 1974 the spring offensive turned into top-level bargaining led by export-industry unions. Disputes over uncertified patients and suits over state responsibility continued long after.

Timeline & Map

Tokyo Niigata (Agano River) Toyama (Jinzū River) Yokohama Kyoto Yokkaichi Kumamoto Minamata 23 Stockholm 11 Niigata 22 Niigata 8 Toyama 15 Toyama 25 Kanazawa 1 Tokyo 2 Tokyo 4 Tokyo 5 Tokyo 7 Tokyo 10 Tokyo 12 Tokyo 13 Tokyo 16 Tokyo 19 Tokyo 20 Tokyo 21 Tokyo 27 Tokyo 28 Tokyo 9 Yokohama 14 Yokkaichi 24 Yokkaichi 18 Kumamoto 26 Kumamoto 3 Minamata 6 Minamata 17 Minamata
  1. 11955.01Japan
    The eight-federation joint struggle: shuntō begins

    Six industrial federations hold a spring wage rally at Toranomon in Tokyo; two more join in March to form the eight-federation joint struggle.

  2. 21955.03Japan
    Japan Productivity Center founded

    Business founds the Japan Productivity Center under three principles: employment, labour-management cooperation and fair distribution.

  3. 31956.05.01Japan
    Official discovery of Minamata disease

    Chisso hospital director Hajime Hosokawa reports an unknown disease of the central nervous system to the Minamata health centre.

  4. 41958.07Japan
    Kaoru Ōta becomes Sōhyō chairman

    With Ōta as chairman and Akira Iwai as secretary-general, the Ōta-Iwai line consolidates the shuntō method.

  5. 51959Japan
    Spring Struggle Joint Committee formed

    The steelworkers join and Sōhyō and Chūritsu Rōren form a joint committee; some four million take part.

  6. 61959.12.30Japan
    Minamata sympathy-money agreement

    Chisso and the patients' mutual aid society sign a sympathy-money agreement barring further claims.

  7. 71960.12.27Japan
    Income Doubling Plan approved

    The Ikeda cabinet approves the plan to double GNP within ten years.

  8. 81961.06Japan
    Noboru Hagino names cadmium

    Hagino attributes itai-itai disease to cadmium from Mitsui Mining and Smelting's Kamioka mine.

  9. 91963.04Japan
    Ichio Asukata elected mayor of Yokohama

    The Socialist leftist Asukata becomes mayor of Yokohama, a forerunner of progressive local government.

  10. 101964.11.11Japan
    Dōmei founded

    Zenrō Kaigi, Sōdōmei and others merge into Dōmei, committed to labour-management cooperation and the Democratic Socialists.

  11. 111965.06.12Japan
    Niigata Minamata disease announced

    Organic mercury poisoning along the Agano River is made public.

  12. 121967.04Japan
    Ryokichi Minobe elected governor of Tokyo

    Minobe, backed by both the Socialists and the Communists, is elected governor of Tokyo.

  13. 131967.08.03Japan
    Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control

    The Basic Law, with its clause on harmony with the economy, is promulgated.

  14. 141967.09.01Japan
    Yokkaichi pollution suit filed

    Nine patients from Isozu sue six companies of the petrochemical complex.

  15. 151968.05Japan
    Itai-itai disease recognised as pollution

    The health ministry names cadmium from the Kamioka mine as the cause, the first official recognition of pollution as a cause of illness.

  16. 161968.09.26Japan
    Government's unified view on Minamata disease

    The government names methylmercury from Chisso and Showa Denko as the cause.

  17. 171969.01Japan
    Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow published

    Michiko Ishimure publishes her book carrying the voices of Minamata patients.

  18. 181969.06.14Japan
    First Kumamoto Minamata suit

    The litigation group of patients and families sues Chisso in the Kumamoto District Court.

  19. 191970.07.04Japan
    Hajime Hosokawa testifies from his bed

    Hosokawa testifies from his hospital bed that the company knew of the cat 400 experiment.

  20. 201970.11.24–12.18Japan
    The Pollution Diet opens

    By 18 December fourteen pollution laws pass and the harmony clause is deleted.

  21. 211971.07.01Japan
    Environment Agency launched

    The Environment Agency is launched as an external agency of the Prime Minister's Office.

  22. 221971.09.29Japan
    Niigata Minamata ruling

    The Niigata District Court finds Showa Denko negligent.

  23. 231972.06Japan
    UN Conference on the Human Environment

    Masazumi Harada and Jun Ui attend with patients and make Minamata disease known worldwide.

  24. 241972.07.24Japan
    Yokkaichi ruling

    The Yokkaichi branch of the Tsu District Court finds the six companies jointly liable.

  25. 251972.08.09Japan
    Itai-itai appeal ruling

    The Kanazawa branch of the Nagoya High Court dismisses Mitsui Mining and Smelting's appeal.

  26. 261973.03.20Japan
    Kumamoto Minamata ruling

    The Kumamoto District Court finds Chisso negligent and voids the sympathy-money agreement.

  27. 271973.07.09Japan
    Chisso compensation agreement

    After direct negotiations led by Teruo Kawamoto and others, patients and Chisso sign a compensation agreement.

  28. 281973.10.06–11.16Japan
    First oil shock

    The Arab-Israeli war sends oil prices soaring; on 16 November the government decides to restrain demand.

Related people 17

Related terms

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26reference 27reference 28reference 29reference 30reference 31reference 32reference 33reference 34reference 35reference 36reference 37reference 38reference 39reference 40reference 41reference 42reference 43reference 44reference 45reference 46reference 47reference 48reference 49reference 50reference 51reference 52reference 53reference 54reference 55reference 56reference 57reference 58