Zhang Xueliang

张学良
Republic of China state institutions Nationalism China China 1901.6.3.–2001.10.15. ↓ Arrested 1936 · natural causes

The “Young Marshal” who detained Chiang Kai-shek at Xi’an and opened the way to the second united front

In December 1936 he detained Chiang Kai-shek at Xi'an, forcing the Second United Front against Japan, and paid for it with more than fifty years under house arrest.

Son of the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin, he inherited the Northeast when the Japanese killed his father in 1928 and pledged allegiance to Nanjing that year. Driven from Manchuria in 1931, he was sent against the Communists, but in December 1936 he and Yang Hucheng seized Chiang Kai-shek at Xi’an to demand an end to civil war and resistance to Japan. Zhou Enlai brokered the release; Zhang flew back with Chiang and spent more than fifty years under house arrest. Freed in the 1990s, he died in Hawaii at 100.

Also known as: Chang Hsueh-liang

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

Related historical events

Secret cooperation between the Northeastern Army and the Communists, 1935–1936

In 1935 Zhang Xueliang commanded the Northeastern Army, stationed in Xi’an and assigned by the Nationalist government to suppress the Communists. The army suffered repeated defeats in clashes with the Red Army. Soldiers captured and then returned after political instruction reported that the Communists were proposing a joint anti-Japanese front. Zhang wanted to recover Manchuria, which Japan had occupied, resented Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of nonresistance, and preferred fighting Japan to fighting the Communists. After contact with the Communist representative Li Kenong in early 1936, Zhang agreed to take a passive stance in the civil war. On 9 April Zhou Enlai came to Xi’an, formalized a secret ceasefire, and secured supplies for the Red Army. Zhang argued that Nationalist leader Chiang should lead resistance to Japan, but did not accept the Communists’ proposal to overthrow Chiang. The two sides formalized their alliance on 22 September. This cooperation meant Zhang did not carry out the central government’s orders to commit his army to war against the Communists, and it formed a political basis for the Xi’an Incident that December.