Economic Security · 2020s–present

Economic Security

경제안보

A policy paradigm that strategically manages economic instruments (trade, technology, supply chains, and investment) within a national security framework. The shift from efficiency-centered globalization to resilience-centered economic security accelerated through the 2018 US-China trade war, the COVID-19 pandemic (2020), and the Russia-Ukraine war (2022). Its core features include the weaponization of supply chains for strategic goods such as semiconductors, rare earths, and batteries, and the deployment of export controls, investment screening, subsidies, and tariffs as security instruments. The US institutionalized this paradigm through the CHIPS Act, the IRA, and export controls on China; China through Made in China 2025 and rare-earth export controls; the EU through its Economic Security Strategy; and Japan through its Economic Security Promotion Act.

In depth

Occasions of the shift

Economic security names a policy paradigm that manages trade, technology, supply chains, and investment inside a national security framework. Its content is the shift from a phase that optimized the international division of labour by efficiency to one that takes resilience and controllability as its criteria.

Three occasions are identified. The US-China trade conflict of 2018 defined technological advantage as a security question, the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 exposed the fragility of supply chains in medical goods and components, and the war between Russia and Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated the possibility of weaponizing energy and food.

Instruments

Responses converged on a similar combination of instruments: export controls blocking the transfer of particular technologies and equipment, investment screening restricting acquisitions in strategic sectors, subsidies building domestic capacity, and tariffs and rules of origin steering the reorganization of supply chains.

Institutional forms differ by country. The United States institutionalized the paradigm through the CHIPS Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and export controls on China; China through Made in China 2025 and rare-earth export controls; the European Union through its Economic Security Strategy and related regulation; and Japan through its Economic Security Promotion Act. South Korea sits in a position exposed simultaneously to both export controls and subsidy policy in semiconductors and batteries.

Points at issue

The paradigm carries structural tensions. First, the cost of resilience: reorganizing supply chains onshore or among allies raises production costs, and the burden transfers to prices and public finance. Second, the problem of scope: because the boundary of security-related sectors is not clear, there is wide room for protectionism to be justified in the language of security. Third, the problem of interaction: if every state responds with the same logic, fragmentation accelerates and everyone's resilience may fall.

A separate question arises from a left standpoint: whether the revival of industrial policy amounts to a recovery of state capacity for public purposes or to a new form of transferring public resources to particular capitals. Whether employment and labour standards or public equity stakes can be attached as conditions of subsidy is the practical focus of that argument.

How long have economy and security been tied together?

The term is new but the idea is old. In National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945) the economist Albert Hirschman set out in theory how foreign trade could be used as an instrument of national power policy, and compared this with German trading methods of the day. The idea is that if trade is more vital to one side, that dependence itself gives the other side power.

The Cold War turned this into an institution. In 1949 the Western bloc established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) to control exports to the Soviet Union and its allies, and its lists covered not only arms and nuclear materials but dual-use goods such as supercomputers and semiconductors. CoCom disbanded on 31 March 1994, after the Soviet Union had dissolved.

How does interdependence become a weapon?

One premise of the globalization of recent decades was that deep mutual dependence makes conflict too costly to pursue lightly. The theory of weaponized interdependence advanced by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in 2019 reversed this. Global networks of finance, data and trade tend to gather around a few hubs, and a state with authority over those hubs can deny others access or watch the flows. They called the power to deny access the chokepoint effect.

The language of policy changed with it. In a speech of April 2022 US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen used "friend-shoring", meaning moving supply chains to trusted countries. After COVID-19, firms worried about interdependence and vulnerability moved production home or nearby, and the growth of global value chains slowed.

How does it fit economic history and political economy?

Seen in the long run of economic history, economic security looks less like an exception than a return. There were the export controls of the Cold War, then after CoCom's dissolution a period of global division of labour led by efficiency, and then through the COVID-19 economic crisis and war the language of security came back to the front.

How to read the shift depends on position. The liberal view held that interdependence gives both sides similar gains and vulnerabilities; Farrell and Newman held that the structure of networks creates enduring imbalances of power. A brief from South Korea's National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences calls economic security "in essence a product of hegemonic competition among great powers" and diagnoses South Korea as under a "dual squeeze" between the United States and China. In the Marxist tradition, Lenin's Imperialism described finance capital obtaining favourable treaty clauses and supply contracts in return for loans. In this framework today's export controls and subsidy conditions can also be read as means by which states secure favourable terms for their own capital.

Whichever way it is read, the practical questions are similar: as noted above, who bears the cost, and what conditions can be attached to subsidies.

Related historical events

Sources

  1. nrc.re.kr 경제인문사회연구회 Global Issue Brief Vol. 29: 경제안보의 정의, 배경(냉전기~미중 패권경쟁), 주요국 추진 현황, 한국에 대한 이중협공(dual squeeze) 분석
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