epistemic injustice · 1998–present

Epistemic injustice

인식적 부정의

The wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower. The British philosopher Miranda Fricker first used the term in 1998 and set it out in her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice. Fricker distinguished "testimonial injustice", in which a hearer's prejudice denies a speaker's testimony the credibility it deserves, from "hermeneutical injustice", in which gaps in the concepts and language a society shares leave some people's experiences unintelligible. By showing that power tied to social identities such as race, sex and class decides whose word counts as credible, it opened a field of research joining epistemology, ethics and political philosophy.

In depth

What question does it answer?

At a meeting someone makes a good point and nobody listens; a few minutes later someone else says the same thing and everyone nods. Many people have been through this. What has the ignored person lost? Is it merely that one opinion was buried, or that she was not treated as a knower, as someone who can know and say something?

The British philosopher Miranda Fricker held it was the latter. She called this wrong done to someone in their capacity as a knower "epistemic injustice". Epistemic means having to do with knowledge, and injustice means unfairness. Fricker first used the term in a 1998 paper and worked it into a theory in her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Arguing that a social epistemology dealing with knowledge must also deal with power relations, she wrote: "epistemology will not be truly socialized until it has been appropriately politicized."

epistemology will not be truly socialized until it has been appropriately politicized

What is testimonial injustice?

Much of what we know comes from other people's word, from testimony. So whose word we believe, and how far, is an important part of knowing. Testimonial injustice, in Fricker's sense, occurs when a hearer, because of prejudice, gives a speaker's word less credibility than it deserves. In her definition as English Wikipedia quotes it, it is when "prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word".

prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word

The real case Fricker gives is the murder in London of the Black teenager Stephen Lawrence. Duwayne Brooks, who saw his friend killed, knew where the attackers had gone, but the police who arrived treated him not as a witness but as a suspect. An official inquiry found that the officers neither listened properly to him nor followed up what he told them. Racial bias, Fricker suggests, played its part. Fricker also cites a scene from The Talented Mr. Ripley: Marge, fiancée of the missing Dickie, offers grounds for suspecting Ripley, but Dickie's father dismisses them as "female intuition".

Underlying such cases is what Fricker calls "identity power". Stereotypes a society shares about social identities such as race or sex decide in advance whose word is credible. As a result privileged groups enjoy an "excess of credibility", being treated as authorities not only on their own experience but on others', while oppressed groups suffer a "credibility deficit", treated as unqualified to speak even of their own experience.

What is hermeneutical injustice?

Hermeneutics means the study of interpretation. Hermeneutical injustice is when society does not yet have the concepts and words to understand some people's experiences, so those experiences go uncomprehended by others and even by the people themselves. Fricker's definition reads: "the injustice of having some significant area of one's social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource."

the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource

The standard example is the phrase "sexual harassment", which arose in the 1970s. Many women had suffered the same thing at work before, but without a word for it they treated it as merely unpleasant, something to be put up with, or could not explain it. Fricker held that this gap was no accident: women had long been kept out of the places where a society makes the words through which it understands experience, such as journalism, publishing, academia and the law. She also cites the way women were met with suspicion by husbands, doctors and friends before post-partum depression was recognised as a medical condition.

What discussions has it led to?

Epistemic injustice opened a new field joining epistemology, ethics and political philosophy, and spread into applied research on medicine, law and education. Fricker herself proposed virtues such as "testimonial justice", in which hearers reflect on their own prejudices, as the remedy.

Criticism and extension followed. Elizabeth Anderson argued that since epistemic injustice arises from institutions and structures, it needs structural remedies, not only individual virtue. Davis pointed out that seemingly positive prejudices such as "Asians are good at maths" also do harm by inflating credibility. Kristie Dotson proposed as a third type "contributory injustice", in which hearers wilfully ignore the interpretive resources a speaker uses, and Gaile Pohlhaus proposed "wilful hermeneutical ignorance", in which privileged groups deliberately disregard the interpretive resources of marginalised groups.

The discussion is close to the standpoint theory that grew out of Marxist feminism but starts from a different place. Where standpoint theory holds that oppressed positions can yield better knowledge, the theory of epistemic injustice analyses the harm oppressed people suffer as knowers. German Wikipedia notes that the concept also connects with Gayatri Spivak's epistemic violence.

Related people

Sources

  1. Wikipedia (EN)
  2. iep.utm.edu
  3. de.wikipedia.org
  4. fr.wikipedia.org
  5. Wikipedia (EN)
  6. plato.stanford.edu
  7. de.wikipedia.org