Epistemological anarchism
인식론적 아나키즘
The position set out by the Austrian-born philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend in a paper of 1970 and the book Against Method (1975). It holds that science has no single method that must always be followed, and that history shows cases of progress made by breaking any methodological rule whatever. The only principle that can be defended in all circumstances, he said, is therefore "anything goes". Feyerabend opened the book with a quotation from Lenin's "Left-Wing" Communism: an Infantile Disorder and carried the lessons of revolutionary politics over to scientific methodology.
In depth
Does science have one correct method?
At school we often learn "the scientific method" as a single procedure: observe, form a hypothesis, test it by experiment, and accept or reject the hypothesis according to the result. Positivism and logical positivism put forward empirical verification as the standard of science, Popper put forward falsification, and Lakatos the progress of research programmes. Whatever the name, all of them believed there were rational rules that make science scientific.
Paul Feyerabend took aim at exactly this belief. He began writing Against Method in 1968, published it in 1970 as a long paper in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, and at Lakatos's urging expanded it into a book published in 1975. Its subtitle is "Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge". The central thesis of the book is that there is no such thing as "the scientific method" and that it is wrong to impose a single methodological rule on scientific practice. He wrote: "Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives."
Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives.
Anarchism here does not mean a bomb-throwing political movement but epistemological anarchy: the attitude of not remaining within one prescribed method, on the grounds that any such method would restrict progress. The German title of the book, Wider den Methodenzwang ("Against the Forced Constraint of Method"), shows the meaning better. What he rejected was not the use of methods as such but the imposition of methodological rules.
Why did Feyerabend quote Lenin?
Against Method opens with a passage from Lenin's 1920 book "Left-Wing" Communism: an Infantile Disorder. Lenin wrote: "History in general, the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively and 'cunning' than even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes imagine."
История вообще, история революций в частности всегда богаче содержанием, разнообразнее, разностороннее, живее, «хитрее», чем воображают самые лучшие партии, самые сознательные авангарды наиболее передовых классов.
Feyerabend also carried over the conclusion Lenin drew next. Lenin said that two very important practical conclusions follow from this: "first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without the slightest exception … second, that the revolutionary class must be ready to pass from one form to another in the quickest and most unexpected manner."
Отсюда вытекают два очень важных практических вывода: первый, что революционный класс для осуществления своей задачи должен уметь овладеть всеми, без малейшего изъятия, формами или сторонами общественной деятельности (доделывая после завоевания политической власти, иногда с большим риском и огромной опасностью, то, что он не доделал до этого завоевания); второй, что революционный класс должен быть готов к самой быстрой и неожиданной смене одной формы другою.
Feyerabend inserted words in square brackets into this quotation. He read the revolutionary class as those who want to change a part of society, such as science, and mastering all forms of social activity as being able to understand and apply not just one methodology but any methodology and any variant of it one can imagine. In a note he said that Lenin was addressing parties and revolutionary vanguards, not scientists and methodologists, but that the lesson is the same, and that a few substitutions turn a political lesson into a lesson in methodology. Methodology and politics are both means of moving from one historical stage to the next, and standard methodologies overlook the fact that history constantly produces new forms. In the same note he drew on Lenin's marginal comment "very lucid" beside a passage of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History, a note preserved in Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks.
These quotations connect with Feyerabend's own political history. According to English Wikipedia, he was influenced by the Marxist playwright Bertolt Brecht, who offered him a post as his assistant at the East Berlin State Opera, which he turned down. An instinctive aversion to group thinking made him refuse to join any Marxist-Leninist organisation despite having friends there, though he voted communist in an early Austrian election. During the student revolution at Berkeley he lectured on revolutionaries such as Lenin, Mao, Mill and Cohn-Bendit.
What does "anything goes" mean?
Feyerabend said that the idea of a fixed method or a fixed theory of rationality rests on too naive a view of human beings and society. If one looks at the rich material that history provides, and does not impoverish it to satisfy a craving for intellectual security in the form of clarity and precision, it becomes clear that there is only one principle that can be defended in all circumstances and at all stages of development: "It is the principle: anything goes."
It is the principle: anything goes.
Scholars dispute what the phrase means. John Preston read it as a sign that Feyerabend had abandoned normative philosophy altogether. A more common interpretation is that it is not Feyerabend's positive conviction but the conclusion of a reductio ad absurdum: the cry a rationalist is driven to utter in terror on looking closely at history, not a methodological prescription. More recently it has been argued that it is a positive proposal with two inconsistent faces: the opportunism of adapting one's methods to the situation at hand, and unrestricted pluralism.
Feyerabend argued that for every methodological rule there is a "counter rule" recommending the opposite, which also has value. His example is "counterinduction": against the rule that theories should be consistent with known facts, one deliberately develops theories that conflict with accepted evidence. A theory accepted for a long time gives rise to "natural interpretations" that seep automatically into the words in which we describe observations, and only by redescribing experience through another theory are these interpretations revealed and made testable.
How did Galileo win without the evidence?
The main case study of Against Method is Galileo's hypothesis that the earth rotates on its axis. On Feyerabend's reconstruction, the evidence of the early seventeenth century made it right to regard the earth's rotation as false. Galileo's theory of the tides, explained by the earth's motion, was inaccurate, and the changes in the brightness of Mars and Venus seen with the naked eye did not fit either. Galileo produced new evidence with the telescope, but at the time the telescope was not understood theoretically, and when tested with astronomers in Padua it produced double images and optical illusions.
Even so, Feyerabend argued that while Galileo and his followers acted "irrationally" by the standards of inductivism and falsificationism, they were right to do so. The Aristotelians' argument that a stone dropped from a tower lands directly beneath it, so the earth does not move, rested on the hidden assumption that all motion is noticeable in perception. Galileo's hypothesis exposed this natural interpretation and made it testable. Yet Galileo did not present it head-on. He used propaganda to make his theory look as if it were already contained in Aristotelian common sense. Feyerabend thought that had he not done so, his theory would have received little attention.
How did he quarrel with Lakatos and Kuhn?
Feyerabend and Lakatos met at the London School of Economics and became very close friends. Lakatos originally planned to write For Method against Against Method, but died in 1974. Feyerabend published the book not with Cambridge University Press but with New Left Books (now Verso). The first edition contained a chapter on Lakatos's methodology of research programmes. Lakatos's rule of giving even degenerating programmes breathing space, he said, forbids no behaviour and is therefore empty, and Lakatos is an "anarchist in disguise".
He also turned on Kuhn's concept of normal science. In the volume collecting the 1965 London colloquium he wrote that Kuhn's normal science fitted organised crime as well as it fitted science. Herbert Feigl, from the side of logical empiricism, criticised Feyerabend for conflating the "context of discovery" with the "context of justification": the distinction that there may be no logic of how theories are conceived, but there must be a logic of confirming or disconfirming them. Feyerabend rejected the distinction itself, arguing that in actual scientific research the two contexts are always mingled.
How was the call to separate science from the state received?
Feyerabend held that if science is not guaranteed high-quality conclusions by a universal method, it also has no ground to claim intellectual authority over other intellectual traditions such as religion or myth. So in Science in a Free Society (1978) and elsewhere he argued that science should be separated from the state just as modern secular society separated religion from the state. He envisaged a free society in which "all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power". He also said that science should be under democratic control: what scientists investigate should be decided by popular vote, and scientific assumptions and conclusions supervised by committees of lay people.
Against Method became an international best seller and was translated into many languages, but the first reaction among philosophers of science was largely negative. Critics said that epistemological anarchism was nothing but a repetition of Pyrrhonian scepticism or relativism, that arguing against method while arguing for methods like counterinduction was self-contradictory, and that he attacked a straw man. Deeply frustrated by the reviews, he wrote in his autobiography that he sometimes wished he had never written the book. Even so, it remains a classic of twentieth-century philosophy of science and influenced, among others, the Stanford School with its emphasis on the plurality of science.