Minsaengdan Incident
민생단 사건
The purge carried out from October 1932 to early 1936 inside the Chinese Communist Party’s East Manchuria Special Committee and its anti-Japanese guerrilla units in eastern Manchuria (Jiandao), in which Korean party members and fighters were arrested and executed as alleged agents of the pro-Japanese Minsaengdan; also called the “anti-Minsaengdan struggle”. The Minsaengdan (People’s Livelihood Corps) was a pro-Japanese, anti-communist body formed in Jiandao in February 1932 that disappeared within months. Sources put the dead at between 400 and some 560; no evidence of membership was found for any of them. It stopped in early 1936 when the Comintern’s united-front policy reached the region.
In depth
The Minsaengdan Incident was the killing by the Chinese Communist Party’s organisation in eastern Manchuria, that is Jiandao (Kando), of its own Korean members and guerrillas as Japanese spies. All the dead were Korean, and Korean cadres were also among those who interrogated and executed. In no case was evidence found that an arrested person belonged to the Minsaengdan; statements extracted under torture were all there was. More are said to have died in the purge than in fighting the Japanese.
The Minsaengdan, which gave the incident its name, was a pro-Japanese group that appeared just after the Manchurian Incident. In September 1931 Cho Pyong-sang, a director of the Kapcha Club in Seoul, Pak Sok-yun, vice-president of the Maeil Sinbo, and others came to Jiandao and set about organising it with the consent of the Japanese consulate-general and the Government-General of Korea; its founding meeting was held at Longjing in February 1932. It proclaimed autonomy and a secure livelihood for the Koreans of Jiandao but in practice devoted itself to anti-communist, pro-Japanese work. Faced with the hostility of Korean society it had in effect dissolved by July 1932, though some sources date its dissolution to October. The group was gone in less than half a year; its name remained for four years as a capital charge.
Behind this lay the make-up of the party in eastern Manchuria. After the Manchurian General Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea was dissolved in 1930 and Korean communists entered the Chinese party under the one-country-one-party principle, most party members and guerrillas in the region were Korean. To Chinese cadres they were former members of another party who had until recently fought each other as the Tuesday, ML and other factions, and talk of Korean autonomy or Korean independence was suspected as nationalism. The party’s leftist line of the early 1930s rejected Korean demands such as “autonomy for Jiandao”. Those who drove the purge argued that factionalists were the Minsaengdan’s helpers and Japan’s channel into the revolutionary ranks.
It began in August 1932, when “Old Song”, the Korean secretary of the Laotougou district committee in Yanji county, was arrested by Japanese police and released. Already under suspicion, he was later seized on the statement of an interpreter captured by the guerrillas and tortured, and a confession naming some twenty people as Minsaengdan members was obtained. In 1933 Pak Tu-nam, political commissar of the Hunchun guerrillas, killed a comrade and went over to the Japanese, which deepened the suspicion. The East Manchuria Special Committee set up a purge committee to organise the campaign, and cadres said openly that 60 per cent, even 80 or 90 per cent, of the party and guerrillas were Minsaengdan. Korean cadres who had led the purge, such as the committee’s organisation chief Kim Song-do, were in turn condemned as Minsaengdan and executed, and Ju Jin, commander of the Independent Division of the Northeast People’s Revolutionary Army’s 2nd Army, fled in February 1935 when he came under suspicion. The Special Committee’s membership fell from about 1,100 in late 1931 to 181 in May 1935. Many of the surviving Korean leaders were replaced by Han Chinese.
The number of victims varies by source. The National Institute of Korean History’s survey gives 431 between late 1932 and mid-1935; the Encyclopedia of Korean Culture says more than 500. English Wikipedia says over 1,000 were arrested or expelled and 500 killed, and Korean Wikipedia cites some 560 victims confirmed by a Chinese investigation in the 1980s.
The purge was stopped by a change of policy from outside. In 1935 the Seventh Comintern Congress resolved on the anti-fascist united front and on support for national liberation movements in the colonies, and the Chinese party issued its August First Declaration. A joint conference at Ning’an in February 1936 admitted that the anti-Minsaengdan struggle had been a mistake, and when Wei Zhengmin, head of the Special Committee, returned from Moscow and chaired the Mihunzhen conference in early March the purge in effect stopped. The Comintern and the Chinese party’s delegation opposed any widening of the purge, supported Korean independence, and said that an army fighting for Korean independence could be organised. Speaking of Korean independence no longer meant being branded a spy. It was this turn that allowed the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland, a Korean united-front body, to be formed that year around the 2nd Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army.
Kim Il Sung too was arrested on the Minsaengdan charge and then cleared. Many studies hold that his opposition to the purge became a basis of his standing among the Korean guerrillas, though it has also been pointed out that there is no firm evidence for the official North Korean account that he settled the affair. The experience of being unable to raise the Korean revolution inside another country’s party is counted as the heaviest wound the one-country-one-party principle left on Korean communists.