Wang Ming line
왕밍 노선
The line pursued by Wang Ming (born Chen Shaoyu) and the Moscow-trained group at the head of the Chinese Communist Party from the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 to the Zunyi Conference of January 1935. The party's resolution of 1945 classed it as the third and gravest "Left" line after 1927. It overstated the weight of capitalism in China and the revolutionary high tide, treated the middle forces as the most dangerous enemy, and struck at cadres in the name of fighting "right deviation". The party organisation in the Nationalist areas was all but destroyed, the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was lost and the Long March followed. In a wider sense the name also covers Wang Ming's "right" errors over the united front in 1937 and 1938.
In depth
Wang Ming studied from 1925 at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, where he became the protégé of Pavel Mif, the Soviet China specialist who went on to head the university. The Chinese students around Mif, among them Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) and Wang Jiaxiang, were nicknamed the "28 Bolsheviks" for their strict adherence to the official line of Stalin and Mif. When Trotskyists and Stalinists fought inside the university, Wang took part in putting down the Trotskyists.
Back in China from 1929, Wang attacked Li Lisan's policy in 1930, but as a "right deviation", not as too far to the left. His pamphlet Two Lines (later reissued as The Struggle for the Further Bolshevisation of the Chinese Communist Party) became the new programme. The Comintern called Li Lisan to Moscow and sent Mif to China. At the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931, which Mif sponsored, Wang, not yet twenty-seven and until then a rank-and-file cadre, entered the Politburo. Historians now hold, however, that Li was removed mainly by the Comintern's intervention and that the returned students played no large part in it. The party's 1945 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party judged the new line as follows.
It was more determined, more "theoretical", more domineering and more fully formed than the "Left" deviation of the Li Lisan line.
According to the resolution, the line overstated the weight of capitalism in the Chinese economy and the importance of the struggle against the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants, and denied that any middle camp existed. It went on stressing a nationwide "revolutionary high tide" and a "line of attack", and named "right opportunism" as the main danger in the party. In organisation it set out to "remould" the leading bodies at every level with "fighting cadres" who "actively supported and carried out" the line, striking both at those who had stood with Li Lisan and at Qu Qiubai and others of the so-called "line of conciliation". After the Japanese attack of 18 September 1931 the new centre still failed to see the anti-Japanese and democratic demands of the middle classes and called the middle groups "the most dangerous enemy".
In the first half of 1931 the Shanghai organisation was breaking up under defections and arrests. In June the general secretary Xiang Zhongfa was arrested and executed, and in October Wang left for Moscow as the party's representative to the Comintern, leaving Bo Gu in charge of the centre. The provisional centre that Bo Gu led from September moved to the base area in southern Jiangxi at the beginning of 1933, after work in the Nationalist areas had suffered heavy losses. Before that, the Ningdu Conference of October 1932 had condemned Mao Zedong's line as a "rich peasant line" and "right opportunism" and changed the leadership of party and army. The Fifth Plenum of January 1934 was the high point of the line. In the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression", which began in the autumn of 1933, the Red Army was beaten, abandoned its base and set out on the Long March. At the Zunyi Conference in January 1935 Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai and Otto Braun were criticised for their failed strategy, and Zhang Wentian took Bo Gu's place.
Wang himself was in Moscow throughout. He headed the party's delegation to the Comintern from 1931 to 1937, was elected to the Comintern's Executive Committee in 1933 and to its presidium at the Seventh Congress in 1935, a higher post than any other member of the Chinese party held. In 1935 he and the delegation issued the August First Declaration and turned towards an anti-Japanese united front. In October of that year the delegation formed a Manchurian commission that acted as the superior body of the party in Manchuria and of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, so that the united front doctrine taken up by the Koreans who fought in that army was Wang Ming's doctrine of an anti-Japanese national united front.
Wang returned to Yan'an in November 1937, and at the Politburo meeting in December he argued that "everything must go through the united front" and that the Eighth Route Army should accept Chiang Kai-shek's command. In Wuhan he became secretary of the Yangtze Bureau and led united front work with the Kuomintang, until the Sixth Plenum in the autumn of 1938 corrected this and dissolved the bureau. The party later called it a "right capitulationist" error that gave up the party's leadership within the united front. The "Wang Ming line" therefore means, narrowly, the "Left" line of 1931 to 1935 and, broadly, the "right" errors of 1937 and 1938 as well. The Yan'an Rectification Movement launched in 1942 was aimed at the "dogmatism" Wang stood for; Wang pleaded illness, stayed out of it and refused to admit his errors. In the Korean Volunteer Army in north China, too, Wang's revolutionary line and united front doctrine failed to win a leading place once rectification had run its course.
Scholars differ on whether Wang sincerely meant to bring Chiang into a united front in 1935 and 1936. Michael Sheng reads his articles as propaganda meant to stir dissent inside the Kuomintang, while Gao Hua argues that Wang really believed it. The 28 Bolsheviks and Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow are treated separately.