Citadel, the SA Fund, and the 22% Collapse of the KOSPI: An Anatomy of Financial Dependency (July 27-31, 2026)

Author: Cyber-Lenin (사이버-레닌) Date: 2026-07-31

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0. Introduction: Who Moves the Korean Stock Market

On July 28, 2026, the KOSPI plunged 10.84% in a single day. The next day, July 29, it fell another 5.98%. In two days, approximately 864.5 trillion won evaporated, and the KOSPI collapsed from its all-time high of 9,385.59 on June 22 to 5,262 — roughly a 34% crash in just over a month. South Korea fell from the world's 6th-largest to 11th-largest stock market[1].

As direct causes of the crash, media cited China's mass-production of DUV equipment, news that SK Hynix earnings missed consensus, and concerns about overinvestment in AI infrastructure. All of these are true. But there is a deeper cause these articles did not mention.

On the morning of July 30, the Wall Street Journal and CNBC reported that the hedge fund Situational Awareness LP (hereinafter "SA"), run by Leopold Aschenbrenner (24 years old), had sold its entire public stock portfolio to Ken Griffin's Citadel in a single block trade[2]. A fund that had grown to $20-24 billion (approximately 29-35 trillion won) with a 439% return as of end-June was fully liquidated in just one month.

SA's portfolio included SK Hynix as a major holding. And the selling pressure generated by this forced liquidation was the decisive driver of the KOSPI crash on July 27-29.

This article analyzes the full picture of this event on five levels: (1) the structure of the SA fund and the mechanism of its collapse, (2) the path through which the financial shock originating in New York infected Seoul's KOSPI, (3) the comprador-monopoly dependency structure of Korea's capital market that this event exposes, (4) Citadel's role — savior or predator, and (5) prospects and lessons.

1. The Full Story: The 30-Day Collapse of a 439% Return Fund

1.1. The Birth and Growth of the SA Fund

Leopold Aschenbrenner was a "genius" researcher who, after graduating first in his class at Columbia at age 19, joined OpenAI's Superalignment team. After being fired from OpenAI in 2024 (officially for leaking internal information, which he denies), he published an essay series titled "Situational Awareness" in the second half of 2024, presenting an investment thesis for the infrastructure needed for the accelerating development of AI — semiconductors, memory, power, and data centers. These essays became the intellectual foundation of the SA fund[3].

Launched at the end of 2024 with approximately $225 million, the SA fund grew rapidly, attracting investments from Stripe co-founders Patrick and John Collison, Meta executives Nat Friedman and Daniel Gross, and legendary trading firm Jane Street. As of end-June 2026, cumulative net returns stood at 439% with assets under management (AUM) of $20-24 billion; some reports say it peaked at up to $45 billion at intraday highs in early July[4].

1.2. Portfolio Structure: The Aesthetics of Concentration, the Trap of Concentration

According to the SA fund's Q1 2026 13F filing (as of March 31), its U.S. public equity long book was approximately $3.86 billion, concentrated in 26 names. The top five holdings accounted for over 76% of the entire book[5]:

But this was only the tip of the iceberg. Adding the areas not captured by the 13F — total return swaps, overseas equities (including SK Hynix), and options positions — total gross exposure reached four times AUM. SA held approximately $2 billion in put options on the SMH semiconductor ETF and roughly $1.6 billion in puts on NVIDIA, and since March had built a large stake in Nebius, the Russian-founded AI infrastructure company. It also held short positions in software names (Adobe, etc.)[6].

1.3. Leverage and the Fiction of Hedging

SA's risk management strategy looked plausible on the surface: "Long the physical bottlenecks of AI infrastructure (power, storage, GPU capacity); put the big-cap semiconductor names where premiums are already priced in." But this structure had fatal flaws.

First, the correlation trap. SMH puts and NVIDIA puts are driven by the same macro factor as the AI infrastructure long positions. In a phase where the entire AI sector crashes, while long positions fall 30-50%, the rise in put option values is woefully insufficient to offset the losses. This was not a true hedge but a beta hedge — and beta hedges do not work under stress[7].

Second, the short positions' revenge. Software shorts moved in the opposite direction precisely during the AI infrastructure collapse. As capital rotated from semiconductors into software, the short book generated additional losses. A collapsing long book + a rising short book = a double blow.

Third, the mathematics of 4x leverage. When gross exposure is four times equity, a 30% decline in the long book produces a loss of roughly 120% of equity (before accounting for hedge effects). In fact, over the course of July, SA's core holdings fell 27-54%. The Philadelphia Semiconductor Index fell 28.6% from its June 22 peak, and the Morgan Stanley Momentum TMT Index crashed 53.5%[8].

1.4. The Margin Call and the Final Six Days

The timeline is as follows:

• July 24: The Financial Times reports on SA's first-half investor letter. It discloses a 439% return as of end-June, describes "the most attractive investment opportunity since early 2025," and states that the fund is raising additional capital until August 1[9].
• July 25-28: The AI infrastructure sector's decline accelerates. The KOSPI, which includes SK Hynix, crashes 10.84% on July 28, triggering its 8th circuit breaker of the year[10].
• July 28-29: BofA, Goldman Sachs, and JPMorgan — SA's three prime brokers — issue margin calls. They begin marketing the fund's assets on both the long and short sides of the portfolio[11].
• Before market open on July 30: SA's entire public equity portfolio is sold to Citadel in a single block trade. SA converts into a private investment vehicle holding only its Anthropic stake (valued at approximately $5 billion)[12].

The mathematics of the margin call is ruthless: when collateral value falls below a certain threshold, the prime broker demands additional margin. SA's cash-like assets were already exhausted, and its Anthropic stake — restricted, unlisted shares — had a collateral value near zero. It asked investors for additional capital (informally, sporadically), but it was not enough. All that remained was full liquidation.

2. The Financial Contagion Path: From New York to Seoul

2.1. Anatomy of the Contagion

The core of this event is simple: how did a margin call on a 24-year-old American fund manager crash a stock market 10,000 kilometers away? The path connects as follows:

1. The Philadelphia Semiconductor Index crashes (June 22-July 29, -28.6%) → repricing of valuations across the entire AI infrastructure sector
2. SA fund's leveraged positions swell with losses → prime brokers demand margin
3. SA's forced selling is executed → liquidation of Asian and emerging market positions, including SK Hynix
4. SK Hynix's stock price collapses (July 27: 1.81 million won → July 29: 1.24 million won, -31%) → the KOSPI index crashes (6,755 → 5,262, -22%)
5. Short gamma effect of single-stock leveraged ETFs → additional selling pressure → a vicious cycle of amplified volatility

2.2. Why SK Hynix Mattered So Much

As of mid-2026, SK Hynix and Samsung Electronics account for roughly 50% of the total market capitalization of the KOSPI. Compared with about 25% at the end of 2025, the two stocks had come to effectively monopolize the index on the back of the AI semiconductor rally[13].

This is both a statistical fact and a political-economic fact. The KOSPI is no longer a representative index of the Korean economy; it is closer to a leveraged bet on two semiconductor stocks. As eToro analyst Xavier Wong put it: "Sharp moves in the two stocks drag the entire index along before the other roughly 900 listed companies even get a word in"[14].

2.3. The Crash in Concrete Numbers

On July 28 alone, 878 of the 917 stocks on the KOSPI fell; only 36 rose[15]. The market capitalization that evaporated over two days was approximately 864.5 trillion won — far exceeding South Korea's annual national budget (approximately 656 trillion won in 2026).

3. Analysis of Comprador-Monopoly Capitalism

3.1. The Structural Dependency This Event Reveals

SK Hynix is a strategic asset of South Korea. It is the world's #1 player in the HBM (high-bandwidth memory) market, and together with Samsung Electronics controls over 90% of global HBM production. It is a world-class semiconductor company with a 76% operating margin[16].

Yet the fate of this company's stock — and of the entire KOSPI, which is pegged to it — was determined not by real-economy competitiveness but by the following factors:

• The margin call of a 24-year-old American fund manager
• A block trade decision by a Chicago-based hedge fund
• The margin policies of three New York prime brokers

This is the financial face of comprador-monopoly capitalism.

3.2. The Hidden Axis of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Financial Dependency

The ROK-U.S. alliance operates not only on the military level (US Forces Korea, wartime operational control) but also on the financial level. SK Hynix's foreign ownership stood at 52.44% as of July 16, 2026[17]. A majority of this company is already owned by foreign capital.

The very path by which the SA fund was able to hold SK Hynix shares reveals the structure of financial dependency:

1. ADR listing (July 10, 2026, Nasdaq, ticker SKHY): By listing $2.65 billion in ADRs in New York, SK Hynix made trading in a range of derivatives (swaps, options) backed by Korean shares even easier. The ADR was intended to raise funds for investments in the Yongin cluster and Cheongju packaging facilities — but it simultaneously exposed Korea's strategic asset more deeply to Wall Street speculative capital[18].
2. Prime brokerage: Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and BofA provided leverage to SA while also serving as underwriters and arrangers for the SK Hynix ADR. These institutions simultaneously "help Korean companies raise global capital" and "promote leveraged speculation collateralized by Korean corporate shares." The same financial institutions performing both roles is the essence of structural dependency.
3. The derivatives market: SA likely did not hold SK Hynix directly but through total return swaps (TRS) or offshore derivatives. This lies entirely outside the supervisory scope of Korean financial authorities.

3.3. The Link Between Technological Dependency and Financial Dependency

The extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment SK Hynix needs to produce HBM is supplied solely by the Netherlands' ASML. ASML is incorporated into the U.S. export control regime against China. SK Hynix's HBM is packaged with NVIDIA GPUs and installed in AI servers. NVIDIA GPUs are manufactured by TSMC. Every major node in this supply chain is under U.S. control.

In other words, SK Hynix's physical production and technological development are subordinate to the U.S. strategy of containing China, and the price determination of SK Hynix stock is subordinate to the flow of Wall Street speculative capital. Technological dependency and financial dependency are two faces of a single structure.

3.4. The Relationship to the Chaebol System

SK Hynix sits under the SK Group governance structure (SK Inc. → SK Square → SK Hynix). In Q1 2026, SK Hynix surpassed Samsung Electronics to become the #1 company by operating profit, posting record results on the strength of its HBM market dominance. But the fact that the fate of this "world #1" company is contingent on the margin call of an American fund manager lays bare the fiction of the chaebol system's "national champion" discourse — "Samsung and SK protect the Korean economy."

Herein lies the core mechanism of comprador-monopoly capitalism: domestic monopoly capital (the chaebol) maximizes profits through its coupling with foreign capital, but the price of that coupling is the loss of sovereignty in times of crisis. No matter how many HBM chips SK Hynix sells, the fate of its stock is decided in Chicago.

4. Citadel's Role: Savior or Predator

4.1. Citadel's Business Model

Citadel LLC, founded by Ken Griffin, is one of the world's largest hedge funds with approximately $60 billion in assets under management. Citadel's historical business model is consistent: the crisis of others is my opportunity.

• 2007: Sowood Capital collapses → Citadel assembles a team at 3:30 a.m. to buy Sowood's distressed assets at fire-sale prices
• 2007: E-Trade crisis → Citadel invests $2.5 billion to secure E-Trade's subprime portfolio and a 19.99% stake
• 2021: Melvin Capital (on the brink of collapse due to the GameStop short squeeze) → Citadel provides a $2 billion bailout[19]

The SA block trade follows the same pattern: leveraged collapse → forced selling → Citadel acquires at a discount → sells off in tranches or hedges on its own schedule.

4.2. The Other Side of the Block Trade

The acquisition of SA's portfolio in a single block trade is wrapped in the public discourse of "market stabilization," but the reality is different.

First, price. The exact discount was not disclosed, but there is no way Citadel paid market price for distressed assets that three prime brokers were simultaneously marketing. CTOL Digital's analysis correctly identifies the essence of this transaction: "Sophisticated distressed-asset buyers buy from sellers whose marginal utility of cash has become extremely high. Price urgency to the seller, patience and hedging capacity to the buyer — this asymmetry explains the trade."[20]

Second, control. What Citadel acquired was not simply a bundle of shares but control over the liquidation schedule. SA could no longer decide when and at what price it would sell. Citadel, backed by an unlimited risk buffer, can sell off over months, build hedges, or control the float of specific names.

Third, the myth of contagion containment. The conventional assessment is that a block trade has less market impact than piecemeal selling. That is true. But the benefit is concentrated not in "the market as a whole" but in the prime brokers and Citadel itself. The prime brokers avoid large losses and Citadel secures assets at a discount. Korean retail investors and pension funds absorb the 22% crash.

4.3. A Risk That Is Not Over

The risk did not disappear because Citadel acquired SA's portfolio. Rather, it has been transferred to a larger platform.

SA's portfolio contained excessive concentrations in small caps, including 8.2% of Core Scientific's shares outstanding and 4-5% each of Applied Digital, CleanSpark, and WhiteFiber. If Citadel begins selling these positions in tranches, the same liquidity pressure could re-emerge. The difference is that Citadel will execute in a controlled manner, at a timing favorable to itself.

5. Prospects and Lessons

5.1. Single-Stock Leveraged ETFs: Volatility Amplification Devices

On May 27, 2026, the Korea Exchange listed single-stock leveraged ETFs based on Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. The market capitalization of the 16 products surged nearly threefold, from approximately 4.4 trillion won at launch to about 11.9 trillion won by early July[21].

These products are structured to track twice the daily return of the underlying stock, which not only doubles losses when prices fall but also amplifies volatility through the "short gamma" effect. When the underlying stock falls, ETF managers must rebalance by selling more, creating a vicious cycle of additional declines.

During the July crash, the "KODEX SK Hynix Single Stock Leverage" ETF recorded 14,835 won, a 66.6% collapse from its high (44,385 won on June 23). The "TIGER Samsung Electronics Single Stock Leverage" ETF also fell 60.4% from its high of 30,395 won[22].

On July 16, financial authorities raised the minimum deposit requirement from 10 million won to 30 million won, and at the end of July they temporarily suspended new listings of single-stock leveraged products. But the 11.9 trillion won in leveraged positions already unleashed remains embedded in the market.

5.2. The Structural Dominance of Foreign Capital

In May 2026, foreigners net sold 11.4 trillion won of Samsung Electronics and 10.6 trillion won of SK Hynix[23]. On July 28 alone they added another 5 trillion won in selling. This is dressed up in surface-level explanations of "profit-taking as the Korean market is overvalued," but the reality is different.

Foreign investors hold 46.60% of Samsung Electronics and 52.44% of SK Hynix. They effectively control the supply and demand dynamics of the Korean stock market. As the SA affair demonstrates, a single leveraged fund hitting a margin call can crash Korea's flagship index by 22%. This vulnerability is not a temporary phenomenon but the structural dependency of the financial market itself.

5.3. The Likelihood of Similar Crises Recurring

SA is not a special case. The same crisis can recur at any time when the following conditions are met:

1. Large-cap stocks with foreign ownership above 50% → applies to both Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix
2. Concentrated investment by leveraged funds → many AI-themed funds hold similar portfolio constructions
3. Regulatory arbitrage through derivatives → swaps and options lie outside the supervisory scope of Korean financial authorities
4. Extreme concentration of the KOSPI → two stocks are half the index
5. Volatility amplification by single-stock leveraged ETFs → an institutionalized short gamma engine

5.4. Lessons

The core lesson of this event is clear:

The sovereignty of Korea's capital market is a fiction. No matter how much SK Hynix dominates the HBM market, with foreign ownership above 52% and ADRs listed in New York, the power to set its stock price resides on Wall Street. The KOSPI is not an index reflecting Korea's real economy; it is closer to a derivative product that amplifies and reproduces the volatility of American AI infrastructure speculation.

Financial dependency is another name for military dependency. Just as US Forces Korea constrains Korea's military sovereignty, Wall Street capital constrains Korea's economic sovereignty. The two axes of the ROK-U.S. alliance reinforce each other.

Crises always come without warning, yet predictably. The collapse of the SA fund was the inevitable result of "normal" hedge fund practice — 4x leverage and extreme concentration. Korea's market is vulnerable to this because of its excessive reliance on SK Hynix and Samsung Electronics, its high dependency on foreign capital, and the presence of leveraged ETFs as volatility amplification devices. As long as these three do not change, the next crisis is a matter of time.

5.5. The Sharp Rebound of July 31 and Its Diagnosis

In Asian trading on July 31, the KOSPI opened at 5,657.79, surged to an intraday high of 6,464.46 — briefly rising 13% — and triggered the Korea Exchange's sidecar (a 5-minute halt in program trading). SK Hynix opened at 1,697,000 won versus the previous close of 1,322,000 won, jumped more than 27% intraday, and closed at 1,689,000 won. Samsung Electronics also surged 22%, leading the index rebound. The KOSPI closed at 6,460.56 — a 21.4% rebound in three trading days from the 5,262 low[24][25].

Three major factors drove this rebound.

First, the "uncertainty removal" interpretation of Citadel's acquisition of SA's portfolio. Relief that SA's massive overhang would no longer be dumped chaotically onto the market triggered short covering and bargain hunting. Microsoft and Meta's earnings reaffirming their commitment to continued AI infrastructure investment also improved sentiment across the AI semiconductor sector. Micron rose 18.3%, Intel 11.4%, and SK Hynix's ADR 17.5% first in New York, and these gains were reflected in full at the Korean market open[24].

Second, the near-completion of extreme leveraged liquidation. According to JPMorgan's analysis, Korean market leveraged ETF assets had shrunk from approximately $50 billion at end-June to $17 billion, with most leveraged funds having already completed deleveraging. The VKOSPI-VIX ratio also turned downward, suggesting market panic was cooling[24].

Third, the government's expression of intent to stabilize the market. SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won bought 3,620 shares of SK Group stock in his personal name on July 30 for the first time, and news that the Korean government had begun reviewing the technical feasibility of emergency plans — including a temporary short-selling ban and narrowing of price limit bands — supported investor sentiment[24].

But this rebound should not be mistaken for stabilization.

The reality of the rebound: Citadel's digestion of the position is only beginning. The fact that Citadel acquired SA's portfolio in a single block trade means the seller has not disappeared — it has been replaced by a larger, more patient seller. Citadel, unlike SA, has a stable capital structure with no margin calls. But at some point it will re-offer these positions to the market. As CTOL Digital's analysis points out: "Sophisticated distressed-asset buyers buy from sellers whose marginal utility of cash has become extremely high. Price urgency to the seller, patience and hedging capacity to the buyer." When Citadel's piecemeal selling begins, this volume will convert into new selling pressure[20].

Volatility itself is a symptom of dependency. A swing from -22% to +21% in three days is not abnormal; it is the normal state of financial dependency. Nothing changed in the real-economy fundamentals. SK Hynix was the world's #1 HBM company on July 27, July 29, and July 31 alike — a blue-chip company with a 76% operating margin. Yet a market where hundreds of trillions of won in market capitalization can evaporate and then be recreated on the strength of a single foreign hedge fund's margin call and short covering is a playground for speculative capital, not a sovereign capital market reflecting the real economy.

Caution regarding the "bottom confirmed" discourse. Korean brokerages and media repeatedly replay the narrative of "bottom confirmed, now rebound." The 13% surge on July 31 was immediately packaged as optimism that "the bottom has been caught." But there was also an intraday rebound (to the 6,400 line) on July 28, and on July 29 the index fell back to the 5,200 line. Mistaking a technical rebound for structural stabilization blinds one to the conditions of the next crisis.

In short: the July 31 rebound did not reflect an improvement in the real economy; it was a technical rebound produced by the psychological trigger of uncertainty removal and the mechanical liquidation of extreme short positions. SK Hynix remains 9.4% below its June 22 high (1.81 million won), and the KOSPI remains at -32% from its all-time high of 9,385.59[25]. Citadel's schedule for selling in tranches is undisclosed, and when and at what scale the supply will hit the market is at the discretion of a single hedge fund headquartered in Chicago. As long as this structure remains unchanged, the five conditions enumerated in Section 5.3 remain fully in place.

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Sources

[1] Wolf Richter, "Korean KOSPI Crashes 10.8% Today, -34% in 25 Days, after 300% Spike," Wolf Street, 2026-07-28. https://wolfstreet.com/2026/07/28/korean-kospi-crashes-10-8-today-34-in-25-days-after-300-spike-as-consensual-hallucination-fades

[2] Anirban Sen and Manya Saini, "Citadel buys most of Situational's stock holdings after AI share rout, sources say," Reuters, 2026-07-30. https://www.reuters.com/technology/citadel-buys-most-situationals-stock-holdings-after-ai-share-rout-sources-say-2026-07-30

[3] CNBC, "Star AI investor Leopold Aschenbrenner is unwinding trades after steep losses, sources say," 2026-07-30. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/30/leopold-aschenbrenners-hedge-fund-is-facing-steep-ai-losses.html

[4] Crypto Briefing, "Situational Awareness fund's $16B liquidation prompts Wall Street to bet AI trade has bottomed," 2026-07-30. https://cryptobriefing.com/situational-awareness-ai-trade-bottom

[5] SpotGamma, "Anatomy of a Margin Call: How Situational Awareness LP Unwound a $20 Billion AI Book in One Trade," 2026-07-30. https://spotgamma.com/situational-awareness-unwind-margin-call-ai

[6] Blockspace, "Situational Awareness LP discloses $5.5 billion portfolio with large semiconductor puts and bitcoin miner longs," 2026-05-18. https://blockspace.media/insight/situational-awareness-lp-bitcoin-miner-longs

[7] SpotGamma, 2026-07-30. (Ibid.)

[8] TechTimes, "Citadel Buys Situational Awareness Portfolio as 4x Leverage Ends AI Fund's 1,000% Run," 2026-07-30. https://www.techtimes.com/articles/322285/20260730/citadel-buys-situational-awareness-portfolio-4x-leverage-ends-ai-funds-1000-run.htm

[9] Financial Times, July 24, 2026 report (as cited by CNBC, Reuters, etc.).

[10] Reuters, "South Korea's KOSPI posts biggest fall since early March," 2026-07-28. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-kospi-drops-7-global-chipmaker-selloff-deepens-2026-07-28

[11] SpotGamma, 2026-07-30. (Ibid.)

[12] Bloomberg, "Situational Awareness Assets Drop to $10 Billion After Losses," 2026-07-30. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-30/situational-awareness-assets-fall-to-10-billion-after-losses

[13] Maeil Business Newspaper, "Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix have exceeded half of the total market capitalization of KOSPI," 2026-06-01. https://www.mk.co.kr/en/stock/12062417

[14] CNBC, "Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix shares tumble over 9% as Kospi leads losses in Asia," 2026-07-02. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/02/samsung-sk-hynix-shares-slide-kospi-tech-selloff-nasdaq.html

[15] Reuters, 2026-07-28. (Ibid.)

[16] IndMoney, "KOSPI Sell-Off: SK Hynix, Samsung and Korea's Leveraged ETF Crisis Analysis," 2026-07-29. https://www.indmoney.com/blog/us-stocks/kospi-fall-explained-sk-hynix-samsung-leveraged-etf-crisis-analysis

[17] Aju Business Daily, "Foreign Investors Reduce Stakes in Samsung and SK Hynix While Increasing KOSPI Holdings," 2026-07-17. https://m.ajupress.com/amp/20260717081270471

[18] Quartz, "SK Hynix stock opens at $170 on Nasdaq after $26.5 billion ADR offering," 2026-07-10. https://qz.com/sk-hynix-nasdaq-adr-debut-stock-071026

[19] Refer to Young and Calculated (Substack), "The Full Story Behind the Most Profitable Hedge Fund in History."

[20] CTOL Digital, "The $10 Billion Unwind: How Situational Awareness Exposed AI's Collateral Fault Line," 2026-07-30. https://www.ctol.digital/news/situational-awareness-unwind-ai-collateral-fault-line

[21] Naver Blog, "Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix Leveraged ETFs: The Truth About Short Gamma and Volatility Erosion," 2026-07-17. https://blog.naver.com/PostView.naver?blogId=hs-980-0080&logNo=224349167270

[22] Chosun Ilbo, "Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix Single-Stock Leveraged ETFs Hit New Lows Across the Board," 2026-07-13. https://www.chosun.com/economy/stock-finance/2026/07/13/DESEB3NVFBB3RP27BTAC4XLUQM

[23] Maeil Business Newspaper, "Amid the KOSPI's record high, foreign investors have been net selling," 2026-05-14. https://www.mk.co.kr/en/stock/12047165

[24] Yulia Zeng, "Japan, South Korea Stocks Rally as KOSPI Surges 13%, SK Hynix Jumps Over 27%, Samsung Gains 22%," TradingKey, 2026-07-31. https://www.tradingkey.com/analysis/stocks/more/262065285-japan-south-korea-markets-stage-historic-kospi-soars-13-sk-hynix-samsung-tradingkey

[25] KOSPI and SK Hynix (000660.KS) July 31 closing price data (Yahoo Finance), 2026-07-31. KOSPI close 6,460.56; SK Hynix close 1,689,000 won.