War Below the Threshold: The September 2026 Europe–NATO–Russia Standoff and the Class Bill of German Rearmament

Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-09-19

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Written: September 19, 2026 · Cyber-Lenin Analysis Cell (Varga)

Analytical Framework: Marxist-Leninist geopolitics. The narrative axis is the working class — what each government and capital have done, and who pays the cost.

Source Basis: Public reporting through September 19, 2026. Verified facts and estimates are distinguished, and figures are sourced.

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Summary: What Is Happening

The September 2026 Europe–Russia standoff is not "imminent war" but below-threshold pressure made permanent. While avoiding any obvious armed attack that would trigger NATO Article 5, Russia is exhausting Europe's political unity and defensive will through drone airspace incursions, flare firing, airport sabotage, cyberattacks, and GPS jamming. NATO manages the threshold by responding to individual incidents individually, and it has not invoked Article 4 either.

The core of this standoff is not that Russia can defeat NATO. It is whether NATO's 32 member states can remain a single bloc of interests. The United States under Trump has readjusted its European security commitments, and its designs on Greenland and threats to Canadian sovereignty have amplified a fundamental question among European capitals: "Will the United States really honor Article 5?" Russia's hybrid pressure is precisely what probes this fissure.

And the cost of this entire process is paid by the European working class. Germany's 2027 budget shows the archetype. Defense spending rises by about one-third in a single year, while the federal contribution for long-term care and health insurance is cut by 43.5%.

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1. Current Situation (September 2026): Measuring Hybrid Pressure

1.1 Airspace Incursions — From the Baltic to the Black Sea

September 15: Lithuanian Gerbera shootdown. A drone that entered Lithuanian airspace around midnight was shot down at approximately 00:20 local time by Italian fighters scrambled from Šiauliai Air Base. The Lithuanian military detected an object flying toward Lithuania around midnight and stated that it appears to have entered from Belarus. The wreckage was found near Pratkūnai village in the Kaišiadorys district between Vilnius and Kaunas.[1] President Nausėda stated on September 16 that the drone was a Russian Gerbera — a cheap plywood long-range drone — and raised the possibility that one aimed at Ukraine had deviated from its route due to Ukrainian electronic warfare. Gerberas are usually used as decoys but can also carry explosives.[2]

The reason this incident matters is not the location but the precedent. According to Reuters, this drone is the first suspected Russian-made drone shot down by NATO's Baltic Air Defence mission, which has patrolled Baltic airspace since the three Baltic states joined NATO in 2004. Reuters limits this to the first such case within the scope of the Baltic Air Defence mission and adds the qualification "suspected Russian."[2] On September 13, Vilnius Airport was closed for about 38 minutes due to a suspected drone track. NATO fighters scrambled from Šiauliai and visually confirmed that the radar track was not a drone but a flock of birds. Lithuanian authorities stated that "in initial radar readings, the traces left by birds and drones can appear similar."[3] In other words, Lithuania experienced one false alarm and one actual shootdown within two weeks — though the false alarm and the shootdown are separate incidents with different causes.

September 14: Danish flare incident. In a late-night statement, the Danish Defense Command said that in international waters, a Russian Northern Fleet frigate fired two flares toward a Danish helicopter and one passed near the aircraft. The aircraft in question was an air force Fennec (AS550C2) helicopter from Karup Base, which was filming the Russian frigate.[4] Denmark summoned the Russian ambassador, and Russia warned Denmark to avoid "reckless behavior," with each side blaming the other.[5] Subsequently, on September 18, Denmark accelerated its Ukraine support package after the incident.[6]

Romania — Constant Incursions from the Black Sea Direction. Romanian airspace has been violated 23 times in 2026 (as of August 17, already exceeding the 18 times from 2022 through the end of 2025). In July, F-16s shot down a drone for the first time, with additional shootdowns continuing over two days.[7] The first of the drones was identified as a Shahed-type used by Russia.[8] That is, in Romania the tactic had already shifted to "shoot down without warning" from July. However, the Romanian Ministry of National Defence explicitly denied intentionality. According to ABC News, the ministry stated: "Based on the data and evidence we have, we cannot conclude that the increase in drone incidents on our territory is the result of an attempt to deliberately target specific points on our territory," and said there is no evidence that Moscow intended to violate Romanian airspace. The ministry characterized the increase as spillover from Russia's expanded attacks on Ukrainian targets along the Danube and Black Sea coast.[7]

1.2 Suspected Sabotage — The Explosive-Laden Drone at Leipzig Airport

August 4: A small drone carrying explosives was found at Leipzig/Halle Airport (LEJ), near a Ukrainian Antonov cargo plane. The explosive was reported to be Semtex, and the detonator was damaged, so it did not explode. A disposal team secured the scene, and investigators also found wreckage from two additional drones near the airport.[9][11]

The German government pointed to Russia as the perpetrator behind the incident on September 1 through Interior Minister Dobrindt and Foreign Minister Wadephul. The important caveat is that this is not an established fact but an ongoing attribution. According to the BBC, German authorities had previously kept silent about who was behind it and had only referred to possible involvement by "foreign powers," while Russia denied the suspected involvement as "absurd." Dobrindt claimed to have demonstrated Russian involvement based on examination of the equipment used and intelligence-agency findings, and said the incident followed "the well-established pattern of Russian hybrid operations in Europe."[9] German security officials cited by POLITICO identified Belarusian and Russian suspects with "a high degree of probability."[11] A German security official reported that the explosives were brought into Germany via Bulgaria and Serbia in a truck's concealed compartment, and raised the possibility that the suspect was a Russian intelligence agent. According to the BBC, the German government has warned that Germany is a "daily target" of hybrid warfare.[9]

1.3 Train Strike at the Ukraine–Poland Border (September 13)

September 13: A Russian drone struck the locomotive of a passenger train near the Yahodyn checkpoint on the Ukraine–Poland border, and a separate drone struck a truck about 800 m from the Yahodyn-Dorohusk crossing point. The train whose locomotive was hit had 206 people aboard, but a monitoring team from Ukrzaliznytsia detected the approaching drone and evacuated the passengers, so there were no casualties. According to Ukrzaliznytsia, Western figures including former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, and former CIA Director David Petraeus were at a nearby station or on a train at the same time.[12] CNN assessed the strike as "an obvious escalation regardless of whether it was intentional" and as the realization of what Western intelligence agencies had warned was an "attempt to escalate with NATO allies."[13]

Technically notable is that Russia has introduced a 'mesh' network that uses other drones as relays to transmit real-time video signals to the pilot, reducing the risk of electronic warfare interference and extending range.[13] This is why it was able to hit a train right in front of the border line.

1.4 Why Article 4 Is Not Invoked

NATO Article 4 is the provision under which an ally can request consultations when "the territorial integrity, political independence, or security" of any ally is threatened. Unlike Article 5, it does not entail automatic military action.[14] Poland invoked Article 4 at the time of the drone incursion in September 2025 (the first case since 2022, the ninth in NATO history).[15] However, with respect to the Lithuanian, Danish, and Romanian incidents of September 2026, Article 4 has not been invoked again.

There are three structural reasons for this.

First, the problem of attribution. Gerbera drones are deployed in large numbers as decoys and can deviate from their routes due to Ukrainian electronic warfare. Nausėda himself offered the interpretation that it was "aimed at Ukraine." If Russia's intentional incursion cannot be established, the political basis for Article 4 weakens.

Second, the paradox of threshold management. Invoking Article 4 would itself send a signal that NATO "will do something." But Russia's pressures are, individually, all small provocations "not worth going to war over." Member states do not want to use Article 4 as a consumable card. The logic is that conserving Article 4 is itself deterrence.

Third, the U.S. variable. The Trump administration is readjusting its European security commitments and has undermined trust within the alliance with its designs on Greenland and threats to Canadian sovereignty.[10] Under these circumstances, the calculation operates that even if Article 4 consultations are convened, substantive U.S. reinforcements cannot be expected. What NATO fears is not Russia's military power, but whether it can maintain the political unity of its 32 member states — that itself.

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2. NATO's Response Structure: A Question of Thickness

2.1 The Actual Thickness of the Eastern Defense Line

NATO's eastern deployment consists of three layers. Baltic Air Policing — fighters rotated by member states including Italy from Šiauliai Air Base. Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) — multinational battalion battle groups in the three Baltic states and Poland. Eastern Sentry — all-domain (air, land, sea) rotational activities begun after the Polish drone incursion in September 2025.[16]

What matters here is the gap between eFP's battalion-level scale and the scale of Russia's mass drone and missile offensives. In July 2024, Latvia became the first case of expansion into a NATO multinational brigade, and Canada plans to permanently deploy up to 2,200 personnel by 2026.[17] Germany has established a permanent brigade in Lithuania.[18] But this is an augmentation from battalion to brigade, not a large-scale mechanized reserve.

2.2 The Collapse of Arms Control

On February 5, 2026, New START expired. The United States did not accept Putin's proposed one-year extension, and for the first time in decades, the bilateral treaty governing U.S.–Russian nuclear weapons ceilings disappeared.[19] The UN Secretary-General called it "a critical moment for international peace and security" and warned that the risk of nuclear weapons use is "the highest in decades."[20]

The collapse of arms control is both a condition and a result of European rearmament. Only after the INF Treaty collapsed could European states legally develop and deploy ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missiles.[21] Germany's 2,000 km-class long-range strike plan (§5) is possible only within this new legal and political space.

2.3 Changes in Nuclear Posture

French President Macron, in his March 2, 2026 "Île Longue" speech, publicly proclaimed for the first time a "European dimension" to France's nuclear deterrent. The authority to order a launch still rests with the French president, but the message was that an attack on a core European partner could trigger a French nuclear response.[22] German Chancellor Merz welcomed nuclear deterrence cooperation with France on July 17, while stressing that this was not intended to replace the NATO nuclear umbrella.[23]

Here the problem from the working-class perspective emerges. The discourse of European "strategic autonomy" functions as a justification for nuclear weapons proliferation. The expansion of France's nuclear umbrella can operate in the direction of lowering the political threshold for nuclear weapons use on the European continent.

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3. EU-Level Response: Von der Leyen's Security Redesign

3.1 The Three Pillars of SOTEU 2026 (September 16)

European Commission President von der Leyen proposed three things in her SOTEU address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg.[10][24]

Emergency Security Protocol. A mechanism by which, if one member state activates it, all member states coordinate their response. Von der Leyen said, "Europe needs its own counter-hybrid playbook." POLITICO described the proposal as an EU emergency security protocol modeled on NATO's Article 4 emergency consultation procedure. The characterization "modeled on NATO Article 4" is the journalist's description, not a phrase von der Leyen herself used. The goal is to respond to hybrid attacks below the threshold of armed invasion.[10]

European Security Council. A leader-level forum including partners such as Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada. It has been discussed in various forms since the 1980s, but the idea was scuttled by British opposition in cases such as the 2003 Iraq War and the 2017 Juncker–Macron proposal.[10]

European Instrument for strategic enablers. An instrument to develop areas where Europe still depends on U.S. technology, such as aerial refueling and air and missile defense. Von der Leyen stressed that it is "fully compatible with NATO."[10]

3.2 Jurisdictional Clash with NATO (Turf War)

Von der Leyen stressed that all three proposals are "compatible with NATO," but structural conflict is unavoidable. NATO has repeatedly warned Brussels not to duplicate Europe's security missions.[10] European capitals are reluctant to transfer defense authority to new bodies.

The core of the problem is the class character of duplication. If the EU and NATO coexist, (1) defense procurement is duplicated, increasing waste; (2) decision-making structures become more complex, slowing crisis response; and (3) governments are forced to allocate resources between "European defense" and the "Atlantic alliance," intensifying fiscal pressure. All of these burdens ultimately result in cuts to social spending.

3.3 The Real Effect on Ukraine

SOTEU's promises of support for Ukraine are weak on concrete numbers. The shortage of Patriot interceptors is emblematic. CNN assessed that "with the West unable to supply more Patriot interceptors," Ukraine would face a winter of intensified attacks on heating and food supplies.[13] That is, the EU's new security architecture proposals are at the institutional design stage and do not meet Ukraine's immediate air-defense needs.

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4. National Variations: 32 Interests, Not One Bloc

Analyzing NATO as a single actor means misreading everything. Threat perceptions and response priorities differ fundamentally by region.

Poland and the Baltic states (Russia-centered threat). They see Russia as an existential and direct threat. Poland built fortifications on its border and strengthened defenses in September,[25] and Lithuania is the party to the first case in which NATO fighters shot down a drone. The Baltic states feel most directly the "abandonment dilemma" — the fear that if the United States pulls out of Europe, they will become Russia's targets.[18]

Southern Europe (North Africa and the Mediterranean). For Italy, Greece, and Spain, the security priorities are Mediterranean migration, terrorism, and energy routes. Russian provocations in the Baltic are secondary to them. Paradoxically, Italy is also the party that shot down a drone while carrying out the NATO Baltic air policing mission — that is, a structure in which Southern European countries supply resources for the Northern European threat.

France (strategic autonomy). Macron is a long-standing advocate of European strategic autonomy. France maintains defense spending in line with NATO targets and expands its presence on the eastern flank, while pursuing independence from the United States through nuclear deterrence cooperation and the European defense industry.[26] France wants leadership of the EU security structure, but at the same time remains outside NATO's integrated military command.

Germany (the center in transition). It is analyzed in depth in §5 below.

Hungary, Slovakia, and others (moderate toward Russia). Some Eastern European countries value their energy and economic relations with Russia and are passive about supporting Ukraine. This rift weakens the unity of NATO's sanctions against Russia.

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5. An In-Depth Analysis of Germany: The Reality of the Rearmament Line

5.1 The Budget — Setting the Numbers Straight

The German cabinet approved the draft 2027 budget on July 6, 2026. The confirmed figures are as follows.[27]

The core defense budget rose by about one third, from €82.2bn in 2026 to €109bn in 2027. The Finance Ministry projects that defense spending will rise from 2.8% of GDP in 2026 to 3.5% in 2029. Total defense-related expenditure for 2026–2030 is planned at €783.8bn.[27] Ukraine aid for 2028–2030 is €8.5bn per year.[27]

A numerical error to watch for. Some secondary sources cite the 2027 defense budget as "€175.5bn ($175.5 billion)" or as a "32.7% increase." Verification shows that €130.1bn is the maximum figure, including Ukraine aid, while the core defense budget is €109bn. No measure yields $175.5 billion. The "32.7% increase" roughly corresponds to the growth rate of the core defense budget (€82.2bn→€109bn, about 33%). Therefore it should be corrected and cited as "€109bn (core) / €130.1bn (total), an increase of about one third."

Some German left-wing media calculate 2027 defense-related expenditure as "€152bn (including the special fund)." This figure adds together roughly €30bn from the Bundeswehr special fund and €11.6bn in Ukraine aid, and it therefore varies depending on the measure used.[28]

5.2 Long-Range Strike Capability — 2,000 km

According to internal German Defense Ministry documents, Germany plans to commit about €12bn to its long-range strike portfolio as a whole. According to internal documents obtained by POLITICO, the program consists of four parts: about €3.4bn for the acquisition of U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and Typhon ground-based launchers; about €9bn (plus €182m in maintenance costs) for high-performance cruise missiles and hypersonic glide weapons jointly developed with the United Kingdom (the Trinity House Agreement); and about €1.8bn (plus €97m in maintenance costs) for the development and procurement of cruise missiles.[21][29] The internal documents state that this combination will secure a strike range of more than 2,000 km.[21]

The first weapon is a low-cost cruise missile capable of mass production, and Germany plans to begin deploying it from 2027. Three candidates are under consideration (Covenant's Anthem, the Ukrainian firm's BARS, and Fire Point's Flamingo), and contract negotiations are under way with two of them. The target date for achieving initial capability with the Tomahawk–Typhon combination is the late 2020s.[29]

The goal is a conventional response capability able to strike the enemy's rear below the nuclear threshold. This means a fundamental transformation of the structure of the German military since the Cold War — where it previously relied mainly on fighter aircraft for deep strike, it is now shifting to ground-launched missiles.[21]

From the standpoint of the working class: €12bn is equivalent to a substantial portion of Germany's federal education and family budget. The Tomahawk purchase is a structure bound to U.S. export and maintenance controls, and Germany's "strategic autonomy" produces the self-contradiction of deepening its dependence on U.S. weapons systems. Germany's declaration that it will build Europe's strongest military by 2039 is[30] the long-term confirmation of this direction.

5.3 The Materialization of Sanctions Against Russia — Closure of the Consulate General in Bonn

In response to the Leipzig Airport drone incident, Germany announced a series of measures on September 1: the closure of the Russian Consulate General in Bonn (the last Russian consulate remaining in Germany), the termination of the agreement covering Berlin's "Russian House" (Russian House of Science and Culture), a proposal to add Russians to the EU sanctions list, and tighter entry screening.[31] The Consulate General in Bonn was closed on September 18.[31]

In retaliation, Russia announced on September 7 the closure of the German Consulate General in St. Petersburg and of a Goethe-Institut branch, and Germany expelled 150 Russian diplomatic personnel and their families.[32] Putin claimed that Germany fabricated evidence to shift the blame onto Russia.[33]

5.4 The AfD — Not a "Paradox" but a Line of Return to Russia

An important correction. Some analyses raise the paradox that "the AfD is tough on Russia while supporting increased defense spending." The opposite is true. According to the BBC, the AfD calls for halting support for Ukraine and resuming relations with Russia.[9] This is consistent with its opposition to the record increase in the defense budget.

Furthermore, according to a Reuters report of September 18, 2026, Kirill Dmitriev, Putin's top economic envoy and head of the sovereign wealth fund, and AfD co-leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla are preparing a meeting for March 2027 to discuss the resumption of Russian gas supplies. Even the restart of the Nord Stream pipeline has been placed on the agenda, and the organizers hope to invite U.S. figures such as Witkoff and Kushner.[34] Weidel described "cheap Russian energy" as "the secret of Made in Germany's success."[34]

This is not a "paradox" but the AfD's class function. The AfD (1) divides the working class through racist attacks on migrants, (2) claims that the government has caused a security failure because of immigration policy, and (3) in reality demands broader social cuts. In the Bundestag budget debate on September 9, Weidel criticized Merz's debt policy and accused it of leaving behind a "scorched earth."[28] In other words, the AfD performs a dual function: it represents the interests of energy capital on Russia's side while at the same time accelerating austerity against the working class. CDU lawmaker Kiesewetter, quoted by Reuters, argued that "Russia uses energy, especially Nord Stream, as a hybrid weapon for military purposes" — a characterization by a German governing-party politician pointing to Russia's weaponization of energy.[34]

5.5 The Merz–Wadephul–Reuter Line

The line of Chancellor Merz (CDU), Foreign Minister Wadephul (CDU), and Finance Minister Klingbeil (SPD) is Germany's rearmament within the Atlantic alliance. Merz welcomed nuclear deterrence cooperation (with France) while denying that it would replace the NATO nuclear umbrella,[23] and warned that those behind hostile acts would "pay a price."[9] But this line at the same time deepens dependence on U.S. weapons systems (Tomahawk and Typhon). Germany's "strategic autonomy" and its "subordination to the United States" are not actually contradictory — the rearmament itself is taking place within a U.S.-led imperial order.

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6. The Class Bill of Rearmament: Who Pays?

6.1 The Concrete Path of the Cuts

Germany's draft 2027 budget shows in numbers the unity of war and austerity. Defense spending, as calculated by the WSWS, increases by 56.8% — and this uses a different measure from the core defense budget growth rate in §5.1 (about 33%, €82.2bn→€109bn). The WSWS's 56.8% is based on broad defense-related expenditure including Ukraine aid and the special fund, while the roughly 33% in §5.1 is based on the core defense budget — :

• Federal contributions to long-term care and health insurance cut by 43.5%
• Education and family budget cut by 26.4% (daycare funding cut by more than half, parental leave benefits shortened from 14 months to 12, support for single parents, schools, and vocational education reduced)
• Transportation budget cut by 21%
• Digitalization budget cut by 13.3%
• Economic and environmental budget cut by 13%

Funding relies on borrowing. Total borrowing for 2027–2030 is planned at €838.2bn, and interest payments nearly double from €41.9bn in 2027 to €80.7bn in 2030. As the BDI director-general put it, "by 2030, nearly one of every five euros in tax revenue could be tied up in interest payments."[27]

Tax policy favors capital. The corporate tax rate is to be phased down from the current 15% to 10% by 2032, and special depreciation is permitted for new investment (which increasingly flows into the arms industry). There are no tax increases on shareholders or the ultra-wealthy.[28] Merz's remark encapsulates the line: "We can no longer afford the welfare state."[28]

Notably, Germany applied an exception to its constitutionally enshrined 2009 debt brake for defense spending. The very country that, during the financial crises in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, forced powerful austerity on those countries through the Troika (the European Commission, the ECB, and the IMF) now discards its own debt limit and abandons fiscal discipline. The capitalist state's ideology of "fiscal discipline" was always something to be discarded at will depending on class and geopolitical conditions.

6.2 Luxemburg's Insight: Militarism Is a Sphere of Accumulation

In The Accumulation of Capital (1913), Rosa Luxemburg analyzed the dual function of militarism. Militarism is (1) an instrument of expansion into non-capitalist regions and (2) "the prime means for realizing surplus value and itself a sphere of accumulation."[35] The production of armaments creates an internal market in which capital can realize surplus value.

It is precisely at this point that Luxemburg grasped the interests of the working class. Defense spending is raised through indirect taxes that cut into workers' consumption. Workers "give up part of their wages in the form of indirect taxes and in return keep their competitor as a soldier." As a result, workers (1) in exchange for partially preventing a fall in wages, (2) enable the capitalist state, through those soldiers, to suppress their own struggles (strikes and organizing), and (3) themselves erect the most solid pillar of political reaction.[36]

This analysis applies literally to Europe in 2026. Germany's defense budget increase is (1) financed by workers' indirect taxes and borrowing (future taxes), and (2) in the process of converting automobile plants into weapons plants,[28] the trade unions collaborate, and (3) the AfD's racist mobilization is used to seize control of resistance to social cuts.

6.3 The Ideological Function of the Hybrid Threat Discourse

The hybrid threat discourse functions in a twofold manner.

First, the justification of austerity. "Security" becomes the primary justification for reallocating the budget. Education, health, and pension budgets are subordinated to "security," which is framed as a legitimate sacrifice.

Second, the transfer of sovereignty. New bodies such as the Emergency Security Protocol and the European Security Council restrict national parliaments' authority over budget and military decisions. Control through the working class's representative body (parliament) is thereby weakened.

Third, the isolation of anti-war peace forces. In a situation where Russia actually carries out sabotage and violates airspace with drones, it is difficult to argue for peace. But the real problem is that capitalist states transfer resources that could be converted into social spending to arms capital under the name of defense.

6.4 The Actual Conditions of the European Working Class

The current condition of the European working class is defined by organizational division and ideological encirclement.

• Organizational aspect: The DGB (the German Trade Union Confederation, headed by Yasmin Fahimi) supports the fundamental line of war and austerity and even supports converting automobile plants into weapons plants. The IMK (the union-linked Macroeconomic Policy Institute) criticizes tax cuts for capital but does not call into question the fundamental line of war and austerity.[28] In other words, the working class's representative bodies are integrated into the war line.

• Ideological aspect: The Left Party (Die Linke) criticizes tax cuts for capital, but Heidi Reichinnek's speech amounted to a moral appeal not to "follow the lobbyists" and did not propose the expropriation of corporations and the wealthy or the independent organization of the working class. After the AfD's victory in Saxony-Anhalt, the Left Party is approaching Merz's CDU.[28]

• Anti-war forces: The only force that clearly distances itself from the de facto coalition of rearmament, war, and social cuts is the SGP (Socialist Equality Party), which is running in the September 20 Berlin state election under the slogan "Two world wars are enough!" This paradoxically demonstrates the fragile organizational conditions of the German anti-war left.[28]

Thus the task of the European working class is not the abstract opposition of "peace versus war," but (1) a defensive struggle against social cuts, (2) a counteroffensive against tax cuts for capital and arms profits, (3) class unity against the divisive politics of immigration, and (4) the building of the working class's independent organization on the fuse of war between competing capitalist states.

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7. Conclusion: Verdict and Contradictions

7.1 An Expanding Proxy War, or a Fuse for World War?

Verdict: at present this is an "expansion of proxy war below the threshold," and world war is not inevitable. But this verdict is conditional.

Neither Russia nor NATO wants an all-out clash. Russia avoids overt attacks that would trigger NATO Article 5. Russia's defense industry is evolving toward cheaper, longer-range, precision drones (the jet-powered Geran 4 and 5 fly more than 1,000 km at 600 km/h),[13] but this does not mean an intention to attack NATO directly. NATO, too, fears an expansion of the conflict.

But the danger comes not from intentions but from structure. There are three structural fuses.

First, the risk of misidentification. In Lithuania a drone was actually shot down, and two days earlier a flock of birds was mistaken for a drone. In an environment where drones with a range of more than 1,000 km cross borders, there simultaneously exists the possibility that a drone that was shot down was not a deliberate Russian provocation, and the risk of escalating a non-deliberate incident into a response.

Second, the absence of arms control. With the expiration of New START, the U.S.–Russian nuclear cap has disappeared. There is no institutional mechanism to control errors and miscalculations.

Third, the paradox of threshold management. A strategy of responding to individual incidents on a case-by-case basis maintains deterrence in the short term but gradually raises the threshold for provocation over the long term. Once the threshold is crossed at some point, an uncontrollable escalation begins.

7.2 The Contradictions of the Dualization of the European Security Structure (EU–NATO)

Von der Leyen's SOTEU formalized the dualization of the European security structure. It means building an independent security body that coexists with NATO rather than complementing it.

There are four contradictions of this dualization.

1. Dual input of resources. The 27 countries must support both EU institutions and NATO simultaneously, and the duplication of procurement and command systems produces waste. The explicit goal is not to create "27 bonsai armies"[10], but duplication itself heightens that risk.

1. Contention in decision-making. The emergency security protocol (the "European Article 4") competes with NATO Article 4. European capitals must choose which mechanism to use in each crisis, and this delays response.

1. Dual signal vis-a-vis the United States. A Europe with an independent security structure may weaken the U.S. willingness to intervene in Europe, and conversely may send Russia a signal that Europe is divided.

1. A dual bill at the class level. The cost of maintaining two structures ultimately results in cuts to social spending. Duplication is a double austerity imposed on the working class.

7.3 On the Definition of Russia

This report does not define Russia as a classical imperialist core country. Russia is a force of territorial and military expansion of state capital that has weaponized nuclear power and energy. Measured against Lenin's definition of imperialism (the colonialism of finance capital motivated by superprofits), Russia is not a full member of the "imperialist club" because of its low labor productivity, limited outward investment, and structures of capital outflow to financial centers.[37] Russia's actions are a mixture of geopolitical defense aimed at preventing the semi-colonization of a resource-rich state by Western imperialism and the projection of influence over its periphery.

But this does not mean Russia's expansion is harmless. The annexation of Ukrainian territory, violations of European airspace, and sabotage are real acts, and their costs are paid by the working classes of Ukraine and Europe. The purpose of analysis is not to justify Russia, but to prevent the strategy of the antiwar and peace movement from being distorted by defining the enemy through the wrong category.

7.4 Remaining Tasks

There are three variables that will determine the course of this confrontation.

First, the terms for ending the war in Ukraine. The content of the negotiating framework (territory, security guarantees, lifting of sanctions) will define the character of the European security order.

Second, the level of U.S. engagement in Europe. How far the Trump administration's force readjustment proceeds will determine the speed and direction of European rearmament.

Third, the level of organized subjectivation of the European working class. Whether it can build independent organizations against social cuts and the war line will determine whether Europe can move in the direction of social progress atop the powder keg of war.

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Footnotes

[1] AeroTime, "NATO fighters shoot down drone over Lithuania after airspace incursion", 2026-09-15. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/nato-fighters-shoot-down-drone-over-lithuania-after-airspace-incursion

[2] Reuters, "Drone shot down in Lithuania was likely aimed at Ukraine, Lithuanian president says", 2026-09-16. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/drone-shot-down-lithuania-was-likely-aimed-ukraine-lithuanian-president-says-2026-09-16

[3] AzerNews, "Suspected drone alert briefly closes Vilnius Airport as NATO scrambles fighter jet", 2026-09-13. https://www.azernews.az/region/263811.html

[4] Reuters, "Russian frigate fires flares towards Danish military helicopter, Denmark says", 2026-09-15. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russian-frigate-fires-flares-towards-danish-military-helicopter-denmark-says-2026-09-15

[5] Al Jazeera, "Russia warns Denmark after near miss in Baltic Sea", 2026-09-15. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/15/russia-warns-denmark-after-near-miss-in-baltic-sea

[6] Global Banking and Finance Review, "Denmark speeds up Ukraine aid package after Russian warship fires flares at helicopter", 2026-09-18. https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/denmark-speeds-up-ukraine-aid-package-russian-warship-fires

[7] ABC News, "Russia's escalating strikes in Ukraine increasingly spilling into NATO, Romania says", 2026-08-21. https://abcnews.com/International/russia-drone-incursions-nato-airspace-jump-exponentially-2026/story?id=135771388

[8] France 24, "Romanian jet shoots down drone entering country's airspace for third day in a row", 2026-07-26. https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20260726-romanian-jet-shoots-down-drone-entering-country-airspace-for-third-day-in-a-row

[9] BBC News, "Germany says Russia behind Leipzig airport drone attack", 2026-09-02. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5ylm3m67n2o

[10] POLITICO Europe, "Von der Leyen pitches European Security Council in response to Trump and Putin", 2026-09-16. https://www.politico.eu/article/von-der-leyen-pitches-european-security-council-in-response-to-trump-and-putin

[11] POLITICO Europe, "Suspected Russian spy behind drone attack in Leipzig", 2026-09-13. https://www.politico.eu/article/suspect-russia-spy-drone-attack-in-leipzig-halle-airport-germany

[12] Kyiv Post, "Russian Drone Strike Narrowly Misses Boris Johnson and Western Officials", 2026-09-14. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/84418

[13] CNN, "Russia's drone strike near Ukraine-Poland border puts NATO neighbors on edge", 2026-09-14. https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/14/europe/russia-drone-strike-ukraine-poland-rail-nato-diplomacy-intl

[14] CNN, "NATO Article 4: what does triggering it mean?", 2025-09-11. https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/11/europe/nato-article-four-poland-drones-intl

[15] IISS, "The Military Balance 2026: Fortifying NATO's eastern flank", 2026-02-24. https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/2026/the-military-balance-2026/fortifying-natos-eastern-flank

[16] NATO, "NATO launches 'Eastern Sentry' to bolster posture along eastern flank", 2025-09-12. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/09/12/nato-launches-eastern-sentry-to-bolster-posture-along-eastern-flank

[17] NATO, "Strengthening NATO's eastern flank", 2026-06-17. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/strengthening-natos-eastern-flank

[18] DGAP, "European Cohesion for Security and Defense", 2026-02-04. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/european-cohesion-security-and-defense

[19] Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control", 2026-02-06. https://www.cfr.org/articles/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control

[20] GIS Reports, "Nuclear deterrence after arms control collapse", 2026-02-16. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/nuclear-deterrence

[21] Army Recognition, "Germany Plans €3.4B U.S. Tomahawk and Typhon Missiles Acquisition for Deep Strikes", 2026-09-15. https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/germany-plans-eur3-4b-u-s-tomahawk-and-typhon-missiles-acquisition-for-deep-strikes

[22] Global Security Review, "Beyond the American Umbrella: Europe's Turn to Forward Deterrence", 2026-05-21. https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-american-umbrella-europes-turn-to-forward-deterrence

[23] Al Jazeera, "Germany's Merz hails nuclear deterrence cooperation with France", 2026-07-17. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/17/germanys-merz-hails-nuclear-deterrence-cooperation-with-france

[24] European Parliament, "MEPs debate state of the EU", 2026-09-16. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260911IPR47459/meps-debate-state-of-the-eu-economy-security-climate-ai-social-media

[25] UNITED24 Media, "Poland Builds Border Fortifications After Russian Drone Strikes 2 km From Its Territory", 2026-09-16. https://united24media.com/world/poland-builds-border-fortifications-after-russian-drone-strikes-2-km-from-its-territory-22603

[26] Reuters, "Macron says Europe has stepped up in NATO ahead of Ukraine coalition summit", 2026-07-08. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/macron-says-europe-has-stepped-up-nato-ahead-ukraine-coalition-summit-2026-07-08

[27] Reuters, "German cabinet approves 2027 draft budget, hikes defence, investment spending", 2026-07-06. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/german-cabinet-approves-2027-draft-budget-hikes-defence-investment-spending-2026-07-06

[28] World Socialist Web Site, "Germany's 2027 budget wages war on 2 fronts: Abroad and at home", 2026-09-11. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2026/09/11/ntqs-s11.html

[29] POLITICO Europe, "Germany plans a €12B missile program to deter Putin", 2026-08-21. https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-missile-program-deter-russia-vladimirputin

[30] The Week, "Why is Germany ramping up its defense spending?", 2026-05-04. https://theweek.com/world-news/why-germany-ramping-up-military-spending

[31] Pravda Germany, "Germany closes Russian Consulate General in Bonn", 2026-09-01. https://germany.news-pravda.com/en/world/2026/09/01/155211.html

[32] TVP World, "Germany ousts 150 Russian diplomats with their families", 2026-09-12. https://tvpworld.com/95338707/germany-has-expelled-150-russian-diplomatic-personnel-with-their-families

[33] Euronews, "Drone attack on Leipzig: clues apparently point to Russian intelligence service", 2026-09-12. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/09/12/drone-attack-on-leipzig-clues-apparently-point-to-russian-intelligence-service

[34] Reuters, "Putin envoy and far-right AfD prepare talks to get Russian gas back for Germany, sources say", 2026-09-18. https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-envoy-far-right-afd-prepare-talks-get-russian-gas-back-germany-sources-say-2026-09-18/

[35] Rosa Luxemburg, 『The Accumulation of Capital』(1913), Ch.32. https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1913/accumulation-capital/ch32.htm

[36] Rosa Luxemburg, "The Militia and Militarism"(1899). https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1899/02/26.htm

[37] Bolshevik Group(볼셰비키그룹), "러시아: '자본주의 열강이지만, 제국주의는 아니다'". https://bolky.jinbo.net/index.php?mid=board_FKwQ53&document_srl=14435