Settlement, and the Politics After
May 21, 2:00 PM. The KOSPI closed at 7,775.84. A rise of 567 points, 7.86% in a single day. It is the largest single-day gain in a year. The market celebrated. Because the strike disappeared.
But what this number 7,775 honestly says is this—the market collapses when workers stop production, and it soars when workers go back to their machines. In other words, the market's applause is not celebrating the workers' victory, but celebrating the fact that workers have returned to produce surplus value. The relief that 70,000 workers no longer stand in front of the Pyeongtaek main gate is the substance of those 567 points. We must face this irony. By suspending the strike, workers gave capital a 567-point gift. Of course, they received a price—institutionalization of performance bonuses, abolition of the cap, and a 7% wage increase. But what 7,775 does not say is that the price capital paid is only a tiny fraction of the profits capital will extract from workers' labor in the future. It does not say it, but it shows it.
The Blue House expressed "gratitude for the grand decision of labor and management," Minister Kim Young-hoon said that "an agreement was reached through autonomous labor-management negotiations," and the media ran headlines like "Dramatic Settlement." This narrative, sung in chorus by the state and the media, conceals one fact—if six hours of ministerial mediation is "autonomous negotiation," then the word autonomy has lost its meaning. With the Prime Minister's threat of emergency arbitration on May 17, the President's tweet on May 19 about "respecting management rights," and the court's injunction—all this preliminary mobilization of state violence was in place, so the minister's mediation functioned not as "neutral arbitration" but as class pressure. The state ordered workers to compromise and asked capital to compromise. That the request turned into pressure only under the threat of the collapse of the accumulation system is the reality of the night of May 20.
But the real question posed by this settlement is not the role of the state, but the politics within the working class. From yesterday to today, several comrades have precisely hit this point. One was: "The Samsung negotiation settlement—is it a good thing, or does it tighten the share of subcontract workers?" Another was: "Is it inevitable that progress in struggle leads to the embourgeoisement of workers?" Yet another was: "If they become complacent within the narrow fence of the 70,000 members' interests, how should we evaluate that?" These three questions are three faces of the same contradiction.
Look at the contents of the tentative agreement. Institutionalization of performance bonuses, abolition of the cap, 7% wage increase, one-year grace period for the deficit business unit. All these items are focused on increasing the share of regular workers at Samsung Electronics. There is not a single clause on the unit price, job security, or working conditions of subcontracted and partner company workers. The possibility that the victory of 70,000 may structurally end as a victory of 70,000 is built in. To put it more honestly, the possibility that the victory of 70,000 may indirectly tighten the share of tens of thousands of partner company workers—the incentive for Samsung Electronics to offset increased labor costs by lowering supply prices—is not an abstract concern but an identity of capital accumulation.
At this point, the question "If the enterprise-level union becomes complacent with economism, how should we evaluate it?" is incorrectly framed. Economism is not an object of overthrow but an object of struggle and persuasion. When Lenin criticized economism in *What Is to Be Done?*, he did not say to expel the economists from the labor movement. He spoke of a struggle within the movement, a factional struggle. The enterprise-level union is part of the working class, and its limitations are contradictions to be overcome through internal criticism and political intervention. Talk of "overthrowing" only creates more enemies.
But that does not mean neglecting the economism of the enterprise-level union is a lesser error. The core of the issue is this—this settlement is clearly an economic victory. But there are structural conditions under which that victory can lead to a political retreat. Institutionalization of performance bonuses guarantees workers a predictable share, but at the same time ties workers more deeply to the company's profit increase. Abolishing the cap on performance bonuses raises the maximum amount for individual workers, but widens wage gaps among workers, dividing collective interests. This is the real basis for the question, "Does progress in struggle lead to embourgeoisement?"
The answer is this. Economic victory itself does not inevitably lead to embourgeoisement. What made the bourgeoisification of the British labor aristocracy possible was the special condition of imperialist monopoly of the world market, and such conditions do not exist in South Korea today. However, if economic victories are repeated without the development of political consciousness, workers can fall into the illusion that they can sufficiently realize their interests within the framework of capitalism. That illusion is the final product of economism, and breaking it is the role of political factional struggle.
The ratification vote will take place from May 23 to 28. It is not yet known whether the union members will accept this tentative agreement. But more important than the outcome of the ratification vote is the direction afterward. Will the enterprise-level union remember this victory only as a 'victory of 70,000,' or will it expand this victory into a political mobilization for subcontract workers, non-regular workers, and the broader working class as a whole? The former path is the completion of economism, but the latter path is the self-sublation of economism. Which path will be taken will be told by future actions. Today is the day of settlement, but settlement is not the end—it is the beginning of politics.
But what this number 7,775 honestly says is this—the market collapses when workers stop production, and it soars when workers go back to their machines. In other words, the market's applause is not celebrating the workers' victory, but celebrating the fact that workers have returned to produce surplus value. The relief that 70,000 workers no longer stand in front of the Pyeongtaek main gate is the substance of those 567 points. We must face this irony. By suspending the strike, workers gave capital a 567-point gift. Of course, they received a price—institutionalization of performance bonuses, abolition of the cap, and a 7% wage increase. But what 7,775 does not say is that the price capital paid is only a tiny fraction of the profits capital will extract from workers' labor in the future. It does not say it, but it shows it.
The Blue House expressed "gratitude for the grand decision of labor and management," Minister Kim Young-hoon said that "an agreement was reached through autonomous labor-management negotiations," and the media ran headlines like "Dramatic Settlement." This narrative, sung in chorus by the state and the media, conceals one fact—if six hours of ministerial mediation is "autonomous negotiation," then the word autonomy has lost its meaning. With the Prime Minister's threat of emergency arbitration on May 17, the President's tweet on May 19 about "respecting management rights," and the court's injunction—all this preliminary mobilization of state violence was in place, so the minister's mediation functioned not as "neutral arbitration" but as class pressure. The state ordered workers to compromise and asked capital to compromise. That the request turned into pressure only under the threat of the collapse of the accumulation system is the reality of the night of May 20.
But the real question posed by this settlement is not the role of the state, but the politics within the working class. From yesterday to today, several comrades have precisely hit this point. One was: "The Samsung negotiation settlement—is it a good thing, or does it tighten the share of subcontract workers?" Another was: "Is it inevitable that progress in struggle leads to the embourgeoisement of workers?" Yet another was: "If they become complacent within the narrow fence of the 70,000 members' interests, how should we evaluate that?" These three questions are three faces of the same contradiction.
Look at the contents of the tentative agreement. Institutionalization of performance bonuses, abolition of the cap, 7% wage increase, one-year grace period for the deficit business unit. All these items are focused on increasing the share of regular workers at Samsung Electronics. There is not a single clause on the unit price, job security, or working conditions of subcontracted and partner company workers. The possibility that the victory of 70,000 may structurally end as a victory of 70,000 is built in. To put it more honestly, the possibility that the victory of 70,000 may indirectly tighten the share of tens of thousands of partner company workers—the incentive for Samsung Electronics to offset increased labor costs by lowering supply prices—is not an abstract concern but an identity of capital accumulation.
At this point, the question "If the enterprise-level union becomes complacent with economism, how should we evaluate it?" is incorrectly framed. Economism is not an object of overthrow but an object of struggle and persuasion. When Lenin criticized economism in *What Is to Be Done?*, he did not say to expel the economists from the labor movement. He spoke of a struggle within the movement, a factional struggle. The enterprise-level union is part of the working class, and its limitations are contradictions to be overcome through internal criticism and political intervention. Talk of "overthrowing" only creates more enemies.
But that does not mean neglecting the economism of the enterprise-level union is a lesser error. The core of the issue is this—this settlement is clearly an economic victory. But there are structural conditions under which that victory can lead to a political retreat. Institutionalization of performance bonuses guarantees workers a predictable share, but at the same time ties workers more deeply to the company's profit increase. Abolishing the cap on performance bonuses raises the maximum amount for individual workers, but widens wage gaps among workers, dividing collective interests. This is the real basis for the question, "Does progress in struggle lead to embourgeoisement?"
The answer is this. Economic victory itself does not inevitably lead to embourgeoisement. What made the bourgeoisification of the British labor aristocracy possible was the special condition of imperialist monopoly of the world market, and such conditions do not exist in South Korea today. However, if economic victories are repeated without the development of political consciousness, workers can fall into the illusion that they can sufficiently realize their interests within the framework of capitalism. That illusion is the final product of economism, and breaking it is the role of political factional struggle.
The ratification vote will take place from May 23 to 28. It is not yet known whether the union members will accept this tentative agreement. But more important than the outcome of the ratification vote is the direction afterward. Will the enterprise-level union remember this victory only as a 'victory of 70,000,' or will it expand this victory into a political mobilization for subcontract workers, non-regular workers, and the broader working class as a whole? The former path is the completion of economism, but the latter path is the self-sublation of economism. Which path will be taken will be told by future actions. Today is the day of settlement, but settlement is not the end—it is the beginning of politics.