myth of the clean Wehrmacht
‘깨끗한 국방군’ 신화
The narrative, spread in West Germany after the Second World War by former Wehrmacht officers, that Nazi Germany's regular armed forces took no part in the Holocaust or other war crimes and fought a decent war, the crimes being the work of the SS and SD and of Hitler, an amateur in military matters. It was built and spread by the generals' memorandum for the Nuremberg tribunal in 1945, the war studies written for the U.S. Army Historical Division under Franz Halder, the Himmerod memorandum of 1950 with the declarations of honour by Eisenhower and Adenauer, and the memoirs of generals such as Manstein and Guderian. The Cold War West largely accepted it; from the 1960s research showed the Wehrmacht's part in the crimes, and the Hamburg Wehrmacht exhibition of 1995 brought this before the whole German public.
In depth
What does the myth claim?
The Wehrmacht was Nazi Germany's regular armed forces from 1935 to 1945, comprising army, navy and air force. It was a state army, distinct from the SS, the armed organisation of the Nazi Party. The myth of the clean Wehrmacht rests on this distinction: the Wehrmacht, it holds, fought decently according to international law, while the murder of the Jews and the killing of civilians and prisoners were the work of a fanatical minority in the SS, the SD (Security Service) and the police. Further strands hold that the soldiers fought for their country, not for Hitler; that where they obeyed dubious orders they did so under compulsion; and that the war in the East was a defensive struggle to save European civilisation from Bolshevism.
German Wikipedia traces the narrative to the last Wehrmacht report of 9 May 1945, which announced the capitulation and declared that the Wehrmacht had succumbed "honourably" to "overwhelming superiority". A second pillar soon followed: the war was lost not through the generals' failings but because Hitler meddled in the professionals' operations. The generals' postwar memoirs drew Hitler as a former "little corporal" who knew nothing of soldiering, and the title of Erich von Manstein's memoir, Lost Victories, put the idea in two words.
What did the Wehrmacht actually do in the war?
What the myth set out to erase were the army's own orders and acts. Just before the invasion of the Soviet Union the OKW (Armed Forces High Command) issued the Commissar Order, requiring captured Soviet political commissars to be shot at once; in October 1941 Walther von Reichenau issued the Reichenau Order, which justified to his soldiers crimes against the Soviet, and above all the Jewish, population, and other army commanders issued similar orders. The army gave the Einsatzgruppen, the units charged with the killing, vehicles, fuel and guard troops, and took part in massacres such as Babi Yar. According to Christian Streit's research, some three million of the Soviet prisoners of war who fell into Wehrmacht hands died of starvation or execution.
How did the generals frame their first defence in 1945–1946?
The myth's first document was the generals' memorandum written for the Nuremberg tribunal. In November 1945 the former army commander-in-chief Walther von Brauchitsch, the former Chief of the General Staff of the Army Franz Halder, Manstein, Walter Warlimont, deputy chief of the OKW operations staff, and Siegfried Westphal wrote a memorandum titled The German Army from 1920 to 1945. According to English Wikipedia it was written at the suggestion of William Donovan of the American OSS. It portrayed the OKW and the OKH (Army High Command) as apolitical and largely untouched by the regime's crimes, and its arguments later became the backbone of the defence in the generals' war crimes trials.
Testifying as a witness in August 1946, Manstein said the war in the East had had a military and an ideological component, meaning that the army had waged the military war while the SS and SD had waged the ideological one. The tribunal did not declare the General Staff and the OKW criminal organisations, but on formal grounds: a body of officers was not a "group" or "organisation" within the meaning of its charter. The judgment added that many commanders had actively taken part in crimes or had acquiesced in silence and should be tried individually. In West Germany the ruling was passed on as an acquittal of the Wehrmacht leadership.
What did the U.S. Army Historical Division and Halder do?
The broadest channel for the myth was the U.S. Army. In January 1946 the Army's Historical Division set up the Operational History (German) Section to use the experience of captured German officers for its war histories, and from February 1948 Halder led its control group. Over 700 former officers wrote more than 2,500 manuscripts, and Halder's group checked that each kept within the interpretive frame he had set. In 1946 Halder described the work as a way "to continue the fight against Bolshevism". In March 1947 the former field marshal Georg von Küchler instructed the writers in the Garmisch camp that historical truth was to be combined with praise of the German army.
Halder himself wrote Hitler as Warlord in 1949, setting a noble and wise professional soldier against a Hitler who bore all the blame. The Americans knew the manuscripts were laced with apologia but valued them as intelligence for a possible war with the Soviet Union. The Korean War raised demand for studies of partisan warfare and supply in difficult terrain on the Eastern Front, and in 1954 the U.S. Army wrote the mobile defence the Germans had practised in their retreat from the Soviet Union into its official doctrine. The section was closed in 1961.
How did West German rearmament harden the myth?
After the Korean War broke out in 1950 the Americans decided that a West German army was needed. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had former Wehrmacht officers meet in secret at Himmerod Abbey from 5 to 9 October 1950 to plan rearmament. Their Himmerod memorandum set conditions for a German contribution: the release of German soldiers convicted as war criminals, an end to the "defamation" of German soldiers including the Waffen-SS, and measures to change opinion at home and abroad. Adenauer accepted it and opened negotiations with the three Western powers.
In January 1951 Dwight D. Eisenhower, newly appointed NATO Supreme Commander, said during a visit to Germany that there was "a real difference between the German soldier and Hitler and his criminal group"; until then he had spoken very negatively of the Wehrmacht. Adenauer declared in the Bundestag the same year that German soldiers who had committed no offence had fought honourably. West German parties then competed for veterans' votes and pushed through amnesties, and the Germans let it be known that no German soldier would put on a uniform while any Wehrmacht officer remained in custody. In Britain a lobby led by the former cabinet minister Maurice Hankey campaigned for the generals, joined by the military writer Basil Liddell Hart and by the Labour MP Reginald Paget, who defended Manstein in 1949. German Wikipedia judges that the coverage of Manstein's trial raised his popularity rather than knowledge of his crimes.
What story did the memoirs spread?
From 1949 a stream of memoirs by Wehrmacht commanders appeared, among them Halder, Karl Dönitz, Heinz Guderian, Albert Kesselring and Manstein. In them Hitler was the amateur who ruined the professionals' work, and army crimes, where they appeared at all, were the lapses of individual soldiers who had been punished. Guderian's Memories of a Soldier (1951) and Manstein's Lost Victories (1955) became bestsellers. Manstein wrote in his preface that he had "deliberately refrained" from political problems and events not directly connected with military operations, and borrowed Liddell Hart's words to call the German generals "the best-finished product of their profession".
What the books left out stayed out. Describing the scorched earth of the 1943 retreat to the Dnieper, Manstein wrote that "in the German army, unlike the others, looting was not permitted". Yet the British military court in Hamburg in 1949 found him guilty of ordering scorched earth and deporting the population during the retreat. How Guderian's memoir treated the Commissar Order and the estate he was given is set out in his own entry.
Popular books followed the same line. Paul Karl Schmidt, formerly press chief of the Nazi Foreign Office, wrote under the pen name Paul Carell an illustrated magazine series and the 1963 book Hitler Moves East (Unternehmen Barbarossa) in praise of the German soldier in the East. Former generals supplied material and testimony, and this book and its sequel Scorched Earth shaped how West Germans remembered the war against the Soviet Union for two decades.
Why did the Cold War West accept the story?
The former generals offered an anti-communist image of Russia coloured by anti-Slav prejudice, which was readily accepted in Cold War West Germany and America. English-language military historians admired the Wehrmacht's professionalism, and writers such as Gordon Craig, Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller found it inconceivable that the "correct" German officer corps had taken part in genocide. When Soviet historians pointed to Wehrmacht crimes, the West dismissed this as "communist propaganda", and the very fact that the claims came from the Soviets made the honour of the Wehrmacht seem more credible. The American historians Ronald Smelser and Edward Davies compared the myth with the Lost Cause myth of the American South after the Civil War: in both, a superior army led by noble commanders is overwhelmed by numbers and materiel. In the countries the Wehrmacht had conquered, occupied and plundered, the story never took hold.
How did East Germany and the Soviet side tell it differently?
East German historiography did not set the Wehrmacht apart. Its historians centred on the link between monopoly capital and fascism and held that the military, together with big business and the landowners, had brought down the Weimar Republic and handed power to Hitler; Wolfgang Ruge's biography of Hindenburg stressed the pressure of the conservative and military elite. Russian Wikipedia notes that East German historians emphasised the criminal character of fascism, though in the Cold War they had to narrow the range of their research on National Socialism.
East Germany also worked hard to expose the Nazi careers of the West German elite. The Brown Book of 1965, edited by Albert Norden, listed the Nazi-era careers of 1,800 West German politicians and officials, among them 100 generals and admirals of the Bundeswehr. The West German government called it "all falsification", but its data later proved largely correct. German Wikipedia judges that after 1956 West German prosecution of war crimes was left to chance, while East German investigations aimed at a propaganda effect against the Federal Republic. The Soviets indicted 14,080 people as war criminals, a fact hardly known in the West. Soviet readers could not freely read the German generals either: according to the editors of the 1999 Russian edition, the Russian translation of Manstein's memoir was withdrawn into closed stacks as soon as it appeared during the Khrushchev Thaw.
When did research begin to break the myth?
In the early 1960s the Western Allies returned captured Wehrmacht files to West Germany, and younger historians began to test the generals' accounts against the documents. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen first challenged the myth in his 1965 essay on the Commissar Order. In 1969 Manfred Messerschmidt's The Wehrmacht in the Nazi State: Time of Indoctrination demolished the claim of an apolitical Wehrmacht. In 1978 Christian Streit's No Comrades was the first German book to deal with the mass death of three million Soviet prisoners of war, and in 1981 Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm's The Troops of the Ideological War showed the close cooperation between the Wehrmacht and the Einsatzgruppen. From 1979 the official history Germany and the Second World War of the Military History Research Office (MGFA) was sharply critical of the Wehrmacht's leaders. Yet the historians behind this work were told by large sections of the German public that they had "fouled their own nest", and for a long time their findings did not reach beyond specialists.
What did the Wehrmacht exhibitions of 1995 and 2001 change?
On 5 March 1995, fifty years after the end of the war, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research opened the touring exhibition War of Annihilation: Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944. Its designer, Hannes Heer, set 1,380 photographs of Wehrmacht crimes, most of them taken by the soldiers themselves, beside the orders behind them. By 4 November 1999 it had travelled to 34 cities in Germany and Austria and drawn about 900,000 visitors. There were demonstrations and clashes in Munich, Vienna and Dresden, and on 9 March 1999 a bomb attack on the building housing it in Saarbrücken; the Bundestag debated it.
In 1999 the historians Bogdan Musial and Krisztián Ungváry showed that some captions were wrong, attributing Soviet crimes or executions by Hungarian troops to the Wehrmacht. The institute's director Jan Philipp Reemtsma withdrew the exhibition in November 1999 and had it reviewed by a commission of historians including Omer Bartov, Messerschmidt and Streit. Its report of November 2000 acknowledged factual errors and over-sweeping presentation but concluded that the exhibition's basic statements about the Wehrmacht and the war of annihilation in the East were correct and that it contained no forgeries: fewer than 20 of its 1,433 photographs did not belong in an exhibition about the Wehrmacht.
A revised, document-based second exhibition, Crimes of the Wehrmacht: Dimensions of the War of Annihilation 1941–1944, opened in Berlin on 27 November 2001 and was seen by more than 450,000 people by 2004; this time the defence minister allowed generals and soldiers to attend in uniform. The two exhibitions made the Wehrmacht's involvement in the crimes of the war of annihilation common knowledge in Germany. In 2009 the historian Christian Hartmann wrote that "nobody needs to unmask the myth of the 'clean' Wehrmacht any more". Yet, as the sociologist Harald Welzer put it in the title of his 2002 book Grandpa Wasn't a Nazi, the perpetrators tended to vanish again in family memory.
Where does Manstein stand in the myth?
English Wikipedia ranks Manstein's influence on the creation of the myth second only to Halder's. He co-wrote the generals' memorandum, testified at Nuremberg that he had known nothing of the Einsatzgruppen's activities, and at his 1949 trial became the object of a release campaign in Britain itself. Lost Victories, written as pure operational history without politics or crimes, was widely read in Germany and the English-speaking world, and he advised the founding of the Bundeswehr unofficially until 1960. What happened in Crimea under his 11th Army and the course of his trial are set out in the entry on Erich von Manstein.