Ontognoseology (Lifshitz)
온토그노세올로기 (리프시츠)
A word coined by the Soviet aesthetician and philosopher Mikhail Lifshitz. Combining the names of ontology and epistemology, it deals with the point where a person's knowing the truth meets the world's own arriving at its truth. For Lifshitz the word was synonymous with a theory of the reflection, in human consciousness, of the truth of actual being. He worked on the idea all his life but did not complete it as a system, and it survives mostly as archive notes.
In depth
Why was such an unfamiliar word needed?
Before a good portrait people say "that's just like her". Yet a really fine portrait can feel more like the person than a photograph does. Is that "being like her" something the painter made up, or something in the person that the painter brought out? If the latter, then painting is the painter's work and at the same time the person's showing of herself. Knowing and being meet in one place.
Philosophy usually separates two questions: what exists (ontology) and how we know it (epistemology). Lifshitz joined the two names to ask about the point at which they cannot in the end be separated. Russian онтогносеология joins онтология (ontology) and гносеология (epistemology); it is also rendered in Korean as "존재인식론". This entry keeps the sound of the word as its headword. Andrey Muravyov states that the term was invented by Lifshitz and was for him synonymous with a theory of the reflection, in human consciousness, of the truth of actual being.
Behind it lay two dissatisfactions. One was with the subjectivism that holds human activity can build the world at will; the other was with the resignation that holds truth will appear of itself if one gives in to the course of the world. Within the Soviet Union he called the former the error of "clever people". The problem can be put this way: how can consciousness obey reality and yet criticise it?
What did Lifshitz claim?
The core claim concerns the relation of being and thought. He said the two are the same and different: "Being and thinking are identical not in being, not in fact, but in the logos, in the rational content of the one and the other; in being they are different, and there is a boundary between them."
Бытие и мышление тождественны не в бытии, не фактически, а в логосе, в разумном содержании того и другого, в бытии же они различны и грань между ними есть
Put simply: an apple and the thought "apple" are quite different as things. But if a thought is true, its content coincides somewhere with the actual make-up of the apple. Lifshitz saw reflection as producing this coincidence. In Soviet textbooks reflection was usually explained as the brain's having an image of the outer world, but he reversed the direction: "It is not we who reflect the object; it reflects itself in us."
Не мы отражаем предмет (“инструментальный разум”), а он отражается в нас
The parenthesis "instrumental reason" gives the meaning. It is not that a mind treating the world as material stamps out an object; through practice the object displays its own properties in the person. Elena Mareeva called this a doctrine of our "mirror" attitude to the world, in which material being is the true subject and man the tool of its self-reflection.
Here passive and active reverse as well. According to Lifshitz, the more consciousness reflects reality, the more it listens to reality's logic, the more active it becomes in the true sense. He defined the object of ontognoseology as two crossing processes: the process of natural history in which being moves of itself toward its truth, its concept, and the process of knowledge in which reason moves toward reality. Where the two meet, being becomes rational and reason becomes a real force.
What are the classic, the gap and the curvature of reality?
Most of this philosophy's peculiar vocabulary came from aesthetics. The first is the "theory of identities". Mixing two opposed extremes half-heartedly produces a deformity that is neither one nor the other. What Lifshitz looked for was not such an average but a true middle in which something new is born between the two extremes, and he called that ideal "the classic".
The second is the "gap". Some scholars say Renaissance art arose thanks to the growth of capitalism; others say it leaned toward the feudal world against capitalism. Lifshitz said the key word is neither "thanks to" nor "against" but "between". At a time when feudalism had already lost its power and capitalism had not yet gained it, the Renaissance passed through the gap between two social formations. It is not a harmony of the two but a new formation different from both. By the same logic he called man the classic of nature. Nature realises its possibilities through man. What man does not yet understand, such as certain phenomena of the microworld, is so, he said, not merely for lack of human ability but because nature itself has not yet grown to where it is intelligible to itself.
The third is the "curvature of reality". Truth emerges not only in spite of error but also thanks to certain errors: there are errors that are not simple mistakes but that call truth forth. His example is how the Christian idea of equality before God opened the way to discovering justice among people. So for him creation is not the expression of one's own subjectivity. He wrote that what is true in knowledge is not the self-expression of the subject but "the voice of being", and that in expressing it the subject becomes able to think freely.
Why did it remain unfinished?
Lifshitz thought about the idea all his life, but began to arrange it as a system only in his last years. According to his student of the work, Viktor Arslanov, he worried in a letter to György Lukács that the work would remain in aphoristic form and said he did not want to become a "Marxist Nietzsche or Heidegger". The worry came true. His ontognoseology has reached us not even as aphorisms but as archive notes, in an archive of some 700 folders. Arslanov called this incompleteness perhaps Lifshitz's bitterest failure.
Publication came after his death. Part of the notes came out under Arslanov's editing in 2004 as What Is the Classic?, followed in 2010 by the small book Varia and the Lifshitz volume in the series "Philosophy of Russia in the second half of the twentieth century". So the ontognoseology read today is a reconstruction and not a book arranged by its author. O. N. Pobedinskaya states plainly, as a limit of the research, that the result might have differed had the author systematised it himself.
How does it differ from the theory of reflection and from Ilyenkov?
Ontognoseology presents itself as continuing Lenin's "theory of reflection". But its emphasis differs from the textbook theory. Textbook reflection is the human head mirroring the outer world. Lifshitz's reflection is the world displaying itself in man, and so ideals and values too have their roots on the side of the world. Mareeva sees Lenin's theory of reflection in Soviet philosophy as represented by two versions, those of Lifshitz and of the Bulgarian Todor Pavlov, both of which separate and juxtapose reflection and creativity. On this point there is also criticism from Lev Naumenko on Ilyenkov's side: the metaphor of the mirror hides the problem more than it illuminates it.
The closest counterpart was Evald Ilyenkov. The entry "Ilyenkov-Lifshitz debate on the ideal" treats the difference. Where Ilyenkov put the ideal in the realm of human social activity, Lifshitz also put it in nature and held that it comes first there. Muravyov summarises that Ilyenkov concentrated on the subjectivity of human activity while Lifshitz thought about the same object from the side of the objective. He also points out that Lifshitz did not demonstrate the passage from object to subject but took it ready-made from experience, and calls that limit the position, in Lifshitz's own words, of an "ordinary Marxist".
How has it been judged?
Judgements divide sharply. Ilyenkov's successors say that, set beside his brilliant literary criticism, this philosophy is as schematic as Soviet dialectical materialism. In Mareeva's phrase it is "a child of its time". Others note a likeness to the pre-Marxian materialism of Diderot and find mysticism entering his treatment of facts.
дитя своего времени
Defenders see it differently. Arslanov goes so far as to say that the discovery of the curvature of reality is no less significant than the discovery of the curvature of space-time. Muravyov judges the incompleteness neither an accident nor a necessary failure but the outcome of thinking that expressed the spirit of the age. In English, volume 68 (2016) of Studies in East European Thought carried papers on Lifshitz. Opinion has not yet settled even on whether the idea became a system.