KGB officer turned first Soviet ambassador to Cuba who won Castro's trust and warned Khrushchev against the missile deployment
In the Kremlin in May 1962, Khrushchev asked: 'Would Castro accept nuclear missiles?' Alexeyev recalled: 'Overcoming my embarrassment with difficulty, I nevertheless expressed doubt that Fidel would agree to such a proposal.'
Born Alexander Shitov, he graduated from Moscow State University's history faculty and joined the NKVD in 1939, serving as an intelligence officer in Iran, France, and Argentina. He arrived in Cuba in 1959 as a TASS correspondent and built close personal trust with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, leading to his appointment as the first Soviet ambassador to Cuba in May 1962. Immediately after his appointment he warned Khrushchev that Castro would not accept the deployment of nuclear missiles, but Khrushchev disregarded this and Alexeyev was dispatched with Rashidov and Biryuzov to secure Castro's consent. During the Cuban Missile Crisis he served as the key intermediary between Moscow and Havana, calming Castro's calls for a preemptive nuclear strike.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 1938–1939Interpreter, Soviet military advisers in Spain
- 1941–1943NKVD intelligence officer, Iran
- 1944–1951NKVD/KI resident, Paris (cover: embassy attaché)
- 1954–1958KGB resident and First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Argentina
- 1959–1960TASS correspondent and KGB resident, Cuba
- 1960–1962Cultural adviser, Soviet Embassy, Cuba
- 1962–1968Soviet Ambassador to Cuba
- 1974–1980Soviet Ambassador to Madagascar
Related historical events
- 1936–1939The Spanish Civil WarInterpreter for Soviet military advisersHe served as an interpreter for Soviet military advisers in the Spanish Civil War in 1938–1939.
- 1962The Cuban Missile CrisisIntermediary between Moscow and HavanaDuring the crisis, he calmed Castro's calls for a preemptive nuclear strike and mediated between Moscow and Havana.
Cuba and diplomacy during the missile crisis
When Alexeyev arrived in Cuba in 1959, he was not an official Soviet representative but a TASS correspondent. He later recalled that his assignment was to determine the nature of the Cuban Revolution and the aims of its new leadership. Che Guevara introduced him to Fidel Castro on October 16, 1959, and he maintained contacts with the Cuban leadership thereafter. After the Soviet embassy was established in 1960, he remained in Cuba as a cultural adviser and continued those contacts.
In May 1962, Khrushchev raised with Alexeyev the proposal to deploy medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. Alexeyev replied that Castro would not accept it, explaining that Cuba's defense strategy relied on Latin American public opinion and the arming of its people. Khrushchev nevertheless ordered Alexeyev to travel to Cuba with Rashidov and Biryuzov to present the proposal. In Alexeyev's recollection, Castro said Cuba could accept the risk if it helped strengthen the socialist bloc, but the Soviet delegation understood his reason for accepting the deployment differently.
During the crisis, Alexeyev reported conditions in Cuba to Moscow. His October 23, 1962 cable to the Foreign Ministry stated that Raúl Castro had announced the mobilization of 350,000 people, of whom 105,000 had been placed on military readiness. The cable estimated that mobilization would reduce production and cost up to one million pesos per day; it also recorded that Cuban troops had orders to fire on enemy aircraft and ships only if attacked first.
The resolution of the crisis also exposed tensions between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Alexeyev recalled showing Castro the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and conveying negotiation information indirectly. But on the morning of October 22, he learned from President Dorticós by telephone that Radio Moscow was announcing the missile withdrawal. He said neither he nor Castro had expected the decision without prior consultation. Disagreement over the withdrawal persisted, although, according to Alexeyev, Castro visited Moscow in the spring of 1963 and discussed the matter with Khrushchev.