Hideki Tojo

東條英機

A soldier-statesman who steered imperial Japan from northern ambitions toward southern expansion and war

In October 1941, he called the demand for withdrawal the “heart” of the issue and framed concession as surrender.

Hideki Tojo was a military politician who represented the Imperial Japanese Army’s Control Faction and pressed imperial expansion in Manchuria and China. As chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, he escalated operations in northern China while tensions with the Soviet Union remained a strategic concern; later, army priorities shifted from an immediate northern advance toward a southern drive for oil and other resources. As prime minister, he organized Japan for total war against the United States and Britain and suppressed dissent, falling from power as the war situation deteriorated in 1944. Convicted at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, he was executed after the war.

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

Related historical events

Senior army posts and the Control Faction's national defense state program, 1934-1941

Promoted to major general and made chief of the Army Ministry's personnel department in 1934, Tojo contributed to Hijōji kokumin zenshū, the Army Ministry's March 1934 collection calling for a totalitarian "national defense state". His essay argued that a modern war of national defense spans every field and requires a state able to control political, social and economic life monolithically, and he accused Britain, France and the United States of waging "ideological war" against Japan since 1919. Top command of the Kwantung Army's Kempeitai in 1935 and the Kwantung Army staff in 1937 made him responsible for the de facto administration of Manchukuo and for penetration into northern China, and after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident he worked with the Control Faction at the center to widen the war. The defense-state idea was taken from the German Wehrstaat concept of the 1920s, and the purge of the Imperial Way faction after the February 26 coup attempt of 1936 unified the army under the Control Faction. As army minister in the second Konoe cabinet from 1940 he pressed the Tripartite Pact and the occupation of French Indochina, and when talks with the United States, which demanded withdrawal from Indochina and China, stalled, he helped bring down the Konoe cabinet and took office as prime minister in October 1941. The Imperial Conference of 5 November set an early-December deadline for diplomacy; on 27 November Tojo misrepresented the Hull note to the cabinet as an ultimatum even though it carried no timeline and was marked tentative; and on 1 December a further conference sanctioned war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. Tojo later testified that he had been, in effect, a dictator.

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