A Marine commander whose caution helped save a surrounded division
“Retreat, hell! We're just attacking in another direction.”
Oliver P. Smith was a U.S. Marine general who served in World War II and the Korean War, known for expertise in amphibious operations and a cautious command style. As commander of the 1st Marine Division, he led the Inchon landing and the advance to Seoul in 1950, then directed the division’s breakout from Chinese encirclement at the Chosin Reservoir. Against speed-first orders from MacArthur and Almond, he prepared supply lines and an airfield, choices that helped preserve his force and sustain the operation.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 1917Commissioned second lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps
- 1934–1936Studied at the École Supérieure de Guerre in France
- 1944Commanded 5th Marines in the New Britain operation
- 1944–1945Assistant division commander, 1st Marine Division, Peleliu and Okinawa operations
- 1950–1951Commanding general, 1st Marine Division, Inchon, Seoul and Chosin operations
- 1953–1955Commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
- 1955Retired as a four-star general
Related historical events
The Chosin Airstrip and Evacuation Decision, December 1950
The existing account covers Smith's command at Inchon and the Chosin breakout, but how he handled the evacuation problem of a surrounded division deserves separate treatment. On November 27, 1950, the 5th and 7th Marines were at Yudam-ni, and divisions of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army IX Army Group cut the main supply route between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. Smith moved to the division's forward base at Hagaru-ri on November 28 and marked it as the decisive point of the defense; the fighting then unfolded much as he anticipated.
One of his judgments at Hagaru-ri concerned the value of an airstrip. In the early morning of December 1, Smith met with his division surgeon, Captain Eugene R. Hering Jr. According to Smith's war journal, about 600 casualties at Hagaru-ri awaited evacuation, and Hering expected 400 more from the east side of the reservoir, where the 31st Regimental Combat Team had been destroyed. Smith wrote that "the only solution to our casualty problem" was completion of the C-47 strip, yet the engineers judged it only 40 percent complete. A trial landing was decided on anyway, and the first C-47 touched down at Hagaru-ri on the afternoon of December 1. The strip operated from that afternoon until the evening of December 6, when the Marines abandoned the base; in those five days 4,312 wounded or frostbitten Marine and Army personnel were flown out.
The decision shows the nature of the choices facing the division. The 5th and 7th Marines were withdrawing to Hagaru-ri bringing all their wounded and dead, while cold-weather casualties such as frostbite, chilblains and trench foot mounted. Without the strip, these men would have had to continue with the withdrawing column. Smith's preparation of airstrips and supply points before the battle was a choice made against the speed-first demands of Almond and MacArthur, and only after securing evacuation capacity could the division move from Hagaru-ri toward Hungnam.