From ambassador to Moscow during perestroika to author of Afgantsy, the British diplomat who knew Russia from the inside
'On Christmas Day 1991 we were still wearing our funny hats and eating our mince pies when Mikhail Gorbachev came on television to tell the world that he had resigned as President of the Soviet Union,' recalling the end from Moscow.
British diplomat and author who served as ambassador to the Soviet Union (1988–1991) and then to the Russian Federation (1991–1992), witnessing perestroika, the August 1991 coup, the rise of Yeltsin, and the Soviet collapse from the inside. On close personal terms with Gorbachev, he later served as foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister John Major and chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. His 2011 book Afgantsy, the key revisionist account of the Soviet-Afghan War, argues that the Soviet 40th Army was never defeated on the battlefield and withdrew in good order, challenging the Western 'Soviet Vietnam' narrative and recasting the war as a failure of intelligence and political judgment, not of arms.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 1951–1952Served in military intelligence, Vienna
- 1955Joined HM Diplomatic Service
- 1963–1966Posted to British Embassy Moscow (first tour)
- 1975–1978UK Permanent Representation to the EC, Brussels
- 1982–1984Minister for Trade, British Embassy Washington
- 1984–1988Deputy Under-Secretary, FCO; G7 Sherpa team
- 1988–1992British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, then Russia
- 1992–1993Foreign Policy Adviser to PM; Chairman, JIC
Related historical events
- 1979–1989The Soviet-Afghan Warauthor of AfgantsyHe wrote Afgantsy, a revisionist account arguing that the Soviet military was never defeated on the battlefield and withdrew in good order, serving as a primary counterweight to the 'Soviet Vietnam' narrative.
- 1991The August Coup and the Collapse of the USSROn-the-ground witness to the Soviet collapseFrom Moscow, he witnessed the August 1991 coup and the Soviet collapse at close range.
Diplomatic judgment and retrospection as ambassador
From 1988 to 1992, Braithwaite served as Britain's ambassador in Moscow, observing the final years of the Soviet Union and the early Russian Federation at close range. In retrospect, he acknowledged that the embassy's judgments were not always right. For example, after Boris Yeltsin referred to the Kremlin as “our Kremlin” at a meeting in 1990, Braithwaite did not expect him to gain power; he later described that as his own misjudgment. He said that Britain dealt with Mikhail Gorbachev while Gorbachev remained in power, then adjusted its position as Yeltsin's prospects improved. He also recalled that his wife, Jill, joined the crowd supporting Yeltsin outside the White House in August 1991, a circumstance that helped establish a good relationship with Yeltsin and his associates after he took power.
His account combines a diplomat's on-the-ground experience with retrospective self-criticism. He argued that attributing the Soviet collapse solely to Gorbachev was an oversimplification, and acknowledged Western arrogance in assuming that it could teach Russians how to organize democracy and manage their economy. These are Braithwaite's own retrospective judgments, not a definitive explanation of the causes of the Soviet collapse.