1991

The August Coup and the Collapse of the USSR

How did the state born in 1917 come to an end?

In August 1991, hardliners seeking to stop the signing of a new union treaty confined Gorbachev and set up a State Committee for the State of Emergency to stage a coup. Led by Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pavlov and others, the coup collapsed within three days as Yeltsin resisted atop a tank and citizens rallied. The coup’s failure only accelerated the dissolution of the union.

A State on the Brink: Summer 1991

By the summer of 1991, the Soviet Union was no longer a functioning state. The perestroika and glasnost reforms that Gorbachev had launched in 1985 had fundamentally eroded the party-state's grip, and the economy was in freefall. After the government first admitted an economic crisis in January 1989, almost every basic consumer good vanished from free sale, and rationing by coupons (talony) spread across the country. In January 1991 Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov ordered 50- and 100-ruble notes exchanged within three days and capped savings withdrawals at 500 rubles a month; on 2 April he raised state retail prices in a single stroke. Shortages persisted all the same, and the budget deficit was plugged by printing money in a self-reinforcing spiral. 15 9

The political fragmentation was even faster than the economic collapse. On June 12, 1990, the Russian Republic adopted its Declaration of State Sovereignty, asserting that Russian law took precedence over Union law. Other republics followed with similar declarations, igniting the so-called 'War of Laws.' Lithuania had declared independence in March 1990 and Estonia and Latvia had proclaimed a transition to restored independence, and the Soviet military's attempt to suppress Lithuania by force in January 1991 had failed. The authorities of six republics, the three Baltic states plus Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, boycotted the all-Union referendum of March 17. In the nine republics that did participate, 76.4 percent voted to preserve the USSR as a 'renewed federation,' but there was no consensus on what that renewed federation would actually look like. 3 8

The final attempt to answer that question was the Novo-Ogaryovo process. On April 23, 1991, Gorbachev signed the so-called '9+1 Agreement' with the leaders of nine republics, including Yeltsin, launching negotiations on a New Union Treaty. At a series of meetings at the Novo-Ogaryovo residence outside Moscow, the republics fought fiercely over the federal budget, taxation, property rights, and the structure of the legislature. Ukraine's Kravchuk demanded the abolition of Union taxes in favor of fixed contributions from the republics. Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev warned that 'the danger of losing the common economic space is not a propaganda invention but a harsh reality.' Tatarstan's Shaimiev insisted that autonomous republics be allowed to sign the treaty on equal terms with the Union republics. 6 7

The final draft, initialled on July 23 by every delegation except Yeltsin's, created a 'Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics' (preserving the USSR initials): a soft federation that reduced the central government's powers to foreign policy, defense, and limited fiscal authority, devolving the rest to the republics. The signing was set for August 20: Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan would sign first, with the remaining republics following between September and October. 7 6

But the moment this treaty took effect, the Union-level institutions (the Council of Ministers, the KGB) would lose most of their authority. To the hardliners, this was not a treaty but a dissolution document. In December 1990, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had resigned from the Congress of People's Deputies, warning that 'a dictatorship is coming.' On June 17, 1991, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov demanded extraordinary powers from the Supreme Soviet, only to be rebuffed by Gorbachev. That same month, Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov told U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock that a coup against Gorbachev was being planned. Matlock passed the warning to Gorbachev, but Gorbachev did not take seriously the possibility that his own cabinet was involved. 4

On July 23, the very day the Union Treaty draft was finalized, the hardline newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya published a manifesto titled 'A Word to the People.' Signed by twelve political and cultural figures (including writers Yuri Bondarev, Alexander Prokhanov, and Valentin Rasputin, Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, and three men who would later stand trial as GKChP defendants: Valentin Varennikov, Vasily Starodubtsev, and Alexander Tizyakov), the text declared that 'the Motherland, our great state, is perishing, collapsing, sinking into darkness and oblivion while we remain silent.' It called the reformers 'crafty and eloquent rulers, clever and cunning apostates, greedy and wealthy grabbers' who were 'carving up the country.' This manifesto would become the de facto ideological platform of the August coup twenty-eight days later. 10

The decisive moment came on the night of July 29 at Novo-Ogaryovo. In a secret meeting, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Nazarbayev discussed replacing Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, and Pugo with more liberal figures after the Union Treaty was signed, with Nazarbayev taking over as prime minister. But the conversation was recorded in its entirety by an electronic bug that Kryuchkov had planted through Gorbachev's own chief bodyguard, Vladimir Medvedev. In early August, Kryuchkov played the tape for his fellow conspirators and argued that time had run out. On August 4, Gorbachev departed for his holiday dacha in Foros, Crimea. At the KGB's secret facility codenamed 'ABTs,' detailed planning for a state of emergency moved into its final stage. Meeting there on August 17, the conspirators decided to declare a state of emergency from the 19th and to demand that Gorbachev either sign the decrees or resign and hand his powers to Yanayev. Sixteen days remained until the scheduled signing of the New Union Treaty. 4 5

The Morning the Tanks Rolled In, and the Man Who Climbed One

At 6:00 a.m. on August 19, 1991, every radio and television station in the Soviet Union began broadcasting the ballet Swan Lake. Then an announcer began reading the documents of the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP): President Mikhail Gorbachev was unable to perform his duties "for health reasons"; Vice President Gennady Yanayev had assumed the acting presidency; and an eight-member GKChP was now governing the country. The committee declared a six-month state of emergency in Moscow and other areas, suspended political parties and public organizations, and banned strikes and demonstrations. In a startling populist gesture, the same decree promised every city resident up to 1,500 square meters of land for personal use. 4 11 5

But the broadcast was merely the final step of events that had begun some thirteen hours earlier at Foros. At 4:40 p.m. the previous day, a delegation of four men, Oleg Baklanov, Valery Boldin, Oleg Shenin, and General Valentin Varennikov, entered the presidential dacha on the Crimean coast. They were let in by Yuri Plekhanov, head of the KGB Ninth Directorate that guarded the president. They demanded that Gorbachev either endorse a state of emergency or resign and transfer power to Yanayev. Gorbachev refused flatly. According to Varennikov's subsequent account, Gorbachev said, "Damn you. Do what you want. But report my opinion!" Others present, however, testified that the delegation returned visibly disappointed and shaken. Gorbachev is said to have shouted at his own chief of staff Boldin: "Shut up, you prick! How dare you lecture me about the situation in the country!" 4

The KGB had already cut the dacha's telephone lines at 4:32 p.m., eight minutes before the delegation walked in, including the line controlling Soviet strategic nuclear forces. After the delegation left, extra guards were posted at the gates; at 4 a.m. the Sevastopol regiment of the KGB border troops surrounded the compound, and two tractors blocked the runway where the presidential jet and helicopter sat. Gorbachev and his family heard the morning's news from a BBC bulletin on a small Sony transistor radio that had not been confiscated. Refusing food from outside for fear of poisoning, Gorbachev took long walks on the grounds to belie claims of illness. 4

At 1:00 a.m. Moscow time, Yanayev signed the documents creating the GKChP. The committee consisted of Yanayev himself, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov, Interior Minister Boris Pugo, Baklanov, and two civilian figures: Vasily Starodubtsev (chairman of the Peasants' Union) and Alexander Tizyakov (president of the Association of State Enterprises). This was the "Gang of Eight." The key architect was Kryuchkov; Yanayev later claimed he had been coerced into participating under threat of arrest. 4 11

At 3:30 a.m., Yazov informed his commanders of Gorbachev's "illness" and the GKChP's formation. The Tamanskaya motor rifle division, Kantemirovskaya tank division, and Tula airborne division were ordered into Moscow. By 9:00 a.m., roughly 4,000 troops, 350 tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers, and 420 trucks had entered the city. The KGB had drawn up an arrest list, but the order to detain Boris Yeltsin was never executed. The Alpha Group surrounded Yeltsin's dacha but received no order to enter; its commander, Viktor Karpukhin, later claimed he had disobeyed Kryuchkov's arrest order, though this account has been disputed. 4 5

That failure proved fatal. Yeltsin reached the White House, the Russian Republic's Supreme Soviet building, by 9:00 a.m., joined by Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, Prime Minister Ivan Silayev, Vice President Alexander Rutskoy, and others. They immediately drafted and distributed "To the Citizens of Russia," condemning the GKChP's actions as "a reactionary, anti-constitutional coup." It called on soldiers not to participate, demanded a general strike, and insisted Gorbachev be allowed to address the people. The declaration spread nationwide by fax, medium-wave radio, and the RELCOM computer network. 4

By noon, thousands had gathered outside the White House; by late afternoon, tens of thousands. Using dumpsters, park fences, concrete blocks, benches, and felled trees, they erected barricades around the building. Volunteer militias formed, joined by Afghan war veterans and employees of the private security firm Alex. The next day former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who had resigned months earlier warning "a dictatorship is coming," spoke at the rally outside the White House to say his warning had proven true. 5 4

At 5:00 p.m., the GKChP held a press conference at the Foreign Ministry press center. Prime Minister Pavlov was absent, reportedly suffering from "alcohol poisoning" from the night before. Yanayev told reporters Gorbachev was "very tired and needs time to get his health back," calling him "my friend" and expressing hope they would work together again. But the cameras captured his trembling hands and unsteady voice, and the footage, unlike in the Brezhnev era, was broadcast uncensored. Soviet viewers saw the coup leadership's incompetence in real time. Watching from Foros on a makeshift TV antenna, Gorbachev concluded Yeltsin would be able to stop the coup. 4 5

But the day's most iconic moment had come at midday. At 12:15 p.m. Yeltsin climbed atop tank No. 110 of the Tamanskaya division, stationed outside the White House, and read "To the Citizens of Russia" to the crowd. The scene was unexpectedly included in the state television evening news. At 11 p.m. that night, Major Sergei Evdokimov, chief of staff of a tank battalion from the same division, declared his unit's loyalty to the Russian government, and ten tanks, unarmed but flying Russia's tricolor, crossed the barricades to join the defenders. The crowd erupted. The tanks sent to crush the coup had become its most potent symbol of resistance. 5 4

The Coup That Collapsed in Three Days

At 12:31 a.m. on August 21, a clash in an underpass on Moscow's Garden Ring sealed the coup's fate. Where the ring road passes under Novy Arbat, civilians used trolleybuses and street-cleaning trucks to block a patrol of eight BMP infantry fighting vehicles from the Tamanskaya Division. The patrol was commanded by Captain Sergey Surovikin, who would later command Russian forces in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Soldiers fired warning shots into the air. Twenty-two-year-old Dmitry Komar, a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan War, was shot and crushed while trying to cover a moving BMP's observation slit. Vladimir Usov, a 37-year-old economist who rushed to help him, was killed by a stray bullet. A BMP caught fire, the troops pulled back, and 28-year-old architect Ilya Krichevsky was shot dead. The three deaths horrified both sides. Journalist Sergey Parkhomenko, who was in the crowd, later recalled: "Those deaths played a crucial role: both sides were so horrified that it brought a halt to everything." 4 5

And indeed, from that hour the coup unraveled fast. The Alpha Group and Vympel special forces never moved on the White House for Operation Grom (Thunder), the assault planned for 3 a.m. Alpha commander Viktor Karpukhin judged the operation would be a bloodbath and objected. No one would sign a written order. At 3 a.m., Air Force Commander-in-Chief Yevgeny Shaposhnikov told Yazov to "withdraw the troops from Moscow and declare the GKChP illegal." At 5 a.m., the Defence Ministry collegium convened. Strategic Rocket Forces commander Yuri Maksimov, Navy commander Vladimir Chernavin, Airborne Forces commander Pavel Grachev, and others fell in behind Shaposhnikov one by one. Yazov gave way and ordered the troops out of Moscow; from 8 a.m. tanks and armored vehicles began leaving the city. 5 4

Meanwhile, the rump GKChP made one last gambit. Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, Tizyakov, plus Lukyanov and Ivashko, flew to Crimea to plead with Gorbachev at Foros. They landed at Belbek airfield at 4:08 p.m., but Gorbachev refused to meet them, demanding that his communications be restored first. A rescue party sent by Yeltsin (Rutskoy, Silayev, Primakov and Bakatin, with 36 armed police officers) left Moscow at 4:52 p.m., 44 minutes after the GKChP plane had landed; it reached Crimea at 7:16 p.m., and Gorbachev received it at 8:10 p.m. At 5 p.m., Yanayev signed a decree dissolving the GKChP and annulling all its decisions. At 6:30 p.m., Yeltsin's press secretary announced that a telephone link to Gorbachev had finally been restored. At 12:04 a.m. on August 22, Gorbachev landed at Moscow's Vnukovo-2 airport, on the same plane as Kryuchkov, who was held under guard and arrested on the airfield along with Yazov and Tizyakov, who arrived on the next plane. The coup was over. 4 5

Belovezhskaya Pushcha: The Empire That Vanished in a Day

Once the coup had failed, the remaining props of the union gave way one after another. On August 24 Gorbachev resigned as general secretary of the Communist Party, and the same day the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared independence. Five days later the USSR Supreme Soviet suspended all Party activity on Soviet territory. Between August and December ten republics broke away from the union, and on September 6 the USSR recognised the independence of the three Baltic states. On November 6 Yeltsin banned Communist Party activity on Russian territory. 3 15

Gorbachev tried to the end to keep the union alive, if only as a loose confederation. On November 14 at Novo-Ogaryovo he and the leaders of seven republics agreed in advance to sign a treaty on a Union of Sovereign States, but on November 25 Yeltsin refused to initial it, objecting to the words "confederative state". The decisive blow came on December 1 with Ukraine's referendum. More than 90 percent of those voting endorsed the August declaration of independence and Kravchuk was elected president; without the republic second only to Russia, no form of union was realistically possible. 7 12 3

On 8 December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus gathered at Viskuli, a hunting lodge in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha national park in Belarus. The ostensible agenda was Russian oil and gas deliveries to Belarus. Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, later recalled: "Winter was coming, and we had no money to buy fuel. That was the aim of our meeting." But Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk remembered it differently: "I hadn't been told anything about oil and gas. I thought I was going there to discuss the future of the USSR." 13 12

Yeltsin was accompanied by Gennady Burbulis, the RSFSR state secretary who in September had given him the "Burbulis Memorandum" (drafted by Yegor Gaidar's team), which argued that Russia should pursue economic independence and maintain only a "temporary" political alliance with the other republics. At the negotiating table, Burbulis made a far more radical proposal. "The USSR, as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality, is ceasing to exist." Shushkevich never forgot that sentence: "It was the opening statement of our agreement, the only one adopted without any arguments." 12 13

Once the three leaders agreed the USSR was finished, they established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its place. The 14-article agreement was ready by about 3 p.m. Legally, they framed themselves as representatives of three of the four original signatories of the 1922 Treaty on the Creation of the USSR (the Transcaucasian SFSR had been dissolved in 1936), bypassing the secession procedure laid out in the Soviet constitution. 12

Primary text

Documents of the Dissolution of the USSR: twelve texts from the August coup to the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991)Соглашение о создании Содружества Независимых Государств (8 декабря 1991 г.)

СОГЛАШЕНИЕ

о создании Содружества Независимых Государств

Мы, Республика Беларусь, Российская Федерация (РСФСР), Украина как государства — учредители Союза ССР, подписавшие Союзный Договор 1922 года, далее именуемые Высокими Договаривающимися Сторонами, констатируем, что Союз ССР, как субъект международного права и геополитическая реальность, прекращает свое существование.

Основываясь на исторической общности наших народов и сложившихся между ними связях, учитывая двусторонние договоры, заключенные между Высокими Договаривающимися Сторонами,

стремясь построить демократические правовые государства,

намереваясь развивать свои отношения на основе взаимного признания и уважения государственного суверенитета, неотъемлемого права на самоопределение, принципов равноправия и невмешательства во внутренние дела, отказа от применения силы, экономических или любых других методов давления, урегулирования спорных проблем согласительными средствами, других общепризнанных принципов и норм международного права,

считая, что дальнейшее развитие и укрепление отношений дружбы, добрососедства и взаимовыгодного сотрудничества между нашими государствами отвечают коренным национальным интересам их народов и служат делу мира и безопасности,

подтверждая свою приверженность целям и принципам Устава Организации Объединенных Наций, Хельсинкского Заключительного акта и других документов Совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе,

обязуясь соблюдать общепризнанные международные нормы о правах человека и народов,

договорились о нижеследующем:

Статья 1

Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны образуют Содружество Независимых Государств.

Статья 2

Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны гарантируют своим гражданам независимо от их национальности или иных различий равные права и свободы. Каждая из Высоких Договаривающихся Сторон гарантирует гражданам других Сторон, а также лицам без гражданства, проживающим на ее территории, независимо от их национальной принадлежности или иных различий гражданские, политические, социальные, экономические и культурные права и свободы в соответствии с общепризнанными международными нормами о правах человека.

Статья 3

Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны, желая способствовать выражению, сохранению и развитию этнической, культурной, языковой и религиозной самобытности населяющих их территории национальных меньшинств и сложившихся уникальных этнокультурных регионов, берут их под свою защиту.

Статья 4

Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны будут развивать равноправное и взаимовыгодное сотрудничество своих народов и государств в области политики, экономики, культуры, образования, здравоохранения, охраны окружающей среды, науки, торговли, в гуманитарной и иных областях, содействовать широкому информационному обмену, добросовестно и неукоснительно соблюдать взаимные обязательства.

Стороны считают необходимым заключить соглашения о сотрудничестве в указанных областях.

Статья 5

Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны признают и уважают территориальную целостность друг друга и неприкосновенность существующих границ в рамках Содружества.

Они гарантируют открытость границ, свободу передвижения граждан и передачи информации в рамках Содружества.

Статья 6

Государства — члены Содружества будут сотрудничать в обеспечении международного мира и безопасности, осуществлении эффективных мер сокращения вооружений и военных расходов. Они стремятся к ликвидации всех ядерных вооружений, всеобщему и полному разоружению под строгим международным контролем.

Стороны будут уважать стремление друг друга к достижению статуса безъядерной зоны и нейтрального государства.

Государства — члены Содружества будут сохранять и поддерживать под объединенным командованием общее военно-стратегическое пространство, включая единый контроль над ядерным оружием, порядок осуществления которого регулируется специальным соглашением.

Они также совместно гарантируют необходимые условия размещения, функционирования, материального и социального обеспечения стратегических вооруженных сил. Стороны обязуются проводить согласованную политику по вопросам социальной защиты и пенсионного обеспечения военнослужащих и их семей.

Статья 7

Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны признают, что к сфере их совместной деятельности, реализуемой на равноправной основе через общие координирующие институты Содружества, относятся:

— координация внешнеполитической деятельности;

— сотрудничество в формировании и развитии общего экономического пространства, общеевропейского и евразийского рынков, в области таможенной политики;

— сотрудничество в развитии систем транспорта и связи;

— сотрудничество в области охраны окружающей среды, участие в создании всеобъемлющей международной системы экологической безопасности;

— вопросы миграционной политики;

— борьба с организованной преступностью.

Статья 8

Стороны осознают планетарный характер Чернобыльской катастрофы и обязуются объединять и координировать свои усилия по минимизации и преодолению ее последствий.

Они договорились заключить в этих целях специальное соглашение, учитывающее тяжесть последствий катастрофы.

Статья 9

Споры относительно толкования и применения норм настоящего Соглашения подлежат разрешению путем переговоров между соответствующими органами, а при необходимости — на уровне глав Правительств и Государств.

Статья 10

Каждая из Высоких Договаривающихся Сторон оставляет за собой право приостановить действия настоящего Соглашения или отдельных его статей, уведомив об этом участников Соглашения за год.

Положения настоящего Соглашения могут быть дополнены или изменены по взаимному согласию Высоких Договаривающихся Сторон.

Статья 11

С момента подписания настоящего Соглашения на территориях подписавших его государств не допускается применение норм третьих государств, в том числе бывшего Союза ССР.

Статья 12

Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны гарантируют выполнение международных обязательств, вытекающих для них из договоров и соглашений бывшего Союза ССР.

Статья 13

Настоящее Соглашение не затрагивает обязательств Высоких Договаривающихся Сторон в отношении третьих государств.

Настоящее соглашение открыто для присоединения всех государств — членов бывшего Союза ССР, а также для иных государств, разделяющих цели и принципы настоящего Соглашения.

Статья 14

Официальным местопребыванием координирующих органов содружества является город Минск.

Деятельность органов бывшего Союза ССР на территориях государств — членов Содружества прекращается.

Совершено в городе Минске 8 декабря 1991 года в трех экземплярах, каждый на белорусском, русском и украинском языках, причем три текста имеют одинаковую силу.

За Республику Беларусь

С. ШУШКЕВИЧ

В. КЕБИЧ

За РСФСР

Б. ЕЛЬЦИН

Г. БУРБУЛИС

За Украину

Л. КРАВЧУК

В. ФОКИН

Immediately after signing, Yeltsin called U.S. president George H.W. Bush. "I talked with USSR Minister of Defense Shaposhnikov. I want to read Article 6 of the Agreement." Yeltsin read aloud the clause guaranteeing unified control over nuclear weapons, reassuring Bush. He claimed Nazarbayev was ready to join, but the Kazakh president had in fact flown to Moscow to see Gorbachev. By the time Shushkevich got through to Gorbachev, Bush had already been briefed. Kravchuk recalled: "Gorbachev was angry, saying, 'What have you done? You've turned the whole world upside down!'" But Gorbachev no longer had the power to stop them. 12 16

The Belarusian KGB had deployed special forces in the forest around Viskuli and awaited Moscow's order to arrest the three leaders. That order never came. Gorbachev explained 25 years later: "It smelled of civil war. It would have looked like I went that far just to hold on to power." On 10 December Ukraine's parliament ratified the accords 295 to 10; Russia's Supreme Soviet followed on 12 December, 188 to 7. On 21 December in Alma-Ata the remaining republics joined, and on 25 December Gorbachev resigned. The Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin. 13 3

The Red Flag Comes Down Over the Kremlin

When eleven republics signed the Alma-Ata Protocol creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 21, resignation was all that remained for Gorbachev. On December 23 he sat across from Yeltsin in the Kremlin for nearly nine hours, negotiating the mechanics of the handover. A joint order issued after the meeting wound up the apparatus of the Soviet presidency. Two days earlier the Alma-Ata meeting had already entrusted command of the Soviet armed forces to Defense Minister Yevgeny Shaposhnikov. 15 14 3

On December 25, less than two hours before his resignation speech, Gorbachev placed his last call as president to George H.W. Bush, who was spending Christmas at Camp David. In the conversation, later declassified by the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library at the request of the National Security Archive, he told Bush he would shortly announce his resignation on television and assured him that the transfer of nuclear command authority to Yeltsin was "under strict control." "As for me, I do not intend to hide in the taiga, in the woods. I will be active politically." Bush answered with praise and affection, recalling their time together at Camp David. 16

At 7 p.m., Gorbachev sat before the Soviet television cameras. In his farewell address he said he had "firmly stood for independence, self-rule of nations, for the sovereignty of the republics, but at the same time for preservation of the union state, the unity of the country." Events had gone another way: "The policy prevailed of dismembering this country and disuniting the state, with which I cannot agree." Yet he insisted on "the historic correctness of the democratic reforms." He cited the end of the Cold War, the halt of the arms race, and the establishment of press freedom, religious liberty, and political pluralism as his legacy, while acknowledging that "the old system collapsed before the new one had time to begin working." 3 15

Immediately after the speech came the transfer of the Cheget, the nuclear briefcase. Gorbachev signed a decree resigning not only as president but also as commander-in-chief. With Defense Minister Yevgeny Shaposhnikov present, nuclear command passed to Yeltsin. The Cheget was a portable terminal connecting the president to the Strategic Rocket Forces command; it was the device that authorized the launch of Soviet nuclear forces. 3 15

At 7:35 p.m., the red flag with the hammer and sickle was lowered from the Kremlin dome and the Russian tricolor rose in its place. Muscovites crossing snowy Red Square stopped to watch. The Soviet state that had begun with the storming of the Winter Palace 74 years earlier came to an end with a phone call, a televised speech, and the exchange of a flag. The next day, December 26, the Soviet of the Republics adopted Declaration No. 142-N, formally dissolving the USSR. At midnight on December 31, all remaining Soviet institutions ceased to exist. 3 15

What ended in 1991, and what did not?

On December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union legally ceased to exist. The 74-year experiment in building a non-capitalist superpower that began in October 1917 ended; the Cold War closed; and Marxism-Leninism ceased to function as a systemic challenge to capitalism. Fifteen republics became independent states, and Russia took over the Soviet seat at the United Nations, including its permanent seat on the Security Council. The centrally planned economy gave way to markets, privatization, and, for many, immiseration. In Russia's case this came through the shock therapy of January 1992. 3

Yet what exactly ended in 1991 is itself a historical question. Competitive elections had already been held, the Party's constitutional monopoly abolished, and several republics had declared sovereignty. Some historians argue that the Soviet Union as a communist state had effectively ceased to exist months before December, and that what was formally terminated was a shell. What is not disputed is that the end came not through external conquest or mass uprising, but through decisions made at the top of the system itself. 3

The costs of transition were heavy. Russian GDP fell roughly 40% between 1990 and 1998. The economist Steven Rosefielde calculated 3.4 million premature deaths in Russia from 1990 to 1998, attributable in part to the shock of transition, and a 2017 study put the figure across the former USSR at 7 million. Life expectancy for Russian men dropped by more than six years in the first half of the 1990s, and oligarchs who had seized state property rose to power. Whether these costs were the price of an unavoidable transition or the consequence of avoidable policy choices remains a live argument: if the dissolution was inevitable, they were an unavoidable price; if it was the result of choices, other choices and other outcomes were possible. 3

Interpretations of the dissolution's character diverge as well. Francis Fukuyama's 1989 "The End of History?" proclaimed the final victory of liberal democracy, and the triumphalist narrative of the 1990s treated this framework as orthodoxy. Yet the collapse did not deliver Fukuyama's 'end of history': within a decade, most successor states had consolidated some form of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule. In 2005 Putin called the dissolution "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century," generating a powerful counter-narrative, and a 2018 Levada Center poll found 66 percent of Russians regretted the Soviet collapse. Polls that still show a majority regretting it are, in their way, a popular rejection of the narrative that history's direction was ever fixed. 19 18

It is not even clear that the dissolution is a completed event. The borders drawn between Soviet republics, often arbitrarily to divide and rule, became international frontiers overnight. Conflicts contained within the union flared into wars: Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan (1988-1994, renewed in 2020 and 2023), Transnistria in Moldova (1992), South Ossetia (1991-1992) and Abkhazia (1992-1993) in Georgia, again in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, Chechnya, and Crimea. Karabakh ended with Azerbaijan's military takeover in 2023, but the other 'frozen conflicts' remain unresolved three decades on, and Russia's relationship with its neighbors has been shaped by them ever since. Armed conflict on former Soviet territory has shown that the borders drawn in 1991 are not final. 3

What ended was not ideological conflict itself, but a specific configuration of it: a bipolar world organized around two superpowers. The multipolar disorder that replaced it, of which the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine was the most violent expression, is part of the collapse's unfinished history. The dissolution may be not a concluded event but an ongoing process. 3

Why did the Soviet Union fall: inevitable or chosen?

The dissolution of the Soviet Union took most observers by surprise. Jack Matlock, the U.S. ambassador who watched Gorbachev from the closest vantage point, later insisted that the end of the Cold War, the collapse of East European communism, and the breakup of the Soviet Union itself were three distinct events. Bundling the Cold War that ended in 1989 with the state that vanished in 1991 into a single drama of inevitability was a retrospective narrative, and that narrative still operates inside every attempt to explain why the union came apart. 3

Over the thirty years since, four broad accounts have competed among historians. The first is the Western triumphalist narrative: the Soviet system was doomed from birth, and it succumbed to the arms race and the pressure of the Cold War. Yet Cold War historians including Matlock counter that Gorbachev, without external pressure, dismantled Communist Party rule himself. The second, rooted in Russian popular memory, is a conspiracy narrative: a planned CIA and Western sabotage operation brought the USSR down. Vladimir Putin cemented this sentiment as state memory when he called the dissolution "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century." The serious scholarly debate unfolds along the other two axes, between structural and intentionalist accounts. 3 19

Structuralists argue that contradictions built into the Soviet system made collapse a matter of time. Martin Malia traced an "original sin" to Bolshevik ideology, making collapse a foregone conclusion from 1917. Others focus on the ethno-federal structure. Edward Walker argued that the Soviet federation, which granted republics nominal sovereignty and a constitutional right of secession, was a "time bomb" that would turn into a legal pathway to independence the moment central authority weakened. Terry Martin's term 'affirmative action empire' captures the Soviet nationality policy that gave republics their own languages, elites, and institutions, essentially building nations that could later demand real sovereignty. Ronald Grigor Suny argued that Soviet nationality policy created the very nations that would destroy the union, and Serhii Plokhy traced how independence movements, from the Baltics to Ukraine, dismantled the federation irrespective of the centre's will. In January 2016 Putin called Lenin's inclusion of the right of secession in the constitution a "delayed-action bomb." The legacy of historical crimes laid bare by glasnost and elite corruption are counted among the structural causes too. On this view Gorbachev was standing on tracks along which the train was already hurtling. 3

Economic explanations form another strand of the structural case. Economic historians note that Soviet GDP growth slowed from roughly 5% annually in the 1960s to around 2 percent, or near zero by some estimates, in the 1980s, that the post-1985 oil-price collapse stripped away the revenue that had masked inefficiencies for a decade, and that the arms race added its burden. Economic explanations split again, however. One side holds that the accumulated inefficiencies of the Stalinist command economy made it incapable of managing modern economic activity. The other counters that the economy, though wasteful, could have reproduced the system indefinitely; what broke it was the contradictory half-measures of perestroika after 1987: partial enterprise autonomy with price controls retained, which destroyed the discipline of planning without enabling a market. 3 15

Intentionalists emphasize the contingency of decisions made by specific individuals between 1985 and 1991. Archie Brown's The Gorbachev Factor (1996) argues that Gorbachev personally was the main driving force in Soviet politics from 1985 to 1988, not a passive hostage of events but the actor who led political change. Without the perestroika, glasnost, market initiatives, and foreign-policy stance he spearheaded there would have been no collapse; without him the system might have staggered on for decades, and had he pursued different reforms the union could have survived. 3

David Kotz and Fred Weir advanced a more radical thesis in Revolution from Above (1997): what destroyed the Soviet system was neither economic collapse nor popular revolt, but the party-state elite itself. Recognizing that private property and the market offered the only route to converting power into wealth, the elite deliberately promoted nationalism and capitalism and dismantled the old system to claim its assets. As evidence, Kotz and Weir pointed to the continued presence of former Soviet elites in the upper reaches of post-Soviet economies and governments. 3

Mark Beissinger occupied a distinctive position between these poles. In Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (2002), he analyzed not structure or will but the dynamics of events themselves. Quantifying 6,663 protest demonstrations and 2,177 mass violent events from 1987 to 1991, Beissinger argued that nationalist movements spread through a "tide" of events: one republic's success triggered a "bandwagon effect" that mobilized the next, creating a period of "thickened history" that structural conditions alone could not explain. 22

Vladislav Zubok, in Collapse (2021), brought the perspective of a Russian-born historian to the debate and pushed back against inevitability narratives. He condenses the Soviet end into the image of "a perfect storm and a hapless captain." Structural crises were real, but collapse was not inevitable. Gorbachev launched reforms that deliberately weakened the institutions holding the state together, the Party apparatus, the security organs and the central ministries, without building replacements that could manage the resulting centrifugal forces; contrary to their intent, his reforms depleted the government's resources and empowered separatism, making him the decisive trigger. The economy was not doomed; a different kind of reform, perhaps along Chinese lines combining Party political control with market economics, might have worked. Not all historians accept this counterfactual. Critics counter that structural problems ran deeper than Zubok allows, and that a 'China-style' solution was unlikely to succeed given the USSR's different political geography and the advanced state of nationalist mobilization in the western republics. 17

Stephen F. Cohen's 'lost alternatives' thesis poses the most fundamental question to the entire debate. Over a lifetime he argued that the Soviet system was not unreformable. Bukharin's NEP, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization, and Gorbachev's perestroika formed a single 'viable anti-Stalinist tradition.' The system did not fall because it could not be reformed; it fell because of the specific way reform was attempted and the specific resistance it encountered: a political outcome, not a structural sentence. 21

Chinese scholarship has formed a separate axis of debate. Some scholars argue that Gorbachev's "humane and democratic socialism" betrayed Marxism and caused the collapse, while others maintain that the rigidity of the Stalinist model was the root cause. Xi Jinping in 2013 identified the lesson of the Soviet collapse as the danger of "historical nihilism" and the Party's loss of ideological control. 3

The opening of the archives from the mid-1990s onward did not produce convergence. Scholars read the same documents and drew opposite conclusions: some saw the inherent inefficiency of central planning, others the institutional chaos wrought by reform. This is more than an academic disagreement. The interpretation of why the USSR collapsed is inseparable from the identity and legitimacy of the post-Soviet states, and from the political question of who bears responsibility for the catastrophe. No one disputes that the dissolution was the end of a 74-year system; but whether it was avoidable, who bears responsibility, and what exactly it was an end toward remain open three decades later. 3

Consequences

After the failed coup the Communist Party was suspended and the republics declared independence one after another. In December 1991 the Soviet Union was formally dissolved and Gorbachev resigned. The Soviet state that had lasted seventy years came to an end.

Timeline & Map

Moscow Belovezha Forest Foros 6 White House 7 White House 1 Kremlin 9 Kremlin 13 Kremlin 14 Kremlin 2 Novo-Ogaryovo 3 Novo-Ogaryovo 11 Belovezha Forest 8 Kyiv 10 Kyiv 4 Foros 5 Foros 12 Alma-Ata
  1. 11991.03.17
    Referendum on the union

    In a referendum on keeping the USSR as a "renewed federation", 76.4 percent voted yes in the nine republics that took part; six republics boycotted it.

  2. 21991.04.23
    The 9+1 Agreement

    At Novo-Ogaryovo, Gorbachev and the leaders of nine republics, Yeltsin among them, signed the 9+1 Agreement and opened talks on a New Union Treaty.

  3. 31991.07.23
    Union Treaty draft initialled

    Every delegation except Yeltsin's initialled the draft New Union Treaty; the signing was set for 20 August.

  4. 41991.08.18
    Confinement at Foros

    After the KGB cut the Foros dacha's communications, emissaries demanded that Gorbachev approve a state of emergency or resign; he refused and was confined there.

  5. 51991.08.19
    The coup

    The emergency committee (GKChP) announced that Gorbachev was "ill", made Yanayev acting president and declared a state of emergency; tanks and troops entered Moscow.

  6. 61991.08.19
    Yeltsin on the tank

    From a tank outside the Russian parliament, Yeltsin read "To the Citizens of Russia", branding the coup unconstitutional; Muscovites began building barricades.

  7. 71991.08.21
    The coup collapses

    Three civilians died blocking armoured vehicles overnight, but the White House was never stormed; troops pulled out of Moscow, and that afternoon Yanayev dissolved the GKChP.

  8. 81991.08.24
    Ukraine declares independence

    The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared independence, subject to a referendum. The same day Gorbachev resigned as party general secretary.

  9. 91991.09.06
    Baltic independence recognised

    The USSR State Council recognised the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

  10. 101991.12.01
    Ukraine's referendum

    Over 90 percent of Ukrainian voters endorsed the declaration of independence, and Kravchuk was elected president.

  11. 111991.12.08
    The Belovezha Accords

    At the Viskuli hunting lodge, Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich signed an agreement declaring that the USSR was ceasing to exist, and founded the CIS.

  12. 121991.12.21
    The Alma-Ata Protocol

    Leaders of eleven republics, all but Georgia and the Baltic states, signed the Alma-Ata Protocol founding the CIS and confirming the end of the USSR.

  13. 131991.12.25
    Gorbachev resigns

    In a televised address Gorbachev resigned as Soviet president and handed nuclear command to Yeltsin. The red flag over the Kremlin came down and the Russian tricolour went up.

  14. 141991.12.26
    Declaration No. 142-N

    The Soviet of the Republics of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted Declaration No. 142-N, acknowledging that the USSR had ceased to exist as a state and subject of international law.

Related people 93

State Emergency Committee (putschists)22

Participants13

Joined the GKChP, committed suicide after the coup failedSergei Akhromeyev1923–1991

During the August coup he met with Yanayev to offer support and prepared emergency measures plans. After the coup failed, he hanged himself in his Kremlin office, leaving a note that he could not live to see the destruction of everything to which he had devoted his life.

Joined the GKChP, the only plotter who refused amnesty and stood trialValentin Varennikov1923–2009

As Deputy Minister of Defence and C-in-C of the Ground Forces, he took part in the August 1991 coup. He flew to Foros to press Gorbachev, and after the coup's failure was the only defendant who refused amnesty and demanded a full trial. In 1994 the Supreme Court acquitted him, finding he had merely followed superior orders.

Last Chief of General Staff who backed the GKChP coupMikhail Moiseyev1939–2022

As Chief of the General Staff he supported Defence Minister Dmitry Yazov's coup. After Yazov's arrest he served as acting Defence Minister for a single day on 22 August 1991 and was dismissed the next day.

GKChP member, Foros emissaryOleg Baklanov1932–2021

On 18 August 1991 he flew to Foros with Boldin, Shenin, and Varennikov to demand that Gorbachev declare a state of emergency. Arrested on 23 August after the coup failed, he was held in Matrosskaya Tishina prison and amnestied in 1994.

participated in the coupOleg Shenin1937–2009

joined the GKChPValery Boldin1935–2006

First Secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist PartyDzhumgalbek Amanbayev1946–2005

As a Politburo member in 1991, he voiced support for the coup.

Estonian Communist Party Politburo memberLembit Annus1941–2018

He expressed support for the coup.

Participant in the GKChP coupViktor Grushko1930–2001

He participated in the August 1991 GKChP coup and was arrested.

Backer of the State Emergency Committee coupNikolai Dementey1930–2018

He openly backed the State Emergency Committee coup in August 1991 and then resigned as chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Deputy who supported the State Emergency CommitteeViktor Alksnis1950–2025

In August 1991, he supported the State Committee on the State of Emergency.

Participant in the coup plotYuri Plekhanov1930–2002

At Foros on 18 August 1991, he demanded that Gorbachev sign documents declaring an emergency and transferring power.

Ambassador who refused to condemn the coupLeonid Zamyatin1922–2019

While serving as ambassador to the UK, he was forced to resign in 1991 after refusing to condemn the August coup.

Yeltsin and the resistance to the coup23

Participants15

Warned of dictatorshipEduard Shevardnadze1928–2014

The foreign minister who resigned in 1990 warning of a coming dictatorship.

Warned of the coupAlexander Yakovlev (politician)1923–2005

The architect of glasnost, he left the party just before the coup, warning of the coming reaction.

Opposed the coup, appointed last KGB chairman to dismantle itVadim Bakatin1937–2022

On the day of the August coup he protested to Yanayev and issued a joint statement of opposition with Primakov, then flew to Foros with Rutskoy to bring Gorbachev back to Moscow. After the coup collapsed he was appointed KGB chairman on 23 August 1991 and tasked with dismantling the agency.

warned of the coupGavriil Popov1936–

Ex-KGB general who opposed the coupOleg Kalugin1934–

Kryuchkov's old adversary, Kalugin learned of the coup hours before from former colleagues, rushed to the Russian White House, led crowds, and induced Yeltsin to address them.

Air Force C-in-C who opposed the coupYevgeny Shaposhnikov1942–2020

In the early hours of 21 August he demanded Yazov withdraw the troops and, at the Defence Ministry collegium, pushed through the decision to end the coup.

Airborne deputy commander who warned the White House of the attackAlexander Lebed1950–2002

As deputy airborne commander, he assessed the crowds around the White House and secretly informed the defense headquarters that the assault was set for 2am.

Gorbachev rescuerYevgeny Primakov1929–2015

He flew to Foros with Rutskoy and Bakatin on 21 August to secure Gorbachev's release, arriving before the GKChP delegation that Gorbachev refused to meet.

Tank battalion commander of the Tamanskaya Division who defected to YeltsinSergei Yevdokimov1955–

On 19 August he turned his tank No. 110 to the White House defense line, and Yeltsin climbed atop it to speak.

Journalist who opposed the coupYegor Yakovlev1930–2005

During the August 1991 coup, he rallied 11 independent newspapers to publish a joint edition in defiance of the putschists.

Politburo member who opposed the coupYegor Stroev1937–

In August 1991, he refused to recognise the GKChP.

Ambassador who publicly condemned the coupBoris Pankin1931–

On August 21, 1991, he publicly condemned the coup on Czechoslovak television and demanded its reversal.

Organiser of resistance in LeningradAnatoly Sobchak1937–2000

During the August coup, he persuaded the military district commander to keep troops out of Leningrad.

Publicly contradicted the coup plottersArkady Volsky1932–2006

During the August 1991 coup, he publicly said the claim that Gorbachev was ill was a lie.

Navy chief who stood against the coupVladimir Chernavin1928–2023

At the Defence Ministry meeting called at 5 a.m. during the August coup he sided with Shaposhnikov.

Gorbachev and the Union and party centre22

Participants20

Party treasurer, fatal fall after the coup failedNikolai Kruchina1928–1991

As Administrator of Affairs of the CPSU Central Committee, he oversaw the party's vast assets and the 'party gold.' Five days after the August 1991 coup collapsed, on 26 August, he fell to his death from the fifth-floor balcony of his Moscow apartment. He left a note: 'I am not a traitor or a conspirator, but I am afraid.' His death was followed by similar fatal falls of his predecessor Georgy Pavlov and international department official Dmitry Lisovolik, making him central to the mystery of the missing party billions.

One-day acting KGB chairmanLeonid Shebarshin1935–2012

After the coup collapsed, he replaced the arrested Kryuchkov as acting KGB chairman for a single day (22–23 August 1991) before Yeltsin blocked him and Bakatin took over.

acting deputy secretary during dissolutionVladimir Ivashko1932–1994

Politburo member elected at the congressAlexander Dzasokhov1934–

He was elected to the Politburo at the 28th Party Congress.

First Secretary of the Belarusian Communist PartyAnatoly Malofeyev1933–2022

During the coup he sought to maintain the party's continuity.

First Secretary of the Georgian Communist PartyGivi Gumbaridze1945–

As a Politburo member during the coup, he led the Georgian Communist Party.

Politburo member and Moldavian party secretaryGrigore Eremei1935–2024

Listed on the Politburo roster during the coup, he could not prevent the USSR's collapse.

Tajik leader and Politburo memberQahhor Mahkamov1932–2016

He participated as a Politburo member during the coup and later accepted the USSR's dissolution.

First Secretary of the Armenian Communist PartyVladimir Movsisyan1933–2014

As a Politburo member, he took part in the events surrounding the coup and the collapse of the USSR.

First Secretary of the Belarusian Communist PartyYefrem Sokolov1926–2022

As a Politburo member during the coup, he represented the Belarusian party leadership.

Politburo memberYuri Prokofyev1939–

As a Politburo member during the coup, he led the Moscow party organization.

late Politburo memberMikhail Surkov1945–

As a Politburo member in 1991, he was in the party leadership during the coup.

First Secretary of the Estonian Communist PartyEnn-Arno Sillari1944–

He led the party during the coup, and the party split as the USSR collapsed.

First Secretary of the Armenian Communist PartyStepan Pogosyan1932–2012

Served as First Secretary from 1990 to 1991 and was a member of the Politburo.

First Secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist PartyAbsamat Masaliyev1933–2004

As a Politburo member, he led the Kyrgyz party during the coup.

Party leader who rejected the GKChP's authorityGalina Semyonova1937–2017

During the August 1991 coup, she refused to recognize the authority of the GKChP.

foreign minister who refused to join the coup committeeAlexander Bessmertnykh1933–

In August 1991, he refused to join the State Committee on the State of Emergency but did not publicly condemn the coup.

Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities during the collapseRafiq Nishonov1926–2023

He presided over the final parliament as the Union dissolved.

Opposed dissolution and sought an emergency CongressAlexander Obolensky1943–

He opposed the dissolution of the USSR and sought an emergency Congress in December 1991.

Soviet premier opposing the transfer of union propertyIvan Silayev1930–2023

After the coup, he sent Yeltsin an open letter asking him to halt decrees transferring union property to Russia.

Republic leaders who dissolved the Union9

Outside the camps

Historians & interpreters10

historian who argued against the inevitability of Soviet collapseStephen F. Cohen1938–2020

His 'lost alternatives' framework, arguing that the USSR was reformable and its collapse avoidable, forms the central counterpoint to the inevitability thesis.

Researcher of elite motivationsDavid Kotz1946–

Analyzed the coup and Soviet collapse as the party-state elite's abandonment of socialism for personal gain.

leading scholar of the collapse's structureEdward W. Walker1955–

Argued that the paradox of the ethno-federal structure was a time bomb that made secession conceivable once central control weakened.

scholar who explained collapse structurallyRonald Grigor Suny1940–

He argued that Soviet nationality policy created the nations that ultimately destroyed the union.

Interpreter of the Soviet collapseMartin Malia1924–2004

His interpretation became a powerful pole in explanations of the Soviet collapse.

Biographer who traced the August coupWilliam Taubman1941–

His biography traces the hardliners’ August 1991 coup attempt through Gorbachev’s resignation at the end of the year.

Historian analysing the Soviet dissolutionAleksandr Shubin1965–

In a 2021 interview, he interpreted the Soviet dissolution as the result of the anti-nomenklatura revolution's incompleteness and inconsistency.

Historian of the Soviet dissolutionSerhii Plokhy1957–

Through works including The Last Empire, he reshaped the historiography of the Soviet dissolution.

Author of The Gorbachev FactorArchie Brown1938–

He argued that Gorbachev's own convictions and choices drove the transformation and that without him the system would have lasted longer.

Author of CollapseVladislav Zubok1958–

In Collapse (2021) he wrote that the USSR fell victim to "a perfect storm and an incompetent captain", not to structural fate.

Related terms

Sources: Serhii Plokhy, The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet UnionEncyclopaedia Britannica: Dissolution of the Soviet Unionreference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22