The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's Capital
마르크스 『자본』에서 추상과 구체의 변증법
The first book of the Soviet philosopher Evald Ilyenkov, published in 1960 by the Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Analysing the method of Capital over five chapters, it separates the concrete from the sensory, explains the logical predicament of classical economics by the philosophies of Locke and Spinoza, and treats contradiction as the form in which science develops. The method itself is treated in the entry "Ascent from the abstract to the concrete"; this entry deals with the structure and argument of the book that systematised it.
In depth
Why have one entry for the method and another for the book?
One often hears "this is too abstract; be concrete". Here "concrete" usually means giving a visible example. Ilyenkov's book starts by reversing this everyday speech. For him, giving many individual cases may not be a concrete understanding at all. It is grasping how the many aspects of an object are entangled with one another that is concrete.
The main line of this idea is already treated in the entry "Ascent from the abstract to the concrete", which covers the publication of the manuscript, the critique of empiricism and the influence on Davydov's pedagogy. This entry cuts overlapping explanation and follows what belongs to this book alone: its structure, chapter 3, which reads English economics through philosophy, chapter 4 on the relation of logic and history, and chapter 5 on contradiction. At the book's end Ilyenkov calls Capital a true high school of theoretical thought and writes that a scholar of any field can learn method there.
The book went to typesetting in 1959 and to press in February 1960, in an edition of 6,000. The manuscript had been complete in 1956 and was cut by more than a third in the course of publication. A short foreword by the philosopher Mark Rosenthal stood at the front. Rosenthal said the approach was on the whole correct but added that it contained statements needing further discussion. Given that Ilyenkov had to leave the Moscow University lectern in 1955 under the charge of "Hegelianism", the sense of this careful sentence can be guessed. Ilyenkov too wrote in his closing words that the book develops one section of Rosenthal's Problems of Dialectics in Marx's Capital.
What do chapters 1 and 2 set out?
Chapter 1 is titled "The dialectical and the metaphysical understanding of the concrete". It opens with Marx's definition: the concrete is the unity of the diverse. In traditional logic this is odd, since binding the diverse into one is usually the work of abstraction. Ilyenkov answers that "unity" has another meaning. It is not the common feature of many things but their connection and interaction within one system.
He shows this difference with the concept of "man". Asking what man is seems absurdly easy: it seems enough to extract what people have in common. But before that one must already have decided whom to count as a person. The scale for choosing common features does not come out of the common features. His conclusion here, the discussion of man as the tool-making being, is introduced in the entry "Ascent from the abstract to the concrete".
Chapter 2, "The unity of the abstract and the concrete as a law of thought", goes on to examine the common advice to look at something from all sides. Ilyenkov distinguishes the eclectic attitude that lists many sides from the dialectical attitude that follows the object's internal relations. He also says that each determination of a theory must be both a condition of the others and a result of their interaction, as tool production is both a premise and a result of human life. Because of this reversal of condition into result, actual development takes the shape of a spiral.
Why read English economics through philosophy?
The most distinctive part of the book is the section of chapter 3 titled "The induction of Adam Smith and the deduction of David Ricardo. The standpoints of Locke and Spinoza in political economy". Ilyenkov says the logical collisions of economics cannot be understood apart from the philosophy of the day. John Locke, the classic philosopher of empiricism, was himself an early economic theorist, and through him economics took over a one-sidedly analytic, inductive method that "reduces" complex phenomena to their simple components.
But actual research diverged from that philosophy. Since economic reality was a complicated interweaving of bourgeois and feudal property, direct induction could describe only the results of forces and could not reach their internal connection. Smith's work remained a mixture of the internal connection alongside descriptions of surface phenomena. As Marx said, the two ways of understanding lived side by side in his book.
Ricardo sorted this out. As Marx said, Ricardo starts from the determination of value by labour time and asks whether all other categories fit it. Ilyenkov said this attitude resembles the method of Spinoza more than that of the empiricist Locke, because it grasps each economic form as a modification of one universal substance. On this point he judged Ricardo and Spinoza right against Smith and Locke. This reading of economic history as a collision of empiricism and rationalism is a good example of how the book reads the history of philosophy and of economics together.
Why say history appears even without writing history directly?
Chapter 4 asks about the relation of the development of theory to history. How can analysis of present-day capitalism, without researching historical facts one by one, tell us how it arose? Ilyenkov's answer is that the result of a development preserves its own history within itself in "sublated" form, that is, with its form changed. The answer is easy to grasp by comparison with the rings of a tree. The rings are the structure the tree has now, yet they hold the past years.
So logical development can be logical in form and historical in content. This is the attitude he called "concrete historicism", which he distinguished from an "abstract historicism" that only lists a chronology of events. The distinction became a ground for opposing readings that try to match the order of categories mechanically to the order of history.
Why is contradiction not an error to correct but the form in which science develops?
Chapter 5 is the book's conclusion. As its section titles indicate, he treats contradiction three times: as a condition of scientific development, as a problem of the labour theory of value, and as a principle of the development of theory. He drew the boundary between metaphysics and dialectics thus: metaphysics sees contradiction as a subjective phantom produced by the imperfection of thought, while dialectics sees it as the necessary logical form in which thought moves from ignorance to knowledge.
метафизика толкует противоречие как лишь субъективный фантом
The history of economics is the evidence. Ricardo fell into contradiction because he tried to derive everything from value. Why do capitals employing different amounts of labour earn the same rate of profit? Ricardo treated that collision as an "exception" to the rule. The formula of vulgar economics, interest for capital, rent for land, wages for labour, has no contradiction. But as Ilyenkov mocks, it is worth about as much as saying that horses eat oats and the Volga flows into the Caspian. Since the terms stand in no internal connection, there is nothing to collide. John McCulloch of the Ricardian school, to remove the contradiction, widened the definition of labour to cover any operation, whether by people, lower animals, machines or forces of nature. The contradiction vanished, and so did the concept of value.
Marx's solution was not to erase contradiction in words but to trace the real movement that produces it. Ilyenkov stressed that where Ricardo treated value as an abstraction common to the other categories, Marx set everything else aside and analysed simple commodity exchange as the concrete reality of value. His discussion later continued in the treatment of contradiction in "Dialectical logic".
How was it received, and from what does it differ?
The next year the book was translated into Italian on the basis of the uncut version, and in 1982 an English edition appeared from Progress Publishers in Moscow. Its later influence is summarised in the entry "Ascent from the abstract to the concrete".
There was another road that branched off at Moscow University from the same theme. Alexander Zinoviev wrote his 1954 candidate thesis "The method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete (on the material of Marx's Capital)", and his colleagues went on to the "Moscow Methodological Circle". Where Ilyenkov read dialectical logic out of Capital and revived Hegel, Zinoviev and his colleagues analysed the procedures of thought in Capital and sought to build a "content logic" that left behind both the existing language of dialectics and formal logic. Two roads from the same book formed two axes of Thaw-era Soviet philosophy.
Compared with "empiricism" the difference is also clear. For one who trusts induction, contradiction is a flaw to be fixed by facts; for Ilyenkov it is the form in which thought moves from ignorance to knowledge, and for that reason a guide to be followed to the end.