Falsificationism
반증주의
The position in the philosophy of science that scientific theories can never be proved by experience but can be refuted, and that only claims which could turn out false through observation, that is, which are falsifiable, are scientific. Karl Popper put it forward in The Logic of Research (1934) in place of logical positivism's verification principle as the criterion separating science from non-science. With it Popper charged that the Marxist theory of history had lost its scientific standing by reinterpreting theory and evidence to escape refutation, a charge that drew counter-arguments from Kuhn and Lakatos.
In depth
Do many white swans add up to proof?
"All swans are white." Europeans saw only white swans for centuries, so the statement seemed reliable. But seeing a million white swans does not guarantee that the next one will be white. Conversely, a single black swan makes the sentence false on the spot.
Karl Popper started from this asymmetry. General laws of the form "all X are Y" speak about infinitely many cases and so can never be verified by finitely many observations, but they can be refuted by a single contrary observation. Hume's point that induction, drawing a general law from a few observations, cannot be logically justified comes back to life here. Popper saw science not as piling up truths by induction but as a process of putting forward bold conjectures and striving to refute them.
This idea is falsificationism. Scientific theories cannot be proved; they are accepted provisionally only so far as they have survived attempts to refute them so far. And a claim that cannot possibly be refuted, one that can be said to fit whatever observation comes along, is not science.
How did Popper separate science from non-science?
Popper, a graduate of the University of Vienna, was a figure on the periphery of the Vienna Circle in regular contact with it, not a member, and was its critic from the start. In The Logic of Research of 1934 (in English in 1959 as The Logic of Scientific Discovery) he rejected the Circle's verification principle. What he sought was not a criterion for whether a sentence has meaning but a "criterion of demarcation" distinguishing empirical science from metaphysics, logic and mathematics. His answer was falsifiability: "An empirical-scientific system must be able to be shipwrecked on experience."
Ein empirisch-wissenschaftliches System muss an der Erfahrung scheitern können.
By this criterion a theory is the more scientific the more it forbids, the more clearly it says which observations would make it false. Nor did Popper call metaphysics meaningless: he granted that metaphysics untestable by experience, such as speculative atomism, had sometimes given rise to scientific discoveries. It was simply not science. Falsificationism is therefore not just the verification principle turned upside down. As German Wikipedia puts it, Popper asked not about the meaning of sentences but about the boundary of empirical science.
Popper called this position "critical rationalism". Knowledge does not grow by being secured through justification but by staying open to criticism and admitting it may be wrong. He applied the same attitude to society: politics should not be the realisation of a blueprint for a perfect society but step-by-step reform within institutions that allow mistakes to be corrected.
Why did Popper take aim at Marxism?
Popper's falsificationism was tied up with Marxism from the start. According to English Wikipedia, in 1919, at seventeen, he was drawn to Marxism, joined the Association of Socialist School Students, became a member of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria, and for a few months considered himself a communist. It is known that he worked as an office boy at the communist headquarters, but sources differ on whether he ever formally joined the Communist Party. When on 15 June that year the police shot at unarmed demonstrators in the Hörlgasse in Vienna, killing eight, he turned against the party's logic of accepting sacrifices for the revolution and abandoned Marx's historical materialism.
He later recalled this experience as the starting point of falsificationism. In a lecture collected in Conjectures and Refutations (1963) he said that Marx's theory had at first made testable predictions which were in fact falsified, but that instead of accepting the refutations the followers of Marx reinterpreted both the theory and the evidence to make them agree, rescuing the theory from refutation at the price of making it irrefutable. Popper concluded: "They thus gave a ‘conventionalist twist’ to the theory; and by this stratagem they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status."
They thus gave a ‘conventionalist twist’ to the theory; and by this stratagem they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status.
He also cited psychoanalysis, which he had met in his youth, especially Alfred Adler's theory, as an example of an unfalsifiable theory: whatever observation was presented, it could explain it, because it excluded nothing.
His attack in political philosophy came in two books. The Poverty of Historicism began as a paper read in 1936, was serialised in the journal Economica in 1944 and appeared as a book in 1957; its title plays on Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy. Popper called "historicism" the belief that the great course of history has laws allowing the future to be prophesied, and dedicated the book to the memory of the countless people of every creed, nation and race who fell victim to the fascist and communist belief in inexorable laws of historical destiny.
The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), written in exile in New Zealand, treated Plato, Hegel and Marx as thinkers of the closed society. With Hayek's help the book opened Popper's way to a post at the London School of Economics, and it became a classic of Cold War liberalism.
What objections came from the Marxist side and from within the philosophy of science?
Marxist epistemology too contains the idea of testing theory by experience: since the Theses on Feuerbach, its core has been that practice is the criterion of truth. But Lenin held that this criterion does not settle matters at a stroke: "Of course, we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in the very nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely."
Конечно, при этом не надо забывать, что критерий практики никогда не может по самой сути дела подтвердить или опровергнуть полностью какого бы то ни было человеческого представления.
For Lenin practice is a process that completes neither confirmation nor refutation while coming ever closer to objective truth. Popper did not recognise confirmation at all and held only refutation to be decisive. The difference leads to the question of what to do when a theory seems refuted. In the positivism dispute that began when Adorno faced Popper at the Tübingen meeting of the German Sociological Association in 1961, the Frankfurt School argued that Popper's criterion did not fit a social theory that asks about society as a whole.
The strongest criticism of falsificationism came from within the philosophy of science. In practice scientists do not readily abandon a theory when contrary evidence appears. Observation is not free of theory, and an experiment always tests a theory together with several auxiliary assumptions. When the motion of Uranus was found not to match the predictions of Newton's laws, astronomers rejected not Newton's laws but the assumption that there are seven planets in the solar system, and in 1846 Neptune was found where Le Verrier and Adams had predicted it. Is the same move a "conventionalist twist" when Marxists make it and a great discovery when Newtonian mechanics does? English Wikipedia sums up that Popper's dismissal of Marxism as unscientific because it was not abandoned despite the evidence was a methodological position rather than a logical criterion, and that Lakatos and others presented precisely this as a limitation of his criterion of demarcation.
Where did falsificationism lead?
In 1965 an International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science at Bedford College, London, chaired by Popper, held a special symposium on Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; its outcome was Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), edited by Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. In that debate Kuhn replied that normal science is not an attempt at refutation but puzzle-solving within a paradigm (paradigm (Kuhn)), and Lakatos proposed to amend falsificationism by appraising not a single theory but a whole research programme (scientific research programme). By that criterion too he judged Marxism a degenerating programme. Feyerabend, holding that no methodological rule could account for the whole history of science, discarded falsificationism along with the rest (epistemological anarchism).
Falsifiability is still widely cited today as a criterion separating science from pseudo-science. At the same time it has become common ground in the philosophy of science that this criterion alone cannot explain how real science chooses and defends its theories. Popper's verdict on Marxism remains a matter of dispute between these two facts.