4대 군사로선 (四大軍事路線) · 1962.12

Four military lines (DPRK)

4대 군사노선

The military policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward in December 1962 by the Fifth Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, together with the line of developing the economy and national defence in parallel. Its four points were arming the entire population, fortifying the entire country, turning the whole army into a cadre army and modernising the whole army. It answered the Cuban missile crisis, the May 1961 coup in South Korea and shrinking Soviet aid, and the Party Conference of October 1966 fixed it as the party line. It sharply raised the share of defence in the state budget and underlay the growing weight of the military and the armed raids on the South in the late 1960s.

In depth

The decision

The Fifth Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, held on 10-14 December 1962, took up the item "On further strengthening defence capabilities in connection with the prevailing situation" and resolved to strengthen national defence first, even at some cost to the growth of the national economy. At the same time the decision called for overhauling the heavy-industry plants while concentrating on agriculture and light industry. Kim Il Sung called this the policy of advancing economic construction and defence construction in parallel. The same plenum decided to set up a Military Commission under the Central Committee. Five days later Rodong Sinmun ran the headline "Let the whole people take up arms and turn the whole country into a fortress". An analyst of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency summed up the line as four major military policies: fortifying the entire country, arming the entire population, modernising the military and establishing ranks in the military (making every soldier a cadre).

Background

When the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles in the Cuban crisis of October 1962, Korea and China saw it as capitulation. In May 1961 Park Chung Hee had seized power in the South; trade with the Soviet Union stagnated from 1961 to 1966, and no new loans came from the socialist countries in 1961-1965. In February 1963 Kim Il Sung explained to People's Army officers that arming the whole people and fortifying the whole country were meant to deter the enemy from provocation, and to prepare for the day when the revolutionary forces in the South grew and asked for support. Pak Kum-chol, by contrast, told the Soviet ambassador in early 1963 that he did not expect the South to attempt an invasion.

Effects on the economy

The parallel line went together with lower economic targets. The December 1962 plenum cut the 1963 industrial growth target from 18 to 11 per cent. The Second Party Conference of October 1966 confirmed the parallel line as the party line; several Political Committee members responsible for the economy left the leadership there and Manchurian-guerrilla commanders moved in. Kim Seong-ju's analysis finds, however, that in the first three years after the line was announced investment actually rose in light industry, because the leadership had to placate popular discontent over living standards that had fallen with the economic failures. Defence spending jumped from 1966, when the escalation of the Vietnam War and worsening relations with China came together. At the Fifth Party Congress in 1970 First Vice-Premier Kim Il reported that defence, which had taken 19 per cent of state budget expenditure in 1960, took 31.3 per cent in 1967-1969. The Seven-Year Plan, which had missed its targets, was stretched to ten years in 1966.

A society on a war footing

At the Party Conference of October 1966 Kim Il Sung declared that unification could not be delayed by one hour and called the liberation of South Korea a national duty. From that year food rations were stockpiled and militia training was lengthened. In late 1967 the East German ambassador in Pyongyang reported that people were not allowed to travel more than two kilometres from their homes and that rumours spoke of evacuating a third of Pyongyang's population in case of war. Soldiers made up only a single-digit share of the presidium at party meetings in 1962-1965, but 30 to 40 per cent in 1968-1970.

The army and politics

Defence Minister Kim Chang-bong and Chief of the General Staff Choe Kwang, appointed in October 1962, drove the four military lines until their purge in 1969. Kim Chang-bong enjoyed enough autonomy in commanding the army to issue "orders of the Minister of National Defence" on the army's anniversaries. An armed army and a larger budget underlay the military adventurism of the late 1960s: the clashes in the Demilitarized Zone, the Blue House raid and the seizure of the Pueblo. After the military purge of 1969, political commissars were introduced down to regimental level and the party's control of the army tightened. Article 14 of the 1972 Socialist Constitution states that the state relies on an all-people, nationwide defence system and carries through the line of self-reliant defence. The line of building the economy and nuclear forces in parallel that Kim Jong Un announced in 2013 revived the parallel line of 1962.

Related people

Related historical events

Sources

  1. nk.ac.kr
  2. wilsoncenter.org
  3. nk.ac.kr
  4. wilsoncenter.org
  5. wilsoncenter.org
  6. ko.wikisource.org
  7. Wikipedia (EN)