East German cybernetics debate
동독의 사이버네틱스 논쟁
The East German dispute in which cybernetics, rejected in the early 1950s as "American pseudoscience", was brought in by the philosopher Georg Klaus reinterpreted as a confirmation of dialectical materialism, gained official backing in the 1960s with Ulbricht's economic reform, and was pushed out again in 1969–71 as the Honecker years began. At stake was what control, feedback and information meant for the Marxist concept of matter and for the leading role of the party.
In depth
What question was the dispute about?
Think of the thermostat in a refrigerator. When the temperature rises the cooler runs; when it falls the cooler stops. This loop, in which a result is measured and fed back to its cause, is called feedback. Norbert Wiener's cybernetics set out to explain machines, animals and social organizations alike through such loops of control and information.
When the theory reached socialist countries it raised questions. Wiener had written: "Information is information, neither matter nor energy."
Information is information, neither matter nor energy.
How should a materialism for which everything in the world is matter take that? If a national economy can be seen as a self-regulating system, why is a party issuing instructions from above needed? Can a machine imitate human thought? The East German cybernetics debate held these questions within it. It is also a story of who decides when a science is permitted.
The framework here rests largely on the study by the researcher Jérôme Segal. He divides the East German reception into three periods: "infection" by a bourgeois science (1948–1961), official recognition as a scientific confirmation of dialectical materialism (1961–1963), and then degeneration and normalization (1963–1971).
Why was it rejected at first?
The first trace of cybernetics in East Germany is the 1952 translation of a Soviet article, "Cybernetics: a new 'science' of the obscurants". The initial rejection simply followed the Soviet model; the debate inside the Soviet Union is not treated here. Segal sorts the reasons into three. First, it came from the United States in the Cold War and recalled Taylorism. Second, philosophically, its idealist interpretation, its reliance on analogy and its equal treatment of machines and living beings seemed incompatible with dialectical materialism. Third, in economics its self-regulation could justify capitalism through supply and demand, and in biology it collided with Pavlov's reflex theory, which had no place for feedback.
The signal for a change came from the Soviet Union. Ernst Kolman's lecture "What is cybernetics?", given at the Soviet party's Academy of Social Sciences on 19 November 1954, amounted to a green light, and it appeared in East Germany a few months later.
How did Georg Klaus persuade them?
The man who published the lecture in the East German journal Forum was the philosopher Georg Klaus. He had been studying mathematics when the Nazis arrested him and held him in Dachau, where, Segal writes, he kept his wits through blindfold chess, and his interest in logic seems to stem from this. He was one of the few leading professors who had never been in the Soviet Union and knew no Russian, and he read Western literature in English and French. His logic lectures were already introducing Wiener, "the American peace campaigner", as the founder of cybernetics.
In 1957 Klaus gave a lecture and published the book Electronic Brain against Human Brain? He opposed both those who vulgarized cybernetics into mechanical materialism and those who rejected it in the name of dialectical materialism. In a 1958 article in the party journal Einheit he pursued what Segal calls a real strategy to persuade the "comrades". Only after seven pages on Marx and the Soviet Union did he bring up the word cybernetics; he compared the speeds of the American ENIAC, BESK in Stockholm and BESM in Moscow, and said there would have been no Sputnik without computing machines.
His 1961 book Cybernetics from a Philosophical Perspective went a step further. Cybernetics was not just compatible with dialectical materialism but confirmed it. The control loop corresponds to dialectical unity, feedback to the dialectical relation of cause and effect. It even came to be said that "bourgeois" cyberneticists had developed dialectical materialism without knowing it. Still, philosophy kept its place: cybernetics serves philosophy and cannot replace it.
There was a more sensitive point too. Klaus reinterpreted democratic centralism cybernetically and viewed the party as a learning system. Segal reads this as implicitly raising doubt about the party's leading role.
Who resisted, and why was it accepted?
Those who resisted were not only dogmatists. In the Academy the physicist Rompe and the biologist Rapoport spoke against it; Segal explains that they feared the blurring of disciplinary boundaries and did not want to be drawn into philosophical quarrels. The philosopher Hermann Ley, as Klaus's opponent, stayed against it to the end. There was criticism from the other side as well. The young Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski sent the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie a review criticizing Klaus's book as dogmatic, and it was not published.
Victory did not come from philosophical argument alone. In February 1961 a Commission for Cybernetics led by Klaus was set up at the Academy, and in April Einheit gathered more than 30 scholars for a consultation. At the 22nd Soviet party congress that year Khrushchev mentioned cybernetics, and a month later the 14th plenum of the Socialist Unity Party's Central Committee took it up. In 1962 a cybernetics section was founded at the Academy and specialist conferences followed one after another.
At the Sixth Party Congress in January 1963 Ulbricht declared that cybernetics was to be particularly promoted. Soon after, Günter Mittag and Erich Apel presented the East German New Economic System. The reform had industrial prices calculated from production costs and planned profit rates, and drew on regulatory theories linked to cybernetics. Around 1964 Ulbricht's goal was "self-regulation".
Why was it pushed out again?
Enthusiasm bred exaggeration. In 1965 Klaus and a co-author invoked Shannon's sampling theorem to write that the head of an industrial association must first know the frequencies of the signal function he is dealing with. At the Seventh Congress in 1967 Ulbricht said that if cybernetics helps, the party would kneel down in this new science until it mastered it completely. But according to the witnesses Segal interviewed, cybernetics was never really taught, and factory managers were in no position to apply it.
After the Prague Spring of 1968 the air changed. Klaus's Game Theory from a Philosophical Perspective was criticized for bringing in "enemies of the proletarian class" such as von Neumann and Morgenstern. On 30 April 1969, in Neues Deutschland, the party's chief ideologist Kurt Hager directly attacked Klaus's student Heinz Liebscher. Segal judges that the possible questioning of the party's leading role was what most alarmed the Central Committee.
At the Eighth Congress of 1971, which brought Honecker to power, he declared, as Segal reports, that it had now finally been proved that cybernetics and systems research were pseudosciences. This sentence was checked only through the English translation of Segal; no German original was found, so it is not asserted as his exact words. The study programme in economic cybernetics was also abolished for ideological reasons in the mid-1970s. Yet the ending was not clean. In 1973 Klaus published Cybernetics: A New Universal Philosophy of Society? and kept writing, placing the work in a series on "Critique of Bourgeois Ideology". Conferences on cybernetics in economics continued until 1985.
How is it judged?
Judgements fall broadly in two. One side sees the dispute as science fighting dogma, and most East German witnesses say so. Segal offers a caution here: those who survived Honecker's rejection all portray themselves as victims of it. The other assessment questions Klaus's work itself. To bring in this science he translated it into the language of dialectical materialism, and in the eyes of critics that translation was one more dogma. That was Fuchs-Kittowski's criticism, and Segal too notes that once Klaus's cybernetics had grown powerful it became an authority barring criticism.
Philosophically, the dispute connects with the question of reflection theory. If information is neither matter nor energy, how must the statement that consciousness reflects matter be read again? Klaus's answer was to see information as a special relation linking matter and consciousness. The East German experience shows that a science carries both use and danger for political power, whether power embraces it or pushes it away.