East German logic debate
동독의 논리학 논쟁
The dispute in East German philosophy, beginning with the Jena conference of 1951, over the place of formal and mathematical logic. The issue was how dialectics, which holds that reality moves through contradiction, can stand beside logic, which forbids contradiction. Georg Klaus tried to bring mathematical logic into Marxist philosophy, and non-communist philosophers and defenders of traditional logic opposed him for different reasons.
In depth
What question was the dispute about?
If a friend says "it is raining today and it is not raining," we feel something has gone wrong. To say of one thing both that it is so and that it is not leaves neither statement worth believing. Logic is that feeling refined into rules. At its root lies the rule that two contradictory statements cannot both be true, the law of non-contradiction. Before anything can be reasoned out of a story, that rule has to stand.
Yet Marxist philosophy says something else as well. Society and nature move through the clash of opposed forces, and it calls that clash contradiction. Hegel had said that dialectical thinking must include contradiction. So is contradiction forbidden, or is it what drives the world? If both, what is the one word "contradiction" doing? The East German logic debate was fought around this question.
A practical question lay on top of it. In the early twentieth century mathematicians such as Hilbert had developed mathematical logic, which handles inference by calculation with symbols. Was that bourgeois science, or a tool anyone must use? In 1951 East Germany set up philosophy as an independent degree at three universities, one of them Jena. What to teach as logic in the new departments was an immediate question.
Who said what at the Jena conference of 1951?
A philosophical conference on questions of logic met at Jena on 17 and 18 November 1951. Its subject was the relation of dialectical materialism to mathematical logic, and the proceedings appeared in 1953 as the first supplement of the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie. Surprisingly, the occasion was officially devoted to evaluating Stalin's "Marxism and Problems of Linguistics". Even so, one study remarks with astonishment, nothing was heard there of the Soviet condemnation of Hegel current at the time.
Georg Klaus asked whether Hegel had not underrated formal-logical thinking, and took the view that logic is itself dialectical. The mathematical logician Karl Schröter set out Hilbert's programme for mathematics and defended modern mathematical logic as an activity essentially free of ideology, to be kept apart from any logician's worldview. His reply touched the heart of the matter. In logic and mathematics, "contradiction" refers to statements in language, not to facts outside language. So for processes and tendencies in reality it would be better to speak not of contradiction (Widerspruch) but of conflict (Widerstreit).
Put simply, Schröter proposed splitting the word in two. That the interests of workers and capitalists collide is a conflict in reality; "it is raining and it is not raining" is a contradiction among statements. Divided this way, the two rules no longer fight each other. The price is that the weight dialectics had placed on the word "contradiction" shrinks.
Ernst Bloch sketched how dialectics deals in its own way with the law of non-contradiction, and asked Klaus sceptically whether finding dialectics in symbolic logical thinking was really so simple. The non-communist Greifswald ontologist Günther Jacoby suggested treating the problem of contradiction through a logic of modalities, that is, of "possible" and "necessary". Klaus Zweiling, a physicist by training who had studied under Max Born, drew on Hegel's idea that logic rests on the human work of abstraction, and argued that the law of non-contradiction has spheres of validity and holds without limit only among relations between abstract quantities.
On the second day Bloch gave a lecture honouring the 120th anniversary of Hegel's death. Kurt Hager, who gave the closing speech, thanked him for it and then announced a plan to found a specialist philosophy journal in East Germany. That journal became the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.
What happened in the Jena lecture rooms?
The dispute went on outside the conference hall. At Jena the neo-Kantian Johannsen, the phenomenologist Paul Linke and the communist Klaus took turns teaching logic. According to Metzler, a witness there at the time, their accounts agreed where traditional logic was concerned and otherwise diverged, and a few students deliberately took Linke's lectures as well. Klaus told his students that "mathematical logic is the crowning of logic in the twentieth century."
„Die mathematische Logik ist die Krönung der
Linke openly criticized reflection theory, a pillar of Leninist epistemology, in his lectures. In the stenographic record of a March 1954 lecture that Metzler reports, he argued that to call something a copy of an original one must already know the original, and how we get to the original is exactly the problem. Moreover, any attempt to define a copy leads back to a copy, which is a circle. To tell whether a photograph resembles me you need to know my face, but in the case of the world, is the "photograph" not all we have?
From the party's point of view this was not merely academic. In a conversation with the Soviet philosopher Konstantinov, Klaus said that two chairs in East Germany were still occupied by "opponents", both at Jena, and named Johannsen and Linke. But the man saying this was also the defender of mathematical logic. Klaus was working to remove bourgeois philosophers and at the same time to protect mathematical logic from his fellow Marxists.
Why did the Marxists fight among themselves?
The opposition was not only non-communist. Around 1956 the Leipzig lecturer Johannes Horn and others, who filled in teaching logic at Jena, stayed with traditional logic, and Klaus disapproved. An anecdote told by Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski shows it. Klaus greeted him, come from Leipzig, with: "Ah, you come from Leipzig. Some people there are still fighting against mathematical logic."
Ach, Du kommst aus Leipzig – dort kämpfen ja einige immer noch gegen die
Jacoby rejected mathematical logic from another direction. Logic is a purely philosophical discipline, and what he called "logistics" belongs to mathematics and has no claim to the name of logic. In 1955 he sent the state a memorandum criticizing the ideologization of university philosophy in East Germany and received only reprimands; he summed up his position in a 1962 book, The Claims of the Logisticians on Logic and Its Historiography. The communist Klaus and Jacoby, who came from the nationalist right, both fought over mathematical logic, but the fight to remove the remnants of bourgeois philosophy and the fight to settle the place of mathematical logic overlapped without coinciding.
Klaus was not free of trouble from his comrades either. In the two-semester logic course he gave at Humboldt University from 1954 he sharply attacked philosophical misjudgements of mathematical logic, and his severe assessment of the work of the Hungarian Marxist Béla Fogarasi earned him no little reproof in East Germany.
Where did it lead?
Klaus's lectures became Introduction to Formal Logic (1958) and Modern Logic (1964), which went through many editions. In 1957/58 at Jena, Metzler himself extended the mostly traditional lecture material along the lines of Klaus's plan. Metzler writes that students at the time saw Klaus's achievement in establishing the place of logic the same way he does. This interest in logic soon carried Klaus into the East German cybernetics debate. In the logic lectures Metzler remembers, Norbert Wiener and cybernetics were already being mentioned.
The philosophical question did not end. Should dialectical logic count as a higher logic above formal logic, or as a different thing doing a different job? Should contradiction be called a law of reality, or a metaphor? These questions returned within East German philosophy. Peter Ruben wrote his higher doctoral thesis on contradiction and the dialectics of nature. From 1980 to 1986 the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie alone published 24 articles on the problem of contradiction.