Ilyenkov-Lifshitz debate on the ideal
일리옌코프와 리프시츠의 이상 논쟁
A debate in which the aesthetician Mikhail Lifshitz answered the Soviet philosopher Evald Ilyenkov, who explained "the ideal" as a form left on things by people's social activity, by arguing that the ideal exists objectively throughout nature, society and individual life. It unfolded in a text Lifshitz was writing in 1980, after Ilyenkov's death in 1979; the text stayed unfinished, a part appeared in Voprosy filosofii in 1984 and an expanded version as a book in 2003. Though one side could no longer reply, it continues today as a discussion of where consciousness and the ideal are to be explained from.
In depth
Where did the shape of the jar come from?
Suppose a potter makes a jar out of clay. Where did its shape come from? It was not stored in the clay beforehand, nor was it written into the potter's muscles and bones, so one can answer that it came from people's long accumulated activity of making. Yet making the same shape out of stone is much harder. So was there not something in the clay that suited the shape? This small difference divides one of the great debates of Soviet philosophy.
The word at issue is "the ideal" (Russian идеальное). Two senses overlap in it. One is "having the character of an idea", as distinct from matter; the other, as in everyday speech, is "the best, the perfect". Ilyenkov pursued the first sense and explained the ideal as a relation in which one body represents something else. Lifshitz revived the second sense, close to the Latin perfectum, "the completed", as a philosophical category. The word "ideal" in this entry's headword covers both senses.
The two were close. Lifshitz wrote that Ilyenkov was the most talented of the postwar generation of philosophers and the one closest to him. Both opposed reducing consciousness to the physiology of the brain, and they agreed in understanding the universal in the manner of Hegel and Marx. According to Andrey Muravyov's study, Lifshitz developed his philosophy from the late 1940s in friendly dialogue with Ilyenkov. So this debate was not a battle between hostile camps but a basic difference breaking out among people on the same side.
Why did Ilyenkov say that there is no ideal in nature?
Ilyenkov's position is set out in the entry "The ideal (Ilyenkov)". In brief: the meaning of a word or the value of a commodity is not in an individual's brain. It exists objectively in the activity people carry on together and in the things and signs that activity produces. Just as a banknote represents the value of all commodities, the ideal arises when one body, while remaining itself, represents the essence of something quite different.
So where there is no human activity, there is no relation of representing either. Ilyenkov wrote: "In nature itself, including the nature of man as a biological being, there is no ideal."
В природе самой по себе, в том числе природе человека, как биологического существа, идеального нет
The jar and the marble statue are his examples. The shape of the jar is not in the clay or in the potter's anatomy from the start but appears in the potter's activity, and the shape of the statue is not in the marble from the start either. His calculation was that only by saying this could one block both the road that reduces the ideal to a product of the brain and the road that floats it off into a mysterious world of spirit. Emil Islamov sums up the starting point of this position as two thoughts: that the ideal exists objectively outside the individual's consciousness, and that it is a process in which one body represents the universal form of another.
What did Lifshitz object to?
Lifshitz's objections can be set out under five heads.
First, he said that Ilyenkov's account contains two thoughts that do not fit together. One is that the ideal does not belong only to the human head and exists objectively; the other is that it exists not as individual consciousness but as the collective consciousness of society, embodied in the products of labour and culture. For Lifshitz, from the standpoint of philosophy's basic question, the relation of consciousness to being, it makes no difference whether the consciousness is an individual's or a society's. Moving to social consciousness does not take you out of consciousness.
Second, how does labour obtain what is not in nature? Nature is the basis of the whole world, and he asked how what is not there could come out of human work. The shape of the jar is not alien to the clay. It is harder to get the same shape from stone. A block of marble also goes some way to determining the shape of the statue. To each block, he answered, its own statue.
Third, he distrusted the concept of "activity". He wrote that Ilyenkov in his last years had drawn close to the psychologists, whose concept of activity plays the role that the pineal gland played for Descartes as the meeting point of mind and matter. Activity is either material or mental, he held, and not something in between. The remark was made when the "activity theory" of Alexei Leontiev and others was a major current in Soviet psychology.
Fourth, he challenged the reading of Marx. As O. N. Pobedinskaya summarises him, Lifshitz held that Marx distinguished the two words ideell and ideal, and that the Russian translation and Ilyenkov collapsed them into one. The ideell is the alienated product of the external development of a social form; the ideal is what is better, what accords with the true essence of reality. The value form of money, which Ilyenkov took as his model case, belongs to the former; the work of art belongs to the latter. To take money as the model of the ideal would mean being unable to tell high values from fetishes.
Fifth, he said that Ilyenkov's use of Spinoza's thought that nature thinks through man was too abstract. Nature thinks itself only as a whole; a chair does not think itself, it is only thought by a person.
The position that results is the opposite one: "The ideal is in everything. It is in material being and in consciousness, it is in society and in nature, or else it is nowhere."
Идеальное есть во всем, оно есть и в материальном бытии и в сознании, оно есть и в обществе и в природе, или же его нет нигде
For Lifshitz the ideal is the degree to which a thing accords with its own essence: self-correspondence. Lev Naumenko drew the difference this way: Lifshitz's ideal is a natural determination of the thing itself, Ilyenkov's a functional determination of representing something else. The examples found in nature are the ideal gas and the crystal close to ideal form. As his warrant he took a note Lenin left while reading Hegel's Logic, that the difference between the ideal and the material is not unconditional either. And he reversed the places of idealism and materialism. It is idealism, he argued, that reduces matter to a heap of scattered particles and so denies matter's ideal possibilities. Hence his conclusion that today only materialism can defend the ideal life of the spirit and universal truth.
Why does this debate survive only in one side's text?
Ilyenkov died in March 1979, and his essay "The Problem of the Ideal" appeared in Voprosy filosofii that year. In the following year, 1980, Lifshitz began a long, purely philosophical text, "Dialogue with Ilyenkov". He did not finish it and died in September 1983. A part appeared posthumously as "On the Ideal and the Real" in Voprosy filosofii 1984 no. 10 (pp. 120–145), and an expanded version assembled from fragments left in his folders came out in 2003 as Dialogue with Evald Ilyenkov: The Problem of the Ideal.
So the two parties never exchanged views over this text, which is why Islamov calls it a dialogue in absentia. Ilyenkov's position stopped with his death without being fully stated, and Lifshitz's text is unfinished. From Lifshitz's side the idea had deep roots. He had written something similar as early as his 1927 theses "Dialectics in the History of Art", which argued for the existence of absolute truth.
Who judged it, and how?
When the text was made public, sharp discussion began among Soviet philosophers and then among those of Russia and the former Soviet area. Andrey Maidansky and Vesa Oittinen wrote that the posthumous manuscript triggered a lively debate that continues to this day.
Criticism from Ilyenkov's side generally takes three forms. Naumenko pointed out that self-correspondence, read narrowly, soon collapses. For racing the ideal horse is the racehorse, for a nomad Przewalski's horse; the short-trunked elephant was ideal for an ancient environment, the long-trunked one for today's. So the judgement depends on conditions and not on the thing itself. And if perfection means equilibrium, it comes close to the logic of death. He added, however, that if the ideal is read broadly as the degree to which the finite accords with the infinite whole of nature, the two men's logic overlaps, since the schemes of activity Ilyenkov spoke of also belong to nature in the end. Second, Elena Mareeva judged Lifshitz's philosophy a version of the Soviet dialectical materialism that derived consciousness directly from the foundation of matter and not from social life. Third, he is criticised for raising the commonplace notion of the ideal as "the best" to a philosophical category, and for letting mysticism enter his treatment of facts.
There are opposing judgements too. Muravyov sees the dialogue as continuing the early nineteenth-century constellation in which Fichte took the subjectivity of the I as his basis and Schelling did not agree. Pobedinskaya notes the differences but judges the two to have been comrades who jointly defended the reality of the ideal. Islamov sees the two positions as interlocking and looks between them for a sociality not yet spoken. Which side is right remains undecided.
How does it differ from other theories of knowledge?
Set beside other answers, the debate gets a clear outline. Where is the ideal? David Dubrovsky looked for the answer in the relation between the subjective reality an individual directly experiences and the brain that realises it. Ilyenkov looked in people's social activity and its products. Lifshitz looked in being itself, and held that human consciousness reflects and completes it. He called this last idea "ontognoseology (Lifshitz)".
The relation to Lenin's "theory of reflection" also divides them. Ilyenkov explained consciousness by putting activity first. Lifshitz saw the current that put activity first as itself in danger of subjectivism, and pushed reflection through to the end. Within the same Marxism, the first road led to activity theory and education, the second to classical aesthetics and to critiques of modernism such as "The Crisis of Ugliness".