partial reform trap / institutional contradiction of transition
전환기 제도의 모순 (부분 개혁 함정)
A phenomenon in the transition from planned to market economy where partial reforms generate institutional contradictions that stall further transition. Early reform winners block further advances to preserve the rents arising from market distortions, locking the economy into a 'partial reform equilibrium' characterized by private ownership without competitive markets. Classic cases include Gorbachev-era cooperatives diverting subsidized state inputs and thereby reducing total output, and postcommunist privatization beneficiaries blocking complementary institutional reforms.
Related historical events
Sources
- Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny (1992), "The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform," Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3): 889-906 — foundational model showing partial liberalization diverts subsidized inputs from state to private firms, potentially reducing total output.
- Hellman, Joel S. (1998), "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," World Politics 50(2): 203-234 — defines 'partial reform equilibrium' where early winners block further reforms that would eliminate their rent-generating distortions.
- Havrylyshyn & Odling-Smee (2000), "Political Economy of Stalled Reforms," Finance & Development (IMF), September 2000 — documents vested interests pushing for partial transition frozen between plan and competitive market.
- Pei, Minxin (2006), "China Is Stagnating in Its 'Trapped Transition,'" Carnegie Endowment / Financial Times — applies the partial reform trap framework to China's hybrid system where half-finished reforms allow elites to perpetuate privileges.