Directive by the Supreme Commander to U.S.S.T.A.F. and Bomber Command for support of ‘Overlord’ during the preparatory period (17 April 1944)

17th April 1944.

OVERALL MISSION

1. The overall mission of the strategical Air Forces remains the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the destruction of vital elements of lines of communication. In the execution of this overall mission the immediate objective is first the destruction of German air combat strength, by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber offensive. Our re-entry on the Continent constitutes the supreme operation for 1944; all possible support must, therefore, be afforded to the Allied Armies by our Air Forces to assist them in establishing themselves in the lodgment area.

PARTICULAR MISSION

2. The first pre-requisite of success in the maintenance of the combined Bomber offensive and of our re-entry on the Continent is an overall reduction of the enemy’s air combat strength and particularly his air fighter strength. The primary role of our Air Forces in the European and Mediterranean theatres is, therefore, to secure and maintain air superiority.

3. Our armies will also require the maximum possible assistance on the ground preparatory to the actual assault. This can best be given by interfering with rail communications, particularly as affecting the enemy movements and concentrations in the ‘OVERLORD’ area. A further Directive covering the employment of the strategical air forces during the assault period and the succeeding land operations will be issued in due course.

4. The particular mission of the strategical air forces prior to the ‘OVERLORD’ assault is:

(a) To deplete the German air force and particularly the German fighter forces, and to destroy and disorganise the facilities supporting them.

(b) To destroy and disrupt the enemy’s rail communications, particularly those affecting the enemy’s movement towards the ‘OVERLORD’ lodgment area.

U.S.S.T.A.F.

5. Under this particular mission objectives allotted to the U.S.S.T.A.F. are as follows, in present order of priority:

(i) Primary objective: The German Air Force with primary importance upon German fighter forces by all means available, including attrition in the air and on the ground, and attacks against the following precision targets and industrial areas and facilities supporting them:

Equal first priority:

(a) German single engine fighter airframe and airframe component production. German twin engine fighter airframe and airframe component production. Axis-controlled ball bearing production.

Second priority:

(b) Installations supporting German fighter air forces.

Third priority:

(c) German bomber air forces and installations supporting them.

(ii) Secondary objective: The enemy rail transportation system.

6. The list of targets best calculated to achieve the primary objective will be passed to the Supreme Commander by the Air Ministry. The list of targets chosen to achieve the secondary objective and the relative priorities accorded them at present will be issued separately. These priorities will be adjusted from time to time in accordance with the situation.

7. Whenever weather or tactical conditions are unsuitable for visual attack of the primary objectives, attacks will be delivered by blind bombing technique on BERLIN or other important industrial areas. Targets will be selected so as to further the aims of attrition of the German fighter force, and the dislocation of the enemy’s transportation system.

R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND

8. In view of the tactical difficulties of destroying precise targets by night, R.A.F. Bomber Command will continue to be employed in accordance with their main aim of disorganising German industry. Their operations will, however, be designed as far as practicable to be complementary to the operations of the U.S.S.T.A.F. In particular, where tactical conditions allow, their targets will be selected so as to give the maximum assistance in the aims of reducing the strength of the German Air Force, and destroying and disrupting enemy rail communications. A list of targets chosen to achieve these objectives, and showing the relative priorities accorded them at present, will be issued separately. These priorities will be adjusted from time to time in accordance with the situation.

TARGETS IN S.E. EUROPE

9. The order of priority of objectives for the employment of the strategic air forces operating in the MEDITERRANEAN and South East EUROPE is as follows:

(i) Emergency requirements of the Battle of ITALY.

(ii) The objectives set out in para. 5 above.

(iii) Targets in the BALKANS of great political and military importance.

10. In order to take advantage of favourable opportunities to attack targets of great political and military importance in S.E. EUROPE, the order of bombing priority given in para. 9 above may be altered when the situation warrants, and when results of the highest importance may be expected therefrom. The Commanding General, U.S.S.T.A.F. will be kept informed of changes in the political and military importance of these objectives as affecting the priority of bombing tasks generally, and will be given timely warning of attacks against such targets in order to enable proper coordination between 15th Air Force and 8th Air Force operations.

OTHER OBJECTIVES

11. Other objectives of great or fleeting importance may present themselves and orders will be issued accordingly. Where possible, the necessary plans and preparations for these have been made. An example of this is the attack of important units of the German Fleet in harbour or at sea.

‘CROSSBOW’

12. The responsibility for neutralising threats from ‘CROSSBOW’ is laid on the Air Commander-in-Chief, A.E.A.F. Where necessary, he may call for assistance from the strategical air forces in the UNITED KINGDOM through the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, who will issue the necessary instructions.

S.O.E. OPERATIONS

13. All S.O.E. Operations undertaken by units of Bomber Command and U.S.S.T.A.F. will be in accordance with the requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander, and orders will be issued accordingly from time to time.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TRANSPORTATION PLAN

14. The political aspects of this plan, as affecting the French, will be kept under continuous supervision, with especial reference to the casualties to the civilian populations involved.

REVISION OF DIRECTIVE

15. This Directive will be subject to review after ‘OVERLORD’ is established on the Continent.

By Command of General Eisenhower.

(Sgd.) W. B. SMITH, Lieutenant General, GSC, Chief of Staff.

SHAEF Message Form — Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, SCAF 48 (8 June 1944)

SHAEF MESSAGE FORM. TOP SECRET.

FROM: SHAEF CP, Supreme Commander. DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN: 8 June 1944.

TO FOR ACTION: AGWAR. TO FOR INFORMATION: SHAEF.

REF NO.: SCAF-48.

ACCOMPANIED BY ADMIRAL RAMSAY I MADE YESTERDAY A COMPLETE TOUR BY DESTROYER OF THE LANDING AREAS BEGINNING ON THE RIGHT PD PAREN TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF FROM EISENHOWER CITE SHSAC PD THIS IS SCAF NUMBER FORTY EIGHT PD UNPAREN THE LANDINGS ON THE COTENTIN PENINSULA APPARENTLY WENT ABOUT AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED WITH THE ONE HUNDRED FIRST AIRBORNE DIVISION CARRYING OUT ITS MISSIONS IN GOOD STYLE PD INFORMATION OF THE EIGHTY SECOND AIRBORNE IS MEAGRE BUT GENERAL BRADLEY INFORMED ME THAT THE SEVENTH CORPS HAD MADE CONTACT WITH IT PD ON BEACH O REPEAT OBOE ATTACKED BY THE FIFTH CORPS OPPOSITION WAS UNEXPECTEDLY HEAVY DUE TO THE PRESENCE ON THE BEACHES OF A FULL GERMAN DIVISION WHICH WAS ON MANEUVERS PD LOSSES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE IN THIS FORCE AND LANDINGS HAVE BEEN MOST DIFFICULT DUE TO THE COVERAGE OF BEACHES BY HOSTILE ARTILLERY PD MOREOVER A LARGE PORTION OF DD TANKS FOUNDERED ON THEIR WAY TO THE BEACHES PD DUE TO THE ROUGH WEATHER DECISION WAS MADE ON THE OTHER BEACHES NOT REPEAT NOT TO ATTEMPT TO SWIM IN THE DD TANKS PD THESE WERE UNLOADED DIRECTLY ON THE BEACHES FROM THE LCT’S CARRYING THEM PD AT NOON ON JUNE SEVENTH GENERAL BRADLEY FELT THAT CONDITIONS WERE IMPROVING ON O BEACH AND STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO REPLACE ARTILLERY WHICH WAS LOST IN LANDING DUE TO HOSTILE ARTILLERY FIRE AND SINKING OF LANDING CRAFT PD BECAUSE OF THE CONFIGURATION OF THE GROUND IN THIS PARTICULAR AREA SPOTTING FOR NAVAL GUNFIRE WAS RATHER DIFFICULT AND SINCE TROUBLE CAME FROM FIELD WORKS RATHER THAN FROM FIXED BATTERIES CMA BOTH AIR BOMBARDMENT AND NAVAL GUNFIRE WERE RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE IN ASSISTING THE LANDING PD

PARAGRAPH ON THE WHOLE U S REPEAT UNCLE SUGAR ARMY FRONT THE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL PLAN HAS BEEN ALTERED WITH THE PURPOSE NOW OF BOTH CORPS MAKING AN EARLY DRIVE TOWARD CARENTAN TO JOIN UP CMA AFTER WHICH THE ORIGINAL CONCEPTIONS WILL BE PURSUED PD

PARAGRAPH ON THE FRONT OF THE FIFTIETH BRITISH DIVISION PROGRESS WAS VERY GOOD ALTHOUGH CMA AS AT EVERYWHERE ELSE CMA UNLOADING WAS INTERFERED WITH BY THE ROUGH WEATHER PD LIKEWISE ON THE FRONTS OF THE THIRD BRITISH AND THIRD CANADIAN DIVISIONS PROGRESS WAS GENERALLY SATISFACTORY ALTHOUGH ROUGH WEATHER HAD FINALLY COMPELLED THE NAVAL FORCE COMMANDER TO DIRECT THE DRYING OUT OF LST’S BECAUSE RHINO FERRIES COULD NOT WORK PD ON THIS PARTICULAR FRONT THE BEACHES WERE FLAT AND HARD AND IT WAS BELIEVED THAT NO DAMAGE WOULD RESULT TO THE LST’S PD

PARAGRAPH THROUGHOUT THE FRONT WE LOST CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS OF THE SMALLER LANDING CRAFT CMA BOTH BECAUSE OF ROUGH WEATHER AND MINES IN THE TOUCHDOWN AREAS PD THESE WERE TELLER MINES WHICH BLEW SIZEABLE HOLES IN THE LANDING CRAFT BUT LARGE NUMBERS OF WHICH CAN BE REPAIRED AS SOON AS MAINTENANCE GROUPS CAN BE PLACED ASHORE AND START TO WORK PD THE LOSS OF THESE CRAFT CMA ADDED TO THE ROUGH WEATHER SLOWED UP THE LANDING OF ALL SUPPLIES AND AT NOON ON D PLUS ONE WE WERE APPROXIMATELY TWENTY FOUR HOURS BEHIND OUR EXPECTED SCHEDULE OF UNLOADING PD THE WEATHER IMPROVED MARKEDLY AT NOON ON D PLUS ONE PD IF THIS GOOD WEATHER STRETCH CAN BE PROLONGED FOR A FEW DAYS WE WILL DO MUCH TOWARD CATCHING UP PD

PARAGRAPH DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY I TALKED WITH GENERAL MONTGOMERY AND GENERAL BRADLEY AND WITH ADMIRALS KIRK CMA VIAN CMA DOUGLAS-PENNANT AND OLIVER PD ALL WERE DISAPPOINTED IN THE UNFAVORABLE LANDING CONDITIONS AND ALL FELT THAT IMPROVEMENT OF THE WEATHER WOULD SEE A CORRESPONDING GREAT IMPROVEMENT IN OUR POSITION PD

PARAGRAPH UPON RETURN OF ADMIRAL RAMSAY AND MYSELF TO ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS ABOUT TEN P M WE LEARNED THAT WE HAD APPARENTLY CAPTURED BAYEUX PD

PARAGRAPH EARLY THIS MORNING I AM INFORMED THAT A GERMAN COUNTER ATTACK BY PARTS OF TWO PANZER DIVISIONS IS PUSHING IN ON THE RIGHT OF THE BRITISH SECTOR AND HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS PD HOWEVER CMA YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WHILE I WAS PRESENT ON THOSE BEACHES THE SEVENTH ARMORED DIVISION WAS BUSY UNLOADING AND THIS EARLY ENEMY THREAT SHOULD BE EFFECTIVELY COUNTERED PD

PARAGRAPH ON THE AMERICAN BEACHES THE SECOND AND NINETIETH DIVISIONS WERE DUE TO BEGIN LANDING LAST NIGHT AND CMA WHILE I HAVE HAD NO REPORTS THIS MORNING CMA I BELIEVE THAT THE GOOD WEATHER LAST NIGHT SHOULD HAVE PERMITTED THE LANDING OF CONSIDERABLE REINFORCEMENTS IN THOSE DISTRICTS PD

PARAGRAPH DUE TO THE FLUID NATURE OF THE BATTLE IT HAS BEEN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GIVE LOGICAL TARGETS TO MUCH OF OUR AIR FORCES BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT IF WEATHER PERMITS OUR AIR WILL INTERVENE EFFECTIVELY IN ANY ATTEMPTED COUNTER ATTACKS BY THE ENEMY

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