PLA marshal who commanded Chinese forces in Korea, then was purged for criticizing the Great Leap Forward
'I want to be a Hai Rui!' — In his 1962 'Letter of 80,000 Words' to Mao, invoking the Ming-dynasty official famed for his courage in admonishing the emperor
One of the ten marshals of the People's Liberation Army, he commanded the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in the Korean War and, as Minister of National Defense, pursued a Soviet-model professionalization of the military. His 1959 letter to Mao criticizing the famine and failures of the Great Leap Forward led to his purge as head of an 'anti-Party clique'; imprisoned and tortured during the Cultural Revolution, he died in custody in 1974 and was posthumously rehabilitated in 1978.
Also known as: Peng Teh-Huai · Peng Dehua
Activities and affiliations
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1926–1928
Republic of China state institutionsNational Revolutionary Army officer under Tang Shengzhi and He Jian
Military command -
1928–1949
Chinese Communist revolutionary forces (before 1949)Red 3rd Army Group, Eighth Route Army deputy and Northwest Field Army commander
Military command -
1928–
Military command
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1945–1959
Communist Party of ChinaMember of the CCP Politburo
Political and party leadership -
1952–1959
People’s Republic of China state institutionsVice Chairman of the Central Military Commission
Military command -
1954–1959
People’s Republic of China state institutionsVice Premier
Government and administration -
1965–1966
People’s Republic of China state institutionsDeputy Commander of Third Front construction in Southwest China
Economy, finance and planning -
People’s Republic of China state institutionsCommander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, Minister of National DefenceMain
Military command
Career Timeline
- 1916–1926Served in Hunan warlord armies, rising from private to major
- 1926–1928National Revolutionary Army officer on the Northern Expedition
- 1928Rebelled against KMT forces, formed the Red 5th Army, joined Mao and Zhu at Jinggangshan
- 1930–1934Commander, Red 3rd Corps; directed defense of the Jiangxi Soviet
- 1934–1935Participated in the Long March; supported Mao at the Zunyi Conference
- 1937–1940Deputy Commander, Eighth Route Army; directed the Hundred Regiments Offensive
- 1945–1959Member of the CCP Politburo
- 1947–1949Commander, Northwest Field Army; defended Yan'an, liberated five northwest provinces
- 1950–1953Commander and Commissar, Chinese People's Volunteer Army in the Korean War
- 1954–1959Minister of National Defense, CMC Vice-Chairman; Soviet-model military modernization
- 1959Purged at Lushan Conference for letter criticizing the Great Leap Forward; stripped of posts
- 1965–1966Deputy Commander of Third Front construction in Southwest China
- 1966–1974Seized by Red Guards; struggle sessions and detention until his death in custody
Related historical events
- 1927–1936From Jinggangshan to Yan’an: the soviet bases and the Long MarchCommander of the Third Army GroupTook Changsha in 1930 and led a main army group on the March.
- 1937–1945The war with Japan and the second united frontCommander of the Hundred Regiments OffensiveDirected the 1940 offensive in north China and was later criticised for it.
- 1945–1949The Chinese Civil WarNorthwest Field Army commanderRecovered northern Shaanxi and the Northwest after Yan’an fell.
- 1949Establishment of the People’s Republic of ChinaNorthwest commander who ordered the march into XinjiangHe assigned Wang Zhen to take Xinjiang.
- 1949–1956From New Democracy to socialist transformationCommander of the People’s VolunteersCrossed the Yalu in October 1950 and commanded in Korea.
- 1950–1953The Korean WarCommander and Commissar of the People's Volunteer ArmyAt the 5 October 1950 Politburo meeting he backed Mao's intervention and turned the debate; from 19 October he commanded the PVA and expelled UN forces from the Yalu.
- 1956–1957From the Hundred Flowers to the Anti-Rightist CampaignDefence minister whose fall set off the “anti-right-deviation” driveHe fell after criticising the Great Leap at the Lushan Conference in 1959, and the ensuing drive turned the anti-rightist logic inside the party.
- 1956–1969The Sino-Soviet SplitWitness to the radio station negotiationsHe set out the 1958 Soviet request for a long-wave station and its proposed cost-sharing.
- 1958–1962The Great Leap Forward and the Great FamineDefence minister who criticised the Leap at LushanHis July 1959 letter to Mao made him head of an “anti-party clique” and cost him his post.
- 1966–1976The Cultural RevolutionFormer defence minister who died under persecutionDragged to Beijing in 1966 for struggle sessions; died in custody in 1974.
- 1976–1992Reform and opening: the Deng Xiaoping eraMarshal rehabilitated at the Third PlenumHe was rehabilitated in December 1978 together with Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo and Yang Shangkun.
How did a starving boy become an officer in a warlord army, and then rise in revolt at Pingjiang?
Peng Dehuai was born on 24 October 1898 in a thatched hut at Wushi in Xiangtan County, Hunan. About an acre and a half of land growing bamboo, sweet potatoes, tea and cotton, plus a bean-curd shop, supported a household of eight. A great-uncle who had fought for the Taiping rebels told him of the Taiping ideals: everyone should have enough to eat, women should not bind their feet, and land should be shared out equally. Peng later described his class background as "lower-middle peasant".
In the Hunan drought of 1905-1906 his mother died and his baby brother starved to death. His father pawned most of the family's possessions and land, and at ten Peng left school and went begging in the village with his brothers. After herding water buffalo, from 1911 he pushed coal carts at a Xiangtan mine for nine yuan a month, until the mine went bankrupt the next year and the owners fled, cheating him of half a year's wages. When drought and famine returned in 1913 he joined a demonstration that broke into a grain merchant's store and shared the grain among the peasants, and to escape the arrest warrant he spent two years labouring on a dyke near Dongting Lake.
In March 1916, aged seventeen, he lied about his age and enlisted as a private second class in the army of Tang Xiangming, a Hunan warlord aligned with the Kuomintang, sending part of his pay home. An officer who had taken part in the 1911 Revolution drew him to the Kuomintang's goals of social reform and national unification. Serving under Tang Shengzhi, he rose through the NCO ranks to second lieutenant in 1921; at one posting, seeing a landlord abuse the village poor, he had his soldiers arrest and execute the man and was reprimanded for it. On entering the Hunan Military Academy in 1922 he first used the name "Dehuai", and the next year he returned to his regiment as a captain.
In 1926 his unit was incorporated into the National Revolutionary Army, and as a major he fought in the Northern Expedition, helping take Changsha and Wuhan. When the Kuomintang split in 1927 between Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing and Wang Jingwei in Wuhan, and Chiang launched his anti-Communist purge, Peng felt the party had abandoned the promises of 1911 and made peace with the warlords. Communists, some of them old friends, approached him repeatedly, and their call for land redistribution spoke to his childhood poverty. He met the party representative Duan Dechang, began studying communist theory, and became a secret party member no later than April 1928. The political scientist Jürgen Domes argues that he was moved less by refined theory than by poverty and disappointment with the Kuomintang.
In May 1928, as a regimental commander, he was stationed in mountainous Pingjiang County, north-east of Changsha, under orders to wipe out Communist guerrillas who had fled there. Instead he kept his unit idle while organising party branches with secret members in his own ranks, and on 22 July he launched the Pingjiang Uprising, executing the county magistrate and landlords, setting up a soviet and reorganising his men as the Fifth Red Army with himself as commander. Driven back by troops under his former superior He Jian, he led the survivors that winter to join Mao Zedong and Zhu De at Jinggangshan.
What kind of war did Peng Dehuai, the general of the frontal assault, fight in the Red Army and the Eighth Route Army?
After reaching Jinggangshan Peng quickly became one of the Red Army's key commanders. When Zhu De and Mao moved into southern Jiangxi in January 1929 he stayed behind to hold Jinggangshan with 800 men and withdrew before 25,000 Hunanese troops, for which Mao criticised him. As commander of the Third Red Army from April 1930, when the party's de facto leader Li Lisan ordered Communist forces in July to "seize a provincial capital" to spark a nationwide uprising, Peng went further than Zhu and Mao and took Changsha, the capital of Hunan, with 17,000 men on 30 July. The hoped-for national rising never came; his old commander He Jian counter-attacked and drove him out within days, and a second assault in September ended in heavy losses.
In repelling three encirclement campaigns between December 1930 and May 1931 he became, with Lin Biao, one of the Red Army's two great field commanders. The American journalist Edgar Snow contrasted them: Lin excelled at feints, ambushes and flank attacks, while Peng met the enemy head-on and fought to annihilate him, believing no battle well fought unless captured guns and prisoners more than made up his losses. In the Fifth Campaign of 1933-1934 Peng too followed positional defence and saw his corps shrink from 35,000 to 20,000; of the 18,000 men he led onto the Long March, only about 3,000 reached northern Shaanxi in October 1935. The defeat turned him toward Mao's guerrilla strategy, and at the Zunyi Conference in January 1935 he backed Mao. That October Mao dedicated a poem to him: "Who dares to rein in his horse and swing his sword? None but our great General Peng!"
When war with Japan broke out in 1937 he became deputy commander of the Eighth Route Army, second only to Zhu De. At the Luochuan Conference in August Mao proposed treating the united front as a feint and saving the Red Army's strength for the final reckoning with the Kuomintang, but Peng and most other leaders believed the army should genuinely fight the Japanese. From late 1938, based in the Taihang Mountains on the Shanxi-Hebei border, he commanded two-thirds of the Eighth Route Army, about 100,000 men.
On 20 August 1940 he launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive, the largest Communist operation of the war against Japan. Some 200,000 regulars and 200,000 guerrillas destroyed railways, bridges and tunnels across north China, wrecking two-thirds of the Zhengtai railway and badly damaging the Jingxing coal mines. Japanese supply lines were not fully restored until 1942, but the Communists also suffered heavily. Communist sources give two figures for Japanese casualties, about 20,600 and 12,600, while foreign sources give around 20,900. The greater price came afterwards: the Japanese "Three Alls" policy, kill all, burn all, loot all, swept through the base areas and inflicted enormous losses on the people of north China and the Eighth Route Army.
Recalled to Yan'an, Peng was branded an "empiricist" during the Rectification Movement for his good relations with the Comintern. Mao had backed the offensive at first and later even praised its results, but at the North China conference of 1945 he had Peng criticised for forty days on the grounds that the offensive had provoked Japanese reprisals and revealed Communist strength too early. Peng had to make a self-criticism without being allowed to reply, and he did not forget it. In 1959 he reportedly told Mao: "At Yan'an you cursed my mother for forty days."
How did Peng, with the poorest army, protect the leadership at Yan'an and take the north-west?
When Japan surrendered in September 1945, Peng led forces in north China in October to occupy parts of Inner Mongolia and accept the surrender of Japanese troops there. After the Communist armies were renamed the People's Liberation Army in 1946 he took command of the Northwest Field Army, 175,000 men, most of whom had served under He Long during the war against Japan; He Long became his deputy, and his subordinates included Zhang Zongxun and Wang Zhen. Though the most poorly equipped of the new PLA armies, it was responsible for the area around Yan'an, the seat of the party leadership.
In March 1947 the Nationalist general Hu Zongnan invaded the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, the Communist base on the borders of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia, with 260,000 men, among the best-trained and best-supplied units in the Nationalist army. But Peng had detailed intelligence on Hu's plans, troop dispositions and air support from an agent Zhou Enlai had placed close to Hu. He gave up Yan'an at the end of March but held the enemy long enough for Mao and the party leaders to get away safely. The Nationalists trumpeted the capture of Yan'an as a great victory, but they had taken an empty city.
Mao wanted an immediate decisive battle, but Peng talked him out of it, and in April Mao agreed that the aim was to "keep the enemy on the run, tire him out completely, reduce his food supplies, and then look for an opportunity to destroy him". The Northwest Field Army moved back and forth across the rugged loess plateau of northern Shaanxi, striking isolated enemy units. It won ambushes at Qinghuabian at the end of March and Yangmahe in April, and on 4 May raided the supply base at Panlong in north-eastern Shaanxi, capturing its commander, food reserves, 40,000 uniforms and a large haul of weapons. Pushed at one point to the border of Inner Mongolia, it decisively defeated Hu's crack units at Shajiadian in August, saving Mao and the central leadership, who had stayed in northern Shaanxi, from the risk of capture. In April 1948 Peng drove the Nationalists out of northern Shaanxi and retook Yan'an.
Between 1947 and September 1949 his forces occupied Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai. He repeatedly defeated the armies of Hu Zongnan and the Hui warlord Ma Bufang without destroying them; they fell back into Sichuan, and some reached Taiwan when the Nationalists lost the war. In August 1949 he stormed and took Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu. In October troops under Wang Zhen entered Xinjiang, where most of the Nationalist garrison surrendered peacefully and were absorbed into his army, though some ethnic armed bands resisted for several years and the occupation of Xinjiang was completed only in September 1951.
After the founding of the People's Republic he became chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Commission and commander and political commissar in Xinjiang, responsible for Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang, more than five million square kilometres but fewer than thirty million people. Integrating the region's many peoples into the new state was his task. In October 1950 he was summoned from here to Beijing for the meetings that would decide on entering the Korean War.
Commanding the Korean War: Supreme Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army
In October 1950, as UN forces drove toward the Yalu, Mao resolved on intervention, and Peng, one of the few senior military leaders to support China's entry, was appointed Supreme Commander and political commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. He effectively took over military command from Kim Il Sung, reflecting Beijing's lack of confidence in the Korean leadership's capacity to sustain the fight.
Between the First Phase Campaign of October 1950 and the Fifth Phase Campaign of June 1951, Peng directed an unbroken series of offensives: driving UN forces south of the Chongchon River, recovering the area north of the 38th parallel, and briefly capturing Seoul before being forced back into stalemate near the parallel by the UN counterattack. The first year's heavy losses, especially supply shortages and tens of thousands of frostbite deaths in the face of an enemy with complete air superiority, impressed on him that China's army was unfit for modern conventional warfare.
He exercised direct command through the first half of the war, until recalled by a head tumor in April 1952, and on July 27, 1953 personally signed the armistice at Panmunjom. At a mass rally in Pyongyang four days later, Kim Il Sung awarded him the title of Hero of the DPRK and the first-class National Flag Order of Merit. The Korean War convinced Peng that the People's Liberation Army must be reorganized into a modern, professional, regular force on the Soviet model, the direct seed of both his later military reform as Defense Minister and his unfolding conflict with Mao, who insisted on politics in command.
Why did Defence Minister Peng write to Mao at Lushan, and what did it cost him?
Back from Korea in 1952, Peng took over the day-to-day running of the Central Military Commission from Zhou Enlai and became Minister of Defence in September 1954. The losses suffered in Korea against an enemy with air superiority convinced him that modernising the army was urgent, and the only communist state with a fully modern army was the Soviet Union. He introduced Soviet-style ranks and uniforms, salary grades, decorations and conscription, and gave commanders precedence over political commissars. In September 1955 he was named one of the Ten Marshals. Mao, however, disliked a direction that put technique before politics.
In the mid-1950s Peng also resisted Mao's personality cult. He struck Mao's name from the phrase "the correct leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong" in the preface to a history of the volunteer army; he blocked a proposal to put up a statue of Mao in the military museum, saying that what is put up now will be taken down later; and he is said to have told soldiers shouting "Long live Chairman Mao" that Mao would not live ten thousand years, not even a hundred, and that this was a personality cult. He also proposed, successfully, that the reference to Mao Zedong Thought be dropped from the draft party constitution for the Eighth Congress in 1956.
When the Great Leap Forward began in 1958 he did not oppose it at first but soon saw its damage. Touring Gansu and his native Hunan that autumn, he saw ripe crops rotting in the fields because the young men had all been sent to "backyard furnaces", primitive smelters built in villages, household pots melted down for iron, and houses and orchards torn down for fuel. He wrote a poem: "Grain scattered on the ground, potato leaves withered; the young have gone to make steel, only children and old women reap; how will they get through next year? Let me raise my voice for the people!"
At the conference at Lushan in Jiangxi in July 1959, Mao invited delegates to speak freely about "mistakes and shortcomings". On 14 July Peng sent Mao a private "letter of opinion". He pointed to the waste of labour on backyard furnaces and the shortages of food and cotton, called the inflated production reports and their uncritical acceptance "petty-bourgeois fanaticism", and criticised the slogan of "putting politics in command" for displacing economic principles. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and others initially shared much of his view. But Mao circulated the letter as a conference document on 17 July and counter-attacked on the 23rd, even saying that if the delegates sided with Peng he would go to the countryside, lead the peasants and overthrow the government. Fearing a split in the party, the other leaders sided with Mao.
On 16 August the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee condemned Peng as leader of a "right-opportunist anti-Party clique" with Huang Kecheng, Zhang Wentian and Zhou Xiaozhou. He kept his party membership and Politburo seat but lost the defence ministry to Lin Biao. The nationwide "anti-rightist" campaign that followed delayed the correction of the Leap by more than a year. With no official count, scholars' estimates of the famine's deaths range from 15 to 45 million, though most agree they ran into the tens of millions. Many historians judge that the party's refusal to heed the problems Peng raised came at that cost.
What persecution did the dismissed marshal suffer in the Cultural Revolution, and when was his name restored?
After losing the defence ministry Peng lived alone at Wujiahuayuan on the outskirts of Beijing, watched by a guard unit. His wife Pu Anxiu, party secretary of Beijing Normal University, could visit only now and then; his niece Peng Meikui came often. He renovated the house, grew vegetables and studied Marxist theory, agriculture and economics. Still technically a Politburo member, he continued to receive and read party and State Council documents. In November-December 1961 he was allowed out for the first time to tour Hunan and found conditions in the countryside worse than in 1959.
As the scale of the Leap's disaster became clear, his standing in the party actually rose. But at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in 1962 Liu Shaoqi blocked his rehabilitation, saying Peng had "colluded with foreign countries". On 16 June 1962 Peng sent Mao and the Politburo a long account of his life, the so-called "Letter of 80,000 Words", rebutting most of the Lushan charges and asking to be readmitted. In it he wrote: "I want to be a Hai Rui." Hai Rui was a Ming official jailed for remonstrating with the emperor, and the charge that the historian Wu Han's play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office was an allegory of Peng later became one of the sparks of the Cultural Revolution.
In September 1965 Mao called him in, suggested the Lushan verdict might have gone too far, and appointed him third deputy director of the Third Front construction committee for the south-west. The Third Front was the programme to relocate defence industries and transport deep in the interior, in Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan, against the threat of war. He worked energetically in Chengdu, but when the Cultural Revolution began in 1966 he became one of its first victims. Ignoring his guards' warnings, he said that a Communist need not fear the masses.
Jiang Qing directed Red Guards in Sichuan to bring him to Beijing. When the local Red Guards hesitated, Wang Dabin, a Red Guard leader from Beijing, abducted him in chains in the early hours of 25 December 1966. Zhou Enlai tried to protect him by placing him under army custody, but Red Guards seized him first when he reached Beijing. In 1967 he was paraded before crowds of thousands at struggle sessions, wearing a dunce's cap with a placard of his "crimes" around his neck, and beaten. Interrogations demanding that he confess to being a "great warlord, great careerist and great conspirator" ran more than ten hours a day; his ribs were broken and his lungs and other organs damaged. In August, at a struggle meeting of 40,000 soldiers, Lin Biao addressed the kneeling Peng and declared that he must be purged.
He is said never to have confessed. In 1970 a special military tribunal sentenced him to life imprisonment; his treatment improved somewhat after Lin Biao's death, but his health had already collapsed. Historians differ over whether he was denied proper treatment on Mao's direct orders or on Jiang Qing's. He died in prison on 29 November 1974, his last wish to see Zhu De refused. His ashes were stored with only a note reading "No. 327, Wang Chuan, of Chengdu", and his death was concealed for years. In December 1978 the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee reversed the verdict on him as "erroneous", and in his eulogy Deng Xiaoping said he had been "courageous in battle, open and upright, incorruptible, caring for the masses and never concerned with his own advantage".