The Soviet Union's foremost Germany expert who opposed Gorbachev's concessions during reunification negotiations
“In the early 1980s, West Germany offered an interest-free credit of 100 billion marks just for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the GDR leaving the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev accepted 14 billion at Arkhyz.” — on the price of German reunification
The Soviet Union's foremost expert on Germany, Falin began his diplomatic career as a speechwriter for Khrushchev and Gromyko before serving as ambassador to West Germany (1971–1978). As head of the CPSU International Department (1988–1991) and CC Secretary (1990–1991), he ran a parallel foreign-policy apparatus alongside the Foreign Ministry. He was the most prominent voice in the Soviet leadership opposing Gorbachev's rapid concessions during German reunification talks, and in 1989 co-formulated the Falin-Kvitsinsky doctrine, which sought to replace declining Soviet military influence in Eastern Europe with energy dependency. He later argued Moscow could have demanded up to 100 billion marks in return for accepting a unified Germany in NATO.
Career Timeline
- 1950–1952Soviet Control Commission in Germany
- 1952–1958Committee of Information, USSR Foreign Ministry
- 1959–1971Head of 3rd European (German) Dept, MFA; adviser to Gromyko; Khrushchev speechwriter
- 1971–1978Ambassador of the USSR to West Germany
- 1978–1982First Deputy Chief, International Information Dept, CC CPSU
- 1983–1986Political observer, Izvestia (in disgrace)
- 1986–1988Chairman, Novosti Press Agency (APN)
- 1988–1991Head of the International Department, CC CPSU
- 1990–1991Secretary of the CC CPSU
- 1992–2000Professor, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg
- 2000–2018Returned to Moscow, lectured at MGIMO
Related historical events
- 1985–1991Perestroika and Glasnostopposed Gorbachev's concessions on German unification
- 1989The Revolutions of 1989International Department chief who opposed the GDR's uncontrolled collapseAs head of the CPSU International Department (1988–1991), he worked through party-to-party channels with the East German SED during the fall of the Berlin Wall and the GDR's dissolution. He opposed Gorbachev's non-intervention line, arguing that Moscow should demand stronger conditions for East Germany's transition, and later maintained the USSR could have insisted on up to 100 billion marks in return for a unified Germany in NATO.