From Foch's brilliant staff officer to a general of defeat and accommodation
On 12 June 1940, Weygand advised the French government to capitulate.
Maxime Weygand was a French general who served as Ferdinand Foch's key staff officer in the First World War, coordinating Allied operations and reading the armistice terms to the German delegation in 1918. Between the wars he carried French military influence in Poland and the Levant, then became commander-in-chief of the French armies in May 1940 and, after the German breakthrough, judged that continued fighting in metropolitan France was no longer feasible and advised an armistice. He joined the Vichy government and later directed French North Africa, choosing limited accommodation with Germany while enforcing antisemitic measures harshly. Detained after the war on treason charges and cleared in 1948, he later defended Marshal Pétain's memory.
Activities and affiliations
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France state institutionsChief of Staff to Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the French ArmiesMain
Military command
Career Timeline
- 1885–1888Studied at Saint-Cyr and the Saumur Cavalry School
- 1914–1918Chief of staff to Foch and senior staff officer at Allied Supreme Headquarters
- 1918Read the armistice terms at the Compiègne negotiations
- 1920Military adviser to the Inter-Allied Mission in Poland
- 1923–1924High Commissioner of the Levant
- 1931–1935Vice-president of France's Superior War Council and Inspector-General of the Army
- 1940.05–06Commander-in-chief of the French armies; advised an armistice
- 1940.06–1941.11Vichy Minister for Defence and Delegate-General in North Africa
- 1942–1945Held by Germany, including internment at Itter Castle
- 1948Cleared of treason charges
Related historical events
- 1914–1918First World WarAllied operations staff officerAs Foch's key staff officer, he coordinated Allied operations.
- 1918–1922The Civil War and Foreign InterventionFrench military adviserAdvised the Polish staff as part of the Interallied Mission in 1920.
- 1919–1921The Soviet-Polish WarFrench military adviserAdvised the Polish staff as part of the Interallied Mission in 1920.
- 1940–1944The Fall of France and the Vichy RegimeFrench commander-in-chief who advised an armisticeOn 12 June 1940, he advised the French government to capitulate.
- 1940–1944The French Resistance and the Liberation of Francegeneral who judged further fighting unfeasibleIn June 1940 he assessed that continued fighting in metropolitan France was no longer feasible, shaping the armistice debate.
Foch's chief of staff: what did he do in the First World War?
Weygand was born in Brussels in 1867 to unknown parents. He was raised by others in Marseille, his schooling apparently paid for by the Belgian royal household or government. Several theories name his parents, including King Leopold II of Belgium and Charlotte, Empress of Mexico, but none is proven, and he said all his life that he did not know. He graduated from Saint-Cyr, the French military academy, was adopted by an accountant in Arras named Francis-Joseph Weygand, whose surname he took, and was posted to a cavalry regiment in 1888. During the Dreyfus affair he was one of the most anti-Dreyfusard officers in his regiment. The affair, in which the Jewish captain Alfred Dreyfus was convicted of espionage on forged evidence, split France between republicans and the army and Catholic right.
On 17 August 1914 he became chief of staff to Ferdinand Foch, commander of the newly formed Ninth Army, and spent most of the war at Foch's side. A chief of staff turns a commander's ideas into concrete orders that units can carry out, and gathers and sorts the information the commander needs. Foch trusted him so fully that he considered their views practically identical. Weygand finalised the Ninth Army's attack plans at the First Battle of the Marne and proved skilled at smoothing friction between the French and British armies. When the Allies created the Supreme War Council in November 1917, Clemenceau sent Weygand rather than Foch as France's permanent military representative, telling an American envoy that he would put in a "second- or third-rate man" and "let the thing drift where it will".
When Foch became Supreme Allied Commander in the spring of 1918, Weygand headed his staff and was his right-hand man through the Allied counter-offensives of that summer and autumn. He drew up the memorandum for Foch's meeting with the national commanders-in-chief, Haig, Pétain and Pershing, on 24 July 1918, at which Foch won agreement to retake the Marne salient the Germans had seized in May, and he personally delivered the directive for the Amiens attack to Haig. He also took part in the armistice negotiations: it was Weygand who, on 11 November 1918, in a railway carriage in the clearing of Rethondes in the forest of Compiègne, read the armistice terms to the German delegation.
After the war he agreed with Foch that French security required a buffer zone reaching to the Rhine. When the politicians ruled out a French client state in the Rhineland, both men's distrust of politicians deepened. In his diary Weygand called the peace conference's leaders, Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando, "the four old men". Because Foch, as the victor of the war, was hard to criticise, Wilson, Lloyd George and others accused Weygand of driving Foch's hard line. This view of politicians as people who did not understand military realities would surface again in 1940, when he demanded an armistice.
Poland, 1920: where did the legend of the 'victor of Warsaw' come from?
Poland had been at war with Soviet Russia since 1919. In the summer of 1920, when the Red Army under Tukhachevsky counter-attacked and closed in on Warsaw, the Allies sent an Interallied Mission of British and French diplomats and soldiers to Poland in July. Weygand was a member, along with the French diplomat Jean Jules Jusserand and the British diplomat Lord D'Abernon. It was distinct from the French Military Mission, which had been in Poland since April 1919 and which included a young captain named Charles de Gaulle.
Weygand went to Warsaw expecting to take command of the Polish army, and that hope was quickly dashed. At their first meeting on 24 July the Polish head of state, Józef Piłsudski, asked him, "How many divisions do you bring?" Weygand had none to offer. The British proposed that he take over the Polish army, but the Poles refused, citing the side he had taken with Germany during the Silesian uprisings. From 27 July he advised the Polish chief of staff, Tadeusz Rozwadowski. Most Polish officers regarded him as an interloper, and he did not understand the Polish they spoke. At the end of July he proposed holding the line of the Bug; a week later, a purely defensive posture along the Vistula. Both plans were rejected. One of his few lasting contributions was to insist that spoken orders be replaced by written ones, along with advice on logistics and modern entrenchments. The historian Norman Davies called him "a proponent of defence in the company of enthusiasts for the attack".
In mid-August the Polish army defeated the Red Army at the Battle of Warsaw, which Poles call the Miracle on the Vistula. The mission's report was submitted only after the battle had been won. Even so, back in Paris Weygand was cheered by crowds along the station platform and kissed on both cheeks by the premier, Alexandre Millerand; he was promoted and advanced in the Legion of Honour. So arose the myth that the Allied mission had saved Poland. Davies calls Weygand "the first uncomprehending victim, as well as the chief beneficiary, of a legend already in circulation", and notes that it persisted for more than forty years, even among academics.
Weygand himself told a French journalist on 21 August 1920: "the victory was Polish, the plan was Polish, the army was Polish." His role is still judged differently from country to country. Some French historians credit him, together with Rozwadowski and Piłsudski, with a share in the battle plan, but most historians today consider his role minimal at best.
June 1940: why did he demand an armistice?
Weygand, retired at the age limit in 1935, was recalled in August 1939 and sent back to the Levant. When the German army broke through the Ardennes in May 1940 and the French front collapsed, the government dismissed the commander-in-chief, Maurice Gamelin, and called the 73-year-old Weygand back from Syria. Arriving on 17 May, he began by cancelling the flank counter-offensive Gamelin had ordered. After two lost days he came back to his predecessor's plan, but in the meantime the German infantry had caught up with the armour and consolidated the breakthrough. He then set up the Weygand Line, an early use of hedgehog tactics, but by then the main Allied forces were already trapped in Belgium. He complained that he had been summoned two weeks too late.
The second German offensive opened on 5 June. On 10 June Weygand barged into Prime Minister Paul Reynaud's office and demanded an armistice. In the cabinet meetings of 12 to 16 June he was the first to demand one, though the decision belonged to the government alone. Besides military reasons, he feared that disorder would spread across the whole country amid the rout and the flood of refugees; from the moment the Germans entered France he had feared something like the Paris Commune. At the cabinet meeting of 13 June he cited an unverified false report that the communist leader Maurice Thorez had returned in the Wehrmacht's baggage train and installed himself at the Élysée. Another biographer writes that he received the report, checked it by telephone with the military governor of Paris, and then reported that the capital was calm.
Reynaud, warning that they were dealing not with an old-style emperor who would take Alsace-Lorraine and be done but with Genghis Khan, proposed that the government carry on the war from abroad while only the army in metropolitan France laid down its arms. Weygand rejected this violently as contrary to military honour and told Reynaud: "The government took responsibility for the war; it is up to it to take responsibility for the armistice." The historian Jean-Pierre Azéma judged this a political intervention by a military chief without precedent since the nineteenth century. On the evening of 13 June the deputy prime minister, Marshal Pétain, strongly backed his demand. When Reynaud resigned on 16 June and Pétain became prime minister, Weygand became minister of defence, and on 22 June he ordered the head of the French delegation, Charles Huntziger, to sign the armistice. He ordered de Gaulle, who had called from London for the fight to go on, to return, reduced him to the rank of colonel, and a military court eventually sentenced de Gaulle to death.
Verdicts are sharply divided. De Gaulle and his supporters condemned him as a defeatist, and President Albert Lebrun said after the war: "What a misfortune when, in extreme peril, it is the generals who refuse to fight!" His defenders argue that the armistice let France survive as a legal state, and that by staying within its terms he preserved the Army of Africa, which could join the Allies in 1942.
Vichy and North Africa: limited collaboration and harsh antisemitic measures
After the Vichy regime was set up in July 1940, Weygand served as Pétain's minister of national defence until September and was then appointed Delegate-General in French North Africa, the French colonies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, where French forces remained after the armistice.
There he persuaded young officers tempted to join the Resistance against the German occupation to go along with the armistice for now, letting them hope that combat would resume later. At the same time, together with Admiral Jean-Marie Abrial, he sent opponents of Vichy to camps in southern Algeria and Morocco. Those interned included Gaullists, Freemasons and Jews, and also communists, even though they were then obeying Soviet orders not to support the Resistance. Foreign volunteers of the Foreign Legion and foreign refugees who were in France legally but without work were also arrested. He applied Vichy's anti-Jewish laws very harshly. On 30 September 1941, without any law, by a mere internal service note, no. 343QJ, he introduced a numerus clausus, a quota on Jewish pupils, in the schools. It drove most Jewish children, including those aged five to eleven, out of the public primary and secondary schools. No such measure was taken in metropolitan France, and Pétain had given no order for it; Weygand said he acted "by analogy" with the law on higher education.
At the same time he earned a reputation as an opponent of collaboration by protesting against the Paris Protocols signed by Admiral François Darlan in May 1941. The protocols allowed the Axis bases at Aleppo in Syria, Bizerte in Tunisia and Dakar in Senegal, and envisaged French military cooperation with the Axis if the Allies attacked those bases. Historians note, however, that he opposed them not to help the Allies or even to keep France neutral, but to preserve the integrity of the French Empire and its prestige in the eyes of the colonised population. His delegation in fact delivered 1,200 French trucks and heavy artillery to the German Panzer Army Africa. He was also wholly submissive to Pétain: when he learned that officers around him, from the Alliance network, were preparing a plan to re-enter the war with American help, he had them arrested and handed over to Vichy, saying: "One does not become a rebel at my age." Hitler wanted full, unconditional collaboration and pressed Vichy to dismiss him in November 1941.
After the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942 the Germans arrested him. He was held in Germany and then at Itter Castle in the Austrian Tyrol, together with Gamelin and other figures of the Third Republic, until US troops freed him in May 1945. Back in France he was detained as a collaborator at the Val-de-Grâce hospital, released in May 1946, and in May 1948 the investigating commission of the High Court of Justice dropped all charges against him. He remained hostile to de Gaulle and supported keeping Algeria French. He died in Paris in 1965 at the age of 98.