A naval reformer sent to negotiate without authority
When the Soviet side asked about negotiating authority, Drax's mission could make no decision without government approval.
Reginald Drax was a Royal Navy admiral who argued for more active tactics and reform of naval command, while holding major staff and operational posts between the world wars. In August 1939 he led the British military mission to Moscow, sent with the French delegation to discuss cooperation with the Soviet Union but without written authority to negotiate. His mission's slow arrival in an outdated merchant ship and inability to commit the British government exposed the limits and mistrust surrounding the talks to prevent war with Germany, which ultimately failed.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 1896Entered the Royal Navy; trained aboard HMS Britannia
- 1909Published Modern Naval Tactics; studied staff training
- 1914–1918Served in HMS Lion; took part in major First World War naval actions
- 1919–1922Director, Royal Naval Staff College
- 1923–1924President, Naval Allied Control Commission in Germany
- 1932–1934Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies Station
- 1935–1938Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth
- 1939Led the British military mission to the Moscow talks
- 1939–1941Commander-in-Chief, The Nore
- 1943–1945Commodore of ocean convoys
- 1939Published Mission to Moscow
Related historical events
- 1914–1918First World WarRoyal Navy battleship serviceHe served aboard HMS Lion and took part in major naval actions from 1914 to 1918.
- 1939.08–1940.08The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Partition of Eastern Europehead of the British military missionHe arrived in Moscow in August 1939 without written negotiating powers, symbolizing Western bad faith.
The 1939 Moscow military negotiations
In August 1939, Drax led the British military mission in Moscow, where it joined the French delegation in discussing a military convention with the Soviet Union. The talks concerned collective security against German and Italian expansion, but the Western missions' authority and willingness to cooperate were distrusted, while Soviet demands for transit across Poland and Romania were also a central obstacle. The failure cannot be reduced to deliberate obstruction by one side alone. After the German-Soviet non-aggression pact was concluded on 23 August, Drax wrote to Voroshilov that there seemed no purpose in continuing the conversations and that the British mission would depart. The British and French governments then instructed their missions to remain in Moscow and await further developments. This record documents the uncertainty and contest over responsibility in the negotiations' final phase, but does not by itself settle responsibility for the overall failure.