Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin

Владимир Николаевич Чернавин
Soviet Union Soviet communism Soviet Union Russia 1928–2023 ○ Natural causes

The last C-in-C of the Soviet Navy, the nuclear submariner who first patrolled under the Arctic ice

"I take full responsibility." — to the Black Sea Fleet commander who hesitated before the 1988 ramming of US warships in Soviet waters

The last Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. In 1962, as captain of the November-class SSN K-21, he conducted the first Arctic under-ice autonomous patrol by a Soviet nuclear submarine and drafted the navy's first under-ice manoeuvring manual. He went on to command the 19th Submarine Division of Delta-class ballistic-missile submarines, the Northern Fleet, and served as Chief of the Main Naval Staff before becoming C-in-C and Deputy Minister of Defence in 1985. Under his command the Soviet Navy reached its zenith, with more than 200 ships deployed worldwide at any time, and in 1988 he authorised the Black Sea ramming operation 'Naval' against intruding US warships, taking personal responsibility. After the dissolution of the USSR he briefly served as the sole C-in-C of the CIS Navy, and in retirement founded the Russian Union of Submariners, leading it until 2014.

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

Operation Atrina and the Atlantic submarine deployment

After becoming Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in November 1985, Chernavin oversaw efforts to test and improve the Northern Fleet's deployment of nuclear submarines into the North Atlantic. Operation Atrina, conducted in March 1987, sent five Northern Fleet multipurpose attack submarines on a covert deployment into the western Atlantic. In a later memoir article, Chernavin described the operation as a test of methods for getting submarines into the Atlantic while avoiding NATO anti-submarine surveillance at the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom approaches, and of their capacity, if required, to attack surface targets in hostile waters. He characterized the operation as having caused a major stir in the Pentagon and US Navy leadership.

Assessments of the operation's results differ. Chernavin's account emphasizes a successful covert deployment, while Western accounts hold that at least four boats were tracked. Atrina is therefore documented as a major test of submarine deployment capability, but whether it evaded detection remains disputed. By the late 1980s, the Soviet Navy had up to 200 ships and support vessels operating in the world's oceans each day.

← Back to card