William D. Leahy

William D. Leahy
United States state institutions United States United States 1875–1959 ○ Natural causes

The five-star chief of staff who warned Roosevelt the Yalta Poland deal was 'so elastic' it could stretch from Yalta to Washington

Leahy told Roosevelt: 'This is so elastic that the Russians can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without ever technically breaking it.' Roosevelt answered: 'I know, Bill, but it is the best I can do for Poland at this time.'

William Leahy was a Fleet Admiral of the US Navy who served as Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman during World War II, functioning as the de facto first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. After serving as CNO, Governor of Puerto Rico and Ambassador to Vichy France, he was recalled in 1942 and spent the war coordinating Allied grand strategy as the nation's most senior officer. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, he read the Poland agreement and told Roosevelt: 'This is so elastic that the Russians can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without ever technically breaking it.' Roosevelt replied, 'I know, Bill, but it is the best I can do for Poland at this time.' Though he later condemned the atomic bomb, he did not oppose its use at the time; after the war he rejected plans that relied on nuclear first use.

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Postwar criticism of the atomic bombings and the 1945 record

In his 1950 memoir, I Was There, Leahy criticized the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as militarily unnecessary in the war against Japan and ethically barbarous. He argued that Japan was already defeated and ready to surrender, and wrote that wars could not be won by destroying women and children. These statements document his public postwar position on the bombings, but must be distinguished from his wartime conduct. Historian Barton J. Bernstein notes that the available records, including Leahy’s wartime diary, provide no indication that he expressed this opinion to Truman or another government associate before the bombings. The forceful criticism in his memoir therefore should not be treated as evidence of an expressed objection during the 1945 decision-making process.

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