Founder of the Chinese Red Army and the PLA, first among the Ten Marshals
Cornered by assassins, he told them "Don't shoot me — I'm only the cook," and survived; his men called him "Chief of the Cooks" ever after.
Commander-in-chief whose military leadership secured the Chinese Communist revolution. He joined Mao Zedong at Jinggangshan in 1928 to form the legendary Zhu-Mao Army, then elevated guerrilla warfare to a strategic art across the Long March, the war against Japan, and the Civil War. After the founding of the PRC he served as vice-chairman and chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, and was named first among the Ten Marshals in 1955. His journey from warlord general to communist, breaking an opium addiction and starting again, traces the arc of the Chinese Revolution more completely than almost any other life.
Also known as: Chu Teh
Activities and affiliations
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1922–1976
Political and party leadership
- Secretary, Central Commission for Discipline Inspection1949–1955
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1927–1949
Chinese Communist revolutionary forces (before 1949)Commander-in-chief of the Red Army and Eighth Route Army
Military command -
1949–1954
People’s Republic of China state institutionsCommander-in-chief, PLA
Military command -
1959–1976
People’s Republic of China state institutionsChairman, NPC Standing Committee
Legislature and state representation -
People’s Republic of China state institutionsMarshalMain
Military command
Career Timeline
- 1911Yunnan Military Academy; joined the 1911 Revolution
- 1922Joined the CCP in Berlin under Zhou Enlai's sponsorship
- 1927Co-led the Nanchang Uprising, origin of the PLA
- 1927–1949Commander-in-chief of the Red Army and Eighth Route Army
- 1928Joined Mao at Jinggangshan; the Zhu-Mao Fourth Red Army
- 1930Red Army commander-in-chief; defeated four encirclement campaigns
- 1934–1935Red Army commander-in-chief through the Long March
- 1937–1945Eighth Route Army commander; led Hundred Regiments Offensive
- 1949–1954Commander-in-chief, PLA
- 1949–1955Secretary, Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
- 1955Marshal of the PRC, first among the Ten Marshals
- 1959–1976Chairman, NPC Standing Committee
Related historical events
- 1911–1916The 1911 Revolution and the birth of the RepublicParticipant in the 1911 RevolutionHe joined the 1911 Revolution.
- 1924–1927The first united front, the Northern Expedition and the catastrophe of 1927Led the survivors of NanchangLed the remnants to join Mao at Jinggangshan in 1928.
- 1927–1936From Jinggangshan to Yan’an: the soviet bases and the Long MarchCommander-in-chief of the Red ArmyJoined Mao at Jinggangshan in 1928, led the “Zhu–Mao” Red Army and commanded on the Long March.
- 1937–1945The war with Japan and the second united frontCommander-in-chief of the Eighth Route ArmyCommanded the Eighth Route Army after the Red Army’s reorganisation.
- 1945–1949The Chinese Civil WarCommander-in-chief of the PLAOrdered the takeover of Japanese-held areas in August 1945.
- 1949Establishment of the People’s Republic of ChinaVice-chairman of the Central People’s Government; PLA commander-in-chiefHe issued the order for the country-wide advance with Mao and reviewed the first parade on 1 October.
- 1950–1953The Korean WarPLA Commander-in-ChiefAs PLA Commander-in-Chief, he participated in the 1950 decision-making conferences on intervention and oversaw the military's support for the Korean War effort.
- 1966–1976The Cultural RevolutionFounder of the Red Army who died in July 1976The Resolution records that he was wrongly criticised during the Cultural Revolution.
Why did Zhu De, a warlord general, give it all up to become a Communist?
Zhu De was born on 1 December 1886 in Yilong County, in the hills of northern Sichuan, to a poor tenant family of Hakka descent, a Han group that had migrated south and kept its own speech and customs. Only eight of the family's fifteen children survived, but the household pooled money to send him to a village school, and at nine he was adopted by a better-off uncle. He passed the county-level examination in 1905, but the imperial examinations were abolished the next year, so he studied at a modern middle school and a physical-education college in Chengdu, then became a gym teacher at a primary school back home, a post he soon lost for teaching modern science and exercise instead of classical recitation.
In 1909 he walked for three months to Kunming in Yunnan and entered the Yunnan Military Academy, a modern officers' school founded in the last years of the Qing, where he joined Sun Yat-sen's secret Tongmenghui, pledged to overthrow the dynasty. There he met Cai E, who became his lifelong mentor. When the 1911 Revolution broke out he took part in Kunming's "Double Ninth" rising and the attack on the governor-general's yamen, and in the National Protection War of 1915-1916 against Yuan Shikai's attempt to become emperor he made his name as a detachment commander under Cai E on the Sichuan front. By 1917 he was a brigade commander with the rank of major-general in the Yunnan army and fought in Sun Yat-sen's Constitutional Protection War.
After the deaths of Cai E and of his first wife Xiao Jufang in 1916, however, he sank into opium addiction. The wars between warlords never ended; he rose to police commissioner of Yunnan in 1921, but in 1922, when Tang Jiyao returned to power in the province, he had to flee for his life. By then he was reading journals such as New Youth and news of the October Revolution. In Shanghai he broke his opium habit in hospital. Sun Yat-sen offered him 100,000 yuan to rally the Yunnan and Guangxi armies against Chen Jiongming, but he declined, saying revolution could not be built on alliances with warlords. He then went to Chen Duxiu and asked to join the Communist Party, and Chen turned him away as too much of a warlord.
At thirty-six he left for Europe in the autumn of 1922. In Berlin he sought out Zhou Enlai, and with Zhou and Zhang Shenfu as sponsors he joined the Chinese Communist Party, while continuing to appear publicly as a Kuomintang member. He attended social-science lectures at Göttingen, was twice arrested for taking part in the German labour movement, and was expelled in 1925. In Moscow he then studied Marxism at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East and modern warfare in a military course. Back in China in 1926 he tried, through old connections, to win the Sichuan warlord Yang Sen over to the Northern Expedition without success, and in January 1927 went to Nanchang, where his academy classmate Zhu Peide gave him command of the Third Army's officer-training regiment and made him the city's police chief. These posts would prove decisive a few months later in the party's first armed uprising.
How did the remnants of the Nanchang Uprising become the core of the "Zhu-Mao" Red Army?
When the First United Front collapsed with Chiang Kai-shek's Shanghai coup in April 1927 and the Wuhan left Kuomintang's turn against the Communists in July, the party decided to answer with armed revolt. In the Nanchang Uprising of 1 August, led by Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Liu Bocheng and others, Zhu De used his posts as deputy commander of the Ninth Army and Nanchang police chief to help. The rebels left Nanchang within three days and marched south toward the Guangdong coast, hoping for Comintern aid by sea, but heat, desertion and Nationalist pincers broke them. Zhu held the rear at Sanheba in Dapu County with the 25th Division, and after the main force was defeated at Chaozhou and Shantou he was left isolated with a few hundred men.
With Chen Yi he reorganised the force three times in southern Jiangxi, instilling discipline and political education and placing party members in every company. In December 1927 he took shelter, under the alias "Wang Kai", with the warlord Fan Shisheng, an old comrade from Yunnan, drawing supplies while quietly rebuilding. In January 1928 he and Chen Yi launched the South Hunan Uprising, took Yizhang County, formed the First Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army and set up soviet governments in several counties. When the Nationalists counter-attacked, he led some ten thousand people to Jinggangshan in April 1928 to join Mao Zedong, who had established a base there after the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Mao's brother Mao Zetan carried the messages, and the two forces became the Fourth Army, with Zhu as commander and Mao as party representative. From then on the peasants spoke of the two men as a single figure, "Zhu-Mao".
Chinese accounts credit Zhu with first formulating the sixteen-character guerrilla maxim that Mao developed: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." The partnership was not always smooth. After the Fourth Army moved into southern Jiangxi and western Fujian in 1929, a "Zhu-Mao dispute" broke out over how the party should lead the army, and in June the Seventh Party Congress of the Fourth Army at Longyan removed Mao as secretary of the Front Committee. But two raids into Guangdong and Fujian under Zhu's command proved costly, Mao returned in November, and at the Gutian Conference in December Zhu delivered the military report and joined in the resolution establishing the party's absolute leadership over the army.
When Jinggangshan was encircled in January 1929 his wife Wu Ruolan was captured by Nationalist troops and executed. That year he married Kang Keqing, a Red Army soldier and peasant leader. As commander-in-chief of the First Front Army from 1930, he and Mao defeated three of Chiang Kai-shek's encirclement campaigns between October 1930 and September 1931, and when the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic was founded at Ruijin in November 1931 he became chairman of its Central Revolutionary Military Commission. Even after Mao was pushed out of military command in 1932, Zhu and Zhou Enlai won the Fourth Counter-Encirclement Campaign in 1933, moving the Red Army from guerrilla fighting to large-scale mobile warfare. In the Fifth Campaign of 1933-1934, however, under the positional-defence doctrine of the Comintern adviser Otto Braun, the base was lost, and in October 1934 the Red Army set out on the Long March.
The Long March: Zunyi Conference and the Zhang Guotao Split
In January 1935, at the city of Zunyi in Guizhou, an enlarged Politburo meeting became the turning point that altered the Chinese Communist Party's destiny. As a Politburo member, Zhu De backed Mao Zedong in condemning the catastrophic military line of Bo Gu and Otto Braun. The guerrilla-warfare strategy Zhu De and Mao had jointly developed, flexible, mobile, and rooted in peasant support, had been displaced by a doctrine of positional defense, 'defending every inch of Soviet territory,' with the result that the Red Army lost its base in the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. At Zunyi, Bo Gu and Braun were demoted; Zhu De shared military command with Zhou Enlai; and Mao returned to the Politburo Standing Committee. Unknown to the outside world for decades, the Zunyi Conference was the moment the Chinese Revolution broke free of Moscow's dogmatic direction and found its own path.
A still greater ordeal lay ahead. In June 1935, the First Front Army under Zhu De joined forces at Maogong in Sichuan with Zhang Guotao's Fourth Front Army. Zhang, a founding member of the Party commanding 80,000 troops, rejected the Central Committee's decision to march north to resist the Japanese, insisting instead on a southern retreat into the Sichuan-Tibetan borderlands. In August, Zhu De was assigned to lead the Left Route Army alongside Zhang Guotao, in effect as a hostage. At a Party meeting in Aba in September, Zhang openly attacked the Central Committee and demanded that Zhu De declare his opposition to the northward march. When Zhang's confidant Huang Chao screamed at Zhu De, calling him an 'old stubborn fool,' Zhu De slammed his hand on the table, shattering a teacup, and rose. 'The Central Committee's policy of going north is correct. I raised my hand for it at the Politburo meeting. I am not against going north. I am for it. I am a Communist Party member, and my duty is to carry out the Party's decisions.' Privately, he urged discontented cadres to endure rather than risk splitting the Red Army through unauthorized action, and he became a crucial brake on Zhang Guotao. Zhu De finally reached Yan'an in the autumn of 1936, having marched farther than anyone on the Long March, over 10,000 kilometers.
What role did Zhu De play as commander of the Eighth Route Army in the war against Japan and the civil war?
The Long March ended when the three Red Army front armies met at Huining in Gansu in October 1936, and the following July the Marco Polo Bridge Incident turned the conflict with Japan into full-scale war. Under the Second United Front that followed the Xi'an Incident, the main Red Army forces were reorganised in August 1937 as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army (soon renamed the 18th Army Group), and Zhu became its commander with the rank of full general in the Nationalist army. That August he attended Chiang Kai-shek's national defence conference in Nanjing with Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, and in September he led the army's headquarters to Wutai in Shanxi to fight the Japanese. The Eighth Route Army won early victories such as Lin Biao's ambush at Pingxingguan and, after Taiyuan fell, moved deep behind Japanese lines in north China to open base areas such as Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei).
Under Zhu's command the Eighth Route Army concentrated on guerrilla warfare and base-building rather than conventional battles. In 1938, also commanding the Eastern Route Army of the Second War Zone, he beat back a Japanese "nine-pronged" encirclement, and in On the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War he set out the strategic place of guerrilla fighting in a protracted war. In August 1940 he planned and deployed, with Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan, the Hundred Regiments Offensive that cut north China's transport network on a large scale. It badly disrupted Japanese supply lines but provoked the brutal "Three Alls" reprisals, and Mao later used it against Peng.
When a Nationalist blockade isolated Yan'an in the winter of 1940, Zhu proposed the "Nanniwan policy", under which troops reclaimed waste land and fed themselves so far as fighting and training allowed, and he took part in the work himself. The 359th Brigade's land reclamation at Nanniwan in Shaanxi became the emblem of the "great production movement". In 1944 the US Marine colonel Evans Carlson called him "a master of guerrilla warfare". At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 he gave the military report "On the Battlefront of the Liberated Areas" and became a secretary of the Central Secretariat, second in rank only to Mao. In August, as Japan prepared to surrender, he ordered the liberated-area forces onto a general counter-offensive and demanded that Japanese troops in north China surrender to the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies rather than to Nationalist forces.
When civil war resumed he issued orders as commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army from February 1947. When Nationalist forces attacked Yan'an in March 1947 he moved with Liu Shaoqi's Central Working Committee to Xibaipo in Hebei, taking charge of land-reform work, and in October he guided the North China Field Army in the battle of Qingfengdian and the capture of Shijiazhuang, the first strongly fortified city the PLA took; he then drew lessons from the siege and spread them to other theatres. From September 1948 to January 1949, as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and commander-in-chief, he helped direct the Liaoshen, Huaihai and Pingjin campaigns.
When the last peace talks with the Kuomintang broke down on 20 April 1949, Mao and Zhu the next day jointly issued the "Order to Advance on the Whole Country", sending the field armies across the Yangtze. On 30 September the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference elected him vice-chairman of the Central People's Government, and at the founding ceremony on 1 October he reviewed the PLA accompanied by Nie Rongzhen. He was less a battlefield general than a commander-in-chief whose long-standing prestige held armies of many different origins together.
Where did the founding elder Zhu De stand during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution?
After the founding of the People's Republic Zhu, as vice-chairman of the Central People's Government and of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission, led the creation of the air force, navy, armoured troops and strategic missile forces, turning an infantry army into one of combined services. From November 1949 to 1955 he was secretary of the party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, criticising bureaucratism cut off from the masses and insisting that every member was equal before party discipline. He became vice-chairman of the People's Republic in September 1954, was named first of the Ten Marshals in September 1955, and became a party vice-chairman at the Eighth Congress in 1956. In 1956 he advised that a world war was unlikely in the short term and that economic development should be pushed ahead, and in 1958 he wrote that socialist distribution according to work did not mean "eating from one big pot", equal shares regardless of work.
In April 1959 he was elected chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. When Peng Dehuai came under attack at the Lushan Conference that July for his letter on the Great Leap's failures, Zhu, even while criticising Peng, limited himself to mild remarks that acknowledged Peng's merits. Mao rebuked him for "not scratching where it itches", and in September Zhu had to make a self-criticism at an enlarged Military Commission meeting and lost his post as its vice-chairman. Touring the provinces afterwards, he urged in 1960 that agriculture be adapted to local conditions, and in 1961 that rural public canteens be closed and village markets restored. After the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference of 1962 he argued that restrictions on peasants were stifling their will to produce and called for reviving collective and household sideline work.
At an enlarged Politburo Standing Committee meeting in Shanghai in December 1965 he said that Mao Zedong Thought could not be called the "summit" of Marxism-Leninism, for a summit could develop no further. At the enlarged Politburo meeting that launched the Cultural Revolution the following May, Lin Biao and Kang Sheng attacked this as "using Marxism to oppose Chairman Mao" and branded him an "ambitious schemer" and "a dangerous time bomb inside the Party". After the Eleventh Plenum in August he dropped to ninth place on the Standing Committee. When he said in January 1967 that the Cultural Revolution was damaging production, rebels acting on Jiang Qing's cue called him a "great careerist, great warlord and black commander" and pressed him to confess "crimes against Mao". Even so, Mao deliberately protected him, and he kept his Politburo seat at the Ninth Congress in 1969, though he lost his place on the Standing Committee and the NPC ceased to function.
In October 1969, as border clashes with the Soviet Union raised fears of war, Lin Biao's "Order Number One" dispersed senior commanders from Beijing, and Zhu, then eighty-two, was sent to Conghua in Guangdong; the Guangzhou military region's leaders would not even let him into the city. After Lin Biao's death in 1971, Zhu returned to the Politburo Standing Committee at the Tenth Congress in 1973, and in January 1975 he presided over the first session of the Fourth NPC and was re-elected its Standing Committee chairman. In 1974 the imprisoned Peng Dehuai asked on his deathbed to see Zhu one last time; the request was refused, and Zhu is said to have wept when he learned of it.
Zhou Enlai died in January 1976, and in June Zhu caught a cold while waiting for a foreign visitor in an air-conditioned room. He died in Beijing on 6 July of heart failure complicated by diabetes and other illnesses, aged eighty-nine; Mao died two months later. The party's obituary called him "one of the outstanding leaders of the Party, the state and the army". A warlord officer who broke his opium habit and started over at thirty-six, he is remembered as the revolution's military leader who seldom stood in the front line of its power struggles.