Empiricism
경험론
The position in epistemology that all knowledge, or all knowledge of the world, ultimately comes from sensory experience. It denies innate ideas and makes observation and experiment the test of knowing. British empiricism, from Bacon through Locke and Berkeley to Hume, is its classic form, and it deeply influenced Mill, logical empiricism and the spirit of modern experimental science.
In depth
What question does empiricism answer?
Can you explain the taste of a tangerine in words to someone who has never eaten one? Can you explain red to someone blind from birth? It is hard. We feel that we must experience something to know it. Whether a drug works, too, is settled by clinical trial and not by plausible theory. Empiricism makes this hunch a philosophical position: no knowledge is in our heads from the start, and all we know came in through the senses and reflection on them.
It differs somewhat from the everyday "experienced". Philosophical empiricism does not claim that people who have worked for long know best, but concerns where the content and justification of knowledge come from. If rationalism took mathematics as its model, empiricism takes the experiment.
What did Bacon and Locke establish?
Francis Bacon rejected the verbal fights of scholastic philosophy and demanded induction, observing nature and ascending step by step to general laws. In the New Organon (1620) he wrote that "human knowledge and power meet in one", the thought commonly handed down as "knowledge is power".
Scientia et potentia humana in idem coincidunt
He warned of four idols that cloud the mind (of the tribe, the cave, the marketplace and the theatre), and criticised at once those who only gather data and those who spin out thoughts: "Empirics, in the manner of ants, only gather and use; reasoners, in the manner of spiders, spin webs from themselves. The bee's way lies between: it draws material from the flowers of garden and field, but transforms and digests it by its own power."
Empirici, formicae more, congerunt tantum, et utuntur: rationales, aranearum more, telas ex se conficiunt: apis vero ratio media est, quae materiam ex floribus horti et agri elicit; sed tamen eam propria facultate vertit et digerit.
In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) John Locke dismissed innate ideas. No principle commands universal assent, and children do not know the laws of logic.
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas
Where does its content come from?
To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE.
Locke distinguished primary qualities in things themselves, such as size, shape and motion, from secondary qualities such as colour, taste and smell, which are sensations produced in us by powers in things. A fire feels hot, but there is no reason to think that heat lies in the fire just as it feels. In the Two Treatises he argued that government's legitimacy comes from the consent of the governed. As he rejected innate principles in the theory of knowledge, he rejected inborn authority in politics.
Why did Berkeley and Hume reach uncomfortable conclusions?
Pressed consistently, empiricism yielded an unexpected result. Locke believed in matter beyond ideas, but Berkeley asked why, if ideas are all we experience, anyone should believe in matter. His answer was idealism.
Hume went further. He began from the claim that
all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.
What then do we see when one ball strikes another and it moves? Only two events in succession, with a necessary force joining them nowhere to be seen. Our expectation that tomorrow will be the same comes from habit.
Custom, then, is the great guide of human life.
He divided all knowledge into relations of ideas and matters of fact. The former, like mathematics, are certain by thought alone but say nothing about the world, and the latter can be known only by experience. So Hume was strict enough to say that a book containing neither reasoning about number nor experience of fact should be thrown on the fire. Here empiricism becomes a blade against theology and metaphysics. But the same blade cuts the causal laws of science, and this crisis is what moved Kant.
Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
How did empiricism change afterwards?
In the nineteenth century John Stuart Mill tried to explain even mathematics and logic by induction, and called matter the "permanent possibility of sensation". In the late nineteenth century Mach treated the world as complexes of sensory elements and tried to wash metaphysics out of physics. Under his influence the logical empiricism of the twentieth-century Vienna Circle sought to dismiss as meaningless any sentence not verifiable by observation. From the 1950s Quine objected that the boundary between empirical and logical truth is not so sharp, and Popper held that science advances by falsification and not induction. The point that observation is already laden with theory also gained force.
How has Marxism treated empiricism?
The verdict is double. On the one hand Marxism claims as ancestors the materialist line within empiricism. In The Holy Family Marx called Bacon "the real progenitor of English materialism and all modern experimental science", and wrote that Locke's philosophy grounded French materialism. Locke's lesson that people are made by circumstance and experience led him straight to socialism.
On the other hand this tradition criticises stopping at experience. To Lenin the single word "experience" forks in two. If experience reflects a world outside consciousness, that is materialism. If experience is itself the whole of the world, that is idealism. Materialism and Empirio-criticism attacked Empirio-criticism and Empiriomonism as the latter. Mach and Bogdanov held that the neutral word "experience" rises above both sides, and this was the heart of the dispute.
In "Natural Science in the Spirit World" in Dialectics of Nature Engels cited scientists such as Wallace and Crookes who became captives of spiritualism, and warned of the danger of the flattest empiricism, which scorns theory and distrusts thought. Marxism further widens experience from the passive sensation of an individual to social practice. People do not take down the world alone but experience it while working together and changing it, and the very framework of experience is made historically. This is the largest difference between this tradition and British empiricism.