Operation Anadyr

Political background

After the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the nationalization of US-owned property, Washington moved to overthrow the new government, and the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion ended in failure. Late that year the United States launched the secret Operation Mongoose to prepare an internal revolt and military intervention in Cuba. As of early 1962 the Soviet Union had only 405 strategic nuclear warheads and was vastly outmatched by the United States. US Thor and Jupiter missiles were deployed in Britain, Italy and Turkey, and the Jupiters in Turkey had a flight time to Moscow of only about ten minutes. In response, on 24 May 1962 a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to station medium-range missiles in Cuba. At a 7 July meeting with the group's commanders Khrushchev said the leadership had decided to "throw a hedgehog down America's trousers" to keep the island out of reach of invasion, seeking leverage for nuclear negotiations with Washington.

Planning and command

Sources differ on who led the planning. Russian Wikipedia credits Marshal Ivan Bagramyan, deputy defence minister and chief of the rear services, while English Wikipedia says General Anatoly Gribkov and two assistants drafted the initial plan shortly after a Defence Council meeting of 21 May. According to military historians cited by TASS, a special department of the General Staff's Main Operations Directorate completed the plan by 10 June under Colonel-General Semyon Ivanov. The Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba (GSVK) was formed on 20 June under the command of General Issa Pliyev. Fidel Castro initially received the Soviet proposal with "bewilderment" and "confusion" before being persuaded by arguments about the danger of US invasion.

Planned force

The core was the 51st Missile Division, with three R-12 regiments and two R-14 regiments. The R-12 had a range of over 2,000 km, the R-14 over 4,000 km, and the warheads were of one megaton. Supporting units included two regiments of FKR-1 front cruise missiles, twelve Luna tactical missiles, two air-defence divisions with S-75 missiles, a fighter regiment of forty MiG-21s, four motorised rifle regiments and twelve missile boats. The total planned personnel figure was 50,874, and 85 ships were to be used for the deployment.

The deception

Troops and equipment moved by rail to four northern ports and four Black Sea ports. Foreigners were barred from the ports, and most loading took place at night. Isolated from the outside world, the troops were given false information that they were bound for a cold region and were issued ski boots, fleece-lined parkas and winter clothing. Sailors built false plywood superstructures, and even deck field kitchens, while missiles and launchers too large to stow below decks were covered with metal sheets to defeat infrared surveillance. Once at sea, captains learned their destination from a KGB officer only after sailing, and troops were allowed on deck only at night in small groups. On arrival the ships unloaded at eleven ports, and Soviet troops were forbidden to wear uniforms, appearing in civilian clothes instead.

Deployment and discovery

On 10 July 1962 a reconnaissance group led by Pliyev left for Cuba disguised as agricultural specialists; between 26 and 31 July ten ships arrived with personnel and equipment. The group's headquarters reached Havana aboard the Latviya on 29 July. The first six missiles were delivered on 9 September, and nuclear warheads began arriving on 16 September. Publicly, TASS denied on 12 September that the USSR intended to place nuclear weapons in Cuba. On 14 October a US U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographed the missile sites; President John F. Kennedy was informed on 16 October, and the Cuban Missile Crisis began.

Withdrawal and aftermath

On 28 October 1962 Khrushchev decided to withdraw the weapons the US called offensive, and that same day the commander of the 51st Missile Division, Igor Statsenko, received a defence ministry directive to dismantle the launch sites and redeploy the division to the USSR. Between 5 and 9 November Soviet ships carrying the missiles left Cuba. Soviet military cooperation with Cuba continued after the withdrawal, and the crisis led to the establishment of the Moscow-Washington hotline.

Assessment and open issues

Soviet and Russian assessments praise Anadyr's secrecy and the speed of the deployment; Russian defence historians call it an example of high military art. Critics note that the operation turned Cuba into a theatre of nuclear confrontation, and that the same deception also left Soviet units themselves short of accurate information about their own mission. The exact number of Soviet military deaths has not been officially published; Russian defence ministry data record 64 Soviet citizens dying in Cuba between 1 August 1962 and 16 August 1964.