Positivism dispute
실증주의 논쟁
A dispute over the method of the social sciences that began at a conference of the German Sociological Association in Tübingen, West Germany, in 1961 and ran through the 1960s. On one side stood the critical rationalists Karl Popper and Hans Albert; on the other, Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas of the Frankfurt School's critical theory. At issue was whether the social sciences should follow the same method as the natural sciences, proposing hypotheses and sifting them by criticism, or whether they must grasp and criticise society as a contradictory totality. The contributions were collected in 1969 as The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology.
In depth
What should a science of society do?
Suppose a sociologist studies unemployment or poverty. Where should she start? Is it enough to frame a hypothesis about why the unemployment rate rose, test it against the data and discard what turns out false? Or can the phenomenon of unemployment not be properly understood without also looking at the fabric of society as a whole that produces it, that is, at the structure of capitalist society? And can the researcher keep value judgements out of her research at all?
In the 1960s a major dispute broke out over these questions in West German sociology. It is called the positivism dispute (Positivismusstreit). On one side were Karl Popper and Hans Albert, who stood for critical rationalism; on the other were Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas of the Frankfurt School, who stood in the tradition of the dialectical social philosophy of Hegel and Marx. The dispute was about the methods of the social sciences and about value judgements.
The dispute had a prehistory. Before the First World War, German economics and sociology had seen the value-judgement dispute (Werturteilsstreit), whose main protagonists were Max Weber, Werner Sombart and Gustav Schmoller. It turned on whether the statements of the social sciences are normative and binding in politics, and whether policy can be justified scientifically. For that reason the positivism dispute is also called the second value-judgement dispute. On the Frankfurt side, the precursor usually named is Max Horkheimer's 1937 essay "The Latest Attack on Metaphysics" (Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik), in which Horkheimer criticised the concept of experience and the conception of logic of the Vienna Circle's logical positivism.
What happened in Tübingen?
From 19 to 21 October 1961 the German Sociological Association (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie) held a working conference in Tübingen. On the opening day Popper gave a paper on "The Logic of the Social Sciences", and Adorno gave a co-paper (Koreferat) on the same subject. The speakers had been invited to discuss the differences between the social and the natural sciences and the place of values in the social sciences.
Popper arranged his paper as a series of numbered theses. The first was that we know a great deal; the second, that our ignorance is boundless. The sixth, which he called his main thesis, reads:
"The method of the social sciences, like that of the natural sciences, consists in trying out tentative solutions to their problems."
Die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften wie auch die der Naturwissenschaften besteht darin, Lösungsversuche für ihre Probleme – die Probleme, von denen sie ausgeht – auszuprobieren.
Solutions are proposed and criticised. A tentative solution that is not open to factual criticism is set aside as unscientific, at least for the time being. Criticism consists in trying to refute the proposed solution. According to Popper, the so-called objectivity of science lies not in the neutrality of the individual researcher but in the objectivity of the critical method: in the fact that no theory is exempt from criticism. To bring out what his main thesis meant, he set against it another widespread methodology, "methodological naturalism" or "scientism": the demand to begin with observation and measurement, for example statistical surveys, and to proceed by induction to generalisations and theories. Popper held that every one of these demands was fundamentally wrong and rested on a myth, the myth of the inductive character of natural-scientific method.
Adorno opened his reply by saying that he found surprisingly many points of agreement with Popper. Rather than set an antithesis against each of Popper's theses, he would take them up and try to reflect on them further. But the differences soon showed. Adorno held that the cognitive ideal of a simple, mathematically elegant explanation fails before the object called society, because society itself is neither simple nor uniform.
"Society is full of contradictions and yet determinable."
Die Gesellschaft ist widerspruchsvoll und doch bestimmbar
According to Adorno, the data sociology works with are not raw data. They are already structured by the context of the social totality. No experiment could prove that every social phenomenon depends on the totality, since the whole that preforms the tangible phenomena never enters any particular experimental set-up. That dependence, Adorno argued, is real all the same. A scientific consciousness of society that poses as value-free, he held, misses its object just as much as one that appeals to values laid down more or less arbitrarily.
Who argued with whom, and about what?
The dispute is usually summed up in three strands. The first was the debate between Adorno and Popper over the basic approach to building theory in the social sciences: Adorno argued from the concept of totality, Popper from critical rationalism. The second was a narrower debate between Hans Albert and Habermas over whether value-free description is possible at least at the level of the most elementary observation data ("protocol sentences"). The third consisted of the summarising and mediating contributions of Ralf Dahrendorf and Harald Pilot.
It was Habermas who fanned the flames. In 1963 he sharpened the debate with an essay in a Festschrift for Adorno, and from 1963 to 1965 he and Albert fought a heated exchange in print. At the 1964 Sociology Day in Heidelberg, Herbert Marcuse joined in, and the debate grew more critical still. Habermas charged Albert and Popper with holding a restricted conception of rationality, even with regard to the empirical sciences. He criticised the assumption that the empirical sciences are independent of the standards that these sciences themselves apply to experience. On his view, theories in the natural sciences too are the subject of a debate that takes place within a scientific community, and scientific principles do not simply fall out of research but are laid down by the community of researchers in a discourse aimed at mutual understanding. He also rejected a social science aimed at "social technologies" that would make social processes available for control in the same way as natural processes.
Albert is said to have found the dispute particularly ironic, because Habermas defended positions very like those Albert himself had once held and had since given up. In his 1968 Treatise on Critical Reason (Traktat über kritische Vernunft), Albert set out the "Münchhausen trilemma": any attempt to give a final justification for a claim ends either in an infinite regress, in which each justification calls for another, or in a circular argument, or in an arbitrary halt at some point. He concluded that certain knowledge is impossible and that every claim must remain open to criticism.
Why call it a "positivism" dispute?
The name came from Adorno, who used his own understanding of positivism to characterise the other side. The opponents rejected the name at first, but it eventually stuck. Popper refused to have his position called positivism and spoke instead of "criticism". Throughout his career he set himself apart from the neopositivism of the Vienna Circle and did not want to be too closely associated with it. Unlike positivism, Popper's falsificationism holds that complex statements cannot be proved by experience, only refuted. In fact, it has been noted that none of the participants held a positivist position in the narrow sense.
Yet the Frankfurt side had its reasons for the name. Popper's main work, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, was published in the Vienna Circle's main book series. The long-running critique of positivism had produced two camps: Popper's critical rationalism on one side, the Frankfurt School's critical theory on the other. Popper regarded himself as an opponent of positivism, and his main work was a sharp attack on it. Adorno and Habermas nonetheless held that critical rationalism was positivist because, with Popper's "piecemeal social engineering" (Stückwerk-Sozialtechnik), it reduced society to its symptoms.
On one point the two camps agreed more than one might expect. Both accepted that value judgements always play a part when scientific theories are built. Both distanced themselves from the postulate of "value freedom" attributed to Max Weber, though attributing that postulate to Weber has been described as resting on a truncated reception of his arguments. Weber himself held that even the choice of a research subject rests on a value, namely the researcher's interest.
The whole, or one problem at a time?
Beneath the dispute lay two ways of looking at society. The Frankfurt School's social analysis starts from the concept of totality. Totality is the basic structural connection that determines the character of a form of society. The "psychosocial agencies" of society, for example family, authorities, peers and mass media, shape the thinking and identity of the individual, and so of the social scientist as well, far more than the individual can act on those agencies in turn. Sociology is to uncover and analyse this totality so as to create the conditions for overcoming it.
For Popper, by contrast, every attempt to solve a problem necessarily concerns particular aspects. He held that changing society "as a whole" was impossible and that attempting it anyway was dangerous. So for critical rationalism the aim of social science is to try to solve social problems and remove social ills.
The Frankfurt School held that the aim is to identify the totality underlying society that causes those problems and ills. This totality consists of contradictions, at present above all class antagonisms. In their view, critical rationalism wrongly blames these contradictions on critical theory's concept of society rather than on society itself, because it uses classical logic instead of Hegelian dialectics. Only by sublating the contradictions, the class antagonisms, can the real causes of social ills be removed, rather than merely the surface symptoms, as critical rationalism tries to do. This view is often summed up in Marx's sentence: it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. Social existence affects the thinking of scientists too, and the hypotheses scientists put forward spring from what their society can think.
What did the dispute leave behind?
The main contributions were collected in 1969 by the publisher Luchterhand as Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie, under the names of Adorno, Albert, Dahrendorf, Habermas, Pilot and Popper. The book was translated into several languages, and an English edition, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, appeared in 1976. The collection revived the debate and introduced it to a broader readership. A Korean edition appeared in 1986 under the title 『사회과학의 논리: 실증주의 논쟁』 (The Logic of the Social Sciences: The Positivism Dispute).
For Habermas the dispute became the occasion for a major treatise on the epistemological status of the social sciences. The result was Knowledge and Human Interests (Erkenntnis und Interesse, 1968). The book grew out of his 1965 inaugural lecture at Frankfurt, and its chapter "Positivism, Pragmatism, Historicism" deals with the positivism of Comte and Mach. Habermas wrote that positivism marks the end of the theory of knowledge: the theory of science takes the place once held by the inquiry into how knowledge is possible. Through the dispute and Knowledge and Human Interests he became widely known in Germany.
Later assessments differ. In 2020 the philosopher Carl Sachs argued that the real two sides of the debate were the Frankfurt School and the Vienna Circle, not Popper's followers as such. On his reading, each side underestimated the other. The Vienna Circle set out to give a purely formal explication of objectivity, not to deny subjectivity, and the Frankfurt School did not give up on "a better future". Both, Sachs concluded, shared the hope of a rational society.